Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative Democracy

This paper studies the impact of lobbying on political competition and policy outcomes in a framework which integrates the citizen–candidate model of representative democracy with the menu-auction model of lobbying. Positive and normative issues are analysed. On the positive side, lobbying need have little or no effect on policy outcomes because voters can restrict the influence of lobbyists by supporting candidates with offsetting policy preferences. On the normative side, coordination failure among lobbyists can result in Pareto inefficient policy choices. In addition, by creating rents to holding office, lobbying can lead to excessive entry into electoral competition.     

On the Strategic Use of Representative Democracy in International Agreements

We consider as endogenous the choice of the delegation rule in an international agreement between two countries. We study three potential types of delegation: strong, weak or no delegation, the latter case corresponding to direct democracy. We show that populations decide to bind themselves by delegating the national policy decision-making to a powerful conservative representative, in order to improve their bargaining position. These noncooperative behaviors of countries when they decide on their delegation rule induce negative political externalities between countries, which cancel the gains achieved by the internalization of economic externalities in the case of political integration. We then examine the consequences of ratification by referendum. We conclude that a Pareto improvement of the international agreement would be to incorporate an ex post referendum.     

A Model of the Representation of Interests in a Compound Democracy

This paper provides a model of democratic government as a compound of independent elective and non elective centers of power that compete in fostering the demands of voters and of interest groups. The analysis describes how interests of voters and of pressure groups are represented and under what conditions the compound democracy is more responsive to voters' or to interest groups' demands. These conditions are shown to depend on the center of power's relative opportunity costs at serving a plurality of interests and on the severeness of informational asymmetries between voters and interest groups.     

Rationality in a Political-Economic Environment

This paper develops a rational expectations model of the circle of public opinion and policy implicit in working democracies. The executive branch of government, in particular, takes into account its own preferences and, indirectly, those of the voters, which are not constant but depend on the policy context in which they are formed. As a result, policies and voter preferences become interdependent stochastic processes rather than solutions of static optimization problems. This interdependence has specific implications for policy and opinion. Most striking, when citizens' opinions develop in this environment, the existence of rationally held belief systems is consistent with the pattern of opinion instability Converse attributes to nonattitudes.     

盈余管理计量方法评述与展望

盈余管理的实证计量方法包括总体应计利润法、具体应计利润法、真实盈余管理计量以及盈余分布法,但是完美的计量方法并不存在。本文通过对各种计量方法的研究现状与优缺点的综合梳理,提出修正总体应计利润法的模型、扩大具体应计利润法的运用、夯实盈余分布法的基础、审慎线下项目的计量、拓展盈余管理的计量方法以及创新盈余管理的研究主题等若干建议。     

秀山构建民族金融示范县的SWOT分析

运用SWOT分析方法对秀山①构建民族金融示范县进行分析,通过优势、劣势、机遇和挑战四方面分析,得出秀山县建立民族金融示范县是可行的结论。     

The Problem of Optimum Income Taxation: A Remark on Its Monotonicity Constraint

We apply a generalized version of Brito and Oakland's (1977) approach to deal with monotonicity constraints in the nonlinear taxation problem of Mirrlees (1971) . This allows removing some analytical weaknesses in the derivation of the necessary conditions that characterize the optimal income tax, impossible to handle with the type of variation used for the proof in Mirrlees (1969) . The qualitative properties of the tax are thus restored provided the candidate consumption functions are restricted to be twice differentiable, except on countably many points, with no corners near the intervals where they show a strictly concave shape.     

Bounded Rationality in Economics: A Game Theorist's View

In this paper, we argue that it is essential to incorporate bounded rationality into game theory. Game theory has been applied to aspects of economics such as industrial organizati on on the basis of the naive interpret ation of game theory, which requires players to be ideally rational in an extremely unrealistic way. We stress the importance of establishing the perceptive interpretation of game theory by taking boundedly rational players' inductive reasoning processes into account. We explain my recent work, Matsushima (1997), which shows that the subjective games perceived by players in the long run are entirely different from the true objective game, and are trivial games in the sense that there exists a strictly dominant and subjectively Pareto-efficient strategy profile among the set of pure strategy profiles.
JEL Classification Numbers: C70, C90, D43, D80     

生态理性对资本主义外部性问题的审视

在资本主义制度及其生产方式下,资本以利润最大化作为其本性,成为资本家首当其冲的问题,而由此造成的"外部不经济"则不在他们的考虑范围内,更不会为了修复"外部不经济"问题而主动买单。在这样的社会价值观指导下,资本逻辑就由人与人的关系转变为物与物的关系,生态问题随即成为资本主义社会的固有顽疾。对此,作为一种理性的生态哲学,生态理性强调整体性的理性,主张人与人、人与自然之间的协调。在这个意义上,生态理性就成为解构资本主义外部性问题或外部不经济的理论路径。     

