Liquidity and Liquidation

The manager of a firm that is selling an illiquid asset has discretion as to the sale price: if he chooses a high (low) selling price, early sale is unlikely (likely). If the manager has the option to default on the debt that is collateralized by the illiquid asset, the optimal selling price depends on whether the manager acts in the interests of owners or creditors. We model the former case. In equilibrium the owner will always offer the illiquid asset for sale at a strictly higher price than he paid, and will default if he fails to sell. As a result, upon successful sales the illiquid asset changes hands at successively higher prices. We also consider a generalization of the model which permits sellers to finance sales using either debt or preferred stock, or both. This allows derivation of an optimal capital structure. We are indebted to seminar participants at the University of California, Los Angeles; University of California, Santa Barbara; Utah State University; University of Miami; Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta; Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. We have received helpful comments from Tom Cooley.     

Why is there money? Endogenous derivation of `money' as the most liquid asset: a class of examples

Summary. The monetary character of trade, use of a common medium of exchange, is shown to be an outcome of an economic general equilibrium. Monetary structure can be derived from price theory in a modified Arrow-Debreu model. Two constructs are added: transaction costs and market segmentation in trading posts (with a separate budget constraint at each transaction). Commodity money arises endogenously as the most liquid (lowest transaction cost) asset. Government-issued fiat money has a positive equilibrium value from its acceptability for tax payments. Scale economies in transaction cost account for uniqueness of the (fiat or commodity) money in equilibrium. Received: February 15, 2002; revised version: August 12, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" This paper has benefited from seminars and colleagues' helpful remarks at the University of California - Santa Barbara, University of California - San Diego, NSF-NBER Conference on General Equilibrium Theory at Purdue University, Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics at San Diego State University, Econometric Society at the University of Wisconsin - Madison, SITE at Stanford University-2001, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Midwest Economic Theory Conference at the University of Illinois - Urbana Champaign, University of Iowa, Southern California Economic Theory Conference at UC - Santa Barbara, Midwest Macroeconomics Conference at University of Iowa, University of California - Berkeley, European Workshop on General Equilibrium Theory at University of Paris I, Society for Economic Dynamics at San Jose Costa Rica, World Congress of the Econometric Society at University of Washington, Cowles Foundation at Yale University. It is a pleasure to acknowledge comments of Henning Bohn, Harold Cole, James Hamilton, Mukul Majumdar, Harry Markowitz, Chris Phelan, Meenakshi Rajeev, Wendy Shaffer, Bruce Smith, and Max Stinchcombe.     

Quantitative easing and asset bubbles

Expansionary monetary policy is necessary to respond to financial crises. However, if Central Bank asset purchase initiatives are too large or last too long, they can lead to explosive increases in asset prices which add to the risk of a future crisis. This article employs two models including the Campbell–Shiller and Generalized Supremum Augmented Dickey Fuller techniques to search for bubbles in the US equity, housing and bond markets over the past eight years. Although, we find that prices in equities and housing have risen following Federal Reserve intervention, there is little indication of asset price bubbles. There is evidence of explosive bond price increases from September of 2011 to February of 2013.     

On the optimality of interest-bearing reserves in economies of overlapping generations

Summary Paying interest on required reserves is considered in an overlapping generations model in which the return to capital dominates the return to fiat money. As Smith (1991) showed, financing interest on reserves benefits the initial old at the expense of future generations. We show that the transfer of wealth associated with interest on reserves can be offset by an accommodating open market purchase, so that the payment of interest on reserves is a Pareto improvement. We also show that paying interest on reserves improves welfare even when financed by distorting taxes on capital.The authors thank Mike Cox, Greg Huffman, Evan Koenig, and Bruce Smith for helpful discussion. Any remaining errors are solely ours. This work originated while Freeman was a Research Associate at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System.     

An experimental examination of the house money effect in a multi-period setting

There is evidence that risk-taking behavior is influenced by prior monetary gains and losses. When endowed with house money, people become more risk taking. This paper is the first to report a house money effect in a dynamic, financial setting. Using an experimental method, we compare market outcomes across sessions that differ in the level of cash endowment (low and high). Our experimental results provide support for a house money effect. Traders’ bids, price predictions, and market prices are influenced by the amount of money that is provided prior to trading. However, dynamic behavior is difficult to interpret due to conflicting influences. JEL Classification C91 · C92 · D80 The views expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta or the Federal Reserve System.     

