The size distribution of Chinese cities

This paper uses urban data to investigate two important issues regarding city sizes in China, the relative growth of cities and the nature of the city size distribution. The manner in which cities of different sizes grow relative to each other is examined and, contrary to the common empirical finding that the relative size and rank of cities remains stable over time, it is found that the Economic Reforms and the One Child Policy since 1979 have delivered significant structural change in the Chinese urban system. The city size distribution remains stable before the reforms but exhibits a convergent growth pattern in the post-reform period. The theoretical literature on city sizes highlights a link between log normal and Pareto distributions for city sizes prompting the employment of Pearson goodness-of-fit tests to examine directly which theoretical distribution provides the best approximation to the empirical city size distribution. Contrary to the evidence for other countries, a log normal rather than Pareto specification turns out to be the preferred distribution.     

One-stage structural models to explain city size

Several papers have estimated the parameters of Pareto distributions for city sizes in different countries, but only one has attempted to explain the differing magnitudes of these parameters with a set of country-specific explanatory variables. While it is reassuring that there has been some research which advances beyond simple “curve-fitting” to explore the determinants of city size distributions, the existing research uses a two-stage OLS method which yields invalid second-stage standard errors (and, consequently, questionable hypothesis tests). In this paper, we develop candidate one-stage structural models with normal and non-normal errors which accommodate truncated size distributions, potentially Pareto-like shapes, and city-level variables. In general, these new models are nonlinear in parameters. We illustrate with data on U.S. urban areas.     

Uneven landscapes and city size distributions

This paper proposes a new model generating city size distributions that asymptotically follow the log-normal distribution. The log-normal distribution is consistent with Zipf’s law in the top tail, which is known to hold for many countries in different periods. The key feature of our model is that it can express city size as a product of multiple random factors (e.g., climate, geographic features, and industry composition). Each factor alone need not generate Zipf’s law. Our model provides a justification for classical urban economics models that have been criticized for not delivering Zipf’s law, since a single model typically represents only one factor among many present in reality.     

Counting Groves-Ledyard equilibria via degree theory

We study the Groves-Ledyard mechanism for determining optimal amounts of public goods in economies whose agents have the most general class of preferences for which a Pareto amount of public goods can be computed independently of income distribution. We use degree theory on affine spaces to show that the number of equilibria in such economies grows exponentially as the number of agents in the economy increases. The large number of equilibria in such simple economic models raises doubts as to whether the Groves-Ledyard mechanism is a workable solution to the Free Rider Problem since individuals may have incentives to falsify their preferences in order to drive the adjustment process to a preferred Nash equilibrium.     

Urban ecology and residential location theories: Application in nigeria's socio-cultural milieu

Urban ecological studies are generally concerned with the spatial distribution of population characteristics, organisations, activities and behaviours across the urban terrain. These spatial distributions are taken to reflect the operation of socio-economic processes. Anglo-American urban ecological investigators had formulated much of the prevailing urban ecological theories of today. These theories were based on studies of their own socio-cultural and economic environments, which were by no means universal. This study, applies the principles of these well-known theories to a different socio-economic and cultural environment—Nigerian, with a view to testing their cross-cultural validity. This is done (i) by testing some empirical data on the city of Lagos, upon some specific propositions embodied in these theories; with a view towards their verification and validation; and (ii) by examining the over-all explanatory power of the theories in accounting for broad urban ecological patterns as revealed by data or information on the study city, and culture. The findings suggest that while similarities in urban ecological patterns in the two environments are discernible in some variables, they significantly differ in others, and even where the patterns appear to be similar, they are explainable by quite different factors. Urban ecological patterns could therefore be said to be culture-specific.     

Product differentiation,monopolistic competition and city size

Traditionally, the formation of cities has been explained by such supply-side phenomena as scale economies in production or such demand-side phenomena as public goods. This paper presents an integrated demand and supply approach to the formation of cities in spatial economy. Demand considerations, in the form of consumer agglomeration economies (i.e., product variety), are presented as a major cause of urban agglomeration. On the supply side, scale economies are introduced. Both aspects are examined by using the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition to characterize the equilibrium and optimum city size. We also discuss a subsidy scheme that produces an equilibrium city size corresponding to a first-best optimum. Then we analyze the distribution of population in a system of two cities.     

