Firm Transparency and the Costs of Going Public

We demonstrate that firms that are more transparent pay less, in all components of issuance costs, to go public. We employ a sample of 334 previous leveraged buyouts and a characteristic-matched control sample to test the hypothesis that greater firm transparency before the issue decreases the flotation costs of the initial public offering. These flotation costs are divided into initial underpricing, underwriter discount, administrative expenses, and the overallotment option required to take the firm public. Our results provide further evidence of the asymmetric information hypothesis as it applies to initial public offerings.     

Government Bond Market Seasonality, Diversification, and Cointegration: International Evidence

Using government bond market data for the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Japan, I investigate several hypotheses. Market efficiency is investigated by testing for seasonality and cointegration. The seasonality results are mixed. In regression tests, a January effect is detected in several markets (United States, Germany, France, United Kingdom, and Canada) using local currencies. However, in a nonparametric test, the January effect is supported only for France. When U.S. dollar returns are used, regression results also reveal a January effect for several markets (United States, Germany, France, and United Kingdom). These results are not confirmed by a nonparametric test. Correlation analysis shows considerable diversification opportunities for short‐term investors. Cointegration tests indicate that several of the markets share cointegrating vectors, increasing the possibilities of using other endogenous bond markets to better predict movements in a particular market.     

News Releases, Market Integration, and Market Leadership

Using intraday data we examine the response of futures on the British Long Gilt (Gilt), the German Government Bond (Bund), the U.S. Treasury Bond (Bond), the Japanese Government Bond (JGB), and the Italian Government Bond (IGB) to the release of U.S. macroeconomic news. Bond, Gilt, and Bund futures respond strongly to the news releases. The response of JGB futures is less pronounced, and IGB futures display weak responses at best. The instruments take time to adjust to news in the announcements. Following the announcements, Bond futures exert a high degree of market leadership. Evidence of increasing market integration is also noted.     

Intra-Industry Reactions to Stock Split Announcements

We examine whether favorable information conveyed by stock split announcements transfers to nonsplitting firms within the same industry. On average, nonsplitting firms' shareholders experience positive and significant abnormal returns at the stock split announcements of their industry counterparts. In addition, industrywide and firm-specific characteristics are important determinants in explaining nonsplitting firms' stock returns. These firms' earnings increase significantly, and the earnings changes are positively related to the stock price reactions. Finally, we find no evidence that investors revise the value of nonsplitting firms because they anticipate a decline in earnings volatility.     

Skewness and Kurtosis Implied by Option Prices: A Correction

Corrado and Su (1996) provide skewness and kurtosis adjustment terms for the Black‐Scholes model, using a Gram‐Charlier expansion of the normal density function. In this note we provide a correction to the expression for the skewness coefficient and illustrate the effect on call option prices of the error found.     

Agency Problems in Public Firms: Evidence from Corporate Jets in Leveraged Buyouts

This paper uses novel data to examine the fleets of corporate jets operated by both publicly traded and privately held firms. In the cross‐section, firms owned by private equity funds average 40% smaller fleets than observably similar public firms. Similar fleet reductions are observed within firms that undergo leveraged buyouts. Quantile regressions indicate that these results are driven by firms in the upper 30% of the conditional jet distribution. The results thus suggest that executives in a substantial minority of public firms enjoy excessive perquisite and compensation packages.     

The Firm Size Effect and the Economic Cycle

Small firms have, on average, lower return on assets and higher leverage than do large firms. Small firms tend to do well in good economic conditions but to perform poorly in the worst economic conditions. We investigate the hypothesis that the small firm effect is manifest in the expansion phase of the economic cycle but not in the contraction phase. The empirical results of our study confirm the hypothesis for 1976–95. We use the alpha, residual, and regression methods in testing the hypothesis.     