Temporary financial equilibrium

Summary. In a two-period pure exchange economy with financial assets, a temporary financial equilibrium is an equilibrium of the current spot and security markets given forecast functions of future prices and payoffs. The temporary equilibrium model can then be interpreted as an Arrow-Debreu economy where preferences depend on prices. This identification implies, among other consequences, the existence and the generic determinateness of the financial temporary equilibria associated with given forecast functions. Received: December 29, 1999; revised version: December 20, 2001     

A correlated bivariate Poisson jump model for foreign exchange

This paper develops a new bivariate jump model to study jump dynamics in foreign exchange returns. The model extends a multivariate GARCH parameterization to include a bivariate correlated jump process. The conditional covariance matrix has the Baba, Engle, Kraft, and Kroner (1989) structure, while the bivariate jumps are governed by a Correlated Bivariate Poisson (CBP) function. Using daily data we find evidence of both independent currency specific jumps, as well as jumps common to both exchange rates of the Canadian dollar and Japanese Yen against the U.S. dollar. The paper concludes by investigating a time-varying structure for the arrival of jumps that relaxes the assumption of constant and bounded jump correlation imposed by the CBP function.I am indebted to two anonymous referees and the editor, Baldev Raj for helpful suggestions. I am also grateful for helpful comments from Adolf Buse, Ramazan Gencay, Rehim Kilic, John Maheu, Alex Maynard, Denis Pelletier, Denise Young, and seminar participants at the Tenth Annual Symposium of the Society for Nonlinear Dynamics and Econometrics (SNDE), Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 2002; the Midwest Econometrics Group (MEG) Meetings, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 2001; Canadian Economics Association (CEA) Meetings, McGill University 2001.     

Competitive equilibrium when preferences change over time

Summary. We show the existence of a competitive equilibrium in an economy with many consumers whose preferences may change over time. The demand correspondence of an individual consumer is determined by the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes in his intrapersonal game. For additively separable preferences with concave period utility functions that are unbounded above, this demand correspondence will satisfy the usual boundary conditions. Whenever consumers can recall their own mixed actions, this correspondence is convex-valued. This ensures the existence of a symmetric competitive equilibrium.Received: 29 July 2004, Revised: 17 November 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D51, D91, C73. Correspondence to: Thomas MariottiWe thank Michele Piccione for useful comments and suggestions. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.     

Bubbles as payoffs at infinity

Summary We define rational bubbles to be securities with payoffs occurring in the infinitely distant future and investigate the behavior of bubbles values. We extend our analysis to a setting of uncertainty. In an infinite horizon arbitrage-free model of asset prices, we interpret the money market account as the value of a particular bubble; a similar interpretation holds for other assets related to the state-price deflator and to payoffs on bonds maturing in the distant future. We present three applications of this characterization of bubbles.This paper was circulated under the title Stochastic bubbles in Markov economies. We acknowledge with gratitude numerous conversations with Mark Fisher, the editorial advice of David Levine and the useful comments of anonymous referees. This paper should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or its staff.     

Consumption choice and asset pricing with a non-price-taking agent

Summary. This paper develops a pure-exchange model to study the consumption-portfolio problem of an agent who acts as a non-price-taker, and to analyze the implications of his behavior on equilibrium security prices. The non-price-taker is modeled as a price leader in all markets; his price impact is then recast as a dependence of the Arrow-Debreu prices on his consumption, allowing a tractable formulation. Besides the aggregate consumption, the endowment of the non-price-taker appears as an additional factor in driving equilibrium allocations and prices. Comparisons of equilibria between a price-taking and a non-price-taking economy are carried out. Received: March 29, 1996; revised version October 29, 1996     

Inflation,growth and exchange rate regimes in small open economies

Summary. This paper compares the merits of alternative exchange rate regimes in small open economies where financial intermediaries perform a real allocative function, there are multiple reserve requirements, and credit market frictions may or may not cause credit rationing. Under floating exchange rates, raising domestic inflation can increase production if credit is rationed. However, there exist inflation thresholds: increasing inflation beyond the threshold level will reduce domestic output. Endogenously arising volatility may be observed independently of the exchange rate regime. Private information - with high rates of domestic inflation - increases the scope for indeterminacy and economic fluctuations.Received: 26 March 2002, Revised: 29 October 2002JEL Classification Numbers: E32, E44, F33.P.L. Hernandez-Verme: I would like to thank Leonardo Auernheimer, Valerie Bencivenga, Dean Corbae, Scott Freeman, Todd Keister, Beatrix Paal, and Maxwell Stinchcombe for very helpful comments and suggestions. Very special thanks are due to Bruce D. Smith. The paper also benefited from the discussions in the seminars in CIDE, the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Indiana University, ITAM, Purdue University, the Second Annual Missouri Economics Conference, Texas A&M, the University of Missouri and the University of Texas at Austin.     

