Integration of unemployment insurance with retirement insurance

This paper analyzes a social insurance system that integrates unemployment insurance with a pension program, allowing workers to borrow against their future wage income to finance consumption during an unemployment episode and thus improving search incentives while reducing the risks arising from unemployment. This paper identifies the conditions under which integration improves welfare and the factors which determine the optimal degree of integration. We show that when the duration of unemployment is very short compared to the period of employment or retirement, the optimal system involves exclusive reliance on pension-funded self-insurance. This system imposes a negligible risk burden for workers while avoiding attenuating search incentives. We also argue that joint integration of several social insurance programs with a pension program through an individual account is desirable unless the risks are perfectly correlated with each other.     

Disability insurance and unemployment insurance as substitute pathways

In this article, we estimate the degree of substitution between enrolment into Disability Insurance (DI) and Unemployment Insurance (UI) in the Netherlands. Starting in the 1990s many policy measures aimed at reducing DI enrolment, and increase labour force participation. We quantify whether these policy measures have led to a reduction in hidden unemployment in DI. A side effect of the reforms may be increased pressure on UI. Therefore, we simultaneously estimate reverse substitution, that is, hidden disability in UI. To this end, we employ a sample of firms in the Dutch AVO database from the period 1993 to 2002. Using instrumental variables in a bivariate Tobit specification, we identify the hidden components in both respective schemes. The estimation results indicate that about 3% of all dismissals took place through DI, which implies that about one quarter of the DI enrolments observed in our sample in fact consists of hidden unemployment. We find no evidence for reverse substitution of disabled persons ending up in UI.     

Group disability income: new policies emphasize employee appeal

Group disability insurance is a voluntary benefit that offers advantages to both employers and employees. Employees who want this kind of coverage realize that their employers have done much of the homework for them in terms of comparing benefits, rates and contract provisions. Employers recognize an opportunity to add a benefit that may help attract and retain valuable employees with little additional cost or administrative burden.     

Mutual insurance for catastrophe hazards: Case of deposit insurance

Deposit insurance involves catastrophe risk because bank failures spike during a banking crisis. Although mutual insurance is ill-suited for catastrophe risk, the US government structures deposit insurance like a mutual company owned by policyholders. Furthermore, an intertemporal mispricing resulting from a dividend-surcharge arrangement produces several problems. Most importantly, it worsens moral hazard. Through dividends and surcharges, deposit insurance transfers the premium burden from high-risk banks to low-risk banks and in effect erodes the charter value of low-risk banks. In addition, high-risk banks taking catastrophe risk can outperform low-risk banks for many years in a row, putting pressures on managers of low-risk banks. Owing to these factors, an underpricing of catastrophe risk before its realization can ratchet up risk-taking by banks. Other problems with the intertemporal mispricing include making the banking business more procyclical, distorting the prices of banking products, and exposing taxpayers to asymmetric downside risk. To ensure fair competition and improve economic efficiency, the government should set the insurance premium based not on the realized loss but on the expected loss.     

Moral hazard,insurance claims,and repeated insurance contracts

Abstract The paper develops a simple model of repeated automobile insurance contracts, providing a framework for analyzing changes in aggregate insurance data in periods of changes that affect driver incentives. Experience rating of premiums gives drivers an incentive to exert effort to avoid accidents (ex ante moral hazard), and an incentive to hide accidents (ex post moral hazard). The empirical analysis, using data from the competitive insurance markets in Ontario and Alberta over a period of major legislative changes in Ontario, suggests that much of the recent decline in accidents in Ontario was due to an increased incentive to hide accidents.     

Performance of European insurance firms in the single insurance market

The deregulation and liberalization process towards establishing a single European financial market has some important implications for the insurance industries. Due to the increased competition, insurance firms have to adjust their costs and operate efficiently to survive in this new environment. This paper attempts to analyze the cost efficiency and scale economies in the single European insurance market. Considering the ongoing enlargement process of the EU, our sample includes the insurance industries of the major EU‐15, four new members and a candidate country, Turkey, over the period 1995–2005. We use the firm‐level financial data and estimate a stochastic cost frontier that controls for differences in environmental conditions. All insurance systems display significant levels of cost inefficiency. The results further indicate that there are significant economies of scale, particularly for small‐ and medium‐size insurance firms. Finally, the analyses suggest similar results for major EU countries, new members and the candidate.     

经济型轿车的广告诉求误区及策划方略

本文阐述了经济型轿车的消费特点与广告诉求，论证了经济型轿车的广告诉求误区，指出了经济型轿车广告诉求的策划方略。