Environmental Regulation and the Eco-Industry

This paper re-examines environmental regulation, under the assumption that pollution abatement technologies and services are provided by an imperfectly competitive environment industry. It is shown that each regulatory instrument (emission taxes and quotas; design standards; and voluntary agreements) has a specific impact on the price-elasticity of the polluters’ demand for abatement services, hence on the market power of the eco-industry and the resulting cost of abatement. This implies that the optimal pollution tax will be higher than the marginal social cost of pollution, while a voluntary approach to pollution abatement may fail unless the eco-industry itself is willing to participate.We thank Dominique Bureau, Olivier Godard, Émeric Henry, Nicolas Marchetti, Alain-Désiré Nimubona, Anne Perrot, Gilles Rotillon, Katheline Schubert, the editors Michael Crew and Anthony Heyes, and two anonymous referees for helpful discussions and suggestions. We also acknowledge valuable comments from seminar audiences at HEC Montréal, the University of Paris I, the University of Toulouse, and the DG-Entreprise of the European Commission in Brussels.     

Pollution Abatement as a Barrier to Entry

With the dramatic increase in federal and state environmental regulation in the 1970s, the cost of compliance also rose. While compliance costs have been discussed elsewhere, the implications for the competitiveness of markets have been evaluated using case studies of specific law changes and specific industries. This study examines the role of environmental regulations as barriers to entry using a panel of industries over ten years. The results indicate that environmental costs increase the value of q for the top quartile of firms, which suggests that compliance cost constitutes a barrier to entry and creates rents for larger existing firms.     

财政分权、政府激励与环境治理

本文运用中国省级面板数据构建计量模型,分析了在财政分权的体制下,地方政府激励模式对环境污染和治理的影响.实证结果表明,在以GDP为考核指标的激励下,财政分权显著地提高了各种工业污染的排放量,降低了工业污染治理投资额;同时,工业化和城镇化进程加剧了环境污染程度和治理难度.环境问题的改善需要相关部门对地方政府考核机制做出适当调整,地方政府应在其中发挥更为积极的作用.     

Pollution Abatement Investment When Environmental Regulation Is Uncertain

In a dynamic model of a risk-neutral competitive firm that can lower its pollution emissions per unit of output by building up abatement capital stock, we examine the effect of a higher pollution tax rate on abatement investment both under full certainty and when the timing or the size of the tax increase is uncertain. We show that a higher pollution tax encourages abatement investment if it does not exceed a certain threshold rate. However, akin to the Diamond-Mirrlees tax anomaly, it is possible that a higher pollution tax rate results in more pollution. The magnitude uncertainty discourages abatement investment, but at the time of the actual tax increase the abatement investment path may shift either upward or downward. On the other hand, when the timing is uncertain, the abatement investment path always jumps upward, thus suggesting that the effect of magnitude uncertainty on the optimal investment path may be more pronounced than that of timing uncertainty. Further, we show that the ad hoc practice of raising the discount rate to account for the uncertainty leads to underinvestment in abatement capital. We show how the size of this underinvestment bias varies with the future tax increase. Finally, we show that a credible threat to accelerate the tax increase can induce more abatement investment.     

Abatement and Permits when Pollution is Uncertain and Violations are Fined

This paper considers a firm’s choice of abatement and of the number of permits if actual pollution is stochastic such that full compliance cannot be ensured. This straightforward extension induces non-trivial and unexpected comparative static properties, such as: permits and abatement can be either substitutes or complements, higher fines can lower the number of acquired permits (or abatement), and higher permit prices can reduce abatement. Yet integrating these reactions into a (competitive) permit market eliminates puzzling features. This is an additional justification of tradable permits over standards, where regulators must cope with potentially counterproductive firm reactions. A first version of the paper was written at the School of Finance and Economics, University of Technology, Sydney and I am grateful for the enjoyed hospitality. I am also grateful for the valuable comments from an anonymous referee.     

The Impact of Foreign Aid Linked to Infrastructure and Pollution Abatement

This paper studies the macroeconomic effects of foreign aid taking into account environmental quality. We develop a dynamic equilibrium model in which public investments in both infrastructure and pollution abatement can be co‐financed using domestic resources and international aid. We consider untied aid, aid fully tied to either infrastructure or abatement and aid equally tied to both expenditures. We find that when the extent to which agents are affected by environmental problems is taken into account, then, regardless of the chances of substitution between factors, transfers linked to both infrastructure and pollution abatement may be the best welfare‐enhancing alternative.     

Technical Synergies and Trade-Offs Between Abatement of Global and Local Air Pollution

In this paper, we explore the synergies and tradeoffs between abatement of global and local pollution. We build a unique dataset of Swedish combined heat and power plants with detailed boiler-level data 2001–2009 on not only production and inputs but also on emissions of \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) and \(\hbox {NO}_{\mathrm{x}}\). Both pollutants are regulated by strict policies in Sweden. \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) is subject to the European Union Emission Trading Scheme and Swedish carbon taxes; \(\hbox {NO}_{\mathrm{x}}\)—as a precursor of acid rain and eutrophication—is regulated by a heavy fee. Using a quadratic directional output distance function, we characterize changes in technical efficiency as well as patterns of substitutability in response to the policies mentioned. The fact that generating units face a trade-off between the pollutants indicates the need for policy coordination.     

