Rivalry within strategic groups and consequences for performance: the firm‐size effects

Our study examines how, in a given industry, rivalry functions within strategic groups defined according to the size of their member firms and how this rivalry affects performance. We hypothesize that, owing to several forms of group‐level effects including market power, efficiency, differentiation, and multimarket contact, strategic groups that comprise smaller firms will exhibit both increased rivalry and decreased performance compared with strategic groups that comprise larger firms. We test our hypotheses by estimating the effect of group‐level strategic interactions (i.e., conjectural variations) on firm performance. Ultimately, our analysis of empirical data on loans in the Spanish banking industry demonstrates that increased rivalry and decreased performance indeed characterizes firms belonging to a strategic group that comprises smaller firms. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Asymmetric rivalry between strategic groups: response,speed of response and ex ante vs. ex post competitive interaction in the spanish bank deposit market

The objective of this study is to examine asymmetric rivalry between strategic groups in a given industry. Two research hypotheses argue for the existence of asymmetric rivalry in the sense that strategic groups of small companies have a greater degree of response but a slower speed of response to the actions of strategic groups of large companies, than vice versa. To test this, we use an ex post approach that examines the news releases published on the strategic actions and reactions of firms. A third hypothesis compares ex ante competitive expectations with ex post asymmetric rivalry between strategic groups. To test this, we compare ex post news on actions/reactions with an ex ante approach that estimates conjectural variations. The empirical application carried out on bank deposits in the Spanish market defines strategic groups in terms of size due to the historical and institutional conditions of the industry (deregulatory change). The results obtained show that rivalry patterns between strategic groups in terms of company size can be predicted as asymmetric in the sense that smaller bank strategic groups have a greater degree of response (Stackelberg ‘leader–follower’ competitive interaction), and a slower speed of response to the actions of larger bank strategic groups than is found the other way around. Moreover, ex ante expectations of aggressiveness on the part of larger strategic groups characterize greater ex post reactions from the smaller‐size strategic groups. Therefore, the size distribution of strategic groups is valuable to research on complex industries with deregulation changes. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

THE BENEFITS OF STRATEGIC HOMOGENEITY AND STRATEGIC HETEROGENEITY: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE RESOLVING PAST DIFFERENCES

Past research on the relationship between strategic variety and industry profitability has argued for either high homogeneity or high heterogeneity. In this paper, we review the literature on strategic variety and use it to develop hypotheses suggesting that the relationship between strategic variety and average industry profits is curvilinear. Based on our analysis of 61 industries, we find empirical support for our hypotheses, suggesting that very high levels of heterogeneity or homogeneity are more likely associated with industry profitability, while the industries in our sample displaying moderate levels of strategic variety are most likely to suffer from widespread financial losses.     

The relative impact of actual and potential rivalry on firm profitability in the pharmaceutical industry

This paper estimates the effects of actual and potential rivalry on profitability of firms in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry during the 20‐year period 1963–82. The results show that during the 1960s actual rivalry among the sampled firms did not materially affect firm profitability, but that during the 1970s competition among incumbents had an increasingly adverse effect on their profitability. The results also show that potential competition significantly reduced drug firms’ profitability during the entire 20‐year period. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

RESOURCE AND MARKET BASED DETERMINANTS OF PERFORMANCE IN THE U.S. BANKING INDUSTRY

This paper explores the implications of studying industry competitive patterns at the level of resource accumulation and the relationship between resource endowments and firm performance outcomes in the U.S. banking industry. It uses the strategic group framework to evaluate two models of rivalry and performance and concludes by discussing the implications of the findings for competitive analysis, strategic group theory and the banking industry.     

A longitudinal study of customers' desired value change in business-to-business markets

Customer value is a dynamic interactive phenomenon. Based on a longitudinal, phenomenological study of buyers and sellers in the New Zealand wine industry, we shed light on the phenomena of customers' desired value change (CDVC), driving contextual conditions, and firms' strategic response. A four-stage model of market-CDVC evolution is proposed. Findings identified external and internal drivers of CDVC, such as increasing niche density, changing customer demands, changing competitor actions, and increased competitive rivalry. We were able to track changes in each driver, and identify the related changes in CDVC, including changes in CDVC form and intensity, and the scope of CDVC related actions.     

