Potential competition and quality disclosure

This study presents a model of quality disclosure in which an incumbent, through its quality and disclosure choices, influences the potential that a new entrant enters the market. In this regard, we consider a sequential framework in which the incumbent chooses its quality and decides whether to disclose it to the market; subsequently, the entrant makes the same decisions, if it enters the market. We show that the potential competition can create strategic incentives for the incumbent to choose nondisclosure, because the availability of information about the incumbent's quality promotes entry by enhancing the entrant's expected profit from the market. In addition, an analysis of the effects of mandatory disclosure laws suggests that they can be effective in encouraging new market entrants and in improving the product quality of established firms.     

A Positive Theory of Moral Management, Social Pressure, and Corporate Social Performance

This paper provides a theory of firm behavior motivated by moral duty, self-interest, and social pressure. A morally managed and a self-interested firm compete in a market in which their corporate social performance (CSP) provides product differentiation. Some citizens have altruistic or warm glow preferences for products with associated CSP, personal giving to social causes, holding shares in firms providing CSP, and contributing to social pressure to increase CSP. Social pressure is delivered by an activist NGO funded by voluntary contributions by citizens. The model characterizes an equilibrium in the product market, the capital market, and the market for social pressure. The equilibrium establishes a price for CSP and for activist-induced social pressure. The theory provides predictions of the market values of firms, the prices of products, firm profits, target selection, contributions to the activist, and the amount of CSP supplied. For example, if citizens do not distinguish between morally motivated CSP and CSP induced by social pressure, the activist is more likely to target the softer, morally motivated firm. Higher quality activists are better funded, target self-interested firms, and obtain greater corporate social performance. Lower quality activists target morally managed firms.     

Product Market Competition,Skill Shortages and Productivity: Evidence from Canadian Manufacturing Firms

In this paper, we estimate the impacts of product market competition and skill shortages on the productivity level performance of Canadian manufacturing firms. We use firms perceptions of their competitive environment from the Statistics Canada 1999 Survey of Innovation to measure product market competition and skill shortages. We argue in the paper that such perceptions are important for productivity level performance. After controlling for other factors, we find that product market competition has a positive impact on the performance of medium-sized and large-sized firms, and that skill shortages have a negative impact on the performance of small-sized and medium-sized firms.Jel Classification: L0, O0     

一类价格调整问题的数学模型及其求解方法

虽然市场需求是价格的函数，但企业在价格调整实践中往往不能直接获取需求函数的具体表达式，而只能在某一给定价格水平下观察到市场需求量的值。因此，企业通常不能直接利用需求函数来调整价格以完成预期的市场需求调整的战略计划。本文将企业为达到市场需求战略调整目的而考虑的价格调整问题归结为一个隐式互补问题。在该模型中，企业可以依据自身经营战略目标的调整相应地调整各类产品的市场价格，使得价格调整后的产品销量迭到预定的目标。文章给出了求解这类隐式互补问题的直接迭代法，并给出了数值结果。     

When should a firm set its selling price to cope with gray market trade?

This study investigates the problem of timing for firms that must cope with gray market in setting its prices by applying an observable delay game. We consider a case in which a multinational firm sells a product in two countries, and a parallel importer buys the product in one country and resells it in the other country. We show that the multinational firm never sets its price at the same time when the parallel importer sets in equilibrium, and that the multinational firm's optimal timing depends on the degree of variation in consumer preferences for product quality.     

Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, and profits in the Presence of Double Marginalization

Whether vertical integration between a downstream oligopolist and an upstream oligopolist is profitable for an integrated pair of firms is shown to depend on whether one means by this that profits increase no matter what other firms do, that all integrated firms are better off when all firms are integrated than when none are, or simply that no downstream-upstream pair of firms has an incentive to deviate from a situation where all firms are integrated. It is also shown to depend on the number of firms in each oligopoly and on the type of interaction that is assumed between firms that are integrated and firms that are not. In particular, it is shown that if no restriction is put on trade between integrated and nonintegrated firms, integrated firms may continue to purchase inputs from the nonintegrated upstream firms, with the goal of raising their downstream rivals' costs. Furthermore, even though firms are identical, asymmetric equilibria, where integrated and nonintegrated firms coexist, may actually arise as an outcome of the integration game.     

Customization with Vertically Differentiated Products

We consider a duopoly market with heterogeneous consumers. The firms initially produce vertically differentiated standard products located at the end points of the variety interval. Customization provides ideal varieties for consumers but has no effect on quality. The firms first choose whether to customize their products, then engage in price competition. We show that the low‐quality firm never customizes alone; customization becomes more likely as the difference between the firms’ qualities increases; and less likely as the fixed cost of customization increases. We extend the base model by relaxing two important assumptions—uniform pricing and exogenous quality. The main conclusions with uniform pricing continue to hold when price customization is allowed. In the second extension the firms’ qualities are endogenously determined. We show that the firms choose to be either substantially differentiated in quality or nondifferentiated.     