The size distribution of cities: An examination of the Pareto law and primacy

This paper examines the Pareto and primacy measures of the size distribution of cities. The mean Pareto exponent for a sample of 44 countries is 1.136, somewhat greater than the exponent of one implied by the rank-size rule. We find that value of the Pareto exponent is quite sensitive to the definition of the city and the choice of city sample size. The significance of non-linear terms in variants of the Pareto distribution also indicate that the rank-size rule is only a first approximation to a complete characterization of the size distribution of cities within a country. The relatively low correlation between primacy and Pareto measures confirms the need for a variety of measures of city size distributions. This paper also suggests that large cities are growing faster than small cities in most of the countries in our sample. This is indicated by the positive coefficient on the first non-linear term introduced into the Pareto equation. Finally, variations in the Pareto exponent and measures of primacy are partly explained by economic, demographic, and geographic factors.     

On Lipschitz continuity of the iterated function system in a stochastic optimal growth model

This paper provides qualitative properties of the iterated function system (IFS) generated by the optimal policy function for a class of stochastic one-sector optimal growth models. We obtain, explicitly in terms of the primitives of the model (i) a compact interval (not including the zero stock) in which the support of the invariant distribution of output must lie, and (ii) a Lipschitz property of the iterated function system on this interval. As applications, we are able to present parameter configurations under which (a) the support of the invariant distribution of the IFS is a generalized Cantor set, and (b) the invariant distribution is singular.     

Fundamental impossibility theorems on voluntary participation in the provision of non-excludable public goods

Groves and Ledyard (Econometrica 45:783–809, 1977) constructed a mechanism attaining Pareto efficient allocations in the presence of public goods. After this path-breaking paper, many mechanisms have been proposed to attain desirable allocations with public goods. Thus, economists have thought that the free-rider problem is solved, in theory. Our view to this problem is not so optimistic. Rather, we propose fundamental impossibility theorems with public goods. In the previous mechanism design, it was implicitly assumed that every agent must participate in the mechanism that the designer provides. This approach neglects one of the basic features of public goods: non-excludability. We explicitly incorporate non-excludability and then show that it is impossible to construct a mechanism in which every agent has an incentive to participate.     

Discrete-time behavioral portfolio selection under cumulative prospect theory

We formulate and study three multi-period behavioral portfolio selection models under cumulative prospect theory: (i) S-shaped utility maximization without probability weighting in a market with one risky asset; (ii) S-shaped utility maximization without probability weighting in a market with multiple risky assets which follow a joint elliptical distribution; and (iii) S-shaped utility maximization with inverse-S-shaped probability weighting in a market with one risky asset. For the first two time consistent models, we identify the well-posedness conditions and derive the semi-analytical optimal policies. For the third time inconsistent model, we assume that the investor is aware of the time inconsistency but is unable to commit to his initial plan of action. Then, we reformulate the model into an intrapersonal game model and derive the semi-analytical subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (time consistent) policy under well-posedness condition. All the three policies take a piecewise linear feedback form. Our analysis of the three models not only partially explains the well documented phenomena of non-participation puzzle and horizon effect, but also extends the two fund separation theorem into multi-period S-shaped utility setting and pushes forward the study on time inconsistency issue incurred by probability weighting.     

A note on globalization and urban residential rents

We present evidence on the impact of international economic openness upon residential real estate, consistent with the well-known Balassa–Samuelson effect, which suggests that increasing openness raises relative prices of non-tradable goods and services. Using a data set for 46 cities in different countries, we find that urban rents are positively affected by the openness of the economy and by city size.     

Walrasian social orderings in exchange economies

We study social ordering functions in exchange economies. We show that if a social ordering function satisfies certain Pareto, individual rationality, and local independence conditions, then (i) the set of top allocations of the chosen social ordering is contained in the set of Walrasian allocations and is typically non-empty, and (ii) all individually rational but non-Walrasian allocations are typically ranked indifferently. Thus, such a social ordering function is quite similar to the Walrasian correspondence, which can be regarded as the social ordering function whose associated indifference classes are the set of Walrasian allocations and the set of other allocations.     

EXPERIENCING URBAN SMELLS WHEN WALKING: Kastamonu City Case

Urban experiences are increasing in popularity every day. In these experiences sensory elements are significant, and a review of the urban environment, in which visual perceptions have prevailed in the past, would demonstrate that other senses are important as well. As Le Corbusier remarked, urban experiences can be achieved by walking with a wide perspective. In the present study scent walks were conducted to reveal the significance of the scent factor in urban experience. As a result of these walks, the existing scents in Kastamonu city, the role of the scents in urban memory, and their effects on individuals were determined, thus emphasizing the significance of scents for urban planning and design.     

