Six IT decisions your IT people shouldn't make

Senior managers often feel frustration--even exasperation--toward information technology and their IT departments. The managers complain that they don't see much business value from the high-priced systems they install, but they don't understand the technology well enough to manage it in detail. So they often leave IT people to make, by default, choices that affect the company's business strategy. The frequent result? Too many projects, a demoralized IT unit, and disappointing returns on IT investments. What distinguishes companies that generate substantial value from their IT investments from those that don't? The leadership of senior managers in making six key IT decisions. The first three relate to strategy: How much should we spend on IT? Which business processes should receive our IT dollars? Which IT capabilities need to be companywide? The second three relate to execution: How good do our IT services really need to be? Which security and privacy risks will we accept? Whom do we blame if an IT initiative fails? When senior managers aren't involved in these decisions, the results can be profound. For example, if they don't take the lead in deciding which IT initiatives to fund, they end up overloading the IT department with projects that may not further the company's strategy. And if they aren't assessing security and privacy risks, they are ignoring crucial business trade-offs. Smart companies are establishing IT governance structures that identify who should be responsible for critical IT decisions and ensure that such decisions further IT's strategic role in the organization.     

How to pitch a brilliant idea

Coming up with creative ideas is easy; selling them to strangers is hard. Entrepreneurs, sales executives, and marketing managers often go to great lengths to demonstrate how their new concepts are practical and profitable--only to be rejected by corporate decision makers who don't seem to understand the value of the ideas. Why does this happen? Having studied Hollywood executives who assess screenplay pitches, the author says the person on the receiving end--the "catcher"--tends to gauge the pitcher's creativity as well as the proposal itself. An impression of the pitcher's ability to come up with workable ideas can quickly and permanently overshadow the catcher's feelings about an idea's worth. To determine whether these observations apply to business settings beyond Hollywood, the author attended product design, marketing, and venture-capital pitch sessions and conducted interviews with executives responsible for judging new ideas. The results in those environments were similar to her observations in Hollywood, she says. Catchers subconsciously categorize successful pitchers as showrunners (smooth and professional), artists (quirky and unpolished), or neophytes (inexperienced and naive). The research also reveals that catchers tend to respond well when they believe they are participating in an idea's development. As Oscar-winning writer, director, and producer Oliver Stone puts it, screen-writers pitching an idea should "pull back and project what he needs onto your idea in order to make the story whole for him." To become a successful pitcher, portray yourself as one of the three creative types and engage your catchers in the creative process. By finding ways to give your catchers a chance to shine, you sell yourself as a likable collaborator.     

A case of AIDS

"A case of AIDS" by Richard S. Tedlow and Michele S. Marram explores the issues involved in managing an HIV-infected employee over time. When an opening on his team occurs, should Greg hire Joe despite his HIV infection? How should Greg handle the issue of confidentiality? And when Joe asks for a promotion, how should Greg manage the issue of Joe's long-term career? Three experts discuss each stage of the case as it unfolds.     

Connectivity and control in the year 2000 and beyond

By now, most executives are familiar with the famous Year 2000 problem--and many believe that their companies have the situation well in hand. After all, it seems to be such a trivial problem--computer software that interprets "oo" to be the year 1900 instead of the year 2000. And yet armies of computer professionals have been working on it--updating code in payroll systems, distribution systems, actuarial systems, sales-tracking systems, and the like. The problem is pervasive. Not only is it in your systems, it's in your suppliers' systems, your bankers' systems, and your customers' systems. It's embedded in chips that control elevators, automated teller machines, process-control equipment, and power grids. Already, a dried-food manufacturer destroyed millions of dollars of perfectly good product when a computer counted inventory marked with an expiration date of "oo" as nearly a hundred years old. And when managers of a sewage-control plant turned the clock to January I, 2000 on a computer system they thought had been fixed, raw sewage pumped directly into the harbor. It has become apparent that there will not be enough time to find and fix all of the problems by January I, 2000. And what good will it do if your computers work but they're connected with systems that don't? That is one of the questions Harvard Business School professor Richard Nolan asks in his introduction to HBR's Perspectives on the Year 2000 issue. How will you prepare your organization to respond when things start to go wrong? Fourteen commentators offer their ideas on how senior managers should think about connectivity and control in the year 2000 and beyond.     

