Cross-country evidence on determinants of fiscal policy effectiveness: the role of trade and capital flows

This article studies the determinants of size differentials between fiscal multipliers in countries around the world, both advanced and developing economies. We introduce variables not considered before for explaining multiplier size differentials, such as capital flows and the openness of capital markets, while controlling for domestic conditions and exchange rate regimes. We also disaggregate GDP into its main components in order to identify the channels through which external and internal factors can influence GDP after a change in fiscal policy. Our results point to the existence of a new channel through which fiscal policy effectiveness is affected. Capital flows, especially FDI flows, play an important role in determining the sizes of fiscal multipliers, and a country’s external conditions largely explain GDP changes after fiscal expenditure shocks. Our results also point towards a strong link between a country’s international position and its real economy.     

The cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy: evidence from the OECD

This paper addresses the topic of cyclicality in fiscal policy. In particular, we show that the level of cyclicality varies across spending categories and across OECD countries. In line with leading theories of fiscal cyclicality, we show that countries with volatile output and dispersed political power are the most likely to run procyclical fiscal policies. Wage government consumption is highlighted as the most important channel by which these variables affect fiscal cyclicality.     

Policy mix and debt sustainability: evidence from fiscal policy rules

This paper characterizes rules-based fiscal policy setting for G-3 and large EMS countries. We set up a simple fiscal policy rule and then infer on the policymakers’ reaction coefficients by testing with GMM. Our results qualify existing evidence on systematic fiscal policy in two respects. First, fiscal policy usually stabilizes public debt; and there is indeed substantial interaction between fiscal and monetary policies via the policy mix or the debt channel. Second, sustainability is achieved with a “stop–go” cycle of consolidation. Unless debt ratios are high, consolidation does not come at the cost of less cyclical stabilization.     

Cross-country fiscal policy spillovers and capital-skill complementarity in integrated capital markets

The 2010 European sovereign debt crisis has renewed discussions on fiscal policy coordination. One rationale for coordination is fiscal policy cross-country spillovers. A common finding in the literature is that spillovers tend to be small in normal circumstances but can be large if monetary policy is at the zero lower bound. Orthogonal to the existing literature, we document a novel channel that generates cross-country spillovers over the medium run. We assume perfect capital markets integration and find that capital-skill complementarity can lead to large spillovers without the zero lower bound nor a large import share in government expenditures. As capital markets have become increasingly integrated in the Eurozone, the current degree of fiscal policy coordination between its members, low, may be insufficient. We also find that the smoothing benefits from a temporary rise in public debt spill over to other countries.     

Monetary–fiscal policy interactions and fiscal stimulus

Increases in government spending trigger substitution effects—both inter- and intra-temporal—and a wealth effect. The ultimate impacts on the economy hinge on current and expected monetary and fiscal policy behavior. Studies that impose active monetary policy and passive fiscal policy typically find that government consumption crowds out private consumption: higher future taxes create a strong negative wealth effect, while the active monetary response increases the real interest rate. This paper estimates Markov-switching policy rules for the United States and finds that monetary and fiscal policies fluctuate between active and passive behavior. When the estimated joint policy process is imposed on a conventional new Keynesian model, government spending generates positive consumption multipliers in some policy regimes and in simulated data in which all policy regimes are realized. The paper reports the model's predictions of the macroeconomic impacts of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act's implied path for government spending under alternative monetary–fiscal policy combinations.     

Asymmetric effects of fiscal policy in EU and OECD countries

In this article, we take account of an evaluation of the short- and medium-term effects of the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy in EU and OECD countries and their dependence on the state of the economy and fiscal behaviour. Our findings indicate that (i) across EU member states the impact of government spending on economic performance is larger in the accession than in core member states, (ii) since the onset of the economic/financial crisis the government spending multipliers have become larger in both core and accession EU member states, and (iii) a comparison with fiscal responses in the OECD countries shows robustness of our estimates. The conclusion implies that the austerity measures present a substantial drag for economic activity in accession EU countries. Thus, we may state that not considering the fiscal behaviour and state of the economy gives misleading fiscal multiplier effects, which in turn lead to the adoption of inappropriate fiscal measures that even worsen a country's economic situation.     

