Determinants of corporate default risk in China: The role of financial constraints

Corporate default risk can affect financial stability and the macroeconomy. However, the determinants of corporate default risk in China are not well defined in the literature. We address this issue by using a rich credit event dataset of 981 Chinese listed firms over the period 1998–2013 and study the factors that affect default risk. We demonstrate that leverage, liquidity, firm size are the key firm-specific factors in determining default risk in China, along with macroeconomic factors like interest rate and stock return. Moreover, ‘Too big to fail’ only applies to non-SOEs, as default risk of SOEs is not affected by the firm size. We further find that high liquidity fails to reduce firms default risk, because small-sized firms which are financially constrained have limited cash to prevent financial distress, whereas large firms with greater cash holdings are able to mitigate their default risk as they are unconstrained.     

Deferred taxation under default risk

In this article, we have used a continuous EBIT-based model to study deferred tax liabilities under default risk. Quite surprisingly, default risk has been disregarded in research on deferred taxation. In order to underline its importance, we first calculated the probability of default, over a given time period, together with the contingent value of tax deferral. We then applied our theoretical model to a sample of 27,749 OECD companies. We showed that, when accounting for both firms with a negative EBIT and firms with a probability of default higher than 50% (over a 10-year period), a relevant percentage of firms were close enough to default. Hence, the expected present value of deferred taxes is much lower than that obtained in a deterministic context. From the Government’s point of view, deferred tax liabilities are a risk-free loan. Since only a portion are subsequently repaid, the Government should account for future losses due to companies’ default. So far, these estimates have been missing, although techniques do exist and are quite practical.     

Financial and economic determinants of firm default

This paper investigates the relevance of financial and economic variables as determinants of firm default. Our analysis covers a large sample of medium-sized limited liability firms. Since default might lead, through bankruptcy or radical restructuring, to firm’s exit, our work also relates to previous contributions on industrial demography. Using non parametric tests we assess to what extent defaulting firms differ from the non-defaulting group. Bootstrap probit regressions confirm that economic variables, in addition to standard financial indicators, play both a long and short term effect. Our findings are robust with respect to the inclusion of Distance to Default and risk ratings among the regressors.     

Corporate governance and default prediction: a reality test

Default prediction has commanded the attention of researchers for at least 50 years. This paper addresses several testable hypotheses regarding the relations between corporate governance and default prediction. We employ the conventional logistic regression to provide empirical evidence from U.S. default data over the period of 2000 to 2015. Empirical results are consistent with the following notions: First, default firms are associated with high ownership concentration, low shareholder rights, low financial transparency and disclosures, and less board effectiveness. Second, in-sample and out-of-sample tests support the incremental contribution of corporate governance information on default prediction, when compared with the models involving just financial information.     

Insolvency regimes and firms' default risk under economic uncertainty and shocks

One of the arguments often advanced for implementing a stronger insolvency and bankruptcy framework is that it enhances credit discipline among firms. Using a large cross-country firm-level dataset, we empirically test whether a stronger insolvency regime reduces firms' likelihood of defaulting on their debt. In particular, we examine whether it reduces default risk during increased economic uncertainty and various external shocks. Our results confirm that a stronger insolvency regime moderates the adverse effects of economic shocks on firms' default risk. The effects are more pronounced for firms in the top half of the size distribution. We also explore channels through which improved creditor rights influence firms' default risk, including dependence on external finance, corporate leverage, and managerial ethics. Our main results are robust to an alternative measure of default risk, inclusion of currency and sovereign debt crisis episodes, and alternative estimations.     

Quantitative easing and default probability of corporate social responsibility in US

The US Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing (QE) policies lowered the cost of servicing corporate debt and enhanced firms’ ability to borrow. This article seeks to improve the accuracy of default probability calculations as proposed by Merton (1974) under conditions of lower interest rates resulting from QE. By modifying the long-term debt ratio, we find distance to default is undervalued. Specifically, we find that the distance to default is more stably for firms with excellent corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance, but those with poor CSR performance are significantly undervalued. Our results show that improved CSR performance correctly estimates the firm’s default risk, even during QE when the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet expanded by nearly $4.5 trillion.     

Industry equilibrium with random exit or default

An industry consisting of a large number of small price taking firms subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks is considered. At the moment of entry, a firm takes on debt. We show that in a competitive equilibrium, some firms exit and pay out their debt while others choose to default. The outcome depends on the realization of firm‐specific shocks. The paper demonstrates that if the firms self‐select between exit with debt repayment and default, then the default region is disconnected from the exit region. The methodological contribution of the paper is the analytical characterization of the long‐run equilibrium for two scenarios of the initial distribution of productivity shocks. We consider two public policy mechanisms—contract enforcement and creditor protection. Our policy recommendation is that regulators need to reduce the contract enforcement if they want to decrease the long‐run default rate.     

