供应商专项投资与感知的合作风险:关系发展阶段与控制机制的调节作用研究

This study examines the dynamic nature of suppliers’ perceived relational risks arising from transaction-specific investments (TSIs) in their relationship with manufacturers, and the moderating effects of contracts and relational norms, during the developmental process of manufacturer-supplier relationship. An empirical study was conducted with data collected from 261 suppliers and manufacturers in the Chinese consumer electronic appliances sector. We found that suppliers’ TSIs have a positive effect on their perceived relational risks, and in different phases of a relationship effect varies significantly. Results of the research also show that both contracts and relational norms have negative moderating effects on the relationship between suppliers’ TSIs and their perceived relational risks, and moderating effects during are different across various phases of a relationship. Translated from Zhongguo Guanli Kexue 中国管理科学 (Chinese Management Science), 2006, 14(1): 30–36     

Pay-for-performance – Does one size fit all? A multi-country study of Europe and the United States

Are there country-level differences in the use of pay-for-performance in executive compensation contracts? We investigate how formal country-level institutions affect pay-for-performance directly and if institutions have a moderating effect on the relation between ownership structure and pay-for-performance contracts. Based on agency theory arguments, we show that substitutionary and complementary relations are conceivable, for the direct and the moderating effect. We conduct an empirical analysis based on 2766 firm-year observations for the years 2005–2008. Our empirical results show that whereas strong shareholder protection substitutes pay-for-performance, disclosure requirements complement pay-for-performance. Additionally, strong shareholder protection complements the effect of concentrated ownership on pay-for-performance while disclosure requirements substitute effects of ownership concentration. Overall, our results provide evidence for the relevance of formal institutions as determinants of executive compensation contracts. Additionally, our results indicate the general complexity of integrating institutions and internal governance mechanisms.     

The Effects of Managers’ Moral Philosophy on Project Decision Under Agency Problem Conditions

This study derives an improved model of managers’ decision-making behavior regarding possibly failing projects. Instead of adopting cognitive moral development used by Rutledge and Karim (Accounting, Organization and Society 24, 173–184, 1999) this investigation uses the agency theory framework to consider individual moral philosophy for the improvement of decisions regarding possibly failing projects. This research hypothesizes that a manager with low relativism has a stronger tendency to discontinue a possibly failing project than one with high relativism when agency problem are present or absent. Also, this study suggests that a manager with high idealism has a stronger tendency to discontinue a possibly failing project than one with low idealism. Through experiments this work finds that agency problem is a significant factor on decisions regarding possibly failing projects in all circumstances. This result is consistent with prior literature and shows agency problem universality. Next, the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that a project manager with low relativism tends to discontinue a possibly failing project more than one with high relativism, showing that individual moral philosophy can partially mitigate the phenomenon of escalating managers’ commitment.     

The Causal Effect of Corporate Governance on Corporate Social Responsibility

In this article, we examine the empirical association between corporate governance (CG) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagement by investigating their causal effects. Employing a large and extensive US sample, we first find that while the lag of CSR does not affect CG variables, the lag of CG variables positively affects firms’ CSR engagement, after controlling for various firm characteristics. In addition, to examine the relative importance of stakeholder theory and agency theory regarding the associations among CSR, CG, and corporate financial performance (CFP), we also examine the relation between CSR and CFP. After correcting for endogeneity bias, our results show that CSR engagement positively influences CFP, supporting the conflict-resolution hypothesis based on stakeholder theory, but not the CSR overinvestment argument based on agency theory. Furthermore, firms’ CSR engagement with the community, environment, diversity, and employees plays a significantly positive role in enhancing CFP.     

Vice or Virtue? The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on Executive Compensation

We empirically examine the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on CEO compensation using a large sample of the US firms from 1996 to 2010. We develop and test two hypotheses, the overinvestment hypothesis based on agency theory and the conflict–resolution hypothesis based on stakeholder theory. We find that the lag of CSR adversely affects both total compensation and cash compensation, after controlling for various firm and board characteristics. Our estimates show that an interquartile increase in CSR is followed by a 4.35% (2.78%) decrease in total (cash) compensation. We also find an inverse association between lagged employee relations and CEO compensation. Our results are robust to the correction for endogeneity using instrumental variable approach. Taken together, our results support the conflict–resolution hypothesis, but not the CSR overinvestment argument.     