Monetary policy,fiscal policy and cross signal jamming

This paper considers the issue of rule versus discretion when the central bank and the government share private information but have different preferences over inflation and output. We demonstrate that if the monetary policy is rule-based, Intuitive Criterion selects the unique separating equilibrium in which the central bank signals a low supply shock by a low interest rate. Interestingly, discretion may be better than the rule for the central bank, contrary to the case of complete information. Also, we examine the effect of information asymmetry on the monetary and fiscal policy mix. We show that cross signal jamming whereby the monetary authority and the fiscal authority successfully jams an unfavorable signal of each other does not occur in equilibrium.     

Optimal fiscal policy in a world liquidity trap

We construct a model of the international transmission of ‘liquidity trap’ shocks, and examine the case for international coordination of fiscal policy to respond to the liquidity trap. Integrated financial markets tend to propagate liquidity traps. In a global environment, fiscal policy may be effective in raising GDP when the economy is stuck in a liquidity trap, but it does so in a ‘beggar thy neighbor’ fashion; when one economy is in a liquidity trap, the cross country spillover effect of fiscal policy is negative. We examine the welfare optimizing policy response to a liquidity trap when countries coordinate on fiscal policy. Fiscal policy may be an effective tool in responding to a liquidity trap, although it is never optimal to use fiscal expansion sufficiently to fully eliminate a downturn. Moreover, there is little case for coordinated global fiscal expansion. For the most part, the country worst hit by a liquidity trap shock should use its own policies to respond, without much help from foreign policies.     

货币政策与财政政策的区域产业结构调整效应比较

本文运用1978—2007年东、中、西部的面板数据分析。货币政策和财政政策是否具有区域产业结构调整效应结果显示:第一,财政政策具有产业结构调整效应,而货币政策的产业结构调整效应并不明显。第二,货币政策在对第一和第三产业的效应方面强于财政政策,而财政政策则在对第二产业的效应方面具有优势。第三,货币政策和财政政策对三次产业的效应都存在比较明显的区域效应。第四,在东部地区货币政策和财政政策对第一产业和第二产业的效应相差非常悬殊,而对第三产业的效应则集中在高位;在中部地区货币政策和财政政策对第二产业的效应集中在高位;在西部地区货币政策对第一产业的效应集中在高位,而财政政策对第一产业的效应则集中在低位。     

Fiscal financing and the efficacy of fiscal policy in Korea: An empirical assessment with comparison to the U.S. evidence

This paper aims to assess the empirical implications of fiscal financing in Korea and study how they differ from those of the U.S. We estimate two versions of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model—a small open economy (SOE) model for Korea and its closed economy counterpart for the U.S.—in which the former nests the latter as a special case. The fiscal policy specification posits that government spending, lump-sum transfers, and distortionary taxation on labor income, capital income and consumption expenditures respond to the level of government debt and the state of economic activity. Analysis of the data from 2000 to 2015 shows that distortionary capital taxes play a critical role in stabilizing government debt in the U.S., whereas non-distorting fiscal instruments are the primary means of fiscal adjustment in Korea. Regarding the magnitude of debt-financed fiscal stimuli, the substantial trade openness of Korea is significant in that it produces relatively smaller government spending and transfer multipliers compared to the U.S.     

Toward a Taylor rule for fiscal policy

In DSGE models, fiscal policy is typically described by simple rules in which tax rates respond to the level of output. We show that there is only weak empirical evidence in favor of such specifications in US data. Instead, the cyclical movements of labor and capital income tax rates are better described by a contemporaneous response to hours worked and investment, respectively. We show that conditioning on these variables is also desirable from a normative perspective as it significantly improves welfare relative to output-based rules.     

Macroeconomic impacts of fiscal policy shocks in the UK: A DSGE analysis

This paper develops and estimates a new-Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for the analysis of fiscal policy in the UK. We find that government consumption and investment yield the highest GDP multipliers in the short-run, whereas capital income tax and public investment have dominating effect on GDP in the long-run. When nominal interest rate is at the zero lower bound, consumption taxes and public consumption and investment are found to be the most effective fiscal instruments throughout the analysed horizon, and capital and labour income taxes are established to be the least effective. The paper also shows that the effectiveness of fiscal policy decreases in a small open-economy scenario and that nominal rigidities improve effectiveness of public spending and consumption taxes, whereas decrease that of income taxes.     