Liquidity default,liquidity management and smooth dividends policy

Our article models liquidity financing constraints with the real options framework. By conducting a comprehensive investigation of the effects of shocks to liquidity constraints on the firm’s optimal investment, financing and dividend policies, our model highlights the importance of liquidity management and extends the liquidity management approach to hedge liquidity default risk. We find that being concerned about liquidity default risk will significantly change a firm’s behaviours, including those related to investment and the optimal capital structure. A firm that is concerned about its liquidity default risk will become more cautious: it will choose to delay investment and have higher leverage when internal liquidity is very low, but choose earlier investment and lower leverage when liquidity is high enough. The dividends policy can alleviate risks from both the external market and internal project volatility and provides an alternative explanation for the ‘smooth dividends policy puzzle’ commonly reported in empirical research.     

Does default point vary with firm size?

This article aims to improve the predictive ability of KMV model by distinguishing firm size. The evidence suggests that default point would vary with firm size. Using the method of particle swarm optimization, we obtain the optimal default point separately for large firms and small firms. Several statistical tests such as the model confidence set methodology show that our relatively tractable model is more likely to have the strongest predictive ability.     

Expected default based score for identifying systemically important banks

The issue of identifying systemically important banks has gained prominence since the recent global financial crisis in 2007. However, the extant methods either neglect the adverse impact on the financial system posed by a bank or ignore the various interactions among banks. To resolve this issue, the objective of this study is to put forward an expected default based score (EDBS) that overcomes the drawbacks of the existing methods from the perspective of contagion risk. This indicator measures the systemic importance of a bank by calculating the expected bank defaults triggered by its initial failure. In the empirical study, the expected default based score is applied to identify the systemically important banks in the Chinese banking system. Both the quantitative comparison with other major methods and the qualitative evaluation of the Delphi method validate the reliability of the EDBS method. The empirical results also demonstrate that interconnectedness among banks is an important and complementary driver of systemic importance in addition to asset size.     

Default correlation: rating,industry ripple effect,and business cycle

For a well-diversified bond portfolio, default risk over the investment horizon is known as the major risk and the risk is largely from correlated defaults. While plenty of theoretical work about default correlation has been developed, empirical studies on default correlation have not made much progress in the past two decades. In this paper, we fill this void in the literature by thoroughly investigating how default correlation changes across different bond ratings, over different time horizons, and across different industries over the sample period of 1970 to 2014. In particular, we examine how rating-based default correlations change before, during, and after recessions. More importantly, we reveal the ‘industry ripple effect’ that default correlations are low within upstream industries but become higher within downstream industries along the structure of the supply chain. Also, default correlations are relatively high between upstream industries and downstream industries.     

The relationship between risk-neutral and actual default probabilities: the credit risk premium

The study investigates empirically the relationship between the risk-neutral measure Q and the real-world measure P. We study the ratio between the risk-neutral and actual default intensities, which we call the coverage ratio or the relative credit risk premium. Actual default intensities are derived from rating agencies annual transition matrices, while risk-neutral default intensities are bootstrapped from CDS quotes of European corporates. We quantify the average risk premium and its changes over time. Compared to related literature, special attention is given to the effects of the recent financial and European sovereign crises. We find that average credit risk premia rose substantially and that post-crisis levels are still higher than those observed before the financial crisis. This observation is especially true for high-quality debt and if it persists, it will have an impact on corporates funding costs. The quantification and revision of risk premia contributes to the discussion of the credit spread puzzle and could give extra insights in valuation models that start from real-world estimates. Our work is furthermore important in the context of state aid assessment. The real economic value (REV) methodology, applied by the European Commission to evaluate impaired portfolios, is based on a long-term average risk premium.     

Sovereign default risk and volatility

In a model of sovereign debt with endogenous default, we find a non-monotonic relationship between default risk and volatility, reflecting a trade-off between prudence and the insurance value of default. We show that this feature also holds in the data.     

Capital asset pricing models with default risk: Theory and application in insurance

The Capital Asset Pricing Model has been used frequently to derive a fair price of insurance. But the use of this model overestimates insurance premiums because it does not account for the insolvency risk of insurers. This paper examines how the insurance price should be fairly adjusted when insurers' default risk is considered. It develops a model which shows that fair insurance premiums are lower when insurance firms have a positive probability of being insolvent. Using data of property liability insurers during the period from 1943–99, the paper further estimates the effects of the insolvency risk on insurers' underwriting profit rate. It shows that the incorporation of the default risk of insurers in the model, by significantly reducing the required price for insurance, would lead to lower profit potentials. Some writers argue that including the insolvency risk when calculating insurance premiums is not so necessary because of the existence of states' guaranty insurance funds which protect consumers. However, as shown in the paper, these funds have provided inadequate protection to consumers. Therefore, because of the increase in the number of insolvencies in recent years, and because of the limited coverage provided by states' guaranty funds, it seems that considering the insolvency risk in insurance pricing has become very necessary.     

