On the probability of entry in potential competition cases

This paper explores, both theoretically and empirically, the extent to which having ‘other potential entrants’ to a market injected into potential-competition cases has been a worthwhile enterprise. This two-pronged attack leads to the conclusion that (he attempt to specifically identify potential entrants probably results in our deluding ourselves as to the likelihood that entry will occur, and that unless a convincing argument can be made to the effect that any given potential entrant from a stockpile of unnamed potential entrants is ‘reasonably likely’ to elect the entry option, expanding lhat stockpile will be similarly misleading.     

Firm and Group Influences on Venture Capital Firms’ Involvement in New Ventures

abstract Drawing on expectancy, equity, and collective effort theories, we argue that the level of involvement of individual firms in multifirm alliances depends on both individual firms’ self‐focused interests and factors stemming from the firms’ membership in the alliance group. We apply our theoretical arguments to the context of venture capital syndicates and test the hypotheses using data about 160 venture capital firms (VCFs) drawn from a survey instrument and a secondary data source. The results show that individual firms’ involvement in a multifirm alliance is somewhat dominated by group effects; specifically, financial stake relative to that of the group and the reputation of the other group members significantly influence the focal firm's involvement. However, focal firms’ involvement relates negatively to their own reputation. We discuss the implications of these findings for future research. Our results imply that firms in multiparty alliances pay attention to the characteristics of their alliance partnership to calibrate their own behaviour. In our specific setting, VCF involvement in syndicates depends more on relative syndicate characteristics than on the focal firm's absolute level of investment. Further, because reputation is negatively associated with involvement, entrepreneurs and potential syndicate entrants should ensure that they fully leverage VCF reputation to achieve their goals.     

Choosing the partners in the licensing alliance

I consider a situation in which the incumbent strategically adopts the licensing alliance, facing potential entrants. The queue of entrants consists of two firms, the ‘strong’ entrant and the ‘weak’ entrant, who differ in their productivities. The incumbent sets a licensing fee and offers it to the entrants. Each entrant decides whether or not to buy the licensing alliance. After the set of the licensing alliance is determined, they engage in the Cournot competition. I examine the optimal licensing fee, and show that the optimal licensing fee is to charge a discriminatory royalty to each licensee. I also examine the licensing policy on the partner(s): To whom should the licensor license its technology? By comparing the equilibrium expected payoffs for the licensor, I show that licensing to both entrants would be preferred to licensing to a single entrant. But, if the licensor faces the problem on choosing the partner, he prefers the licensing of the weak entrant to the strong entrant. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Information acquisition,foreign bank entry,and credit allocation

This paper presents a theoretical framework to understand the impact of foreign bank entry on the access to and the price of credit for different types of firms. A major point of departure from the previous literature is that incumbents’ information about firms is endogenous in the model; previous screenings and lending relations of incumbents determine which type(s) of firms they can identify. I show that incumbents’ information is negatively correlated with the quality of borrowers. Moreover, although a priori entrants have a comparative advantage in lending to transparent firms, previous lending relations of incumbents might reverse this relation. In particular, given that transparent firms are the only type screened before the entry and therefore they are the only type distinguishable by incumbents, entrants might have a comparative advantage in lending to opaque firms. The analysis provides new insights into the inconclusive evidence of the literature regarding entrants’ credit allocation.     

Platform competition: Betfair and the UK market for sports betting

We examine two episodes of strategic interaction in the UK betting industry: (a) Betfair (an entrant multisided platform, or MSP) versus Flutter (also an MSP), and (b) Betfair versus traditional bookmakers. We find that although Betfair was an underfunded second mover in the betting exchange space, it was able to attract punters at a much faster rate than the better‐funded first mover, Flutter. Moreover, while Betfair and traditional bookmakers competed aggressively for market share, they also developed a highly complementary relationship that favored all parties. We discuss implications for research in the economics and management of MSPs. Specifically, we argue that the literature would benefit from work that endogenizes platform design and that considers the possible competitive and cooperative interactions between the business models of traditional incumbents and those of potential innovative MSP entrants.     

Late entry,market shares and competitive survival: The case of synthetic fibers

This paper examines product policy in relation to the experience curve and product life cycle concepts in the context of the experience of the thirteen major firms in the Western European synthetic fibers industry. It examines the hypothesis based on Boston Consulting Group and the Profit Impact of Market Share (PIMS) evidence that late entrants to a market will be at a competitive disadvantage because they lack the accumulated experience of the pioneering firms. For each of the three main synthetic fibres, acrylic, nylon and polyester, it was found that the early entrants who established major market shares early in the growth phase of the product life cycle were able to maintain that leadership nearly twenty years later. In contrast not only did almost all the late entrants fail to achieve significant market shares but in the difficult market conditions between 1974 and 1981 they provided seven out of nine market withdrawals.     