Mommy-track backlash

"Please don't tell me that I need to have a baby to have this time off." Those words were still ringing in the ears of Jessica Gonon an hour after a tense meeting with Jana Rowe, one of her key account managers. Jessica, the vice president of sales and customer support at ClarityBase, considered Jana's request for a four-day workweek, for which she was willing to take a corresponding 20% cut in pay. Although the facts seemed simple, the situation was anything but. Just last week, Davis Bennett, another account manager, had made a similar request. He wanted a lighter workload so he could train for the Ironman Triathlon World Championship. Both Jana and Davis were well aware that Megan Flood, another account manager, had been working a reduced schedule for nearly two years. When she was hired, Megan had requested Fridays off to spend time with her two young sons. And since she came highly recommended and the talent pool was tight, Jessica had agreed to the arrangement. The eight account managers at ClarityBase were in charge of helping the company's largest clients install and maintain database applications, which often required no small amount of hand-holding and coddling. Because Megan had an abbreviated schedule, the other account managers were assigned the more difficult clients. But if Jessica agreed to a shorter workweek for Jana and Davis, who would take on the toughest customers? And what would happen if the other account managers started asking for similar deals? How can Jessica maintain the productivity of her department and meet her staff's needs for flexible work schedules while striking an equitable solution for both parents and nonparents? Four experts advise Jessica on her next move in this fictional case study.     

The very real dangers of executive coaching

A personal coach to help your most promising executives reach their potential--sounds good, doesn't it? But, according to Steven Berglas, executive coaches can make a bad situation worse. Because of their backgrounds and biases, they ignore psychological problems they don't understand. Companies need to consider psychotherapeutic intervention when the symptoms plaguing an executive are stubborn or severe. Executives with issues that require more than coaching come in many shapes and sizes. Consider Rob Bernstein, an executive vice president of sales at an automotive parts distributor. According to the CEO, Bernstein had just the right touch with clients but caused personnel problems inside the company. The last straw came when Bernstein publicly humiliated a mail clerk who had interrupted a meeting to ask someone to sign for a package. At that point, the CEO assigned Tom Davis to coach Bernstein. Davis, a former corporate lawyer, worked with Bernstein for four years. But Davis only exacerbated the problem by teaching Bernstein techniques for "handling" employees--methods that were condescending at best. While Bernstein appeared to be improving, he was in fact getting worse. Bernstein's real problems went undetected, and when his boss left the company, he was picked as the successor. Soon enough, Bernstein was again in trouble, suspected of embezzlement. This time, the CEO didn't call Davis; instead, he turned to the author, a trained psychotherapist, for help. Berglas soon realized that Bernstein had a serious narcissistic personality disorder and executive coaching could not help him. As that tale and others in the article teach us, executives to be coached should at the very least first receive a psychological evaluation. And company leaders should beware that executive coaches given free rein can end up wreaking personnel havoc.     

Pricing and the psychology of consumption

Most executives know how pricing influences the demand for a product, but few of them realize how it affects the consumption of a product. In fact, most companies don't even believe they can have an effect on whether customers use products they have already paid for. In this article, the authors argue that the relationship between pricing and consumption lies at the core of customer strategy. The extent to which a customer uses a product during a certain time period often determines whether he or she will buy the product again. So pricing tactics that encourage people to use the products they've paid for help companies build long-term relationships with customers. The link between pricing and consumption is clear: People are more likely to consume a product when they are aware of its cost. But for many executives, the idea that they should draw consumers' attention to the price that was paid for a product or service is counterintuitive. Companies have long sought to mask the costs of their goods and services in order to boost sales. And rightly so--if a company fails to make the initial sale, it won't have to worry about consumption. So to promote sales, health club managers encourage members to get the payment out of the way early; HMOs encourage automatic payroll deductions; and cruise lines bundle small, specific costs into a single, all-inclusive fee. The problem is, by masking how much a buyer has spent on a given product, these pricing tactics decrease the likelihood that the buyer will actually use it. This article offers some new approaches to pricing--how and when to charge for goods and services--that may boost consumption.     