完善人民代表大会制度的路径探索——"中国民主的制度结构"学术研讨会综述

2006年6月23—24日,由复旦大学中国政府与政治研究中心主办的“中国民主的制度结构”学术研讨会在复旦大学召开。来自中国社会科学院政治学所、中央编译局当代所、美国加州大学伯克利分校、日本庆应大学、复旦大学、武汉大学、南开大学等科研高校单位,以及一些地方人大研究部门共60余人参加了这次学术研讨会。本次研讨会就如何坚持和完善我国的根本政治制度———人民代表大会制度,进行了有益的探讨。与会人员就人民代表大会制度在社会主义政治文明建设中居于核心地位且存在着较大的发展空间达成了共识。一、人民代表大会制度是一个属性丰富…     

A Laboratory Investigation of Multiperson Rationality and Presentation Effects

This paper reports the results of laboratory experiments in which subjects were presented with different two-person decision problems in both their extensive and normal forms. All games generated the same equilibrium outcomes. Our results indicate that the presentation of the decision problem significantly affects the strategy chosen. Surprisingly, these presentation effects were most prominent in the simplest games where differences in presentation would seem most transparent. It appears that subjects are much more likely to use (and fear) incredible threats when the problem is presented as a one-stage rather than as a multistage game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 026,215.     

从利他性到社会理性——利他主义经济学研究的一个综合观点

利他主义经济学的研究非常繁杂,缺乏一个统一的理论.本文提出利他行为的方向性问题,分析了基因决定论的局限,综合研究了基因选择、个体选择以及群体选择对人类个体利他行为的影响,从而形成了利他性研究的一个综合性理论.在解决利他行为方向性问题的基础上,发现人类利他行为实质上是人的社会性的体现,从而提出了社会理性概念,扩展了利他主义经济学的研究.     

A Model of a Predatory State

We provide a model of a primitive state whose rulers extorttaxes for their own ends. This "predatory" state can resultin lower levels of both output and popular welfare than eitherorganized banditry or anarchy. The predatory state may providepublic goods, such as protection, and hence may superficiallyresemble a contractual state. But the ability to provide suchgoods can actually reduce popular welfare after allowing fortax changes. Moreover, the kinds of public goods that predatorystates provide are those that increase revenue, not necessarilywelfare. We consider when primitive states are likely to emergefrom organized banditry, and argue that poverty may result instatelessness rather than vice versa. We show that even a weakstate (in transition from banditry) can be bad for output andwelfare, and that a "corrupt" state that makes side deals withbandits is especially bad.     

Democracy as a middle ground: A unified theory of development and political regimes

Although many of the worst performing countries over the post-World War II period were autocracies, many of the best were likewise autocratic. At the same time, no long-lived autocracy currently is rich whereas every long-lived democracy is. This paper proposes a theory to account for these observations that rests on the ideas that autocrats are heterogeneous and that elites experience lower land rents with industrialization. In a model calibrated to Britain's development, we show that elites democratize society only after the economy has accumulated enough wealth, and that the democratization date depends importantly on the history of rulers and distribution of land.     

中国网络民主发展问题研究

随着科技的进步,互联网技术发展日新月异,网络信息技术迅猛发展,其影响已经渗入到社会生活的方方面面,网络技术的应用也为全面突破传统民主形式的局限注入了新的生机,对民主建设有着不可或缺的作用和深远的影响。但是由于中国的网络民主仍然处在发展的初级阶段,其本身必然存在一定的问题。因此,通过对网络民主的定义、发展现状及存在问题加以分析研究,进而对中国网络民主发展的完善策略进行探讨。     

关于信任的博弈分析——基于个体的自利理性和社会理性

信任的根本在于不完全信息和有限理性,信任是个体弥补自己理性不足的一种策略.所以,信任分析无法在个体的自利理性下完成,需要扩展个体理性的范畴.将个体理性扩展为自利理性和社会理性,利用理性的这种二元特性,重新解释了两个具有代表性的博弈模型--蜈蚣博弈和信任博弈.这不但对信任问题提出了一种新的分析框架,而且还解决了博弈分析的困境.这说明,对个体理性的扩展是合适的,个体的社会理性是经济学不可忽视的一部分.     

关于住宅价格水平合理性的分析——以江苏为例

依托江苏各城市房地产信息上报系统与统计局的公开数据,对江苏住宅价格现状及其成因进行了深入分析,通过多种计量经济研究手段,从住宅价格与经济的协调性、住宅价格结构合理性及住宅价格增幅合理性三方面,论证了2005年江苏住宅价格的合理性,对当前江苏住宅价格认识中存在的部分误区进行了探讨,提出有针对性的政策建议。     

双峰并峙 风采各异——基于代表作细读的高适、岑参诗风比较

《燕歌行》与《走马川行奉送出师西征》分别是唐代诗人高适和岑参的代表诗作。本文通过回归历史现场并在此前提下对两篇作品进行文本细读,梳理诗歌内蕴,辨析两位诗人各自不同的诗歌风格,从而得出结论：二人虽同以边塞诗闻名,但高适诗风更少雕饰而略显古朴悲凉,岑参诗歌更多华美辞章且慷慨雄壮,更富想象力。