Strategic location of firms: Does it empower bribe givers or bribe takers?

This paper uses survey data on the corruption experience (rather than corruption perceptions) of firms located in different types of cities in more than one hundred countries to analyze the impact of firms’ strategic location on corruption. In a corrupt economy, location might influence the ability of bureaucrats/politicians and firms to extract and dodge rents. Placing the analysis in the literature on determinants of corruption, our results reveal that the corruption experiences of firms located in nations’ capital cities are qualitatively different from firms located elsewhere: they do not experience greater corruption, while firms in large cities and main business cities do. However, when manufacturing and service firms are considered separately, their corruption experience and perceptions differ.     

Measures of corruption and determinants of US corruption

This paper contributes to the literature by examining whether conclusions from empirical models of corruption determinants are robust with respect to three alternative measures of corrupt activity for the US states. Are the determinants of US corruption sensitive to the choice of the measure of corruption? Overall, the answer to this question is that the choice of the measure of corruption matters in explaining corruption. However, some findings are robust across measures. For instance, greater educational attainment lowers corruption, while greater judicial employment adds to corruption. Southern states were found to be more corrupt, ceteris paribus. We also provide evidence that it is important to control for enforcement efforts in empirical modeling using convictions as a measure of corruption. Significant differences, however, across corruption measures occur in a number of other instances. Specifically, the effects of urbanization, economic prosperity, population size, media, government spending, and enforcement are sensitive to the measure of corruption. Further, the influences of the nation’s foreign neighbors and of the location of the state relative to the nation’s capital remain unclear.     

Institutional quality and environmental pollution: MENA countries versus the rest of the world

Using data for over 100 nations over the years 2004–2007, this study examines the effect, of institutional quality on environmental pollution, focusing primarily on influences of corruption, and the shadow economy, and paying special attention to MENA countries. Controlling for a, number of factors, results show that both more corrupt nations and nations with large shadow sectors have qualitatively and quantitatively similar effects in yielding fewer (recorded) emissions; however, MENA nations have higher pollution rates. Policy implications are noted.     

Effects of subject pool culture and institutional environment on corruption: Experimental evidence from Albania

This research uses experimental methods to investigate whether subject pool culture and institutional environment have an effect on participants’ corrupt behavior in the laboratory. While we find that subject pool culture does not affect the overall magnitude of corruption of laboratory participants, it does affect the likelihood of corruption and its distribution. Additionally, we find that the effect on corrupt behavior differs with the framing of the experiment’s instructions. Interestingly, in the context of a weak rule of law and high levels of corruption, loaded negative instructions positively affect corrupt behavior of firms and public officials. Previous research in the context of a country exhibiting a strong rule of law and low levels of corruption finds no framing effects. We also find that increasing the probability of detection significantly reduces corruption as measured by the amount of the bribes offered/accepted and the probability of offering/accepting a bribe. Finally, we find that individual risk preferences negatively affect the level of corrupt behavior.     

Judiciaries in corrupt societies

Recent empirical work shows that judicial dependence can explain high levels of corruption. This paper examines how the dependence of judiciaries influences corruption at different levels of the government in a model where the central government, low-level officials, and the judiciary are corrupt. In the model, the central government sells offices to low-level officials and demands ex-post payments enforced by the judiciary. Because an independent judiciary can rule against the central authority and accept bribes from stealing low-level officials, it reduces corruption at the higher level of government but promotes corruption at the lower level. Therefore, even if highly corrupt, an independent judiciary may reduce total corruption.     

Is privatization related to corruption? An empirical analysis of European countries

This study analyses the relationship between privatization and corruption in Europe over the period 1995 to 2013, taking into account the problems surrounding the issue of causality. There have been researches into the role of privatization in reducing corruption, but decisions about privatization itself are made by politicians, and so corruption could also affect decision making about privatizations. The empirical findings suggest that perceived corruption decreases as the number of privatization transactions increases, but the effect is contrary when privatizations are a more important in terms of annual revenues. Furthermore, our results indicate that overall, privatizations carried out since the early 1980s have not been effective in reducing corruption in Europe. Indeed, privatizations reforms are more carried out in the less corrupt countries.     

Judicial checks on corruption in the United States

Judicial oversight provides an important check on executive and legislative power. Two components of judicial oversight have been identified in the literature: judicial independence and constitutional review. Recent research using country-level data indicates that the effectiveness of constitutional review is largely determined by the rigidity of the constitution. In this paper, I use state-level data to test whether judicial independence and constitutional rigidity are related to a specific type of abuse of power by government officials: corruption in office. Specifically, I fit negative binomial regressions in which the dependent variable is the number of officials convicted for corrupt acts and the independent variables are (i) measures of judicial independence, such as judges’ remuneration, method of appointment, and term length, along with various controls or (ii) measures of constitutional rigidity, such as legislative majorities required to propose constitutional amendments and provisions for constitutional conventions or constitutional initiatives, along with various controls. I find that, in general, states with higher levels of judicial independence and more rigid constitutions have lower levels of corruption per capita than states with the opposite characteristics.     