Leading change from the top line. Interview by Thomas A Stewart and David Champion

Most CEOs who specialize in turning around struggling companies focus on costs. But for Fred Hassan, chairman and CEO of Schering-Plough, the primary focus in a turnaround is the top line. Since 2003, when Hassan took the helm at the global pharmaceutical company, he has overseen a remarkable recovery in performance. And consistent with his philosophy, the turnaround started with sales. Considering sales reps as less than crucial to strategy, Hassan cautions, is a big mistake. At Schering-Plough, he has concentrated on motivating and organizing salespeople to create trusting relationships with doctors. "You have to differentiate the salesperson in the customer's mind--just like you differentiate brands," he explains. A doctor may see 60 pharmaceutical reps on a regular basis but actually trust far fewer. To earn a spot in this inner circle, Schering-Plough reps try to turn each customer encounter into an occasion to help doctors provide better care for their patients. Schering-Plough also restructured its sales forces so that reps carry not just one kind of product, as they do in most pharmaceutical companies, but several. Covering a broad range of treatments gives reps more ways to build value-adding relationships with doctors. In this interview, Hassan discusses his success at Schering-Plough and his experiences at other pharmaceutical companies. During his career, he has built a reputation for being in tune with the front lines, as well as for reaching out to the managers who supervise salespeople. He has found that this level of personal attention not only makes reps feel respected but also gives him valuable strategic insights.     

Real Earnings Management in Sales

We surveyed 1,638 sales executives across 40 countries regarding their companies’ likelihood of asking sales to perform real earnings management (REM) actions when earnings pressure exists. Using this information, which we refer to as companies’ REM propensities, we study how company characteristics and environmental conditions relate to the responses received. The use of cash‐flow incentives for sales personnel and the distribution of interfunctional power in favor of finance rather than sales are both associated with companies’ REM propensities. In addition, we show that sales executives preemptively change their behaviors in anticipation of top management's REM requests. Sales executives working for public companies and companies in the United States reported higher levels of REM propensity. The data also support an association between REM propensity and finance–sales conflict. These findings and others are compared and contrasted with existing empirical and survey‐based research on REM throughout the paper.     

Six rules for accurate effective forecasting

The primary goal of forecasting is to identify the full range of possibilities facing a company, society, or the world at large. In this article, Saffo demythologizes the forecasting process to help executives become sophisticated and participative consumers of forecasts, rather than passive absorbers. He illustrates how to use forecasts to at once broaden understanding of possibilities and narrow the decision space within which one must exercise intuition. The events of 9/11, for example, were a much bigger surprise than they should have been. After all, airliners flown into monuments were the stuff of Tom Clancy novels in the 1990s, and everyone knew that terrorists had a very personal antipathy toward the World Trade Center. So why was 9/11 such a surprise? What can executives do to avoid being blind-sided by other such wild cards, be they radical shifts in markets or the seemingly sudden emergence of disruptive technologies? In describing what forecasters are trying to achieve, Saffo outlines six simple, commonsense rules that smart managers should observe as they embark on a voyage of discovery with professional forecasters. Map a cone of uncertainty, he advises, look for the S curve, embrace the things that don't fit, hold strong opinions weakly, look back twice as far as you look forward, and know when not to make a forecast.     