Crisis spillover of corporate environmental misconducts: The roles of perceived similarity,familiarity, and corporate environmental responsibility in determining the impact on oppositional behavioral intention

Negative impact of a firm's environmental misconduct can spread to other firms under the same category due to stakeholders' categorization. Such problem implies a sociocognitive process that has yet to be explored. Therefore, this study extends the current literature by exploring how interfirm similarity affects the spillover effects through stakeholders' engagement. We propose that interfirm similarity can be perceived by stakeholders as a categorization standard, which can lead to their opposition to other firms. Spillover of misconduct is caused by the decreasing stakeholders' trust, wherein the negative effect is contingent upon stakeholders' perceptions. A questionnaire study is conducted to investigate how people resist an innocent firm in China when a chemistry firm experienced an explosion accident. Our findings confirm that interfirm similarity increases stakeholders' opposition to the innocent firm by decreasing their trust. However, the negative effect is alleviated when the innocent firm is perceived as highly environmentally responsible. Our work contributes to the crisis spillover literature and carries important implications for the management of innocent firms that may lose from an industry peer's misconduct.     

Debt financing,first-mover advantage,and vertical product differentiation

This paper examines the impact of the strategic use of debt financing as a commitment device, in a vertically differentiated duopoly with demand uncertainty. We consider various possible game sequences for two firms with asymmetric financial structures to enter the market. The results show that (i) having access to external debt does not necessarily promote the firm to provide a higher quality product; (ii) strategic debt improves the degree of product differentiation and benefits both firms; and (iii) a firm's optimal debt level is positively related to the first-mover advantage of introducing its product to the market.     

Capability building through innovation for unserved lower end mega markets

Although product innovation for unserved lower end mega markets in large developing countries has been recognized as an opportunity for improving the competitiveness of local firms, limited research has been conducted that explicitly explores how innovation capabilities can be built for these markets. This study investigates Tata Motors' Nano as an exploratory case of building innovation capabilities. This paper shows that the building of innovation capability could be achieved through creating a process that overcomes ‘the deficiency problem’ in generating radically cheap priced original products.The study's contribution to the literature is that it addresses issues of building local firms' innovation capabilities through creating original products for the unserved lower end market, in which advanced country firms have limited experience.Nano, as an unprecedented innovation in the automobile industry, reveals a path to building innovation capability that has not previously been observed. We show that detailed processes involved in generating an original product for the lower end market provide insights on the strategy in terms of target price setting, initiating innovation process overcoming ‘the deficiency problem’, and creation of complementary resources.     

Better Late than Early: Vertical Differentiation in the Adoption of a New Technology

After the initial breakthrough in the research phase of R&D, a new product undergoes a process of change, improvement, and adaptation to market conditions. We model the strategic behavior of firms in this development phase. We emphasize that a key dimension to this competition is the innovation that leads to product differentiation and quality improvement. In a duopoly model with a single adoption choice, we derive endogenously the level and diversity of product innovations. We demonstrate the existence of equilibria in which one firm enters early with a low-quality product while the other continues to develop the technology and eventually markets a high-quality good. In such an equilibrium, no monopoly rent is dissipated and the later innovator makes more profits. Incumbent firms may well be the early innovators, contrary to the predictions of the "incumbency inertia" hypothesis.     

Macroeconomic policy and the pricing behavior of imperfectly competitive firms

This paper develops theoretical models of the effect of expansionary macroeconomic policy on the pricing behavior of pure monopolist and oligopolist firms. A number of factors are identified which affect the magnitude of the price change chosen by an imperfectly competitive firm in response to macro policy action. The behavior of oligopolistic firms in response to macro policy changes is found to be influenced by the fact that expansionary macro policy initially impacts on industry demand rather than firm demand, and that the oligopolist's consequent pricing behavior will affect the share of the industry demand increase which it is able to appropriate.     

Vertical differentiation,product innovation,and dynamic competition

This paper presents an infinite horizon dynamic model in which two firms compete in a market vertically differentiated by the qualities of their products and consumers have heterogeneous preferences for quality. Given the product qualities offered, the firms engage in price competition that segments the market. In each period each firm can spend on product innovation that if successful increases the quality of its product. Three types of Markov perfect equilibria are identified. A running–coasting equilibrium exhibits increasing quality dominance with one firm undertaking innovation and the other coasting to free ride on the innovation by the first firm. The firm that coasts can have the larger dynamic payoff, so quality dominance does not imply payoff dominance. A second is a leap‐frog equilibrium in which the trailing firm undertakes innovation to leap into the lead. The trailing firm never innovates solely to narrow the gap with the leader, so catch up strategies are never used. In the third both firms undertake innovation, but if both have innovation successes, product differentiation remains the same and profits are reduced by the cost of innovation. The rivalry between Intel and AMD in microprocessors for personal computers provides a motivating example.     