‘Post‐Third‐World City' or Neoliberal ‘City of Exception'? Rio de Janeiro in the Olympic Era

This article considers processes of urban development within the context of mega‐event preparations in Rio de Janeiro. We begin with a brief overview of these development processes, highlighting their connections to political and economic change in recent years. Proponents of these mega‐event‐led initiatives argue that Rio is undergoing a period of inclusive growth and integration: a perspective we call here a ‘post‐Third‐World city' narrative of urban renewal. Critics, however, contend that urban officials are harnessing mega‐events (e.g. the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games) to push forward a neoliberal agenda of socially unjust policies benefiting the interests of capital and marginalizing the city's poor and especially its favelas (i.e. the ‘city‐of‐exception' thesis). In this article we explore the insights of these two perspectives and consider why they have grown popular in recent years. Though we side generally with the city‐of‐exception thesis, we argue that important geographic and historical particularities must also be accounted for. Without carefully situating analytical perspectives empirically—in particular, cases in which theoretical models are drawn from European and North American contexts—urban researchers risk concealing more than they reveal in analyses of rapidly developing countries like Brazil.     

US city-size distribution and space

ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on spatial city-size distribution in the United States. It proposes a new distance-based approach to analyze the influence of distance on the city-size distribution parameter by considering the Pareto distribution and using data from different definitions of US cities in 2010. Considering all possible combinations of cities within a 300-mile radius, the results indicate that the Pareto distribution cannot be rejected in most cases regardless of city size. Placebo regressions validate the results, thereby confirming the significant effect of geography on the Pareto exponent.     

Pareto improving interventions in a general equilibrium model with private provision of public goods

Most of the literature on government intervention in models of voluntary public goods supply focuses on interventions that increase the total level of a public good, which is considered to be typically underprovided. However, an intervention that is successful in increasing the public good level need not benefit everyone. In this paper we take a direct approach to welfare properties of voluntary provision equilibria in a full blown general equilibrium model with public goods and study interventions that have the goal of Pareto improving on the voluntary provision outcome. Towards this end, we study a model with many private goods and non-linear production technology for the public good, and hence allow for relative price effects to serve as a powerful channel of intervention. In this setup we show that Pareto improving interventions generally do exist. In particular, direct government provision financed by “small” , or “local” , lump-sum taxes can be used generically to Pareto improve upon the voluntary provision outcome.     

城市公共产品供给决策中的公众参与

实现城市公共产品的有效供给,为城市发展提供良好的基础条件,是提升城市综合发展能力的关键所在。由于缺乏系统完善的公众参与机制,在城市公共产品供给决策领域,存在着公众参与层次较低、公众参与失灵等问题。城市公共产品供给决策中公众参与的作用能否得到实现,离不开公众参与子机制作用的有效发挥。实现城市公共产品供给决策过程和实现过程与公众参与的系统整合,以此构建城市公共产品供给决策中公众参与机制的运作模型。     

The Rank-Size rule in the absence of growth

This paper makes a discovery in comparing Steindl's model of a growing system of cities to Champernowne's model of a stationary one: While the so-called Pareto coefficient (a measure of size concentration) of the city size distribution for a growing system is determined by the ratio of the average rate of growth in the sizes of cities to the rate of growth in the number of cities, and is thus independent of the variance in growth rates across cities, and also, to a large degree, independent of their behavior over time, the coefficient is directly proportional to this variance in the case of stationarity. This has interesting policy implications: As long as the urban system is growing as a whole, efforts to reduce rates of growth in high-growth areas and to raise them in low-growth areas, i.e., to reduce the dispersion in growth rates across cities, will have no effect on the shape of the size distribution of cities. However, if the system were to cease to grow, these same efforts would have a potentially great effect on this distribution. This suggests that the customary pessimism expressed by students of urban phenomena in the efficacy of legislation to alter the form of the size distribution of cities, a pessimism induced by their observation of the persistence of the current distribution over time in many countries, is primarily due to the circumstances in which these systems are observed, i.e., in periods of growth and expansion.     

Double implementation of the Lindahl equilibrium by a continuous mechanism

We consider a class of economies with public goods that have the following properties: (i) The preferences of the agents are convex, interior, and strictly increasing. (ii) The technology for production of public goods is a closed convex cone that satisfies free disposal and an additional mild assumption. No assumptions are made on continuity, completeness or transitivity of preferences. We provide a continuous and feasible mechanism that implements the Lindahl equilibrium by Nash equilibria, and has the following property: For every economy in our class every Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the mechanism is a strong Nash equilibrium.     

(Non-)Existence of Equilibria in Multicommunity Models

This paper reconsiders equilibrium existence in models with migration and voting over local public goods. We show that under some straightforward assumptions on preferences and income distributions, the basic structure of multicommunity models (i.e., perfect mobility, majority rule, single crossing property) implies that no equilibrium with jurisdictions conducting different policies can exist. Stratification equilibria—with sorting of the population according to income classes—are therefore not as natural as is sometimes suggested. Mechanisms that can serve to support stratification (i.e., tight housing markets, returns to scale in the provision of publicly consumed goods) are discussed.