Macroeconomic Fluctuations as Sources of Luck in CEO Compensation

Macroeconomic fluctuations in interest rates, exchange rates, and inflation can be considered sources of good or bad “luck” for corporate performance if management is unable to adjust operations to these fluctuations. Based on a sample of 2,091 US firms, we decompose the impacts of macroeconomic fluctuations on three measures of CEO compensation. Our study provides empirical support for the importance of considering macroeconomic fluctuations in designing CEO incentive schemes. It adds to the managerial power literature on moral hazard and CEO compensation by pinpointing the obvious risk that the CEO in an asymmetric and non-linear reward system will be inclined to prioritize his/her own cash flow at the expense of fulfilling an assumed agency role. The policy conclusion for remuneration committees and board of directors is to filter out macroeconomic influences on performance to be rewarded whenever an asymmetric compensation scheme has been opted for.     

Evolutionary game-theoretic model for dynamic congestion pricing in multi-class traffic networks

This paper describes an evolutionary game-theoretic learning model for dynamic congestion pricing in urban road networks, taking into account route choice stochasticity and reliability considerations, and the heterogeneity of users, in terms of their value of travel time and real-time information acquisition. The learning model represents the dynamic adjustments of users to travel cost changes which may take place in the day-to-day as well as the within-day timescales. The implementation into a simplified and a real urban road network signifies the important implications of modeling the dynamic and stochastic learning components of users’ behavior for accommodating the efficient deployment of congestion pricing schemes.     

Agency costs,institutions, learning,and taxation in venture capital contracting

This paper introduces a data set on forms of finance used in 12,363 Canadian and US venture capital (VC) and private equity financings of Canadian entrepreneurial firms from 1991 to 2003. The data comprise different types of venture capital institutions, including corporate, limited partnership, government, and labour-sponsored funds as well as US funds that invest in Canadian entrepreneurial firms. Unlike prior work with US venture capitalists financing US entrepreneurial firms, the data herein indicate that convertible preferred equity has never been the most frequently used form of finance for either US or Canadian venture capitalists financing Canadian entrepreneurial firms, regardless of the definition of the term ‘venture capital’. A syndication example and a simple theoretical framework are provided to show the nonrobustness of prior theoretical work on optimal financial contracts in venture capital finance. Multivariate empirical analyses herein indicate that (1) security design is a response to expected agency problems, (2) capital gains taxation affects contracts, (3) there are trends in the use of different contracts which can be interpreted as learning, and (4) market conditions affect contracts.     

Corporate Governance, Ethics, and the Backdating of Stock Options

Backdating of stock options is an example of an agency problem. It has emerged despite all the measures (i.e., new regulations and additional corporate governance mechanisms) aimed at addressing such problems? Beyond such negative controlling measures, a more positive empowering approach based on ethics may also be necessary. What ethical measures need to be taken to address the agency problem? What values and norms should guide the board of directors in protecting the shareholders’ interests? To examine these issues, we first discuss the role values and norms can play with respect to underlying corporate governance and the proper role of directors, such as transparency, accountability, integrity (which is reflected in proper mechanisms of checks and balances), and public responsibility. Second, we discuss various stakeholder approaches (e.g., government, directors, managers, and shareholders) by which conflicts of interest (i.e., the agency problem) can be addressed. Third, we assess the practice of backdating stock options, as an illustration of the agency problem, in terms of whether the practice is legally acceptable or ethically justifiable. Fourth, we proceed to an analysis of good corporate governance practice involving backdating options based on a series of ethical standards including: (1) trustworthiness; (2) utilitarianism; (3) justice; and (4) Kantianism. We conclude that while executive compensation schemes (e.g., stock options) were originally intended to help remedy the agency problem by tying together the interests of the executives and shareholders, these schemes may have actually become “part of the problem,” and that the solution ultimately depends upon whether directors and executives accept that all of their actions must be based on a set of core ethical values.     

