The language of US corporate environmental disclosure

We rely on prior work in environmental disclosure and corporate impression management to investigate whether there are self-serving biases present in the language and verbal tone used in corporations’ environmental disclosures. Specifically, we argue that the degree of bias in these narratives varies systematically based on firm environmental performance, hypothesizing that disclosures of worse environmental performers exhibit significantly more “optimism” and less “certainty” than their better-performing counterparts. We test our two hypotheses using a cross-sectional sample of corporate environmental disclosures contained in US 10-K annual reports. Utilizing the content analysis software DICTION to determine “optimism” and “certainty” scores for the disclosures, we find empirical support for both hypotheses. Our study contributes significantly to research in environmental disclosure by investigating bias in the use of language and verbal tone as a tool for managing stakeholder impressions and by finding empirical support for this role. Thus, the language and verbal tone used in corporate environmental disclosures, in addition to their amount and thematic content, should be considered when investigating the relation between corporate disclosure and performance.     

The interaction between corporate tax structure and disclosure policy

When socially desirable behaviors are deemed difficult to legislate, tax code is often called upon to indirectly achieve the desired ends. Adjustments to tax policy have been employed to spark investment, encourage charitable donations, and discourage tobacco consumption, to name a few examples. This paper demonstrates that tax policy may also be an effective means of encouraging welfare enhancing disclosures by firms. Further, by inducing disclosures of the right types of information while discouraging revelation of other types, tax policy proves to be a more versatile instrument than direct regulatory attempts which can mandate (but not prohibit) disclosures. The intuition behind our results is that when firms make decisions to disclose (or withhold) pieces of private information, such a decision is often made with an eye on the potential for a large payoff. In such cases, progressive taxes can dampen the appeal of big payoffs and better align the incentives of firms with those of consumers. In short, while progressive taxes may be criticized for curbing aggressiveness, it is precisely such a decrease in aggressiveness that can prompt efficient sharing of information.     

Temporal resolution of uncertainty,disclosure policy,and corporate debt yields

In this paper, we study how risk-shifting incentives and the design of debt covenants are affected by the pattern of temporal resolution of uncertainty (TRU) in the underlying technology of the firm. We show that the extent of risk-shifting as well as the yield demanded on corporate debt are larger the later the resolution of uncertainty (thus providing one explanation for the empirical evidence of Reisz and Perlich (2006)). We allow for contracting based on verifiable information disclosed by the manager. In this context, we characterize optimal covenants restricting investment. The effects of these covenants on the firm's investment policy and corporate bond yields under different disclosure policies and patterns of TRU are studied. Empirical implications are derived and discussed.     

Voluntary disclosure and corporate innovation

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - We examine whether a firm’s voluntary disclosures, proxied by management earnings forecasts, affect its innovation activity. A firm making more...     

Stock-market disruptions and corporate disclosure policies

We examine managers’' disclosure decisions in response to non-fundamental price shocks. Using mutual fund fire sales as a source of market disruption, we show some firms respond by issuing earnings guidance. Others, especially firms with weaker performance and more short-term-oriented investors, engage in accrual-based earnings management. To identify the efficacy of firm disclosure choices, we examine passage of Sarbanes-Oxley and Regulation Fair Disclosure and show that they increased reliance on guidance rather than earnings management. The shift is associated with faster post-fire-sales price recovery, suggesting enhancing information disclosure rather than manipulation is effective in mitigating the effect of market disruptions.     

Equity home bias and corporate disclosure

I show that more comprehensive corporate disclosure reduces investors’ uncertainty about domestic companies’ payoffs at no cost, thereby decreasing investors’ equity home bias toward a country. Since investors should base their investment decisions on valid and easily interpretable company information only, more comprehensive disclosure will reduce the home bias only if domestic securities law is sufficiently stratified and domestic companies use international accounting standards. Using panel data for 38 countries from 2003 to 2008 I find that more comprehensive disclosure reduces investors’ home bias, though significantly only for countries that sufficiently enforce their securities law and implement international accounting standards.     

Director capital and corporate disclosure quality

Conventional wisdom regarding board effectiveness emphasizes the role of board composition and incentives in alleviating conflicts of interest. We argue that board capital, however, may be a more important aspect of board efficacy since directors are the highest level agents of shareholders, meet infrequently, and shareholders have limited recourse for poor decision-making. In contrast, shareholders and the SEC can sue/prosecute directors for conflicts of interest or bias. One role of the board involves determining the depth and degree of the firm’s financial disclosures. To test the idea that high capital boards seek to provide greater disclosure quality to investors, we manually collect data on director attributes and apply factor analysis to measure the networking, educational, and experience capital of the board. The results indicate that board capital is positively related to disclosure quality, with differing key attributes for inside and outside directors. These results are robust to 2SLS and difference-in-difference approaches.     