A Comparison of Seasonal Adjustment Methods When Forecasting Intraday Volatility

In this article we compare volatility forecasts over a thirty‐minute horizon for the spot exchange rates of the Deutsche mark and the Japanese yen against the U.S. dollar. Explicitly modeling the intraday seasonal pattern improves the out‐of‐sample forecasting performance. We find that a seasonal estimated from the log of squared returns improves with the use of simple squared returns, and that the flexible Fourier form (FFF) is an efficient way of determining the seasonal. The two‐step approach that first estimates the seasonal using the FFF and then the parameters of the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model for the deseasonalized returns performs only marginally worse than the computationally expensive periodic GARCH model that includes the FFF.     

Forms of Foreign Investment Liberalization and Risk in Emerging Stock Markets

I examine the effect of different forms of foreign investment liberalization on risk in emerging equity markets, including international cross-listings and closed-end country funds, and in the domestic equity market as foreign investment restrictions are eliminated. I find that in Latin American markets volatility declines significantly with different forms of foreign investment liberalization, and in Asian markets volatility does not increase significantly. Volatility is driven by domestic factors in South America, but the transmission of volatility from the United States to Mexico increases after liberalization. The market risk exposure increases in Argentina after liberalization, in Chile with an index of American Depositary Receipts, and in Thailand with greater foreign ownership, reducing the diversification benefits of these markets.     

Gains to Mutual Fund Sponsors Offering Multiple Share Class Funds

Although the number of mutual funds grew during the 1990s, much of the growth is attributable to the introduction of multiple share class (MS) funds. Proponents argue that the MS structure leads to cost savings, which can be passed onto investors as lower expenses. However, if the structure lowers costs, sponsors are likely to profit from it. Though investors are concerned about the base expense ratio, the sum of administrative and management fees, fund sponsors generate profits from the management fees. As such, they would prefer to increase the management fee if they can simultaneously lower administrative fees. Our results indicate that MS fund investors pay lower administrative fees, but management fees are approximately 7 basis points higher than single-class funds. Overall, base expense ratios are higher than for single-class funds, suggesting fund sponsors capture the cost benefits the MS structure provides. Our results are robust to different model specifications and different estimation techniques.     

Are the Best Small Companies the Best Investments?

Previous research finds that large companies previously judged to be excellent growth companies have subsequently been poor investments. We examine small companies selected by Business Week on the basis of multiple criteria used in annual articles featuring highly rated growth companies. We study the investment performance over the three years before eleven annual Business Week publications and the three years after publication. We find positive excess returns in the pre‐publication period, but negative excess returns in the post‐publication period. This reversal in investment performance appears to be due to a mean‐reversion tendency in operating performance, in which the earnings and the past rates of return on capital of such companies subsequently decrease significantly.     

Valuing the Option to Purchase an Asset at a Proportional Discount

I analyze the value of a nonstandard call option that allows the holder to purchase an underlying asset at a discount proportional to the asset's market price. Several applications for this type of option exist, including its use in employee compensation contracts. I derive the value of this option for a dividend-paying asset and for an option whose exercise price reflects a time-varying discount factor. The derived value incorporates the optimal time at which the option should be exercised. One application of this option relates to a residential real estate program in China.     

Differences in Performance of Independent and Finance-Affiliated Venture Capital Firms

We examine the differences in the investment behavior of independent and finance-affiliated venture capital firms (VCFs). We find that differences in internal management mechanisms and staff backgrounds lead to external performance differences. Using VC-backed companies listed in Singapore as our sample, we find significant differences between these two types of VCFs in industry preference, investment duration, VCF syndication, number of board seats, initial underpricing, and long-term market returns. Independent VCFs add more value to their portfolios. Thus, we conclude that the participation of independent VCFs is an important corporate-level factor for the success of the venture capital market.     