The role of self selection, usage uncertainty and learning in the demand for local telephone service

Telephone services are often characterized by the presence of ‘fixed’ plans, involving only a fixed monthly fee, as well as ‘measured’ plans, with both fixed fees and per-unit charges for usage. Consumers are faced with the decisions of which plan to choose and how much to use the phone and these decisions are not, in general, independent. Due to the presence of a time lag between plan choice and usage decisions, consumers are uncertain about usage at the plan-choice stage. We develop a structural discrete/continuous model of plan choice and usage decisions of consumers that accounts for such uncertainty. Prior research has also found that consumers switch less often from fixed plans to measured plans to gain from potential savings than vice versa. Consumer uncertainty regarding their mean usage levels and different rates of learning by consumers in the two plans is a potential explanation for this phenomenon. We extend our discrete/continuous model to account for consumer learning about their mean usage and estimate different rates of learning for the two types of plans. We estimate our model using data from the 1986 Kentucky local telephone tariff experiment. Even in the absence of any price variation over time, we are able to measure the price elasticities both of usage and of choice of plan. Using our parameter estimates, we simulate the effects of the introduction of a metered plan in a market with only a fixed plan and vice versa, on both firm revenues and consumer surplus. We also find that consumers learn very rapidly if they are on the measured plan but learn very slowly when they are on the fixed plan. We investigate an alternative assumption on the nature of the learning process in which only consumers in the measured plan have an opportunity to learn. We find that our empirical results are robust to this change of specification. We conduct counterfactual simulations to simulate enhanced calling plans from the firm and consumer points of view. Additional simulations to measure the value of information in this category are also carried out. We compute the value of both complete information, where the entire uncertainty about future usage is resolved, as well as that of limited information, where the consumer's uncertainty about mean usage is resolved, but the uncertainty about specific month-to-month usage remains. We find that the value of information is modest. We also find that a large proportion of the value of information is that about the mean usage, with the value of the information about a specific month's usage being relatively small.

Staging of venture capital investment: a real options analysis

This paper uses contingent claims analysis to investigate the staging decision of venture capitalist (VC) in a principal-agent framework. Venture capital investment opportunities are modeled as real options with multiple volatilities, and the entrepreneur’s incentive is assumed to maximize the probability of getting funded in the next financing round. Two celebrated formulae in the option pricing literature are generalized to evaluate these real options. We find that staging not only gives the VC a waiting option but also mitigates the agency problem of the entrepreneur undertaking too conservative activities. Moreover, we find that the VC tends to stage her investment when the expected growth rate of the venture’s market value is lower. However, the risk-free interest rate is not an important factor in the staging decision. Our model also provides a good explanation for existing empirical evidence on the staging of venture capital investment.     

Porter's Model of Generic Competitive Strategies

A firm’s competitive behavior is an important topic for practitioners, theorists, and policy makers. Among the explanations of firms’ behavior is Michael Porter’s model. We have presented this model along with some alternative approaches: Structure-Conduct-Performance, the New Industrial Organization and Game Theory, the Resource-Based Perspective, and Market Process Economics. These approaches are discussed in terms of their relations, similarities, and differences relative to Porter’s model. In our comparative discussion, we support the use of Porter’s model to evaluate firms’ competitive behavior. Our reasons for this support are this model’s popularity, well-defined structure, feasibility, clarity, simplicity, generality, and its complementarity to two other main approaches. We find the Porter model to be a convenient approach to the firm’s competitive advantage and strategy. This article draws on the thesis that Orges Ormanidhi wrote for his Masters of Philosophy from Staffordshire University.     