How elections affect fiscal policy and growth: revisiting the mechanism

This paper reconsiders the popular result that the lower is the probability of reelection, the greater is the incentive of incumbent politicians to choose short-sighted, inefficient policies. The set-up is a general equilibrium model of economic growth, in which fiscal policy is endogenously chosen under electoral uncertainty. Political parties can value possible economic benefits differently depending on whether they are in or out of power, and—by contrast with the literature—the relevant preference coefficient is a choice variable rather than an exogenous taste parameter. The main result is that, when political parties choose both economic policy instruments and preference coefficients, the fundamental reason for short-sighted policy is the extra rents from being in power per se.     

Monetary and fiscal policy transmission in Poland

This paper combines a fiscal structural vector-autoregression (SVAR) with a monetary SVAR for the Polish transition economy. Data are constructed from scratch in order to account for features of the transition economy and for delays in implementing legislated government spending and tax changes (fiscal foresight). For monetary policy, we find no price puzzles in the combined SVAR. Also, fiscal foresight variables have no statistically significant effects. We calculate an initial government spending multiplier of 0.70, which later peaks at 1.61 for the cumulative multiplier. This multiplier is much larger than multipliers estimated in previous studies not combining fiscal and monetary policy, where they were found to be close to zero. On the other hand, the tax multiplier is generally near zero in our study. We demonstrate the importance of combining fiscal and monetary transmission mechanisms when assessing the effects of government macroeconomic policies.     

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a post Keynesian open-economy model

Using a post Keynesian model, this study aims to analyze the stabilizing role of fiscal and monetary policies in an open economy with a managed exchange rate regime. The real exchange rate is modeled as an endogenous variable and inflation explained using the conflicting claims approach. The dynamic properties of macroeconomic equilibrium are evaluated in different regimes of fiscal and monetary policies. The main result of this study suggests that the preferred policy regime is the one in which economic authorities are complementary and fiscal policy plays an explicitly active role. In this regime, the fiscal policy must commit to the target for the rate of capacity utilization and the monetary authority must commit to the inflation target.     

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a New Keynesian model with capital accumulation and non-Ricardian consumers

The paper examines simple monetary and fiscal policy rules consistent with determinate equilibrium dynamics in the absence of Ricardian equivalence. Under this assumption, government debt turns into a relevant state variable which needs to be accounted for in the analysis of equilibrium dynamics. The key analytical finding is that without explicit reference to the level of government debt it is not possible to infer how strongly the monetary and fiscal instruments should be used to ensure determinate equilibrium dynamics. Specifically, we identify bifurcations associated with threshold values of steady-state debt, leading to qualitative changes in the local determinacy requirements.     

Under threat: Rules-based fiscal policy and how to preserve it

Rules-based fiscal policy is under threat. Over the last two decades, it proved frustratingly complicated to strike the right balance between three essential properties of sound fiscal policy rules: simplicity, flexibility, and enforceability. Simplicity has been sacrificed to ensure that more contingent (i.e. flexible) rules remained enforceable. The resulting arrangements have failed to adequately guide fiscal policy, undermining formal compliance, and ultimately, popular and political support for rules. To mitigate the risk that countries abandon rules-based policymaking, we suggest downplaying enforceability—i.e. the role of formal sanctions through enforcement—and enhancing the reputational costs of breaching rules. At the limit, the rule could consist of a simple quantitative benchmark for a key fiscal indicator. To boost reputational effects, independent fiscal councils should focus on debunking the “fiscal alchemy,” clearing the public debate from partisan smokescreens, and fostering popular support for sound fiscal policies.     

On the benefits of fiscal policy coordination in a currency union: a note

It is quite often claimed by politicians that a common currency makes it beneficial to be also endowed with a common fiscal policy. However, if fiscal policy can reasonably be considered to be a source of shocks, national fiscal policies which are steered independently from each other are generally preferable because they allow the possibility to diversify macroeconomic risks. Abstracting from automatic stabilizers, this view is valid independent on whether the ECB targets money growth or interest rates.

Time-varying effects of fiscal policy in Spain: a Markov-switching approach

How have the effects of Spanish fiscal policy varied over time? Given this starting point, in this article we analyse the regime dependence of fiscal policy in Spain by estimating a vector autoregressive model within a Markov-switching framework. Our results indicate that Spain’s membership of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is the most likely source of time variation in the fiscal outcomes. Accordingly, increases in the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio do not succeed in stimulating economic activity in the first regime; rather, unexpected upsurges in the primary deficit harm economic activity (non-Keynesian effect) in the second regime, which prevails since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.