Indivisibilities,lotteries, and sunspot equilibria

Summary We analyze economies with indivisible commodities. There are two reasons for doing so. First, we extend and provide some new insights into sunspot equilibrium theory. Finite competitive economies with perfect markets and convex consumption sets do not allow sunspot equilibria; these same economies with nonconvex consumption sets do, and they have several properties that can never arise in convex environments. Second, we provide a reinterpretation of the employment lotteries used in contract theory and in macroeconomic models with indivisible labor. We show how socially optimal employment lotteries can be decentralized as competitive equilibria without lotteries once sunspots are introduced.We thank Kenneth Arrow, Aditya Goenka, Ed Green, Jeremy Greenwood, Walter Heller, Steve Matthews, Herve Moulin, Roger Meyerson, Jim Peck, Patrick Kehoe, Ramon Marimon, Ed Prescott, Richard Rogerson, Nancy Stokey and Raghu Sundaram for their comments. We also thank participants in seminars at Northwestern, Yale, USC, Cornell, Barcelona, Madrid, Santander, and the Canadian Economics Association annual meetings in Victoria. We are grateful to the National Science Foundation (through grants SES-8606944 and SES-8821225), the Center for Analytic Economics, the Thorne Fund, and the University of Pennsylvania Research Foundation for research support. The views expressed here are those of the authors, and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve System or the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.     

The P* model and Austrian prices

In theP ^* model the price level is determined by the money stock per unit of potential out-put and the long-run equilibrium level of the velocity of money. This article applies this model to Austria. Problems in identifying permanent shocks to potential output and/or velocity lead to the rejection of such models of the price level, but their first-difference version is not so suspect. While evidence is found of a long-run relationship between Austria inflation and money growth, even the first-difference version of theP ^* model is rejected for Austria. Since Austria is a small economy, closely tied to Germany, the article also investigates whether Austrian prices are tied to a GermanP ^* measure. This hypothesis is also rejected, but there is a statistically-significant long-run relationship between Austrian and German inflation. Moreover, Austrian money growth remains significant even in this relationship.This article was written while the author was a Visiting Scholar at the Austrian National Bank. The author is indebted to Fritz Breuss, W. Jahnke, and Dieter Proske for help in obtaining the data used here, and for useful discussions about the data, relevant theoretical issues and results. The comments of the referees on an earlier version are also gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed here are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Austrian National Bank, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.     

Transaction costs and the use of cash and credit

Summary An overlapping generations model with spatial separation and transaction costs is developed that displays steady state equilibria in which both cash (fiat currency) and trade credit are used in exchange. Equilibria in which trade credit is used are not Pareto optimal. The question of the optimal quantity of money is addressed. Deflation is found to be optimal, contrary to the result for standard overlapping generations environments.This paper is based upon my dissertation, written for the University of Minnesota. I am grateful to Kathryn Combs, Michael Dotsey, Bruce Horning, Anne Villamil and seminar participants at numerous institutions for helpful comments. Most of all, I want to thank my advisor, Neil Wallace, for the attention he gave to my work. The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.     

A simple search model of money with heterogeneous agents and partial acceptability

Summary. Simple search models have equilibria where some agents accept money and others do not. We argue such equilibria should not be taken seriously. This is unfortunate if one wants a model with partial acceptability. We introduce heterogeneous agents and show partial acceptability arises naturally and robustly. There can be multiple equilibria with different degrees of acceptability. Given the type of heterogeneity we allow, the model is simple: equilibria reduce to fixed points in [0,1]. We show that with other forms of heterogeneity equilibria are fixed points in set space, and there is no method to reduce this to a problem in R¹.Received: 4 September 2002, Revised: 23 September 2002JEL Classification Numbers: C78, E40.A. Shevchenko, R. Wright: We thank seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Indiana University, Purdue University, University of Toronto, the 2002 Midwest Macroeconomics Conference at Vanderbilt University, and the 2001 Conference on Economic Dynamics at the University of Essex. The National Science Foundation and the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland provided financial support. Braz Ministerio de Camargo and Gabriel Camera provided some helpful suggestions. Correspondence to: R. Wright     

