Implementation of individually rational social choice functions with guaranteed utilities

A simple mechanism is presented that allocates an indivisible object between two agents for almost any possible compensation rule. Furthermore, the equilibrium strategy guarantees a level of utility not less than −ε, where ε can be arbitrarily small.     

Efficiency versus social optimality: The case of telecommunications pricing

Standard arguments for efficiency-based pricing policies break down once it is admitted that no lump-sum transfers and taxes are available. In this paper, it is argued that the appropriate solution is to equate the marginal welfare cost of redistributing income through pricing policies that deviate from marginal cost with the marginal cost of redistribution through the tax and welfare systems. For telecommunications pricing, this solution may be implemented by charging usage prices for long-distance services in excess of marginal cost and making corresponding reductions in fixed access charges. An illustrative example, based on data for Australia, is presented.     

Beyond the average effects: The distributional impacts of export promotion programs in developing countries

Do all exporters benefit the same from export promotion programs? Surprisingly, no matter how obvious this question may a priori be when thinking of the effectiveness of these programs, there is virtually no empirical evidence on how they affect export performance in different parts of the distribution of export outcomes. This paper aims at filling this gap in the literature. We assess the distributional impacts of trade promotion activities performing efficient semiparametric quantile treatment effect estimation on assistance, total sales, and highly disaggregated export data for the whole population of Chilean exporters over the 2002-2006 period. We find that these activities have indeed heterogeneous effects over the distribution of export performance, along both the extensive and intensive margins. In particular, smaller firms as measured by their total exports seem to benefit more from export promotion actions.     

Sensitivity analysis of efficiency rankings to distributional assumptions: applications to Japanese water utilities

This article examines the robustness of efficiency score rankings across four distributional assumptions for trans-log stochastic production-frontier models, using data from 1221 Japanese water utilities (for 2004 and 2005). One-sided error terms considered include the half-normal, truncated normal, exponential and gamma distributions. Results are compared for homoscedastic and doubly heteroscedastic models, where we also introduce a doubly heteroscedastic variable mean model, and examine the sensitivity of the nested models to a stronger heteroscedasticity correction for the one-sided error component. The results support three conclusions regarding the sensitivity of efficiency rankings to distributional assumptions. When four standard distributional assumptions are applied to a homoscedastic stochastic frontier model, the efficiency rankings are quite consistent. When those assumptions are applied to a doubly heteroscedastic stochastic frontier model, the efficiency rankings are consistent when proper and sufficient arguments for the variance functions are included in the model. When a more general model, like a variable mean model is estimated, efficiency rankings are quite sensitive to heteroscedasticity correction schemes.     

On the impossibility of complete Non-Interference in Paretian social judgements

We study a principle of ‘Non-Interference’ in social welfare judgements. Non-Interference captures aspects of liberal approaches (particularly a Millian approach) to social decision making. In its full generality, Non-Interference produces an impossibility result: together with Weak Pareto Optimality, it implies that a social welfare ordering must be dictatorial. However, interesting restricted versions of Non-Interference are compatible with standard social welfare orderings.     

Water allocation by social choice rules: The case of sequential rules

This paper considers the problem of allocating shares of irrigation water to different agricultural agents with single-peaked preferences with respect to their own shares. We define two different sequential allocation rules that respect the asymmetry between the agents and maintain the properties of Pareto efficiency and strategy-proofness, and we design a specific algorithm to apply these rules. The results of the empirical application of these rules for the case of an irrigated area located in the Ebro Basin (Spain) show that the designed sequential rules are able to substantially improve the efficiency of the currently applied proportional rule in context of severe scarcity of water and/or high administrative water prices.     

‘Linear’ income tax cuts: distributional effects,social preferences and revenue elasticities

The paper examines differential (yield-equivalent) distributional effects, social welfare and voting preferences as well as revenue elasticities of alternative ‘linear’ income tax cuts, each of which is progressivity-neutral with respect to a local progressivity measure. Judged by all criteria, there exists a unique preference for an income tax cut that preserves initial residual progression (or a tax increase that preserves initial liability progression).     

The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets

The paper examines the communication requirements of social choice rules when the (sincere) agents privately know their preferences. It shows that for a large class of choice rules, any minimally informative way to verify that a given alternative is in the choice rule is by verifying a “budget equilibrium”, i.e., that the alternative is optimal to each agent within a “budget set” given to him. Therefore, any communication mechanism realizing the choice rule must find a supporting budget equilibrium. We characterize the class of choice rules that have this property. Furthermore, for any rule from the class, we characterize the minimally informative messages (budget equilibria) verifying it. This characterization is used to identify the amount of communication needed to realize a choice rule, measured with the number of transmitted bits or real variables. Applications include efficiency in convex economies, exact or approximate surplus maximization in combinatorial auctions, the core in indivisible-good economies, and stable many-to-one matchings.     

