FINANCING URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE: KNOWNS,UNKNOWNS, AND A WAY FORWARD

Improved urban infrastructure is widely believed to be essential in facilitating economic growth and in improving the lives of urban dwellers, both in developed and in developing countries. This paper focuses on several dimensions of urban infrastructure finance: finance for major infrastructure improvements in major economic centers, finance for expansion of basic municipal services in secondary cities and towns, and intergovernmental systems for financing investments with impacts beyond jurisdictional limits. It reviews what is “known” about current practices in these areas, using international evidence and case studies and summarizing international best practices. It also indicates areas in which knowledge gaps remain. Despite these “unknowns,” there are avenues by which our understanding of infrastructure schemes can be enhanced, and some suggestions for a research agenda on financing urban infrastructure are offered in the concluding section.     

Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games

We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information. We identify a class of two-way communication mechanisms which mirror those considered in the single principal analysis of Myerson (1982). In such mechanisms, every agent truthfully reveals her type to all principals, and obeys the private recommendations she receives from each of them. We show that there is a rationale in restricting attention to this class of mechanisms: if principals use these mechanisms, there is no unilateral incentive to deviate towards more sophisticated ones. We develop three examples to analyze possible extensions and limits of our approach. The first two examples show that the restriction to direct and incentive compatible mechanisms is not sufficient to provide a complete characterization of all pure strategy equilibria. The third one shows that private recommendations play a fundamental role in competing mechanism games, suggesting that one cannot safely restrict to one-sided communication mechanisms.     

On the incentives to experiment in federations

Conventional wisdom has it that policy innovation is better promoted in a federal rather than in a unitary system. Recent research, however, has provided theoretical evidence to the contrary: a multi-jurisdictional system is characterized—due to the existence of a horizontal information externality—by under-provision of policy innovation. This paper presents a simple model that introduces political competition for federal office and emphasizes that such competition plays an important role in shaping the incentives for experimentation. For, in this case, political actors use the innovative policies to signal ability to the electorate. This effect may offset the effect that arises from the incentive to free ride, and so a federal system may generate more innovation than a unitary one.     

An empirical model of transfers within a federation, with an application to the European Union

We construct a stylized model of transfers within a federation and apply it to the European Union. Our approach differs from that of most of the existing literature in that we fix the preferences for redistribution of resources among a federation's members, rather than fix the current budgetary rules or modify them on the basis of assumed scenarios. The model is tested (successfully) by assessing its ability to predict the effects of the last (1995) enlargement on the European budget. We then use the estimated model to predict the reallocation of the Union's net transfers after the upcoming Eastern enlargement. Our estimates of transfers to the incoming member states exceed those of the rest of the literature. Our results can be interpreted in one of two ways: first, either the European Union, in its collective decision-making process (that in the future will include the five incoming countries as voting members), will institute new rules and programs to further reduce the regional disparities in income, or second, if the current rules and programs are maintained, then the Eastern enlargement would result in a reduction in the “depth” of the Union. The approach we introduce can be more generally applied to the analysis of other intergovernmental or international organizations.     

Soft budget constraints and strategic interactions in subnational borrowing: Evidence from the German States, 1975-2005

Cooperative federations are usually characterized by the existence of bailout guarantees and intergovernmental transfer schemes. This paper explores whether such features of cooperative federations lead to subnational soft budget constraints using panel data from the German States covering the 1975-2005 period. The methodology is based on the premise that subnational governments’ borrowing will exhibit vertical and horizontal strategic interactions if they operate under soft budget constraints. Therefore, a test for strategic interactions in subnational borrowing can be used to infer whether a cooperative federation like Germany is susceptible to soft budget constraints. The results suggest that state borrowing in Germany exhibited horizontal but not vertical interactions during the time-frame of the analysis. This indicates (i) that German States faced soft budget constraints and (ii) that they were more concerned about the likelihood of a bailout than about its volume.     