Sovereign debt spread and default in a model with self-fulfilling prophecies and asymmetric information

The euro area sovereign debt crisis has renewed interest in government credibility and the risk of default. Recent empirical evidence has shown that the sharp increase in government bond yields cannot be attributed entirely to changes in macroeconomic fundamentals. Contagion effects can occur, and self-fulfilling speculation may arise. In this paper, we develop a theoretical model in the spirit of the second-generation currency crisis models developed by Obstfled (1996). The model describes a strategic game between governments and private investors. Euro area countries face a trade-off as governments may either commit to and implement restrictive fiscal policies or default on debt. The commitment strategy may not be optimal if the fundamentals deteriorate. The policy maker lose part of their credibility, and governments are forced to default. In addition, we introduce uncertainty about the cost of default in the model, which is then able to account for a greater variety of equilibrium. Thus, when the evaluation of the cost of default is asymmetric, prophecies are not always realized and default does not occur. Simulations of the model then show that it offers insights, and can help to account for the situations of Greece and Italy during the sovereign debt crisis.     

S-based taxation under default risk

This article studies the characteristics of a S-based tax system under default risk. In particular we show that its neutrality properties depend on whether debt is protected or unprotected. In the former case, this system is neutral. In the latter case, where default timing is optimally chosen by shareholders, the S-based system is neutral with respect to real decisions only if the firm's and the lender's tax rate are equal. However, the shareholders' decision to default is always distorted.     

A DSGE model of banks and financial intermediation with default risk

This paper takes the view that a major contributing factor to the financial crisis of 2008 was a failure to correctly assess and price the risk of default. In order to analyse default risk in the macroeconomy, a simple general equilibrium model with banks and financial intermediation is constructed in which default-risk can be priced. It is shown how the credit spread can be attributed largely to the risk of default and how excess loan creation may emerge due to different attitudes to risk by borrowers and lenders. The model can also be used to analyse systemic risk due to macroeconomic shocks which may be reduced by holding collateral.     

The effect of political factors on sovereign default

This aricle examines the effect of political factors on sovereign default. Using a theoretical model, we find that political instability increases the likelihood of default. To test this theoretical implication, we use a panel logit model to estimate the effect of long- and short-run political factors, along with other macroeconomic variables, on the probability of default. Data from 68 developed and developing countries between 1970 and 2010 is used to conduct the study. Our findings suggest that a country is more likely to default when (i) it has a relatively younger political regime in place; (ii) it faces a higher chance of political turnover; and (iii) it has a less democratic political system. Economic factors are also vital; a country with stronger growth and less external debt is less likely to experience sovereign default. Robustness tests using alternative measures of political risk, trade balance and EMBI sovereign bond spreads also support the baseline findings.     

Analysis of sectoral credit default cycle dependency with wavelet networks: Evidence from Turkey

In this paper, we investigate the relationship between industrial production and sectoral credit defaults (non-performing loans ratio) cycle by wavelet network analysis in Turkey over the period January 2001–November 2007. We use feedforward neural network based wavelet decomposition to analyze the contemporaneous connection between industrial production cycles and sectoral credit default cycles at different time scales between 2 and 64 months. The main findings for Turkey indicates that industrial production cycles effect the sectoral credit default cycles at different time scales and thus indicate that the creditors should consider the multiscale sectoral cycles in order to minimize credit default rates.     

Country Default Risk: An Empirical Assessment

We provide benchmarks to evaluate what is an optimal foreign debt and a maximal foreign debt ( debt-max ), when risk is explicitly considered. When the actual debt exceeds debt-max , then the economy will default when a 'bad shock' occurs. This paper is an application of the stochastic optimal controls models of Fleming and Stein (2001), which gives empirical content to the question of how one should measure 'vulnerability' to shocks, when there is uncertainty concerning the productivity of capital. We consider two sets of high-risk countries during the period 1978–99: a subset of 21 countries that defaulted on the debt, and another set of 13 countries that did not default. Default is a situation where the firms or government of a country reschedule the interest/principal payments on the external debt. We thereby explain how our analysis can anticipate default risk, and add another dimension to the literature of early warning signals of default/credit risk.