Technical Change and Measuring Pollution Abatement Costs: An Activity Analysis Framework

The cornerstones of studies that estimate the effectof environmental regulations on an economy areestimates of the pollution abatement costs incurred bythe manufacturing and electric utility sectors.However, there are concerns regarding the accuracy ofthe surveys used to generate these cost estimates.This paper demonstrates that technical change tends toresult in an increasing share of pollution abatementcosts being impossible to measure. This finding hasimportant implications for estimating the productivityeffects of environmental regulations, developingregulatory budgets, and data collection effortsrelated to environmental accounting.     

Lethal Effects of Pollution and Economic Growth: Efficiency of Abatement Technology

The accumulation of pollution negatively impacts human health. Extreme increases in pollution, in particular, may have lethal implications for human beings, and, indeed, all living organisms. This paper thus devises a new model of economic growth that takes into account these lethal effects of accumulated pollution via a pollution threshold to show two key results. First, if an abatement technology is relatively inefficient, there exists a stationary steady state in which consumption and pollution stop growing. Second, if the abatement technology is sufficiently efficient, there exists a path along which pollution decreases at an accelerating rate until it finally reaches zero. In this case, consumption grows at a constant rate.     

Enforcement of Intellectual Property,Pollution Abatement,and Directed Technical Change

We theoretically investigate the interaction between endogenous enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPRs) and tax-financed pollution abatement measures. IPRs affect dirty and clean intermediates alike such that higher IPR enforcement may promote the transition to the clean technology, if this technology is productive enough. If the green technology is relatively unproductive, higher IPRs promote the dirty technology while pollution is increasing. As households are due to subsistence consumption subject to a hierarchy of needs, the level of IPR enforcement as well as the level of abatement measures depends on the state of technology and is increasing during economic development. Thus, if the incentive to enforce IPRs is low the level of abatement measures is also low. This argument provides a theoretical foundation for the observed clash of interests in international negotiation rounds regarding the harmonization of IPR protection and actions to combat climate change.     

R&D Subsidies versus R&D Cooperation in a Duopoly with Spillovers and Pollution

We introduce pollution, as a by‐product of production, into a non‐tournament model of R&D with spillovers. Technology policy takes the form of either R&D subsidisation or pre‐competitive R&D cooperation. We show that, when the emissions tax is exogenous, the optimal R&D subsidy can be negative, i.e. there should be a tax on R&D, depending on the extent of the appropriability problem and the degree of environmental damage. In a wide class of cases, depending on the parameter values, welfare in the case of R&D cooperation, is lower than welfare in the case of R&D subsidisation.     

生态产业系统的管理理念剖析

生态产业系统是一个经济过程高效、生态功能和谐的进化型产业系统，是可持续发展战略的重要内容和保证经济增长方式转变的必由之路。本文首先通过分析生态产业系统管理的内涵和实质及层次．建立起该产业系统管理的基础；然后．通过对整体协同理念、时空理念、生态效益理念以及耦合共生理念的分析．进一步阐释了生态产业系统管理理念。最后指出只有构建这种新的理念．才能在生态产业系统管理时把握系统发展及其方向，最终实现产业系统的生态化和整个社会的可持续发展目标。     

Pollution Abatement and Productivity Growth: Evidence from Germany,Japan, the Netherlands,and the United States

The passage of environmental legislation was accompanied by concerns about its potential detrimental effect on productivity. We assume inputs can be assigned to either abatement activities or good output production. This allows us to specify regulated and unregulated production frontiers to determine the association between pollution abatement and productivity growth. We then employ our “assigned input” model to determine the association between productivity and abatement activities for manufacturing industries in Germany, Japan, the Netherlands and the United States.     

Incentives for Investment in Advanced Pollution Abatement Technology in Emission Permit Markets with Banking

We examine the incentives that firms have to invest in cleaner abatementtechnology when the banking of permits is allowed in emission permittrading schemes. We show that under certainty permit banking can distortincentives for investment and lead to a sub-optimal amount of investmentspending. Under imperfect information, aggregate abatement costuncertainty and investment irreversibility provide arguments for allowingbanking. We generalize the model to consider these, showing that somebanking is desirable but that it need not be the case that the privatebanking solution is optimal.     

我国生态产业运营机制的三维理论模型研究

生态产业是我国经济可持续发展的本质要求，是发展循环经济的重要保障。本文在分析我国生态产业现状的基础上，建立了我国生态产业运营机制的三维理论模型，提出了适应市场经济体制的生态产业自我发育、自我生长的运营机制。     

Environmental Abatement and Intergenerational Distribution

This paper employs an overlapping-generations model to explore the impactof public abatement on private investment and the intergenerationaldistribution of welfare. Whereas public abatement benefits the oldestgenerations in terms of non-environmental welfare, future generations gainmost in terms of environment welfare. The overall benefits tend to besmallest for generations born at the time of the unanticipated policy shock.Public debt policy, however, can be employed to ensure that welfare gainsare distributed more equally across the various generations. Such a policyimplies that natural capital crowds-out man-made capital.     

Abatement investments and green goodwill

This paper develops and estimates a dynamic model that links profits to green goodwill. Assuming that abatement investments generate green goodwill, and using data from the Swedish pulp industry, we are able to test the effects of green goodwill on firm level output price and profits. The results suggests that Swedish pulp plant output prices and profits may be positively related to changes in green goodwill. Furthermore, no evidence is found to support the existence of adjustment costs due to abatement investments.