How Do Investors Interpret Announcements of Earnings Delays?

Unlike in the case of delays of 10‐K or 10‐Q filings, the SEC does not require managers to disclose delays of earnings announcements to the public. Thus, for companies that are unable to report earnings by their expected date, managers face a decision: remain silent or announce the delay. Prior research has investigated all earnings delays, whether or not they are accompanied by announcements of the delay announcement, and found that the market reaction is slightly negative, on average, for companies that allow their expected earnings dates to pass without disclosing results. It's not clear, however, whether this negative reaction was due to the absence of news or to the information contained in the announcements of the earnings delays. The authors' recent study documents that earnings delay announcements are associated with an average one‐day abnormal stock return of a negative 6%. This statistically as well as economically significant reduction in value is consistent with anecdotal evidence in the popular business press as well as predictions of disclosure theories, in particular the explanation that concerns about legal liability and managerial reputation motivate managers to disclose bad news. The study also shows that almost all managers who announce earnings delays attempt to influence the market reaction by disclosing the underlying cause. Finally, the study shows that the market reaction to earnings delay announcements is positively related to future earnings changes, consistent with the role of these disclosures in providing a signal of deteriorating financial performance.     

Do Institutional Investors Enhance Accounting Earnings Attributes in the Korean Market?

This study examines whether the effectiveness of institutional monitoring depends on the economic conditions of emerging capital markets. We use trading volume data by investor type to compute a proxy for total institutional ownership. We then analyze the impact of the proxy variable on accounting earnings attributes and examine whether the association between the two depends on an expectation of market growth. We find that the effect of institutional monitoring decreases when market growth is expected to be low, implying that market growth may be a critical determinant of institutional investors’ long-term monitoring effectiveness in emerging capital markets.     

Do Restatements Improve the Persistence of Earnings and Its Components?

We examine the persistence of earnings in the pre‐ and postrestatements periods and find that restatements generally improve the persistence of earnings. We also examine how the persistence of earnings is influenced by restatements that are voluntarily initiated by managers (voluntary restatements) and those forced onto firms by outsiders (mandated restatements). Our analysis shows that voluntary restatements are followed by improvement in the persistence of earnings and that mandated restatements are not followed by improvement in earnings persistence. We find results that are consistent with the main finding when we decompose earnings into accruals and free cash flows. We use a difference‐in‐difference research design and confirm that the improvement in the postrestatement persistence of earnings components exceeds that of control firms only for voluntary restatements. Further, we show that our results are robust after controlling for endogeneity of voluntary restatements by including a two‐stage model using the Heckman ( 1979 ) method where we first estimate the likelihood of manipulation detection and analyze change in persistence conditional on the first stage analysis. The improvement in earnings persistence around voluntary restatements is not driven by the level of earnings decomposition or a subgroup of voluntary restatements. The results support our hypothesis that voluntary restatements have distinctly different economic consequences from mandated restatements.     

What is the Relationship Between REIT Governance and Earnings Management?

The empirical corporate finance literature claims that better corporate governance constrains earnings management, while others argue that the unique legal and reporting structure of REITs may reduce the need for such internal corporate governance. Using a sample of publicly traded REITs for the 2004–2008 time period, we examine the relationships amongst corporate governance, accruals earnings management, manipulation of Funds from Operations (FFO), and real earnings management. We find that corporate governance quality is unrelated to accruals earnings management and manipulation of FFO. At first glance, the findings suggest that managers need less internal oversight because of the more transparent reporting structure of REITs. However, we document that REITs engage in significant real activities manipulation for earnings management purposes. Our empirical findings further show that corporate governance characteristics, in particular board size, independence, number of board meetings and audit committee financial expertise, are essential for constraining such activities. Finally, by focusing on a subset of REITs that act in ways which previous research has identified as more susceptible to earnings management activities, we demonstrate that good corporate governance effectively reduces accruals earnings management and manipulation of FFO for these REITs. Overall, our findings indicate that, despite the unique legal and reporting structure, REITs engage in certain forms of earnings management, and that the ability for REITs to manipulate earnings is reduced when corporate governance is more effective.     

Why Do Individual Investors Disregard Accounting Information? The Roles of Information Awareness and Acquisition Costs

We investigate the frictions that impede individual investors’ use of accounting information and, in particular, their costs of monitoring and acquiring accounting disclosures. We do so using an archival setting in which individuals are presented with automated media articles that report both current earnings news and past stock returns. Although these investors have earnings information readily available, we find no evidence that their trades incorporate it. Instead we find that their trading responds to the trailing stock returns presented in the articles. Our study raises questions about the efficacy of regulations that aim to aid less sophisticated investors by increasing their awareness of and access to accounting information.     