Salesforce Compensation: An Analytical and Empirical Examination of the Agency Theoretic Approach

Since the papers of Basu et al. (1985) and Lal and Srinivasan (1993), marketing academics have been interested in the design and implementation of optimal compensation plans. The literature has focused on agency theory as a foundation to help describe and understand this process. Although there has been much theoretical work on this topic, empirical evidence to support this theory remains sparse. Studies by Coughlan and Narasimhan (1992) and John and Weitz (1988, 1989) have found some early evidence that supports agency theory.In this paper we revisit the issue of salesforce compensation on both theoretical and empirical fronts. On the theory side we build a game theoretic model of salesforce compensation that accounts for risk aversion on the part of both the principal and the agent. We further show that accounting for the firm size within the analytical framework yields new insights into the nature of compensation design.The results obtained from our model, while substantiating past findings, offer some new insights into the compensation design process. In particular we find that firm demographics play an important role in the design of the optimal compensation scheme. We then use two datasets collected ten years apart by the Dartnell Corporation to investigate and test hypotheses generated by our model and the extant literature. Our results show that the basic tenets of agency theory continue to hold over time and that our new theoretical hypotheses are consistent with the data. Using the two datasets we also find that inter-temporal changes in salesforce compensation coincide with the advent and adoption of new technologies. Our research thus adds to our substantive knowledge of the drivers of salesforce compensation, while adding to the theoretical structure through taking account of the possibility of principal risk aversion.     

Private Equity and the Public Good

The dominance of agency theory can reduce our collective scope to analyse private equity in all its diversity and depth. We contribute to theorisation of private equity by developing a contrasting perspective that draws on a rich tradition of virtue ethics. In doing so, we juxtapose ‘private equity’ with ‘public good’ to develop points of rhetorical and analytical contrast. We develop a typology differentiating various forms of private equity, and focus on the ‘take private’ form. These takeovers are where private equity funds are used to buy all a firm’s publicly listed shares. Take private deals reduce reporting requirements and lessen the amount of public scrutiny a firm comes under. They allow greater control of a firm’s assets and resources but also have effects in terms of the wider social fabric. The ‘public good’ and virtue ethics offer an alternative basis for theorisation of these deals. This provides a needed contrast to accounts of private equity based on agency theory.     

On Evaluating the Performance of Problem Structuring Methods: An Attempt at Formulating a Conceptual Model

In the past decade there has been a discussion on the need for and degree of empirical evidence for the effectiveness of problem structuring methods (PSMs). Some authors propose that PSMs are used in unique situations which are difficult to study, both from a methodological and a practical perspective. In another view experimental validation is necessary and, if not obtained, PSMs remain substantially invalidated and thus ‘suspect’ with regard to their claims of effectiveness. Both views agree on one point: the necessity of being clear about the important factors in the context in which a method is used, the method’s aims and its essential elements through which these aims are achieved. A clear formulation of central variables is the core of a theoretical validation, without which empirical testing of effects is impossible. Since the process of PSMs is sometimes referred to as ‘more art than science’, increased clarity on the PSM process also supports the transfer of methods. In this article we consider goals important to most PSMs, such as consensus and commitment. We then focus on outcomes of group model building, and expectations on how context and group modeling process contributes to outcomes. Next we discuss the similarity of these central variables and relations to two sets of theories in social psychology: the theory of planned behavior and dual process theories of persuasion. On the basis of these theories we construct a preliminary conceptual model on group model building effectiveness and address its practical applicability for research on PSM.     

What matters in a price negotiation: Evidence from the U.S. auto retailing industry

While there is a great deal of theoretical and experimental literature on what factors affect bargaining outcomes, there is little empirical work based on data from real markets. In this paper we analyze negotiations for new cars, a $340 billion industry in the United States in 2010. Our results suggest that search costs, incomplete information, and bargaining disutility have an economically significant effect in real-world negotiations: we estimate that relative to an uninformed consumer, a consumer with basic information about the seller’s reservation price and his own outside options captures 15% of the average dealer margin from selling an automobile. We also find that a buyer’s search cost and bargaining disutility have significant effects on bargaining outcomes. Finally, our results show that while search is common, there remains a substantial group of consumers who do not engage in any of the search behaviors we measure. We hypothesize that these buyers are not aware of how easy and effective certain activities in improving negotiation outcomes can be.     