Getting 360 degrees feedback right

Over the past decade, 360-degree feedback has revolutionized performance management. But one of its components--peer appraisal--consistently stymies executives and can exacerbate bureaucracy, heighten political tensions, and consume lots of time. For ten years, Maury Peiperl has studied 360-degree feedback and has asked: under what circumstances does peer appraisal improve performance? Why does peer appraisal sometimes work well and sometimes fail? And how can executives make these programs less anxiety provoking for participants and more productive for organizations? Peiperl discusses four paradoxes inherent to peer appraisal: In the Paradox of Roles, colleagues juggle being both peer and judge. The Paradox of Group Performance navigates between assessing individual feedback and the reality that much of today's work is done by groups. The Measurement Paradox arises because simple, straightforward rating systems would seem to generate the most useful appraisals--but they don't. Customized, qualitative feedback, though more difficult and time consuming to generate, is more helpful in improving performance. During evaluations, most people focus almost exclusively on reward outcomes and ignore the constructive feedback generated by peer appraisal. Ironically, it is precisely this overlooked feedback that helps improve performance--thus, the Paradox of Rewards. These paradoxes do not have neat solutions, but managers who understand them can better use peer appraisal to improve their organizations.     

Dear white boss. Do you remember that first management-team offsite

It's easy for white managers to assume that their colleagues of color face the same basic challenges they do. On one level that's true--the work itself is the same. But on another level, African-American managers often contend with an atmosphere of tension, instability, and distrust that can be so frustrating they lose the desire to contribute fully. Their white bosses and coworkers are simply unaware of the "miasma" and are often puzzled when African-Americans quit apparently for no reason or seemingly overreact to a minor incident. This portrayal of what it's like to be different in the workplace takes the form of a fictional letter from a black manager to a white boss. The letter, based on interviews and surveys the authors conducted with hundreds of mid- to senior-level African-American managers, is not about the lack of role models or mentors of color or any of the other barriers that limit opportunities for blacks in corporate America. Instead, the letter sheds light on the realities that lurk below the surface for black managers--the feeling that they leave some part of their identities at home and the sometimes subtle and often systemic racial biases that inhibit and alienate African-Americans. "Differences really do matter, although they may matter in ways you probably didn't expect. One of the big ways they matter is that race is always with us," the letter writer observes. "As a friend of mine said recently, 'I don't think a day goes by that I'm not reminded that I'm black.'" The letter may not apply to every leader, black or white, or to every organization, but the issues are more widespread than corporate America cares to acknowledge. It should be required reading for all white executives who don't want talent to slip through their fingers.     

The science of thinking smarter. Interview by Diane Coutu

Advances in neurobiology have demonstrated that the brain is so sensitive to external experiences that it can be rewired through exposure to cultural influences. Experiments have shown that in some people, parts of the brain light up only when they are presented with an image of Bill Clinton. In others, it's Jennifer Aniston. Or Halle Berry. What other stimuli could rewire the brain? Is there a Boeing brain? A Goldman Sachs brain? No one really knows yet, says Medina, a developmental molecular biologist, who has spent much of his career exploring the mysteries of neuroscience with laypeople. As tempting as it is to try to translate the growing advances to the workplace, he warns, it's just too early to tell how the revolution in neurobiology is going to affect the way executives run their organizations. "If we understood how the brain knew how to pick up a glass of water and drink it, that would represent a major achievement," he says. Still, neuroscientists are learning much that can be put to practical use. For instance, exercise is good for the brain, and long-term stress is harmful, inevitably hurting productivity in the workplace. Stressed people don't do math very well, they don't process language very efficiently, and their ability to remember--in both the short and long terms--declines. In fact, the brain wasn't built to remember with anything like analytic precision and shouldn't be counted on to do so. True memory is a very rare thing on this planet, Medina says. That's because the brain isn't really interested in reality; it's interested in survival. What's more, and contrary to what many twentieth-century educators believed, the brain can keep learning at any age. "We are lifelong learners," Medina says. That's very good news indeed."     