Does Earnings Quality Influence Corporate Social Responsibility Performance? Empirical Evidence of the Causal Link

The study examines the causal links between earnings quality and corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance using a large sample of United States (US) firms from 1992 to 2013. We first find that the association between earnings quality and CSR performance is positive and significant. We then test the flow of causality using Granger's (1969) lead–lag analysis to determine whether changes in earnings quality cause changes in CSR performance or vice versa. Our findings show that changes in earnings quality cause changes in a firm's CSR performance but not vice versa. Further analysis shows that earnings quality reduces the cost of equity capital for firms with higher CSR performance. These findings suggest that one plausible means by which firms with higher earnings quality can maintain better CSR performance is to reduce their cost of equity capital.     

Do Weather‐Induced Moods Affect the Processing of Earnings News?

We investigate whether unpleasant environmental conditions affect stock market participants’ responses to information events. We draw from psychology research to develop a new prediction that weather‐induced negative moods reduce market participants’ activity levels. Exploiting geographic variation in equity analysts’ locations, we find compelling evidence that analysts experiencing unpleasant weather are slower or less likely to respond to an earnings announcement relative to analysts responding to the same announcement but experiencing pleasant weather. Price association tests find evidence consistent with reduced activity due to weather‐induced moods delaying equilibrium price adjustments following earnings announcements. We also use our analyst‐based research design to re‐examine an existing prediction that unpleasant weather induces investor pessimism, and find evidence of both analyst pessimism and reduced activity in the presence of unpleasant weather. Together, our study provides new evidence that both extends and reaffirms findings of a relation between unpleasant weather and market activities, and contributes to the broader psychology and economics literature on the impact of weather‐induced mood on labor productivity.     

Why Do Firms Evade Taxes? The Role of Information Sharing and Financial Sector Outreach

Tax evasion is a widespread phenomenon across the globe and even an important factor in the ongoing sovereign debt crisis. We show that firms in countries with better credit information–sharing systems and higher branch penetration evade taxes to a lesser degree. This effect is stronger for smaller firms, firms in smaller cities and towns, firms in industries relying more on external financing, and firms in industries and countries with greater growth potential. This effect is robust to instrumental variable analysis, controlling for firm fixed effects in a smaller panel data set of countries, and many other robustness tests.     

Why Do Politicians Intervene in Accounting Regulation? The Role of Ideology and Special Interests

Politicians frequently intervene in the regulation of financial accounting. Evidence from the accounting literature shows that regulatory capture by special interests helps explain these interventions. However, many accounting rules have broad economic or social consequences, such as their effects on income distribution or private sector subsidies. The perception of these consequences varies with a politician's ideology. Therefore, if accounting rules produce those consequences, ideology plausibly spills over and explains a politician's stance on the technical accounting issue, beyond special interest pressure. We use two prominent U.S. political debates about fair value accounting and the expensing of employee stock options to disentangle the role of ideology from special interest pressure. In both debates, ideology explains politicians’ involvement at exactly those points when the debate focuses on the economic consequences of accounting regulation (i.e., bank bailouts and top management compensation). Once the debates focus on more technical issues, connections to special interests remain the dominant force.     

Managers’ Escalation Behavior in Equity Investment Decisions and the Role of Corporate Governance

The aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between free cash flows and escalation behavior in the long-term stock buying decisions for the firms listed in Taiwan. The main findings include: (1) Managers tend to exhibit the escalation behavior in the long-term equity investment. (2) There is a positive association between the level of free cash flows and the magnitude of managers’ behavioral escalation. (3) The corporate governance mechanisms play a contributory role in mitigating the escalation behavior. The evidence is robust across subsamples for electronic versus non-electronic industries, growth versus value firms, and loss versus gain firms.     

Are Investors Sensitive to the Quality and the Disclosure of Financial Statements?