Beyond choice: investigating the sensitivity and validity of measures of strength of preference

Many experiments investigating different decision theories have relied heavily on pairwise choices between lotteries. These are easy to incentivise, but often yield only limited dichotomous information. This paper considers whether respondents’ judgments about their strength of preference (SoP) for one alternative over another can usefully supplement standard choice data. We report extensive evidence that such judgments show sensitivity to variations in question format and parameter values in the directions we should expect, not only within-subject but also between-sample. We illustrate how such judgments can usefully supplement standard pairwise choice data and enrich our understanding of observed behaviour.     

Tariffs and Pareto optimality in international trade: The case of unemployment

This paper constructs a non-Walrasian two-country model of international trade, and investigates the possibility of policy combinations including tariffs which lead to Pareto superior trades. While such policies clearly do not exist in the Walrasian full employment situation, the paper shows that there may exist some in the case of unemployment. These policies are studied in various unemployment regimes, and it is shown that their effects depend both on the regime the economy is in, and on the degree of wage indexation.     

The ramsey model revisited: The optimality of cyclical consumption and growth

This paper reconsiders the familiar Ramsey model of optimal saving. This model is modified with two respects: direct spillovers (positive or negative) of capital on utility and penalties for changes of consumption. It will be shown that these two modifications may substantially change the stability properties of an optimal programme if capital provides utility directly (in addition to indirectly through production). More precisely, complex strategies such as (stable) limit cycles or even unstable policies may be optimal. Adjustment costs must be sufficiently high in order to obtain stable limit cycles (or even exploding spirals). This is quite surprising because large adjustment costs are expected to smooth intertemporal strategies.     

An extreme point characterization of random strategy-proof social choice functions: The two alternative case

We show that every strategy-proof random social choice function is a convex combination of strategy-proof deterministic social choice functions in a two-alternative voting model. This completely characterizes all strategy-proof random social choice functions in this setting.     

On the frontier between possibility and impossibility theorems in social choice

This paper attemts to make precise the frontier between possibility and impossibility theorems in social choice. It is shown that some criterion of rejection of some alternative is the critical factor. In the absence of such a condition, it is possible to construct a fairly wide class of “democratic” decision rules which satisfies a class of consistency conditions. Any one of these, together with the criterion of rejection, generates a power structure similar to the ones discovered by Arrow, Gibbard, and others when the decision rule is required to satisfy the weak Pareto principle and the independence condition.     

A leximin characterization of strategy-proof and non-resolute social choice procedures

Summary. We characterize strategy-proof social choice procedures when choice sets need not be singletons. Sets are compared by leximin. For a strategy-proof rule g, there is a positive integer k such that either (i) the choice sets g(r) for all profiles r have the same cardinality k and there is an individual i such that g(r) is the set of alternatives that are the k highest ranking in i's preference ordering, or (ii) all sets of cardinality 1 to k are chosen and there is a coalition L of cardinality k such that g(r) is the union of the tops for the individuals in L. There do not exist any strategy-proof rules such that the choice sets are all of cardinality to k where . Received: November 8, 1999; revised version: September 18, 2001     

Modelling the choice between regulation and liability in terms of social welfare

Abstract.  Using a formal political economy model with asymmetric information, we illustrate the conditions under which an environmental protection system based on extending liability to private financiers is welfare superior, inferior, or equivalent to a system based on an incentive regulatory scheme subject to capture by the regulatees. We explicitly consider the following factors: the cost of care and its efficiency in reducing the probability of an environmental accident, the social cost of public funds, the net profitability of the risky activities, the level of damages, and the regulatory capture bias. We characterize in such a parameter space the regions where one system dominates the other. JEL classification: D82, K32     

Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria in social choice environments

Summary Jackson [1] and Yamato [12] constructed game forms which implement social choice correspondences in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria simultaneously in exchange economies. In this paper, I deal with social choice environments and construct a game form which implements social choice correspondences satisfying monotonicity, no veto power and having at least three agents in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria under the existence of an alternative called a holocaust. The game form constructed in this paper includes an integer game but satisfies the boundedness condition introduced by Jackson [1].I am grateful to Professors Tatsuyoshi Saijo and Stephen Turnbull, and to an anonymous referee for their helpful comments and suggestions. However all remaining errors are mine. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1991 Annual Meeting of the Japan Association of Economics and Econometrics at Hokkaido University.After this paper was submitted toEconomic Theory I became aware of the work of Jackson, Palfrey, and Srivastava [2] who have obtained a similar result to mine as a by-product of their main result.     

The optimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames

The result of Colombo and Labrecciosa [Colombo, Luca and Labrecciosa, Paola (2006). ‘The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames’, Economics Letters 90, pp. 116–121.] that optimal punishments are inferior to Nash-reversion trigger strategies with decreasing marginal costs is shown to be due to the output when a firm deviates from the punishment path becoming negative.