The effect of entrant brand's ownership on national brands' positioning strategies

National brand manufacturers face the threat of new product entry from not only their traditional competitors (other national brand manufacturers) but also from their own customers (the retailer). We compare how national brands can limit the loss due to entry of these two types of entrants by positioning of their brands. Our results show that national brands position farther from one another when the new entrant is a store brand than when the entrant is another national brand. We also find that due to different positioning strategies of these two types of entrant brands—the entrant store brand positioning “in‐between” incumbent national brands whereas the entrant national brand positioning “away” from incumbent national brands—incumbent national brands may lose more from the entry of a weaker store brand than from the entry of a stronger national brand. Finally, we find that taking into consideration both pricing and product positioning decisions, consumer and social welfare are generally higher from store brand entry than from national brand entry.     

License Auctions and Market Structure

We analyze the interplay between license auctions and market structure in a model with several incumbents and several potential entrants. The focus is on the competitiveness induced by the number of auctioned licenses. Under plausible conditions, we show that auctioning more licenses need not result in a more competitive final outcome, contrary to what common sense suggests. This is due to the nature of competition among incumbents, which sometimes exhibits free-riding. We illustrate some results with examples drawn from the recent European license-auctions for third generation (3G) mobile telephony.     

Leadership and cooperation in growing teams

We study how the growth of teams affects leadership effectiveness and intragroup cooperation. We put experimental participants in two teams. In each team, the members voluntarily contribute to a club good. In one of the two teams, the members observe the contribution of a randomly chosen leader before they decide themselves. Two treatments allow for migration between the teams. In one of them, participants control access to their team with a voting process. By design, participants can achieve the efficient outcome only if they all move into one team. We compare the results with a leaderless setting as well as with four treatments which vary team size exogenously. The results show that high contributions of leaders encourage higher per-capita contributions of their followers which foster migration into their teams. In turn, larger teams experience even more courageous leadership and higher contributions, but the coordination effect diminishes. Nevertheless, the dismissal of potential newcomers in the treatment with voting suggests that team members see a trade-off between team size and contributions. They sacrifice economic benefits from potential entrants to maintain intrateam cooperation.     

Incumbency advantage and its value

Markets with network effects are typically concentrated. The aim of this paper is to discuss some recent work on “incumbency advantage.” That is, the fact that firms already installed generate higher profits than entrants even if the latter offer identical or even better terms (in terms of price and quality) to consumers. In particular, we review recently known sources of the advantage and potential mitigating factors and point to a number of open issues.     

International endogenous growth,macro anomalies,and asset prices

This paper develops a two-country production economy with complete and frictionless financial markets and international trade in which investments in research and development (R&D) by entrants lead to endogenous new firm creation and economic growth. Innovative entrants use both consumption goods in their innovation technologies to capture international technological spillovers. Households also consume both goods. Specifically, I compare the equilibrium implications from the model with technology spillovers to the ones from an equivalent model without technology spillovers, i.e. a model where entrants only use domestic final goods in their R&D expenditures. With these two models at hand, new insights on the interplay of endogenous growth and long-run risks, technology spillovers, complete financial markets, and international trade are obtained, particularly with respect to international macro and asset pricing anomalies. The novel technology spillover channel has the potential to help explaining a number of these anomalies.     

Incumbency and R&D Incentives: Licensing the Gale of Creative Destruction

This paper analyzes the relationship between incumbency and R&D incentives in the context of a model of technological competition in which technologically successful entrants are able to license their innovation to (or be acquired by) an incumbent. That such a sale should take place is natural, since postinnovation monopoly profits are greater than the sum of duopoly profits. We identify three key findings about how innovative activity is shaped by licensing. First, since an incumbent's threat to engage in imitative R&D during negotiations increases its bargaining power, there is a purely strategic incentive for incumbents to develop an R&D capability. Second, incumbents research more intensively than entrants as long as (and only if) their willingness to pay for the innovation exceeds that of the entrant, a condition that depends critically on the expected licensing fee. Third, when the expected licensing fee is sufficiently low, the incumbent considers entrant R&D a strategic substitute for in-house research. This prediction about the market for ideas stands in contrast to predictions of strategic complementarity in patent races where licensing is not allowed.     

Patent Settlements as a Barrier to Entry

We formulate a model of entry with two incumbent firms—a patent holder and an infringer—and a potential entrant, with asymmetric information about the validity of the infringed patent (patent strength) between incumbent firms and the entrant. Within this framework we show that patent settlements between the incumbent firms can be mutually beneficial even when the cost of trial is zero and the settlement agreement takes the form of a simple fixed license fee. For patents of intermediate strength, settlements are a tool for entry deterrence. The two parties agree on a high settlement amount which sends a credible signal to “outsiders” that the patent is not weak and therefore entry will not be profitable. This provides a novel explanation for the role of settlements and to the recent observation of high license fees negotiated in settlement agreements. It suggests that firms should disclose the settlement amount if they want to keep out further entrants. We also show that even nonreverse settlements that entail only a fixed fee can be anticompetitive because they are used to block entry.     