Firm profitability and relative firm power

This paper expands the notion of extended rivalry as cross-industry relations within the chain of production and distribution, and argues that firm power resides in the exclusivity and essentiality of the firm's function in the chain. A cross-section of U.S. manufacturing firms representing components for finished goods, capital goods, and supplies or consumable products is examined. The analysis of the three industry groups by simultaneous equation estimation provides general support for the hypothesis that firm power, as expressed in inter-industry transactions, and industry structure, is associated with firm profitability.     

A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING CHANGES IN STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE

In this paper we present a framework for analyzing changes in strategic performance. Traditional measures for comparing the strategic performance across firms or over time have been return on investment (ROI) and its component ratio, return on sales (ROS). We decompose the ROS ratio into four separate ratios that capture the impact of changes in a firm's productivity, price recovery, product mix and capacity utilization on its profitability. These ratios help to highlight the micro sources of strategic success or failure. They can be used to assess changes in the performance of a firm compared to itself over time, or to other firms in its industry group. This framework can also be used to evaluate changes in the dynamic performance of an industry as a whole. We illustrate the use of these ratios with a 4-year analysis of the performance of a large manufacturing company. We also demonstrate how the technique can be applied to an industry with an evaluation of the performance of U.S. telecommunications firms between 1975 and 1987, a period during which the industry experienced a progressive increase in competitive pressure.     

STRATEGIC GROUPS AND RIVALROUS FIRM BEHAVIOR: TOWARDS A RECONCILIATION

This research examines the question of whether rivalry is greater between or within strategic groups by utilizing more direct, dynamic and fine-grained measures of rivalry. Examining the competitive actions of firms in different strategic groups to determine if competitive responses were more likely to occur from firms in the same strategic group, or from firms in different strategic groups, the research found that competitive responses cannot be predicted by strategic group membership. Importantly, however, strategic group membership is a predictor of the manner by which firms compete with one another, or the frequency with which they undertake competitive actions, cut prices, instigate warfare and imitate rivals. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic groups: Theory,research and taxonomy

This paper discusses the concept of strategic groups, focusing upon the importance of intra-industry strategic groupings in understanding differences across firms within an industry. The problems involved in identifying strategic groups within industries are examined through a comprehensive review of recent studies. It is demonstrated that much of the research has used surrogates for elements of a firm's strategic direction, e.g. vertical integration, product range, R & D expenditure, to suggest bases by which creative and sustainable groups are formed. The authors argue that certain theoretical concepts such as mobility barriers, isolating mechanisms and controllable variablesprovide much firmer bases for identifying strategic groups within industries. Thus, taxonomies for understanding the nature of strategic group formulation can be developed. Implications of the strategic group concept for such strategic issues as the structure-performance linkage, firm mobility, patterns of rivalry, industry evolutionand firm growthare then examined. The paper concludes by indicating fruitful directions for strategic group research in the context of the strategic management field.     

Strategy and environment as determinants of performance: Evidence from the Japanese machine tool industry

This study examines the roles played by the environment and realized strategies on firm-level performance in the Japanese machine tool industry. We examine the effect of environment and strategy on performance using longitudinal data on a sample of 25 Japanese machine tool firms over the period 1979-92. Our results indicate that both firm strategies and the environment play significant roles in influencing profitability and growth. More specifically, whereas both strategy and environmental variables are significantly related to firm profitability, only environmental variables are associated with firm growth. Additionally, in contrast to U.S. based studies, we find that capital expenditures and technological change are not negatively associated with profitability. Rather technological change has a positive impact on firm growth. We discuss the implications of these results for strategic management and provide suggestions for future research.     

Asymmetric rivalry within and between strategic groups

Our study examines asymmetric rivalry within and between strategic groups defined according to the size of their members. We hypothesize that, owing to several forms of group‐level effects, including switching costs and efficiency, strategic groups comprising large firms expect to experience a large amount of retaliation from firms within their group and accommodation from the group comprising smaller firms. Small firms, on the other hand, expect to experience a small amount of retaliation from the group comprising large firms and no reaction from the other firms in their group. We estimate the effect of group‐level strategic interactions on firm performance. Our analysis reveals that the rivalry behavior within and between groups is asymmetric, which supports the dominant‐fringe relation between firms, as described in our hypothesis. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The risk of contagion from multimarket contact

It is conventional wisdom that the strategic linkage of markets that is enabled by multimarket contact typically increases the profitability of cooperation among rivals. We find to the contrary that a strong force against strategic linkage results from imperfect monitoring of adherence to cooperation. With such imperfections, strategically linking markets can lower payoffs by permitting the impact of adverse shocks in one market to spread to others. Consequently, players of repeated games on more than one front may find it strictly advantageous to avoid linking strategies on a front with clear monitoring to outcomes on a front with error-prone monitoring. One implication is that antitrust, competitive strategy, and foreign policy analyses have presumed too broadly that multimarket contact fosters cooperation. The game-theoretic equilibria characterized here shed light on why players such as firms and nations sometimes strategically link fronts in their rivalry, and sometimes take care to articulate that some fronts of particularly volatile conflicting interests will not trigger broader adverse moves against the rival.     