Building a leadership brand

How do some firms produce a pipeline of consistently excellent managers? Instead of concentrating merely on strengthening the skills of individuals, these companies focus on building a broad organizational leadership capability. It's what Ulrich and Smallwood--cofounders of the RBL Group, a leadership development consultancy--call a leadership brand. Organizations with leadership brands take an "outside-in" approach to executive development. They begin with a clear statement of what they want to be known for by customers and then link it with a required set of management skills. The Lexus division of Toyota, for instance, translates its tagline--"The pursuit of perfection"--into an expectation that its leaders excel at managing quality processes. The slogan of Bon Secours Health System is "Good help to those in need." It demands that its managers balance business skills with compassion and caring. The outside-in approach helps firms build a reputation for high-quality leaders whom customers trust to deliver on the company's promises. In examining 150 companies with strong leadership capabilities, the authors found that the organizations follow five strategies. First, make sure managers master the basics of leadership--for example, setting strategy and grooming talent. Second, ensure that leaders internalize customers' high expectations. Third, incorporate customer feedback into evaluations of executives. Fourth, invest in programs that help managers hone the right skills, by tapping customers to participate in such programs. Finally, track the success of efforts to build leadership bench strength over the long-term. The result is outstanding management that persists even when individual executives leave. In fact, companies with the strongest leadership brands often become "leader feeders"--firms that regularly graduate leaders who go on to head other companies.     

Target ratcheting and effort reduction

In this paper, we examine how retail store managers reduce their sales activity in response to target ratcheting. We find that managers with favorable sales performance in the first three quarters reduce their sales activity in the final quarter. We also document that managers who engage in sales reducing activities enhance their likelihood of meeting their next-year sales target, which is based on their current sales. That is, managers who reduce their sales activity in the final quarter are more likely to beat their next-year sales targets than managers who refrain from reducing their final-quarter sales.     

What's wrong with strategy?

Why is it that successful strategies are rarely developed as a result of formal planning processes? What is wrong with the way most companies go about developing strategy? Andrew Campbell and Marcus Alexander take a common sense look at why the planning frameworks managers use so often yield disappointing results. Companies often fail to distinguish between purpose (what an organization exists to do) and constraints (what an organization must do in order to survive), the authors say. Many executives mistakenly believe, for example, that satisfying stakeholders is an objective that drives thinking about strategy. In fact, it's a constraint, not an objective. Companies that don't win the loyalty of stakeholders will go out of business. Strategy is not about plans but about insights, the authors add. Strategy development is the process of discovering and understanding insights and should not be confused with planning, which is about turning insights into action. Furthermore, because executives develop most of their insights while actually doing the real work of running a business, it is important for companies not to separate strategy development from implementation. Is there a better way? The answer is not new planning processes or more effort. Instead, managers must understand two fundamental points: the benefit of having a well-articulated, stable purpose and the importance of discovering, understanding, documenting, and exploiting insights about how to create value.     

The young and the clueless

It's natural to promote your best and brightest, especially when you think they may leave for greener pastures if you don't continually offer them new challenges and rewards. But promoting smart, ambitious young managers too quickly often robs them of the chance to develop the emotional competencies that come with time and experience--competencies like the ability to negotiate with peers, regulate emotions in times of crisis, and win support for change. Indeed, at some point in a manager's career--usually at the vice president level--raw talent and ambition become less important than the ability to influence and persuade, and that's the point at which the emotionally immature manager will lose his effectiveness. This article argues that delaying a promotion can sometimes be the best thing a senior executive can do for a junior manager. The inexperienced manager who is given time to develop his emotional competencies may be better prepared for the interpersonal demands of top-level leadership. The authors recommend that senior executives employ these strategies to help boost their protégés' people skills: sharpen the 360-degree feedback process, give managers cross-functional assignments to improve their negotiation skills, make the development of emotional competencies mandatory, make emotional competencies a performance measure, and encourage managers to develop informal learning partnerships with peers and mentors. Delaying a promotion can be difficult given the steadfast ambitions of many junior executives and the hectic pace of organizational life. It may mean going against the norm of promoting people almost exclusively on smarts and business results. It may also mean contending with the disappointment of an esteemed subordinate. But taking the time to build people's emotional competencies isn't an extravagance; it's critical to developing effective leaders.     