Corruption in transition economies: Effects of government size, country size and economic reforms

This paper uses annual pooled data over 1998–2002 for transition countries to examine whether government size or country size matters more in its impact on corruption; and whether piecemeal reforms or comprehensive transition reforms are desirable for corruption reduction. Our results show that greater economic prosperity leads to lower corruption, and contrary to findings for other nations, a bigger government size seems toreduce corruption in transition nations. The geographic size of a country is positive and significant, suggesting that more spread out countries would have a harder time controlling corruption. Comprehensive transition reforms might work best at corruption reduction. A version of this paper was presented at the Sixth Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting of the Mediterranean Programme of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute, Montecatini Terme, March 2005. Comments of participants at the Mediterranean meetings, especially Utku Teksoz, and two anonymous referees are appreciated. Insightful comments by Prof. Vojmir Franicevic on an earlier version and research assistance of Richard Connelly are also appreciated. Remaining errors are our own.     

Causes of corruption: a survey of cross-country analyses and extended results

We survey and assess the empirical literature on the sources of corruption Thanks to the improved availability of data, we are able to produce an improved cross-country econometric model to test well-established and more recent hypotheses jointly. We do not find that the common law system, or a past as a British colony predicts corruption. Our results support cultural theories on the causes of corruption, and suggest that a medium-long exposure to uninterrupted democracy is associated with lower corruption levels, while political instability tends to raise corruption. Our results also suggest that the diffusion of newspapers helps to lower corruption levels.      

An Empirical Approach

There is empirical evidence that investors' confidence is not only adversely affected by corruption but also by the lack of predictability and confidence that accompanies corrupt deals. However, the positive aspect of this lack of confidence is that it acts as a deterrent to corruption. Empirical data provided here on a cross–section of countries proves that confidence in corrupt deals enhances the further spread of corruption. This suggests that the adverse effects of corruption cannot be avoided by divesting it of its unpredictability.     

Collusive Market Sharing and Corruption in Procurement

This paper investigates links between corruption and collusion in procurement. A first-price multiple-object auction is administered by an agent who has legal discretion to allow for a readjustment of (all) submitted offers before the official opening. The agent may be corrupt, that is, willing to "sell" his decision in exchange for a bribe. Our main result shows that the corrupt agent's incentives to extract rents are closely linked with that of a cartel of bidders. First, collusive bidding conveys value to the agent's decision power. Second, self-interested abuse of discretion to extract rents (corruption) provides a mechanism to enforce collusion. A second result is that package bidding can facilitate collusion. We also find that with corruption, collusion is more likely in auctions where firms are small relative to the market. Our main message to auction designers, competition authorities and criminal courts is that risks of collusion and of corruption must be addressed simultaneously. Some other policy implications for the design of tender procedures are discussed.     

Trust and corruption: The influence of positive and negative social capital on the economic development in the European Union

Why are the Scandinavian countries in the European Union significantly richer than Southern/Eastern European countries? We try to answer this question from an empirical social capital perspective. In particular, we are interested in the interplay of social trust as a positive and corruption as a negative manifestation of social capital. The opportunities to provide answers by multivariate modelling are, however, limited by several problems related to small sample size and low degrees of freedom. Regarding these problems, we test the interrelating influences between positive and negative social capital by applying a path model that accounts for Granger-like causal effects. Our empirical results, referring to a sample of up to 25 EU countries, show that corruption might harm poor European countries but is not able to affect social trust. However, corruption in itself means that resources end up in the wrong places and not in socioeconomically optimal investments. There is, therefore, a direct damaging effect of corruption on wealth. This implies that economic actors have to invest higher transaction and control costs which will bind resources to non-productive purposes and thus destroy economic wealth. Most remarkable is that the augmentation of positive social capital could work as an effective counterforce to corruption, even if it does not compensate for the economic loss caused by corruption. Thus, adding the social capital perspective may contribute to understanding present day variation in the wealth of European nations by the damaging effect of corrupt activities and/or the positive force of social trust.     