Takeover premiums and the perception of auditor independence and reputation

This study investigates if there is a positive association between takeover premiums and the bidder’s perception of target firm auditor reputation and independence. Using auditor size as a proxy for auditor reputation, the results indicate that in hostile takeovers target shareholders receive a higher takeover premium when a Big 4 auditor audits the target firm prior to the takeover. This result is only significant, however, in the period prior to the highly publicised audit failures. The impact of perceived auditor independence on takeover premiums is studied using the levels and size of non-audit service (NAS) fees provided by the target firm auditor. Using three proxies for auditor independence, the results show no association between perceived auditor independence and takeover premiums. This finding is robust to partitioning the sample by auditor size, takeover hostility and splitting the sample into takeovers pre- and post- the corporate scandals that occurred in 2002.     

Monetary Policy and the Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns

Ample evidence shows that size and book-to-market equity explain significant cross-sectional variation in stock returns, whereas beta explains little or none of the variation. Recent studies also demonstrate that proxies for monetary stringency increase the explained variation in stock returns. We reexamine a three-factor model that includes beta, size, and book-to-market equity, while allowing monetary conditions to influence the relations between these risk factors and average stock returns. We find that ex-ante proxies for monetary stringency significantly influence the relations between stock returns and all three risk factors. Additionally, all three variables are found to contribute significantly to explaining cross-sectional returns in a three-factor model that includes the monetary sector.     

Corporate fraud and bank loans: Evidence from china

Receiving punishment from regulators for corporate fraud can affect financing contracts between a firm and its bank, as both the firm’s credit risk and information risk increase after punishment. By focusing on Chinese firms’ borrowing behavior after events of corporate fraud, we find that firms’ bank loans after punishment are not only significantly lower, but are also less than those for non-fraudulent firms. In addition, loan interest rates after punishment are not only higher than before, but also higher than those for their non-fraudulent counterparts. In addition, we find that corporate fraud indirectly destabilizes the “performance-bank loan” relationship. Our results suggest that corporate fraud negatively affects a firm’s ability to source debt financing, which provides new evidence about the economic consequences of fraud.     

Corporate asset purchases and sales: Theory and evidence

Purchases and sales of operating assets by firms generated $162 billion for shareholders over the past 20 years. This contrasts sharply with the evidence on mergers. This paper characterizes the behavior of value-maximizing firms, which could grow organically, purchase existing assets, or sell assets. The approach yields an endogenous selection model that links asset purchases and sales to fundamental properties of the firm. Empirical tests confirm the predictions of the model. In particular, return on assets and size strongly predict when firms purchase or sell assets, and the transaction size covaries with the value of capital employed by the firm. These findings indicate that corporate asset purchases and sales are consistent with efficient investment decisions.     

Corporate governance and firm value: International evidence

In this paper, we investigate the relation between firm-level corporate governance and firm value based on a large and previously unused dataset from Governance Metrics International (GMI) comprising 6663 firm-year observations from 22 developed countries over the period from 2003 to 2007. Based on a set of 64 individual governance attributes we construct two alternative additive corporate governance indices with equal weights attributed to the governance attributes and one index derived from a principal component analysis. For all three indices we find a strong and positive relation between firm-level corporate governance and firm valuation. In addition, we investigate the value relevance of governance attributes that document the companies' social behavior. Regardless of whether these attributes are considered individually or aggregated into indices, and even when “standard” corporate governance attributes are controlled for, they exhibit a positive and significant effect on firm value. Our findings are robust to alternative calculation procedures for the corporate governance indices and to alternative estimation techniques.     

Corporate governance when founders are directors

We examine chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, CEO retention policies, and mergers and acquisition (M&A) decisions in firms in which founders serve as a director with a nonfounder CEO (founder-director firms). We find that founder-director firms offer a different mix of incentives to their CEOs than other firms. Pay-for-performance sensitivity for nonfounder CEOs in founder-director firms is higher and the level of pay is lower than that of other CEOs. CEO turnover sensitivity to firm performance is also significantly higher in founder-director firms compared with nonfounder firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that boards with founder-directors provide more high-powered incentives in the form of pay and retention policies than the average US board. Stock returns around M&A announcements and board attendance are also higher in founder-director firms compared with nonfounder firms.