Investor protection and cash holdings: Evidence from US cross-listing

This paper examines (i) whether the level of firms’ cash holdings differ depending on the strength of investor protection, (ii) whether excess cash holdings are valued more with better investor protection, and (iii) whether cross-listed firms that improve investor protection through “bonding” hold relatively more cash than non-cross-listed firms. We analyze 1405 ADR firms and their corresponding matched firms from 39 different countries and document that ADR firms have significantly higher cash holdings relative to their non-cross-listed peers, especially in recent years. The increase in cash holdings is much higher for emerging market firms because of their transition from particularly poor home country investor protection and accounting standards before cross-listing to much higher standards after cross-listing. In addition, firms with level III ADR listing, which represents the strongest investor protection, have higher cash holdings relative to other types of ADR firms.     

Social impact disclosure and corporate annual reports

Corporate Social Responsibility may be clarified by utilizing the economic concept of externalities. The line-by-line prose in annual reports throws some light on the intensity and nature of these activities. Two independent tests support the concept that annual reports may for some purposes be considered a reasonable surrogate for real activity. Annual reports from eighty-two food-processing corporations are used as a data base to illuminate corporate social responsibility activities, as well as the nature of current disclosure patterns.     

Engagement partner specialization and corporate disclosure transparency

This paper explores the association of audit partners' industry specialization with corporate disclosure transparency and the latter's informativeness. The distinctive institutional designs of partner signature requirement and Information Disclosure and Transparency Ranking System (IDTRS) adopted in Taiwan allow us to empirically address the issue. We posit and find that the rankings from the IDTRS are higher for firms audited by industry specialist engagement partners than for firms audited by non-specialist engagement partners. Additionally, the results show that the probability of informed trade (PIN) proxy for information asymmetry is negatively associated with the rankings for clients of industry specialist engagement partners, but not for clients of industry non-specialist engagement partners. The results are robust with respect to alternative estimation method and alternative measures of industry specialization. Overall, the evidence suggests that industry specialist engagement partners enhance the credibility of corporate disclosure transparency, through which information asymmetry is further declined. The evidence provides policy implications to the partner signature requirement adopted in Taiwan and China.     

Customer information disclosure and corporate financing constraints

We examine the impact of voluntary customer information disclosure by Chinese-listed companies on their financing constraints from the perspective of information transparency. The results show that voluntary disclosure can alleviate financing constraints, and the effect is pronounced when detailed customer information is disclosed. Analyst following and information opacity are used as a proxy for information transparency to test the mediating effect, and it is found that voluntary disclosure reduces financing constraints by increasing information transparency. In addition, the results indicate that when industry competition is fierce and the quality of internal control is low, disclosure of customer information has a more pronounced effect on the alleviation of financing constraints. Policymakers and corporate decision-makers should be aware that voluntary customer information has great significance for the improvement of information environment in China's capital market.     

Cross-border regulatory enforcement and corporate voluntary disclosure

In this study, we find that foreign firms cross-listed in the US issue significantly more and better-quality management earnings forecasts after their home countries sign the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information (MMoU), a nonbinding arrangement established by the International Organization of Securities Commissions to enhance the cross-border enforcement of securities laws. Specifically, we find that after the MMoU, relative to their domestic counterparts in the US, foreign firms cross-listed in the US are not only more likely to issue management earnings forecasts but also issue them more frequently. They also tend to issue better-quality earnings forecasts, as measured by lower surprise, higher precision, greater timeliness, more disaggregation, lower optimism and fewer errors. We find that the observed effects of the MMoU signing are stronger for cross-listed firms from countries with weaker institutional environments, resulting in greater enforcement concerns after the MMoU, and for firms with less foreign institutional ownership before the MMoU. Collectively, our findings support the conjecture that after a US-listed foreign firm's home country enters the MMoU, the firm has more incentives to engage in voluntary disclosure due to greater concerns about regulatory enforcement and increased information demand from investors.     

