Comparative Advantage With and Without Gains from Trade

In 1980, Deardorff, and Dixit and Norman, generalized the law of comparative advantage to show that the value of net imports at autarky prices (or "DDN index") is nonnegative, so that net imports are correlated with autarky prices. The DDN index can be decomposed into the sum of (i) the equivalent variation of gains from trade, and (ii) the difference in GNP at autarky prices between autarky and trade. Several examples are given of classical and neoclassical economies where (i) or (ii) can be zero. Hence gains from trade are sufficient but not necessary for the existence of comparative advantage.     

Strategic Environmental Policies and the Gains from Trade Liberalization

The literature on strategic environmental policy has not fully addressed welfare effects of trade liberalization from autarky. In a reciprocal market model of duopoly with transboundary pollution, we study how reductions in transport costs and import tariffs affect the Nash‐equilibrium welfare of an environmental policy game as compared to any initial state including autarky. We show three patterns of gainfulness of trade depending on the interaction between marginal damage from pollution and the degree of transboundary pollution.     

Making Sense of the Comparative Advantage Gains from Trade: Comment on Batra

This paper addresses Ravi Batra’s (2002 ) criticism of the basic comparative advantage gains‐from‐trade model. While Batra’s criticism is based on the selection view interpretation of real income, the gains from trade can only be properly understood from the options view interpretation of real income. I also show how a recent empirical implementation of the gains‐from‐trade model defies Batra’s claim that “the consumption gain . . . is not subject to measurement” (2002, p. 642).     

Marshall's Scissors: The Gains and Losses from Trade

In a Ricardian two‐factor endowment model with Cobb–Douglas tastes and many goods, this paper describesthe interaction of the demand and supply sides to determine the gains and losses from trade. If the abundant factor has a sufficiently rich profile of comparative advantages, trade causesthe proportionate gain to the abundant factor to be smaller than the proportionate loss to the scarce factor. However, if the abundant factor has sufficiently skewed comparative advantages toward the best goods, then the opposite will hold. Some examples suggest that these patterns may have something to do with the selection of trade regimes. In the usual one‐factor Ricardian model the gains from trade to a country are enhanced by higher demand shares for imports, but such gains from trade from imports to a country is not the case in a factor endowment model.     

International Economies of Scale and the Gains from Trade

In this paper, we present a two-country trade model with external economies of scale that emerge on an international level but are partially localized in each country. First, we show that the larger country exports the good produced in an industry with external economies of scale in the trading equilibrium. Second, we investigate the welfare effects of trade for the following two cases: (I) the case where external economies are completely localized in autarky; (II) the case where external economies are internationally effective in autarky. In case (II), it is shown that trade can be welfare-decreasing for both countries.     

The Voluntary (Private) Production of Public Goods,the Gains From Trade,and Comparative Advantage*

Any (finite) number of privately produced public goods are incorporated into a general trade-theory model of private goods and factors. Postulating Cournot-Nash behavior, a necessary condition for gainful trade is derived. Potential trade gains are related to the law of comparative advantage in private goods and the change in the underproduction of public goods. A sufficient condition is also proven. Trade gains/losses are compared for more or less populous economies. All the results have analogues in the literature on imperfect competition and/or increasing returns to scale.     

International Trade with a Public Intermediate Good and the Gains from Trade*

This paper presents a one‐primary factor, two‐consumer good, and two‐country model of international trade where each country’s government supplies a country‐specific public intermediate good so as to attain efficient production. By introducing the Marshallian adjustment process, it is demonstrated that the country with larger factor endowment exports the good whose productivity is more sensitive to the public intermediate good. Our normative analysis of free trade shows the following results. First, at least one country gains from trade. Secondly, if a country incompletely specializes in the trading equilibrium, the country necessarily loses from trade.     

Dynamic Gains from International Trade with Imperfect Competition and Market Power

This paper revisits the gains from trade under imperfect competition by explicitly modeling strategic competition and entry. The papers highlights a welfare cost of imperfect competition, due to inefficiently high entry. Through increasing competition, international trade lowers price–cost markups and reduces excessive entry. This adds on a "competitive" channel for gains from trade to the well-known "product diversity" channel from previous literature. Both channels will increase the return to investment and raise the steady-state capital stock. An alternative case is possible, however, where there is inefficiently low entry. In that case, trade tends to be "anticompetitive," raising price–cost markups and encouraging increased entry.     

Competitive and Comparative Advantage: Towards a Unified Theory of International Trade

The field of international business/economics is largely dualistic in nature. On one hand is the economics literature which has, for two centuries, focused on the notion of comparative advantage (technology, factor proportions) while on the other is the business literature which has recently developed the concept of competitive advantage. This paper presents a reconciliation of the two based on global value chain/supply chain analysis and the concept of vertical comparative advantage. It is shown that the theory of competitive advantage's epistemological comparative advantage lies with its ‘how to’ approach to developing an advantage, while the theory of comparative advantage's epistemological comparative advantage lies with its account of ‘what is’ and that both are complementary. However, it is also argued that the failure to recognize this complementarity as well as the shortcomings of each have prevented and continue to prevent the emergence of an integrated, empirically-consistent theory of international trade – in short, prevented us from taking advantage of the gains from epistemological trade.     

