经理人过度自信、不对称信息与企业投资决策

通过构造二阶段投资模型,本文探讨信息不对称情况下经理人过度自信对企业投资决策的影响.研究结果表明:对于真实融资约束企业和伪融资约束企业,经理人过度自信心理偏误可能引发投资过度或投资不足;过度自信程度时企业投资-现金流敏感度有正向影响;对于过度自信程度轻微的劣质企业,投资对现金流不敏感,经理人心理偏误仅在举债筹资时可能引发过度投资.     

Enhancing managerial incentives and value creation: Evidence from corporate spinoffs

We study corporate spinoffs with changes in CEO compensation to examine how spinoffs affect managerial incentive compensation and whether the changes in managerial compensation can explain the value enhancement and operating performance improvements that occur following spinoffs. Analyzing a sample of 124 non-taxable spinoffs during 1990–1997, we find that changes in incentive compensation are a significant motive for spinoffs. Changes in managerial incentives alone are consistent with the post-spinoff changes in operating performance, while changes in business focus are not. Spinoffs that are not accompanied by enhanced pay-performance relationship do not improve operating performance even with increased business focus. (JELG34, J33)     

Behavioral agency and corporate entrepreneurship: CEO equity incentives & competitive behavior

Scholars have long studied drivers of entrepreneurial behavior among established firms. Yet little is known about how individual factors shape a firm’s choice to pursue entrepreneurship. We draw on behavioral agency theory to explore the role of equity incentives in driving corporate entrepreneurship. Our findings suggest CEOs avoid corporate entrepreneurial behaviors as their option wealth increases. However industry dynamics also prove to be an important contingency when predicting the effects of both restricted stock and stock options on the likelihood that the CEO engages in corporate entrepreneurship. Our findings provide a theoretical platform for predicting dimensions of entrepreneurial behavior and highlight effects of CEO equity ownership.

     

Managerial expertise,learning potential and dynamic incentives: get more for less?

In this paper the impact of ability and learning potential on incentive contracts is analyzed. A central feature of the model is that the true ability will not be revealed. The learning potential of an agent is modeled as the magnitude of impact on the agent's expected ability that learning‐by‐doing has in a given task. Absent a managerial labor market, depending on an agent's learning potential, a monotone or non‐monotone pay structure may be optimal. The second important result is that using agents' ability distributions as inputs to information systems, higher learning potentials lead to less costly information systems, i.e. actions can be implemented at lower costs. Additionally, it is proven that the criteria cost minimization and value maximization are equivalent in the model's context. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managerial perceptions of corporate environmentalism: interpretations from industry and strategic implications for organizations

Environmental issues are becoming increasingly important in organization theory and practice. Corporate environmentalism is emerging as a process of addressing environmental issues facing business firms. In this paper I examine managerial perceptions of corporate environmentalism and describes how key organizational members interpret the relationship between their firm and the biophysical environment. Corporate environmental orientation and environmental strategy focus are two themes of corporate environmentalism that emerge from the study. I discuss managerial perceptions of regulatory forces, public environmental concern, top management commitment and need for competitive advantage, and how perceptions of these factors might translate into environmental strategies. I conclude by discussing implications of corporate environmentalism for organizational theory and practice.     

Abandoned mergers and the market for corporate control

This paper investigates the financial performance cf a sample of UK firms involved in abandoned mergers during the period 1977–81. Predictions derived from a broadly neoclassical theory of merger activity are tested empirically and implications for the theory of the firm are discussed. Using an extension of discriminant analysis for firms in our samples we cannot find any evidence to suggest that the market for corporate control exercises discipline in completed mergers or in abandoned ones. In the latter case we suggest that the motives for takeovers tend to reflect managerial rather than shareholder interests.     

基于公司治理的会计控制问题探讨

有效的会计控制对于公司治理结构的优化及推行均有重要作用;反过来,公司治理结构直接影响会计控制的有效性。公司治理与会计控制具有“共生互动”的关系,因而会计控制须纳入公司治理的整体架构当中,做到两个同步：一是在搭建公司治理结构的过程中,同步设计会计组织架构及运行机制;二是在公司治理配套制度体系建设过程中,同步建立会计监督和资金监控机制。     

Manager replacement,employee protest,and corporate control

When faced with the replacement threat, incumbent managers look for support from employees by investing in a non-contractible employee–friendly relationship. Enjoying the relationship, employees help managers preserve their job by protesting against shareholders. When the benefits from the good employee–manager relationship are large enough to cover the loss of managerial inefficiency, shareholders prefer to share the influential power at the firm with employees.     