审计信息的不确定性及其控制

审计信息不确定性的存在,降低了审计信息的有效性,使利益相关者在依据所获取的审计信息作出评价和决策时受到限制。本文分析了审计信息中存在不确定性的原因,并提出相应的防范措施,以提高审计信息的质量和有效性。     

Tax Competition between Unitary and Federal Countries

We analyse taxation of capital in a two-country model, where one country is unitary while the other one is federal, consisting of two identical regions. Both national and regional governments levy a tax on capital. The countries play a noncooperative game between them, with the government of the federal country acting as a Stackelberg leader with respect to its regional governments. We show under what circumstances, at equilibrium, the federal country sets its tax rate inefficiently low, while the unitary country sets it inefficiently high.We are deeply grateful to three anonymous referees for their comments, and especially to one of them for extremely helpful suggestions. We also wish to thank participants at ESEM 2004 for fruitful discussions     

Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incentives

First generation fiscal federalism (FGFF) studies the performance of decentralized systems under the assumption of benevolent social planners. Second generation fiscal federalism (SGFF) studies performance based on the fiscal and political incentives facing subnational officials. The paper focuses on three aspects of SGFF. First, it considers the design of intergovernmental transfers. While FGFF emphasizes correcting vertical and horizontal equity, SGFF emphasizes the importance of fiscal incentives for producing local economic prosperity. SGFF extends FGFF approaches by showing how non-linear transfer systems can produce both equalization and high marginal fiscal incentives to produce local economic growth. Second, the paper raises the fiscal incentive approach, showing how different tax systems produce different fiscal incentives for political officials to choose policies. Third, the paper discusses the interaction of democracy and fiscal federalism.     

不同资本账户开放程度下的中国财政货币政策效果分析

研究目标：分析不同资本账户开放程度下的中国财政货币政策效果及福利效应。研究方法：将内生化的政府支出（税收）政策以及包含汇率的价格（数量）型为主的混合货币政策一并纳入一个小型开放的DSGE模型。研究发现：随着资本账户的逐步放开,财政政策方面,减税政策刺激经济增长和促进就业的效果越来越好,政府支出政策刺激经济增长和促进就业的效果越来越差;货币政策方面,国内货币政策的调控效果及利率上升的跨期替代效应减弱。从社会福利损失的角度分析表明：无论是与内生化的政府支出（税收）政策组合还是与财政赤字政策组合,价格型为主的混合货币政策始终优于数量型为主的混合货币政策。研究创新：考察在高、中和低三种资本账户开放背景下中国不同财政货币政策组合的相互作用和经济效应。研究价值：为资本账户放开过程中合理地使用财政货币政策组合提供理论参考。     

论住宅开发中开发商与顾客之间的信息不对称

从信息经济学的角度出发,通过定量与定性分析,建立委托-代理的最优激励合同机制解决开发商与购房者之间的信息不对称问题。弱化住宅开发中由于严重的信息不对称情况导致的逆向选择①和道德风险②。以期在开发商和顾客之间建立一个良好的信息沟通桥梁。     

On the value of information in the presence of moral hazard

This paper shows that the marginal value of a “small amount of non-output information” is generally non-positive in the context of the standard principal-agent model involving moral hazard, which suggests a non-concavity in the value of information. However, when both the principal and the agent are risk neutral, even a small amount of non-output information may exhibit a positive incremental value in presence of a liability constraint.      

Robust implementation under alternative information structures

In this paper we consider a model in which agents have complete information about their neighbors and, possibly, incomplete information about the rest of the environment. We consider two different informational frameworks. In the first, agents do not have priors about the relevant characteristics in the rest of the environment. In the second, agents are supposed to have priors about the unknown characteristics. We present a mechanism which implements any social choice correspondence satisfying monotonicity and no veto power in both informational settings for every possible prior thus requiring little knowledge from the point of view of the designer of the information possessed by agents about the environment. The authors wish to thank J. Canals, B. Chakravorty, P. Chander, C. Herrero, G. Orosel, D. Schmeidler, W. Thomson, W. Trockel, F. Vega, A. Villar, T. Yamato and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies. The first author acknowledges financial support from the Institució Valenciana d’Estudies i Investigació; L.V.I.E. and DGICYT under projects PB/88-0289 and PB/91-0756. The second author acknowledges financial support from DGICYT under project PB/90-0156. A previous version of the paper was written when authors visited (May 1991) the Institute of Mathematical Economics (Bielefeld) to which authors are grateful.     

Optimal taxation and intergovernmental transfer in a dynamic model with multiple levels of government

In this paper, we study the optimal choices of the federal income tax, federal transfers, and local taxes in a dynamic model of capital accumulation and with explicit game structures among multiple private agents, multiple local governments, and the federal government. In general, the optimal local property tax is zero if the local property tax is constrained to be nonnegative, whereas the optimal local consumption tax is always positive. When the local consumption tax is chosen optimally, the federal income tax can be either positive or negative. For most reasonable parameter values, our numerical calculations have shown that with a positive local consumption tax there exists a reverse transfer from local governments to the federal government.     

信息系统工程方法探析

信息系统工程方法按其来源的不同可分为四种类型。信息系统工程方法论是关于如何选用信息系统工程技术和方法的方法。