International Risk Sharing and Government Moral Hazard

This paper analyzes incentive problems caused by international risk sharing. They arise because international risk sharing contributes to the insurance of domestic consumption and thus lowers governments’ incentives to increase output. We show that the resulting distortions can lead to substantial efficiency losses. Complete risk sharing is, therefore, undesirable and the optimal degree of risk sharing may be low. Furthermore, we show that households’ risk sharing decisions are socially inefficient and are effectively maximizing government moral hazard. As a result, financial innovation and integration may reduce welfare by increasing households’ risk sharing opportunities.

Monetary Union, institutions and financial market integration: Italy, 1862–1905

Years into the single currency, EMU financial markets are not fully integrated. We argue that the phenomenon can be better understood by looking at financial markets’ behavior in the wake of Italy’s monetary unification (1862). Variables such as the spread of the telegraph, trade volumes, and the diffusion of the ‘single currency’ fail to explain why it took 25 years for prices across regional stock exchanges to converge. A single Italian financial market appeared only when the State prevailed upon local vested interests by enforcing nation-wide financial market legislation.     

International Rent Sharing and Domestic Labour Markets: A Macroeconomic Analysis

Compared to international trade relations relatively little is known about the role foreign direct investment linkages play in the transmission of disturbances from one country to the next. Inspired by the microevidence on profit sharing within multinational corporations and within industries, we investigate for six countries whether a cross-border rent-sharing phenomenon can be identified at the macroeconomic level. The rent-sharing hypothesis implies that an increase in foreign profitability should boost wages and/or employment in the domestic economy. We find corroborative evidence for Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. US labour market conditions, by contrast, are not affected by changes in profitability in other countries. JEL no. E32, F23, F40, J23, J31     

Free entry equilibria with positive profits: A unified approach to quantity and price competition games

Free entry equilibria are usually characterized by the zero profit condition. We plead instead for a strict application of the Nash equilibrium concept to a symmetric simultaneous game played by actual and potential entrants, producing under decreasing average cost. Equilibrium is then typically indeterminate, with a number of active firms varying between an upper bound imposed by profitability and a lower bound required by sustainability. We use a canonical model with strategies represented by prices, although covering standard regimes of quantity and price competition, to show that in equilibrium the critical (profit maximizing) price must lie between the break-even and the limit prices.