Corruption and the ownership composition of the multinational firm at the time of entry: Evidence from Turkey

This paper presents an empirical assessment of the relationship between corruption and the ownership structure of foreign direct investment receipts by Turkey. Two forms of ownership structures are considered: joint venture and wholly owned subsidiary. The results indicate a strong negative impact of corruption on joint ventures, particularly for the ones originating from developed countries. As the degree of dissimilarity between corruption levels in the source country and Turkey diverges, the share of foreign ownership declines. This lends support to the transaction cost approach which emphasizes the expected increase in costs of sharing ownership in corrupt environments.     

The Welfare Effects of Consumers' Reports of Bribery

A primary means of bureaucratic oversight is consumer complaints. Yet this important control mechanism has received very little attention in the literature on corruption. I study a signaling game of corruption in which uninformed consumers require a government service from informed officials. A victim of corruption can report corrupt officials whose supervisors are negligent or conscientious but an official's type is his private information. I find that social welfare may be nonmonotonic in the proportion of conscientious supervisors. Several examples show that an increase in the proportion of conscientious supervisors decreases social welfare if the mass of conscientious supervisors is below a critical level. I find that this perverse result does not hold if (a) the bribe is very large, or (b) bribe‐giving is legalized. I also find that there is an equilibrium in which no one reports corruption.     

The effect of corruption on environmental performance: Does spatial dependence play a role?

Different from previous studies that mainly focused on conventional estimation techniques, this paper explores the role of spatial dependence in the effect of corruption on environmental performance by using a spatial panel data model. Our results show that the direct effects, indirect effects and total effects of corruption on environmental performance are negative and highly significant, implying that corruption is detrimental to environmental performance. More importantly, we find that there is a significant spatial spillover effect between corruption and environmental performance, namely being surrounded by highly corrupt countries has a negative impact on the local country’s environmental performance. Our results also suggest that a larger population density will worsen the environment, while urbanization has a significant positive impact. These results provide some important implications for policymakers seeking to improve their environmental performance.     

Corruption perceptions versus corruption incidence: Competition for rents across Russian regions

This paper examines the effects of different competitions for favors on the prevalence and perceptions of corruption across Russian regions. Results show that while greater general competition (measured by regional population size), increases both perceived and actual corruption, competition among enterprises only increases corruption perceptions, while competition among government employees increases actual, but not perceived, corruption. Privatization activity and unemployment fail to affect either measure of corruption. Finally, the effects of urbanization differ on perceived and actual corruption. Besides Russia, these findings are somewhat unique to the broader literature.     

Corruption,development and demography

This paper presents an analysis of the joint, endogenous determination of bureaucratic corruption, economic development and demographic transition. The analysis is based on an overlapping generations model in which reproductive agents mature safely through two periods of life and face a probability of surviving for a third period. This survival probability depends on the provision of public goods and services which may be compromised by corrupt activities on the part of public officials. The dynamic general equilibrium of the economy is characterised by multiple development regimes, transition between which may or may not be feasible. In accordance with empirical evidence, the model predicts that low (high) levels of development are associated with high (low) levels of corruption and low (high) rates of life expectancy. The authors are grateful for the comments of two anonymous referees on an earlier version of the paper. The usual disclaimer applies.     

How institutions affect export quality

We examine the relationship between a country's institutional environment and the quality of its exports. Institutional factors such as widespread corruption, inefficient bureaucracy, and high risk of expropriation of private property by government can create uncertainty among producers and discourage them from investing and innovating over the long term. This can limit the ability of producers to improve the quality of their exports in the future. We find some evidence that a better institutional environment (i.e. lower corruption, more efficient bureaucracy and more secure property rights) is associated with better export quality. After accounting for potential endogeneity between institutional and economic variables, we conclude that better institutions lead to improvements in export quality. Among the institutional factors considered in this article, corruption appears to be most robustly associated with export quality. These results have important implications for policymakers.     

CORRUPTION, THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PRIVATESECTOR : WHY IT MATTERS AND WHAT CAN BE DONE

The author proposes a definition of corruption which requires five conditions to be satisfied simultaneously. The definition is applicable to both the state and private sectors. Empirical work shows that corrupt countries receive less inward investment, pay higher interest on borrowings and achieve lower rates of investment overall. Ways of combating corruption are suggested.     

A political-economy perspective on social expenditures: corruption and in-kind versus cash transfers

This paper presents a novel political-economy perspective on the composition of social expenditures. We take into account the possibility that institutions are weak, i.e. there is corruption, and analyze how this affects the government’s choice between cash and in-kind transfers. Our results show that the share of in-kind transfers (e.g. basic health care, public housing or food stamps), whose appropriation by corrupt politicians is more easily observed than in the case of cash transfers, increases with corruption. This positive relationship exists, however, only in highly democratic countries. We argue that voters use their political influence in democratic countries to ensure that a higher share of transfers is provided in kind thereby shielding transfers from appropriation by corrupt politicians.