Negotiating without a net. A conversation with the NYPD's Dominick J. Misino

In some languages, the word for "business" is the same as the word for "negotiation." That's not really surprising: Every interaction--with customers, suppliers, and even partners and investors--entails negotiation. And some involve very high stakes: The breakdown in negotiations between Hewlett-Packard's management and its founding families, for instance, put the company's future in doubt. Dominick Misino is a man who knows about negotiating when the stakes are at their very highest. As a hostage negotiator for the New York Police Department, Misino successfully persuaded the hijacker of Lufthansa Flight 592 to lay down his gun and turn himself in. Misino spent the last six years of his career as a primary negotiator, handling more than 200 incidents and never losing a life. Since his retirement in 1995, he has taught negotiating skills to law enforcement officials, military personnel, and business executives. Anyone can become a crisis negotiator, Misino contends. It takes what he calls "applied common sense." Be polite. Listen. Acknowledge the other guy's point of view (no matter what it is). But it's clear that in dealing with hijackers, kidnappers, and child molesters, Misino is far from passive. Negotiation, he says, is really a series of small agreements, and he is adept at orchestrating those agreements from the start so that his adversary learns to trust him and come around to his point of view. In vivid and sometimes hair-raising detail, Misino demonstrates how he gets criminals to trust police officers enough to refrain from harming innocent parties and give themselves up. Many of the techniques he describes are surprisingly applicable to business negotiations, where the parties may seem equally intractable and failure is not an option.     

The post-capitalist executive. Interview by T George Harris

For half a century, Peter F. Drucker has influenced senior executives across the globe with his rare insight into socioeconomic forces and practical advice for navigating often turbulent managerial waters. In his latest contribution to HBR, Drucker discusses the impact of the ideas in his latest work, Post-Capitalist Society, on the day-to-day lives and careers of managers. Drucker argues that managers must learn to negotiate a new environment with a different set of work rules and career expectations. Companies currently face downsizing and turmoil with increasing regularity. Once built to last like pyramids, corporations are now more like tents. In addition, businesses in the post-capitalist society grow through many and varied complicated alliances often baffling to the traditional manager. Confronted by these changes, managers must relearn how to manage. In the new world of business, information is replacing authority as the primary tool of the executive. And, Drucker advises, one embarks on the road toward information literacy not by buying the latest technological gadget but by identifying gaps in knowledge. As companies increasingly become temporary institutions, the manager also must begin to take individual responsibility for himself or herself. To that end, the executive must explore what Drucker calls competencies: a person's abilities, likes, dislikes, and goals, both professional and personal. If executives rise to these challenges, a new organizational foundation will be built. While a combination of rank and power supported the traditional organization, the internal structure of the emerging organization will be mutual understanding and trust.     

The virtue matrix. Calculating the return on corporate responsibility

Executives who want to make their organizations better corporate citizens face many obstacles: If they undertake costly initiatives that their rivals don't embrace, they risk eroding their company's competitive position. If they invite government oversight, they may be hampered by costly regulations. And if they adopt wage scales and working conditions that prevail in the wealthiest democracies, they may drive jobs to countries with less stringent standards. Such dilemmas call for clear, hard thinking. To aid in that undertaking, Roger Martin introduces the virtue matrix--a tool to help executives analyze corporate responsibility by viewing it as a product or service. The author uses real-life examples to explore the forms and degrees of corporate virtue. He cites Aaron Feuerstein, CEO of Malden Mills, a textile company whose plant was destroyed by fire in 1995. Rather than move operations to a lower-wage region, Feuerstein continued to pay his idled workforce and rebuilt the plant. Unlike the typical CEO of a publicly held corporation, who is accountable to hundreds or thousands of shareholders, Feuerstein was free to act so generously because he had only a few family members to answer to. But as Martin points out, corporations don't operate in a universe composed solely of shareholders. They can be subject to pressure from citizens, employees, and political authorities. The virtue matrix provides a way to assess these forces and how they interact. Martin uses it to examine why the public clamor for more responsible corporate conduct never seems to abate. Another issue the author confronts is anxiety over globalization. Finally, Martin applies the virtue matrix to two crucial questions: What are the barriers to increasing the supply of corporate virtue? And what can companies do to remove those barriers?