This paper investigates the influence of Swiss firms'disclosure policy and of their financial analysts'coverage on stock price abnormal reactions to thepublication of the annual reports. It first showsthat, after controlling for the number of analysts,the absolute abnormal returns are significantly andpositively affected by the rating measure used as aproxy of the informational quality of annual reports.It furthermore emphasises asymmetry in therelationship between stock price abnormal reactionsand two informational variables, namely the quality ofthe firm's disclosure policy and its financialanalysts' coverage. It appears that while positiveabnormal returns are significantly and positivelyrelated to the rating variable, negative abnormalreturns are only affected by the number of financialanalysts. The inverse relationship between abnormalnegative returns and the financial analysts' coveragesupports the fact that competition among analystsreduces investors' adverse selection problem. Finally,the study evidences a non-linear relationship betweenrating and positive abnormal returns which ismeaningful for the ``good' and ``very good type' firmsand thus emphasises the signaling role played by afirm's financial disclosure policy.     

Are Investors Sensitive to the Quality and the Disclosure of Financial Statements?

This paper investigates the influence of Swiss firms' disclosurepolicy and of their financial analysts' coverage on stock priceabnormal reactions to the publication of the annual reports.It first shows that, after controlling for the number of analysts,the absolute abnormal returns are significantly and positivelyaffected by the rating measure used as a proxy of the informationalquality of annual reports. It furthermore emphasises asymmetryin the relationship between stock price abnormal reactions andtwo informational variables, namely the quality of the firm'sdisclosure policy and its financial analysts' coverage. It appearsthat while positive abnormal returns are significantly and positivelyrelated to the rating variable, negative abnormal returns areonly affected by the number of financial analysts. The inverserelationship between abnormal negative returns and the financialanalysts' coverage supports the fact that competition amonganalysts reduces investors' adverse selection problem. Finally,the study evidences a non-linear relationship between ratingand positive abnormal returns which is meaningful for the "good"and "very good type" firms and thus emphasises the signalingrole played by a firm's financial disclosure policy.     

Earnings Reported under IFRS Improve the Prediction of Future Cash Flows? Evidence from European Banks

This paper examines the relative costs and benefits of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption in the European Union by testing the ability of earnings computed under IFRS to predict future cash flows. The study considers the contribution of net income, comprehensive income and other comprehensive income to the usefulness of earnings to predict cash flows, and it compares IFRS with domestic Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Evidence from a sample of Continental European banks shows that IFRS improve the ability of net income to predict future cash flows. Comprehensive income, too, provides relevant information to predict future cash flows, although with a measurement error which is higher than that in net income for greater lags of time. In our interpretation, these findings are consistent with unrealised gains and losses recognised in other comprehensive income being more transitory and volatile in nature. Overall, our results are relevant to academics and standard setters debating the merits of IFRS adoption and to those who use financial statements and adopt reported earnings to form expectations about future cash flows.     

Do institutional investors reinforce or reduce agency problems? Earnings management and the post-IPO performance

This study investigates the dual roles of institutional investors in earnings management during initial public offerings (IPOs). Research suggests that institutional investors play a monitoring role in the corporate governance of firms by mitigating earnings management to reduce agency problems. However, institutional investors have incentives to opportunistically maximize their wealth by manipulating earnings when firms engage in IPOs. Results suggest that institutional investors facilitate accrual-based earnings management before IPOs but restrain earnings management after their issuance. We also find that firms with high institutional ownership experience superior post-IPO stock returns and operating performance, thereby suggesting that the capital market positively prices the monitoring function of institutional investors after IPOs, and the performance of these firms is improved. Our results are robust to controlling the endogeneity problem of institutional investors and further identifying active institutional investors.     

Can Investors Identify Managerial Discretion in Corporate Social Responsibility Practices? The Moderate Role of Investor Protection

This paper analyses investors’ ability to identify if managers use corporate social responsibility as an entrenchment practice to conceal the risk of dismissal associated with managerial discretion and if this detection is determined by the level of investor protection orientation. Results based on an international database of 1949 companies show that investors and markets do not identify managerial entrenchment based on the promotion of sustainable practices, except when such entrenchment is developed by companies located in countries with strong investor protection. In these countries, investors identify and penalise such companies with lower financial performance.     

Are Controlling Shareholders Influencing the Relationship Between CSR and Earnings Quality? Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

This article examines how controlling shareholders may affect the relationship between the level of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and earnings quality. We find that controlling shareholders have a significant impact on the relationship between the level of CSR and earnings quality; the relationship between the level of CSR and earnings quality is significantly positive in privately owned enterprises but not state-owned enterprises; and, among state-owned enterprises, the relationship is weaker at enterprises controlled by the central government than at those controlled by local governments. Our article highlights the differential impacts of controlling shareholders on the relationship between CSR and earnings quality.