An evolutionary perspective on strategic group emergence: a genetic algorithm‐based model

We develop a simulation model to examine conditions under which strategic groups emerge and their performance difference persists. In our model, mobility barriers, strategic interactions among high performers, dynamic capabilities (the mechanisms that allow winners to continue to survive), and boundary of rivalry are put together to derive their joint implications for the evolution of strategic groups. Not surprisingly, our model behavior shows that mobility barriers and strategic interactions play an important role in sustaining intergroup performance difference. However, the extremely high level of mobility barriers is shown to impede the emergence of strategic groups. We also find that dynamic capabilities and boundary of rivalry are as essential as mobility barriers in understanding the emergence and stability of strategic groups. When dynamic capabilities are absent or when rivalry is extended over firms with dissimilar strategies, strategic groups are less likely to exist. These findings can serve as a guideline for empirical research to probe why strategic groups exist sometimes and why they do not at other times. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the determinants of non-market strategy: The separations mechanism and cost shifting in the telecommunications industry

This study examines the relationship between performance levels and the levels of cross-subsidy attained by local exchange carriers in the United States telecommunications industry. These cross-subsidies have been obtained by firms via their engagement in a separations mechanism, based on a cost allocation process, which telecommunications sector regulatory authorities use. Non-market strategies have assumed primacy in the activities of several sectors world-wide. Thus, understanding non-market strategic choices is important in the analysis of firms’ behavior and performance. Active engagement in the separations process is an important non-market strategy in the telecommunications industry, as a firm relatively successful in this activity can gain large cross-subsidies. The analysis establishes that less profitable firms obtain greater cross-subsidies. Once the profitability variable is decomposed into its two main components, which are productivity and price recovery, the impact of the profitability variable reduces. Firms which are relatively unproductive, as well as those unable to recover higher output prices, obtain relatively greater cross-subsidies. These results are inconsistent with the postulates of the strategic cost-allocation and behavior literatures but are consistent with x-inefficiency and rent-seeking perspectives of firms’ strategic actions.     

Taking industry structuring seriously: A strategic perspective on product differentiation

Given legal impediments to consolidation and collusion, firms often resort to product differentiation to attain market power. This paper provides a formal analysis of product differentiation as a tool for such industry structuring at both the firm and industry level. We examine: how industry structure differs when firms collaborate on their differentiation decisions, and when the profitability of such collaboration is greatest; how an individual firm's differentiation decisions affect subsequent market outcomes under price competition, such as margin, market share, and profit; how mere differentiation differs from a ‘differentiation advantage’; and how changing a firm's differentiation affects its rivals through both positive externalities (by restraining rivalry) and negative externalities (by shifting competitive advantage). Our results have implications for empirical research, strategy theory, and pedagogy.     

Mobility barriers and strategic groups

A procedure for identifying strategic groups based on mobility barriers is recommended and illustrated. The strategic groups identified were observed to exhibit group membership stability and differences in profitability.     

Measuring strategic performance

This paper demonstrates the inadequacy of traditional measures, that are based on a firm's profitability, for evaluating its strategic performance. Two other measures, one that attempts to assess the quality of a firm's transformations (and not merely its outcomes) and the other that attempts to measure the satisfaction of all of the firm's stakeholders (and not merely its stockholders), are shown here to be important discriminators of strategic performance. The performances of seven ‘excellent’ firms from the computer industry, featured in the recent book by Peters and Waterman, are contrasted with that of seven ‘non-excellent’ firms from the same industry, to develop a framework for measuring strategic performance.     

Organizational performance in a regulated environment: The role of strategic orientation

This study explores the influence of governmental regulation on organizational strategies and performance outcomes. Drawing on literature in strategic management, we provide a longitudinal empirical analysis of viable strategies in the U.S. domestic airline industry during a 6-year period (1965-70) when it was regulated by the Civil Aeronautics Board. Results indicate that air carriers were indeed able to articulate coherent strategic postures despite regulatory constraints, and were thus able to influence profitability.