Absolute and Comparative Advantage, Reconsidered: The Pattern of International Trade with Optimal Saving

The paper obtains new results about absolute and comparative advantage, by introducing international technological differences into the three–sector Findlay–Komiya and two–sector Oniki–Uzawa–Stiglitz models of open–economy growth with optimal saving. For example, if a country has the same Hicks–neutral advantage in all industries, it exports the capital–intensive tradable, even though the technological advantage is only absolute rather than comparative. Alternatively, even a small comparative advantage in some good is sufficient for the advanced country to export this product, regardless of relative factor supplies. In either case, the fundamental reason for trade is technological superiority rather than factor abundance.     

International Cross-Ownership and Strategic Trade Policies

The paper analyzes a model of strategic trade policies in the presence of international cross-ownership of firms that are heterogenous both in terms of costs and in terms of extent of foreign ownership. The equilibrium pattern of taxes and subsidies is characterized for any arbitrary cross-ownership profile, and any number of heterogenous firms. The equilibrium subsidy (or tax) given to any firm is shown to depend, in a separable manner, on the firm's characteristics and on the covariance of the distribution of cost and foreign ownership across firms. A neutrality theorem is proved concerning the Nash equilibrium of the game between governments: in equilibrium, the pattern of trade, the value of each firm, and world welfare are independent of the ownership pattern.     

比较优势与加工贸易——基于中国各省市的实证分析

受经济全球化的影响，国际分工进一步深化，从产品层面延伸到了产品内不同工序层面，传统的比较优势理论可以解释这种新型产品内分工产生的原因及影响。作为产品内分工的表现形式——加工贸易目前已成为中国最主要的贸易方式。以2000—2005年中国各省市加工贸易进出口额为样本，利用Egger（2005）的方法对加工贸易的影响因素进行定量分析，进而得出比较优势仍是加工贸易的重要决定因素。     

比较优势、国际分工与发展战略

比较优势理论是国际分工与贸易理论的重要组成部分,但是对于一国发展是否适宜以比较优势理论为指导却存在极大争议。以比较优势、国际分工与发展战略三者之间的关系为逻辑起点,从辨析比较优势的概念内涵、梳理比较优势的发展脉络、分析比较优势作为发展战略的适宜性和阐述动态比较优势的形成机制等方面对比较优势理论的发展进行梳理,指出培育动态比较优势应该是发展中国家经济发展的主要战略之一。     

International Productivity Differences,Infrastructure, and Comparative Advantage*

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the effect of infrastructure provision on industry‐level productivity and international specialization, as suggested by Clarida and Findlay’s (1992 ) model. We calculate total factor productivity (TFP) for 18 developed and developing countries and 10 manufacturing industries, and study the effects of supplies of roads, telecommunications and electric power on international variations in sectoral TFP, i.e. comparative advantage. We also examine the effects of infrastructure on the sectoral composition of output across countries. Using a three‐stage least‐squares estimation strategy to control for endogeneity of infrastructure provision, we find that infrastructure, especially roads, helps to explain patterns of comparative advantage and international specialization.     

International Environmental Permit Trade and Debt: the Consequences of Country Sovereignty and Cross-Default Policies*

We investigate the joint occurrence of international intertemporal trade and international environmental-permit trade, both of which are subject to country sovereignty. Assuming that side payments cannot be made to keep a debtor country from terminating international environmental cooperation, we analyze the impact of these two trade opportunities on a debtor country's incentive to continue environmental cooperation. We also show how, by way of a suitable strategic linkage between debt and permit trade, the public good of ensuring continued environmental cooperation can be provided by the supply side of private international loans.     

Comparative Advantage and the Pattern of Trade Within Industries

This paper investigates empirically one aspect of the vertically differentiated models of intraindustry trade. These models predict that the pattern of trade within an industry is based on comparative advantage rather than being completely random. An empirical model is specified in which the relative quality of two countries' bilateral exports within an industry depends on the relative differences in unit labor requirements. Using a variety of econometric methods, the results suggest that the quality of US manufacturing exports to the UK, Japan, and Germany relative to its imports from these countries is positively and significantly related to the relative differences in value added per worker.     

Strategic R&D Commitment and the Gains from Trade

This paper examines how trade liberalization affects innovation, profits and welfare in a model of reciprocal markets when firms pre‐commit to research and development (R&D). We establish that the equilibrium is not always unique and show that, with trade, R&D commitment leads to higher levels of innovation, lower profits, higher consumer surplus and higher welfare than when R&D is chosen simultaneously to output levels. Furthermore, if the effectiveness of R&D is sufficiently high, trade always yields higher welfare than autarky, implying that R&D commitment may significantly enhance the welfare gains from trade liberalization.     

试论我国对外贸易如何将比较优势转化为竞争优势

文章阐述了基于劳动和资源的比较优势,引入国外先进生产要素创造竞争优势,以及产业升级创造产业结构竞争优势,同时指出,任何一国对外贸易的发展都会受到其国内资源禀赋和比较成本的制约。因此,必须发挥比较优势,提高竞争优势。