CEO ownership, corporate control, and bank performance

This study examines the relation between CEO ownership and bank performance. In contrast to Pi and Timme (1993), we find that, when economic measures of performance are used, the relation between ownership and the performance of commerical banks is nonlinear. Additionally, in contrast to previous studies, we find the question of whether or not the CEO also holds the title of chairman of the board has an insignificant impact on bank performance. We conclude that, in commercial banks, management entrenchment may offset the effects predicted by Jensen and Meckling's (1976) convergence-of-interest hypothesis.     

An explanation for recapitalization in corporate control contests

This paper examines the role of corporate financial policy in determining the equilibrium allocation of takeover gains in corporate control contests. The model justifies capital-structure changes in response to a takeover bid, and shows how recapitalization can be used as a strategic device to alter the price a bidding firm pays to acquire the target firm.     

Optimal auctions and information disclosure

We characterise properties of optimal auctions if the seller may disclose information about the quality of the object for sale. We show that the seller maximizes his expected revenue by revelation of all information to all bidders and implementing a second price auction with appropriate reservation price.     

Narrative and organizational control: corporate visionaries,ethics and power

The purpose of this paper is to explore the language of corporate visions with particular reference to its strategic persuasiveness, the ‘narrative’ of the visions. It explores the nature and content of vision discourses to identify the main dimensions of visions with regard to strategic decision making, to the legitimation of business objectives and to motivation, and relates the vision phenomenon to the literature of narrative and social control. While the futurist elements to visions, their attempts to restructure the relationship of the organization to the environment, and the intuition on which individuals claim that their visions are based are all recognized as essential to the visionary narrative, the key dimension of visions is argued to be their ethical appeal. It is this appeal on which the power to motivate those towards whom the visions are directed is based. The paper concludes by considering the significance of the status of visionary discourse in the understanding of strategic decisions. We can either take visionary discourse on its own terms, and recognize the ethical dimensions of visions and their legitimate role in transforming the organization's relationship with its environment; or we can see them primarily as a further dimension of control which needs to be integrated analytically into the way we view the identification of strategic issues. Either way, visions call upon and reflect power in a significant way.     

Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study

This paper considers two multi-item auction formats (ascending and sealed bid) which both identify the minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices and where truthful preference revelation constitutes an equilibrium. Even though these auction formats share many theoretical properties, there are behavioral aspects that are not easily captured. To explore this issue in more detail, this paper experimentally investigates what role the design of the auction format has for its outcome. The results suggest that the sealed bid mechanism performs weakly better in all of the investigated measures (consistent reporting, efficiency etc.). In addition, we find that the performance of the ascending auction is increasing over time, whereas the sealed bid auction shows no such tendency.     

博弈分析视角下内部控制与公司治理的结合

本文从博弈的角度进行研究,得出结论：公司治理结构对内部控制的影响体现在权力的博弈中,只有各种权力在博弈中达到均衡,内部控制才会逐渐完善。     

浅析企业采购业务内部控制制度的设计

内部控制是企业内部管理的组成部分,对企业的生存和发展具有重要的意义。采购是生产经营中的首要环节,采购业务涉及现金与商品的进出,交易频繁,极易产生错弊,使企业遭受损失。因此采购业务内部控制制度的设计主要是规范采购与付款行为、防范采购与付款过程中的差错与舞弊。     

Knowledge transfer in corporate venturing activity and impact of control mechanisms

This study investigated how control mechanisms impacts knowledge transfer between a parent company and its new ventures in corporate venturing (CV). Based on the knowledge-based theory, we proposed that autonomy and incentive scheme may stimulate or eliminate knowledge flows in CV activity, and such relationships may be moderated by the extent to which CV activity is aimed at exploring new technologies/markets. Using a sample of 61 companies in both Japan and the United States, we found strong evidence that the impacts of autonomy and incentive schemes are contingent upon various CV objectives.     

Descending price multi-item auctions

We propose a simultaneous descending price auction mechanism to sell multiple heterogeneous items, each owned by a distinct seller, to a number of buyers. Each buyer has known private valuations on items, and wants at most one item. We show that if the sellers follow a descending price offer procedure and the buyers follow a greedy strategy for accepting the offers, the auction results in a nearly efficient allocation, and terminates close to a competitive equilibrium price vector. The descending price offer strategy of the sellers is close to a Nash equilibrium. However, we show that the buyers are better off waiting in our auction. There is a maximum limit (corresponding to the minimum competitive equilibrium price vector) till which they can wait without running into the risk of not winning any item. If the buyers wait within this limit, the prices can be brought arbitrarily close to a uniquely defined competitive equilibrium price vector.     

On second-price auctions and imperfect competition

Consider two sellers each of whom has one unit of an indivisible good and two buyers each of whom is interested in buying one unit. The sellers simultaneously set reserve prices and use second-price auctions as rationing device. An equilibrium in pure strategies where each seller has a regular customer is characterized. The result is applied in order to demonstrate that not allowing sellers to use second-price auctions may enhance total surplus.