Broad money demand and financial liberalization in Greece

This paper develops a constant, data-coherent, equilibrium correction model for broad money demand (M3) in Greece over 1976–1994. The aggregate M3 was targeteduntil recently, and current monetary policy still uses such aggregates as guidelines. In spite of financial innovation, financial liberalization, and large fluctuations in the inflation rate, the estimated model is remarkabli stable. Dynamics are important, with price and income elasticities being much smaller in the short run than in the long run. The model provides a better understanding of the portfolio consequences of financial innovation and the effects of monetary policy in Greece.The authors are staff economists in the Division of International Finance, Federal Reserve Board, Washington, DC 20551 USA, and the Research Department, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC 20431 USA, respectively. They may be reached on the Internet at ericsson@frb.gov and ssharma@imf.org. The views expressed in this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting those of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the International Monetary Fund, or other members of their staffs. We wish to thank the Bank of Greece for providing the data; Sophocles Brissimis, Nicholas Paleocrassas, and George Simigiannis for offering insights into institutional aspects of the Greek financial system; and Richard Agénor, Caroline Atkinson, Adi Brender, Julia Campos, Dimitri Demekas, David Hendry, Katarina Juselius, Tim Lane, Helmut Lütkepohl, Jaime Marquez, Jürgen Wolters, and two anonymous referees for useful comments. An earlier version of this paper appeared as Ericsson and Sharma (1996). All numerical results were obtained using PcGive Professional Versions 8 and 9: see Doornik and Hendry (1994a, 1994b, 1996, 1997) and Hendry and Doornik (1996). The data may be obtained from the Internet, http://wotan.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/ oekonometrie/engl/data.html     

A model of the federal funds market

Summary This paper develops a stochastic general equilibrium model of the federal funds market that incorporates non-Fisherian effects on interest rates stemming from both supply and demand shocks to reserves. Such a model may reconcile the widespread belief in a liquidity effect of money supply shocks with the difficulty many researchers have had in finding empirical support for such an effect. The model also cautions against interpreting the observed negative correlation between the federal funds rate and innovations to nonborrowed reserves as empirical confirmation of the ability of the Federal Reserve to lower short-term real interest rates.This paper should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or its staff. We gratefully acknowledge lengthy discussions and correspondence with V. V. Chari, Marty Eichenbaum, and especially Larry Christiano, that helped to clarify many issues. We were told many institutional details by Jim Clouse and Josh Feinman, and we received many helpful comments from David Altig, Michael Dotsey, and participants at the conference on Recent Research on the Liquidity Effect of Monetary Policy, 1993, Federal Research Bank of Cleveland, the conference on Recent Macroeconomic Research: Lessons for Policymaking, 1993, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta and the conference on Operating Procedures and the Conduct of Monetary Policy, 1992, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.     

On characterizing equilibria of economies with externalities and taxes as solutions to optimization problems

Summary We characterize equilibria of general equilibrium models with externalities and taxes as solutions to optimization problems. This characterization is similar to Negishi's characterization of equilibria of economies without externalities or taxes as solutions to social planning problems. It is often useful for computing equilibria or deriving their properties. Frequently, however, finding the optimization problem that a particular equilibrium solves is difficult. This is especially true in economies with multiple equilibria. In a dynamic economy with externalities or taxes there may be a robust continuum of equilibria even if there is a representative consumer. This indeterminacy of equilibria is closely related to that in overlapping generations economies.An earlier version of this paper, entitled Externalities and Taxes in General Equilibrium, was presented at the North American meetings of the Econometric Society, June 1988, at the University of Minnesota. We are grateful to David Backus, Kenneth Judd, Patrick Kehoe, and Rodolfo Manuelli for helpful conversations. National Science Foundation grants SES 86-18325 and SES 87-08616 provided financial support.The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.     

预算软约束与资产价格理性泡沫

文章将预算软约束引入资产价格理性泡沫的分析之中,在给出一个预算软约束情形下资产均衡价格决定模型的基础上,得出了资产价格理性泡沫的表达式.模型分析表明,当存在预算软约束时风险资产的理性泡沫为正;同时,风险资产对应企业面临的预算软约束越大,该风险资产价格中的理性泡沫越大.     

Inducing liquidity in thin financial markets through combined-value trading mechanisms

Asset pricing theory hypothesizes that investors are only interested in portfolios; individual securities are evaluated only in terms of their contribution to portfolio risk and return. Yet, standard financial market design is that of parallel, unconnected markets, whereby investors cannot submit orders in one market conditional on events in others. When markets are thin, this exposes them to substantial execution risk. Fear of ending up with unbalanced portfolios after trading may even keep investors from submitting orders, further eroding liquidity and the ability of markets to equilibrate. The suggested solution is a portfolio trading mechanism referred to as combined-value trading (CVT). Investors are allowed to submit orders for packages of securities and the system matches trades and computes prices by optimally combining portfolio orders in an open book. We study the performance of the CVT mechanism experimentally and compare it to the performance of parallel, unconnected double auctions in experiments with similar parametrization and either a similar number of subjects or substantially thicker markets. We present evidence that our portfolio trading mechanism facilitates equilibration to the extent that the thicker markets do. Inspection of order submission and trade activity reveals that subjects manage to exploit the direct linkages between markets enabled by the CVT system.