Entry limiting agreements: First‐mover advantage,authorized generics,and pay‐for‐delay deals

During patent litigation, pay‐for‐delay (P4D) deals involve a payment from a patent holder of a branded drug to a generic drug manufacturer to delay entry and withdraw the patent challenge. In return for staying out of the market, the generic firm receives a payment, and/or an authorized licensed entry at a later date, but before the patent expiration. We examine why such deals are stable when there are multiple potential entrants. We combine the first‐mover advantage for the first generic with the ability of the branded manufacturer to launch an authorized generic (AG) to show when P4D deals are an equilibrium outcome. We further show that limiting a branded firm's ability to launch an AG before entry by a successful challenger will deter such deals. However, removing exclusivity period for the first generic challenger will not.     

Entry and Predation: British Shipping Cartels 1879–1929

I examine the outcomes of cases of entry by merchant shipping lines into established markets around the turn of the century. These established markets are completely dominated by an incumbent cartel composed of several member shipping lines. The cartel makes the decision whether or not to begin a price war against the entrant; some entrants are formally admitted to the cartel without any conflict. I use characteristics of the entrant to predict whether or not the entrant will encounter a price war conditional on entering. I find that weaker entrants are fought, where "weaker" means having fewer financial resources, less experience, smaller size, or poor trade conditions. The empirical results provide most support for the long-purse theory of predation. Due to the small number of observations available, 47, I discuss qualitative evidence (such as predatory intent expressed in correspondence between cartel members) that supports the empirical results. The results are also found to be robust to misclassification of the dependent variable, which is a particular concern when dealing with historical data.     

Inefficient entry order in preemption games

In a preemption game, players decide when to take an irreversible action. Delaying the action exogenously increases payoffs, but there is an early mover advantage. Riordan (1992) shows that in a preemption game with two asymmetric players, players act in decreasing order of efficiency. This provides a microfoundation to the assumption that entry in a market occurs in the order of profitability, commonly used in the empirical analysis of market entry. We provide a counterexample showing that with more than two players this intuitive result can be reversed. We present a preemption game of entry into a new market. The potential entrants are three asymmetric firms: one “efficient” firm with high post-entry profits, and two “inefficient firms”. We show that the set of parameters such that the equilibrium entry order does not reflect the efficiency ranking is nonempty, and analyse which changes in post-entry profits preserve this entry order.     

Disentangling economic crisis effects from environmental regulation effects: Implications for sustainable development

With climate change becoming more severe, policy makers must impose environmental regulations that will lead firms to adopt sustainable corporate models. According to the Porter hypothesis, environmental regulation can favour the implementation of business strategies that improve economic and environmental performances. In this study, we examine how one such form of regulation, the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), impacts firm performance, and we subsequently widen the examination beyond the regulation to evaluate an economic crisis which could potentially confound regulation effects. We estimate a panel model with time- and firm-fixed effects for different subsamples that disentangle the effect of the EU ETS policy from the 2008 economic crisis. The results indicate that the EU ETS policy in its third phase can activate the Porter hypothesis and is effective in fuelling the implementation of sustainable corporate models by firms. However, we also find that the economic crisis neutralises the effects of the regulation on firm performance, precluding the triggering of the Porter hypothesis in severely affected firms.     

完全信息动态条件下企业总成本领先战略探究

首先,从迈克尔.波特教授的著作中引入总成本领先战略;接着,从博弈论斯坦克尔伯格模型出发,来建立所要分析问题的一般化模型,并分析一般化的完全信息动态模型得到均衡解。在结论分析中,引入要讨论的总成本领先战略,通过对比分析先动的企业和跟随的企业在采取成本领先的时候其市场的份额和利润,得到讨论的结论;先动的企业采取成本领先可以获得行业竞争优势,跟随企业在采取足够低的成本领先的前提下,也可以获得更高的市场份额和利润空间,从而可以获得竞争优势。     

Potential competition and quality disclosure

This study presents a model of quality disclosure in which an incumbent, through its quality and disclosure choices, influences the potential that a new entrant enters the market. In this regard, we consider a sequential framework in which the incumbent chooses its quality and decides whether to disclose it to the market; subsequently, the entrant makes the same decisions, if it enters the market. We show that the potential competition can create strategic incentives for the incumbent to choose nondisclosure, because the availability of information about the incumbent's quality promotes entry by enhancing the entrant's expected profit from the market. In addition, an analysis of the effects of mandatory disclosure laws suggests that they can be effective in encouraging new market entrants and in improving the product quality of established firms.     

The Effect of Leasing versus Buying on Entry Deterrence

Models of entry deterrence typically require that incumbents possess a cost advantage as a prerequisite for deterring entry. Potential entrants possess a cost advantage over incumbents, however, if input costs fall over time. This paper models the behavior of an incumbent and a potential entrant when the input cost falls over time and the firms have the option of buying or leasing the input. The model shows that if the future cost savings from new technology exceed the marginal transaction costs of leasing the current equipment, then leasing increases the incumbent's ability to deter entry. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.