Voluntary disclosure of corporate political spending

In this paper, we study voluntary political spending disclosure, a widespread yet relatively unexplored corporate voluntary disclosure practice. Using an index created by the CPA-Zicklin Center that measures the level of voluntary political spending disclosure for S&P 500 firms, we examine firm-level characteristics associated with such disclosures, and their importance. We find that firms with greater political expenditures, direct political connections, higher investor activism, better corporate social responsibility performance and governance, and more industry competition tend to have a higher level of political spending disclosure. We also find that a higher level of political spending disclosure is positively associated with both the number of institutional investors and the proportion of shares owned by institutional investors, particularly socially responsible institutional investors, after controlling for the quality of other disclosures. The level of political spending disclosure is also associated with a higher analyst following, lower forecast error, and smaller forecast dispersion. Finally, we find that political spending disclosure enhances the positive relationship between annual corporate political spending and firm financial performance. Together, these results are consistent with the view that voluntary political spending disclosure helps align managers’ interests with those of shareholders.     

Peer effects in corporate disclosure decisions

This study examines peer effects in corporate disclosure decisions. Peer effects suggest that the average behavior of a group influences the behavior of individual group members. Consistent with peer effects, I find that disclosures made by industry peers induce firm disclosure. Peer effects in disclosure are more pronounced when a firm's strategic uncertainty is higher, indicating that peer firm disclosure reduces the external uncertainty arising from the firm's interaction with its industry peers and thus increases the precision of managerial private information. I also find that peer effects are stronger when a firm's dependence on external financing is greater, suggesting that peer firm disclosure increases the costs on firm visibility and reputation in capital markets. Overall, these findings suggest that peer firm disclosure shapes a firm's information environment.     

Voluntary disclosure of corporate venture capital investments

In this paper, we investigate drivers of corporate venture capital investment announcements. Consistent with voluntary information disclosure theories, we find that a public announcement is less likely to be made when the start-up firm is in the seed stage but more likely when the parent company is large, active in concentrated markets and in non-high-tech industries; spends heavily on internal R&D and capital expenditures; has low leverage ratio; and faces more information asymmetry problems. In addition, corporate venture capital programs managed externally disclose more often than internal programs. We find that parent companies facing more severe asymmetric information problems enjoy the highest abnormal returns in response to announcements. This study contributes to the literature on voluntary information disclosure in that it evidences that larger corporations use disclosure of some of their investments in innovative startups strategically as a way to convey valuable information to the market.     

Appraisal rights and corporate disclosure during mergers and acquisitions

Target shareholders have the right to ask for a higher merger price if good news emerges after a merger agreement. This “appraisal right” varies with state law and was substantially strengthened in Delaware in 2007. I examine how target managers respond to changes in this right. If target managers represent target shareholders, the managers would be more likely to release good news, but I find they are more likely to withhold good news when appraisal rights are higher. This suggests agency problems and collusion on the part of target managers, and thus my paper adds to the larger literature that considers agency problems on the part of managers.     

Corporate innovation strategy and disclosure policy

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - We examine the impact of a firm’s innovation strategy on its disclosure policy. Using a sample of innovation-intensive U.S. firms from 1992 to...     

Monetary policy and corporate default

When a corporation issues debt with a fixed nominal coupon, the real value of future payments decreases with the price level. Forward-looking corporate default decisions therefore depend on monetary policy through its impact on expected inflation. We build a general equilibrium economy with deadweight bankruptcy costs that demonstrates how nominal rigidities in corporate debt create an important role for monetary policy even in the absence of standard nominal frictions such as staggered price setting in the output market. Under a passive nominal interest rate peg, the direct effects of a negative productivity shock combine with deflation to produce strong incentives for corporate default. A debt-deflationary spiral results when there are real costs of financial distress. Inflation targeting eliminates this amplification mechanism but full inflation targeting requires permitting the nominal interest rate to depend explicitly on credit market conditions.     

A multinational test of determinants of corporate disclosure

This paper develops a model of cultural, national, and corporate factors that influence the financial disclosure of corporations. This model is then tested empirically using a sample of companies from 33 countries. The paper extends the literature on disclosure by considering a larger number of variables that represent determinants of disclosure and by empirically testing the model using a larger number of countries than prior studies. The model is tested using disclosure scores included in International Accounting and Auditing Trends. The model considers the influence of culture, national political and economic systems, and corporate financial and operating systems on the amount of corporate financial disclosure. The results of the regression model indicate that disclosure is influenced by culture, national systems, and corporate systems. The model developed is shown to provide a reasonably good explanation of the disclosure decision. Differences among the components of the model help explain differences in observed financial disclosure between companies in different countries and between companies within the same country. The results indicate that the financial-disclosure decision for a company is complex and influenced by many national and corporate factors.