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): Models and Theories in Stakeholder Dialogue

The pharmaceutical sector, an industry already facing stiff challenges in the form of intensified competition and strategic consolidation, has increasingly become subject to a range of pressures. Crucially, in common with other large-scale businesses, pharmaceutical firms find themselves ‹invited’ to respond positively to the corporate ‹social’ responsibility (CSR) expectations of their stakeholders. Consequently, individual managers will almost certainly be obliged to engage in some form of stakeholder dialogue and this, in turn, means that they will have to make difficult choices about which practices to adopt. This real-world management predicament runs parallel to an academic interest in CSR stakeholder dialogue theory and models. Accordingly, the approach of this paper is to focus primarily on the academic debate surrounding stakeholder dialogue, by reviewing past attempts to research and theorise the subject, by identifying gaps and weaknesses in the literature, and by proposing a new analytical model. The central aim of the proposed new model is to offer a unified, structured, systematic, and comprehensive approach to CSR decision making whilst simultaneously providing a practical framework for CSR executives who face the challenge of responding in an effective manner to stakeholders. The model outlined here is currently being employed to conduct international comparative empirical research into stakeholder dialogue practices amongst UK and German pharmaceutical firms. In the longer term the intention is to use the model to undertake international comparative research encompassing a broader range of countries and industries.     

Contractual Design as a Determinant of Performance: Evidence from Franchising

This empirical note deals with the contractual design of relationships between producers and retailers. It provides evidence on the links between the features of vertical contracts organizing franchising networks and the performances of these networks. An agency perspective is used to understand the structure of contracts. We focus on the relevance of vertical restraints by the upstream firm to prevent retailers from free‐riding in the distribution networks. From six frequent contractual provisions we distinguish two types of contracts according to the degree of constraint imposed on the franchisees. Econometric estimations carried out on this basis offer evidence consistent with the hypothesis that within franchising systems, more constrained contracts for retailers encourage better performance at the network level.     

The Agency Problems Embedded in Firm’s Equity Investment

We find that agency problems are embedded in firm’s excess and abnormal equity investments that are mainly dictated by controlling shareholder’s motives and ethical choices manifested in ownership and board structure. The excess equity investment is gauged with respect to industry average. The abnormal equity investment is specifically referred to the number of nominal investment companies that are fully controlled by the controlling owners while subject to little governance. Our empirical evidences of 345 Taiwanese non-financial listed firms show that firm’s excess and abnormal equity investments are negatively correlated with controlling shareholder’s cash flow rights while are positively correlated with the control–cash flow deviation, and board affiliation. The results are supportive of the positive incentive hypothesis and the negative entrenchment hypothesis put forth by La Porta et al. (2002, Journal of Finance 57, 1147–1171) and Claessen et al. (2002, Journal of Finance 57, 2741–2742). The negative relation between equity investment and firm’s value further supports the agency postulation that corporate excess and abnormal equity investments represent a leeway for controlling shareholder to exploit wealth of minority shareholders. This study potentially contributes to the literature of business ethics by portraying an empirically testable linkage from controlling owner’s ethical choices to his actions and therefore firm’s value. Yin-Hua Yeh, Ph.D., is Professor and Director of the Graduate Institute of Finance at Fu-Jen Catholic University (FJU) in Taiwan. He is also the Director of the Center for Corporate Governance and Business Ethics at FJU. His main research and teaching areas are corporate governance, corporate finance, and merger and acquisition. Tsun-Siou Lee, Ph.D., is Professor of Finance at National Taiwan University. His main research and teaching areas are corporate governance, futures and options, and financial innovation. Pei-Gi Shu, Ph.D., is Professor of Business Administration at Fu-Jen Catholic University in Taiwan. He is also the Vice Dean of Management College at FJU. His main research and teaching areas are mutual funds and behavioral finance.     

Duties Owed to Organizational Citizens – Ethical Insights for Today’s Leader

Organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) has been widely recognized as a contributor to improving organizational performance and wealth creation. The purpose of this article is to briefly summarize the motives of many employees who exercise OCB and to identify the ethical duties owed by organizational leaders to the highly committed employees with whom they work. After reviewing the nature of OCB and the psychological contracts made with highly committed employees, we then use Hosmer’s framework of ten ethical perspectives to identify how OCB is viewed from each of those ethical viewpoints. We offer six propositions about OCB that relate to building employee commitment and trust.