Outsourcing,Product Quality,and Contract Enforcement

Does outsourcing compromise product quality? Does sound contract enforcement alleviate this concern? We offer a simple model to illustrate how outsourcing leads to lower product quality and how contract enforcement helps mitigate this problem. These theoretical predictions are borne out of a survey of 2,400 firms in China conducted by the World Bank in 2003.     

Oligopolies with (Somewhat) Environmentally Conscious Consumers: Market Equilibrium and Regulatory Intervention

We consider a horizontally differentiated duopoly where consumers care about the product's “greenness.” Firms can be asymmetric: they may differ in the product's intrinsic value and may also differ in their chosen level of greenness. We examine the choice of greenness and the implications of various policy interventions. We show that (i) the choices of product greenness are strategic substitutes, (ii) the high‐intrinsic quality firm produces the greener product, (iii) the low‐quality firm's greenness may increase with the cost of its provision or decrease with consumer willingness to pay for it, (iv) a minimum quality standard (MQS) leads the greener firm to lower its environmental quality and can even reduce average quality, (v) greenness is underprovided even if consumers fully internalize the externality, and (v) an MQS can reduce welfare if the greenness of the high‐quality firm exceeds the MQS, even when environmental quality is underprovided. The effects of policy interventions on profits differ qualitatively across polices and firms: A firm that lobbies for one type of intervention may lobby against another similar one, and a firm may lobby for an intervention while its competitor may lobby against it. A subsidy for the development costs of a green product can financially hurt both firms.     

Overcoming the Negative Product Quality Image of Manufacturers in Emerging Economies

Abstract

Companies from emerging economies often suffer from perceptions of negative quality for their products. This study investigates, using an experimental design, how manufacturers in emerging countries can make use of warranty strategies to overcome their negative product quality image. Contrary to what is proposed in the warranty literature, our study shows that the use of better warranties for products designed and manufactured by firms in the emerging countries does not improve their product quality image. This is because of the “too good to be true” suspicion by consumers. Strategic alliances with firms in developed countries to produce hybrid products also may not be effective in overcoming the poor quality image for firms in emerging countries. A comprehensive warranty package such as providing full repair and replacement of parts is also effective in altering consumers' trepidation of hybrid products originating from countries of low repute. Implications for strategic alliances between firms in the developed and emerging economies are discussed.     

复杂供应链网络风险识别下的审计质量研究——基于全球断供冲击的视角

通过重点考察复杂供应链网络风险识别下的审计质量，研究发现全球断供冲击下我国下游企业供应链运营的中断风险显著提升了审计质量。作用机制表明，全球断供冲击会影响审计师执业风险，进而提高下游企业的审计质量。异质性分析显示，上述效应在事务所信息化水平高、企业供应商集中度低、审计师具备行业专长及大规模事务所的样本中更加显著。经济后果检验表明，在全球断供冲击下高质量审计供给有助于降低企业股价同步性，提高资本市场定价效率。研究结论不仅丰富了供应链网络风险与审计质量的相关研究，也为识别复杂供应链网络风险传播机理、增强供应链竞争力提供了理论依据与经验参考。     

An explanation of why shareholders' losses are so large after drug recalls

Recent studies show firms suffering drug recalls experience security losses many times larger than any reasonable measure of their direct cost. We discover that the implied standard deviation of stock returns from the Black-Scholes option pricing model significantly increases after a drug recall. The implied standard deviation provides a good proxy for the stock's ex ante beta. The higher systematic risk after a product recall must raise the discount rate used by investors. After a recall, stock prices are reduced in line with the lower expected future earnings and are further reduced because of a higher discount rate.     

Sequential product positioning in the presence of an asymmetric network externality intensity

In this study, we analyze the sequential decisions on product positioning of two firms in the presence of network externalities. One commonly accepted phenomena in a market where a network externality arises is the first‐mover advantage, in which the first entrant into a market can earn a higher profit than later entrants. However, in some recent online services markets, we see that the second mover earns a higher profit than the first mover. This occurs because the second mover strengthens its variety of available functions and services markedly, thereby facilitating consumers' work and communication with its main product, which we call network externality intensity. Based on this observation, we analyze sequential positioning in Hotelling's framework by incorporating an asymmetric network externality intensity between firms. We show that unlike the results of previous related studies, both first‐ and second‐mover advantages can appear in the equilibrium depending on the relationship of the network externality intensity between firms; further, they do not change monotonically with the level of network externality intensity.     

A decision model for bank branch site selection: Define branch success and do not deviate

Site selection is one of the most important decision making processes for firms since, if done correctly, it provides access to the best customers and the greatest market potential. In contrast, poor location choices are costly and difficult to reverse.This paper deals with the single branch site selection problem in the banking context. Due to the high level of complexity (several factors have to be taken into consideration in the decision making process as well as a wide range of entities' internal requirements), to date there is no single procedure that fits all needs. This paper attempts to provide a solution to this problem by proposing a unified method based on minimizing the distance from the candidate-branch to the most successful branches, taking into account each banking institution’ notion of branch success. This methodology would work well at the lowest possible cost.