首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
相似文献
 共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
The existence of a public competitive equilibrium for any arbitrary (nondistortive) tax schemes (in particular, proportional taxes) for economies with local public goods, is proved. Allowing preferences to be both nontransitive and noncomplete enables an explicit introduction of the government as an (additional) agent in the economy. Moreover, we allow for “spillovers” of the public goods among localities, and for the production sets to depend on the amount of public goods produced in the economy. The only restriction on the tax system is that every individual is able to afford it and that the government's budget never runs a surplus. Since every equilibrium allocation is a Pareto optimum, every tax scheme is optimal (in the sense that its equilibrium allocation is a Pareto optimum).  相似文献   

2.
We make two contributions to the theory of optimal income taxation. First, assuming conditions sufficient for existence of a Pareto optimal income tax and public goods mechanism, we show that if agents' preferences satisfy an extended notion of single crossing called capacity constrained single crossing, then there exists a Pareto optimal income tax and public goods mechanism that is budget balancing. Second, we show that, even without capacity constrained single crossing, existence of a budget balancing Pareto optimal income tax and public goods mechanism is guaranteed if the set of agent types contains no atoms.  相似文献   

3.
We explore the characteristics of Pareto‐optimal allocations in the context of local public goods or clubs. A set of first‐order conditions for Pareto optimality is provided. Classical treatments apparently neglect an important term related to migrant compensation, and thus are incorrect. A Pareto optimum is shown to exist.  相似文献   

4.
Summary We examine the set of Pareto-efficient allocations in economies with public goods. We show that even if preferences are continuous and strongly monotonic, it need not coincide with the set of weakly efficient allocations. We then study topological properties of the Pareto set. We show that it is neither connected nor closed in allocation space. Furthermore, if the public goods are local, the image of the Pareto set in utility space need not be closed or connected. We provide two independent sufficient conditions for the closedness of the Pareto set. The results are directly applicable to private goods economies with joint production. Our results should be of interest for general equilibrium and mechanism design theory; where for example, the properties of the efficient set are important for proving the existence of an equilibrium and for the study of the properties of monotone-path social choice correspondences.We thank Hideo Konishi, Tomoichi Shinotsuka, Nicholas Yannelis and an anonymous referee for valuable comments on previous drafts of this paper.  相似文献   

5.
In collaborative negotiation, stakeholder representatives are charged with the development of a mutually acceptable set of public policies. Although this approach has become popular in environmental negotiations, little is known about the characteristics of the outcomes that are reached. In this paper, we employ an Edgeworth box framework to investigate the nature of bargaining over public goods (environmental policies) that have multiple attributes. We then design and conduct laboratory experiments within this framework to test whether negotiated outcomes satisfy standard axiomatic bargaining predictions under a variety of conditions. Specifically, we test whether two parties with Pareto inefficient endowments of two goods will trade to Pareto improving and Pareto efficient outcomes, and to the Nash bargain in particular. We vary whether the Nash bargain coincides with or diverges from the outcome that maximizes the joint payoff, or the outcome that equalizes payoffs, and whether subjects are provided full or partial information. We find that bargainers reach Pareto improving and efficient outcomes across treatments, but withdraw support for the Nash bargain when it generates unequal payments or when payoff information is private. We conclude that this experimental framework offers a promising method for studying multi-attribute negotiations.  相似文献   

6.
In this paper we estimated the demand for local public spending for the Brazilian municipalities within a median voter's framework. The rationale for applying that framework came from the fact that in federal systems voters’ preferences are more likely to be reflected at the local level as the consumers of public services have a better knowledge of the benefits and costs of the local public expenditures. Results obtained are consistent with the theoretical background thus suggesting that this hypothesis might be useful to describe the demand for local public goods in Brazil. In particular, the use of quantile regression permitted us to investigate the impacts of the conditioning variables on local public expenses across different expenditures classes thus allowing for heterogeneity across municipalities. Our results also suggest that the impact of the city size on the quality of club goods shows crowding effects as γ is between zero and one. However, in the estimated models, marginal congestion slightly decreases with expenditure. This is a rather surprising result as one is tempted to conclude that the congestion effect should be higher on big cities. Yet, a more careful look shows the drawbacks of such an interpretation. The indivisibilities preclude the provision of certain services in small towns, concentrating their provision on larger cities. Hence, the higher expenditures of those big cities reflect not only a crowding cost but also the fact that these towns offer a wide range of services when compared to the small ones.  相似文献   

7.
Matching mechanisms have been proposed to improve public good provision in voluntary contributions. However, such decentralized subsidizing mechanisms may not be Pareto‐improving and may suffer from incomplete information and incredible commitment. This paper examines participation constraints of matching mechanisms with small matching rates in two cases of equilibria. At interior equilibria, there always exist small Pareto‐improving matching schemes regardless of preferences. This universal existence is useful for cooperation among heterogeneous players in the context without global information of preferences or at the international level without central governments. At corner equilibria, matching schemes work in different ways and have distinct welfare effects in certain cases, and the existence of Pareto‐improving matching schemes is not universal but is possible under certain conditions. The paper further characterizes Pareto‐improving matching schemes, and shows that it is easier to reach Pareto‐improving matching outcomes if players value more on public goods and have stronger substitution between private and public goods.  相似文献   

8.
9.
机制设计理论综述   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
方燕  张昕竹 《当代财经》2012,(7):119-129
机制的新理解和激励相容概念使得机制设计框架得以确立,显示原理极大简化了分析框架。公共品经济难以有效权衡配置效率、自愿参与和激励相容。公共品提供的占优策略均衡机制,在拟线性环境和一般性经济环境下分别导致帕累托严格无效和独裁。在贝叶斯环境下,对于公共品经济和私人品经济,帕累托效率与自愿参与均难以兼容。其中,公共品不兼容性在极限角度仍成立。纳什执行及其拓展试图使在所设机制下的所有均衡结果对于社会选择目标而言都最优。放松关于信息结构和理性的假定,理论的最新发展围绕信息结构内生化、机制稳健化以及计算机制设计问题展开。  相似文献   

10.
While conventional agreements on international public goods require bilateral or multilateral cooperation, we show that unilateral action through matching mechanisms with a self‐commitment device can possibly generate Pareto‐improving outcomes. Even without commitment, unilateral matching may also benefit both players at corner situations. We further characterize the conditions under which this desirable outcome is achieved, particularly highlighting the role of the income distribution and its interplay with the preferences. Moreover, we propose a variant of unilateral matching that can generate Pareto‐improving outcomes regardless of the preferences and the income distribution, indicating that income inequality may not be an obstacle for improving public good provision through unilateral matching.  相似文献   

11.
This paper introduces into the Tiebout model individuals with different skills. It is shown that the production techniques, the distribution of tastes and skills and intercommunity trade will affect the pattern of communities. In the suggested model competition with local public goods is Pareto optimal: communities will not be composed of identical people. The optimal solution requires that every community will tax everybody according to his marginal social cost. A Pareto efficient redistribution policy can be carried out only by a central government using lump-sum taxes. A federal income tax will affect community patterns and therefore is inefficient.  相似文献   

12.
By shedding light on market imperfections and the congestion of public goods, we show that free entry in a market equilibrium will lead to excessive entry relative to the social optimum. Moreover, by specifying a generalized congestion function, it is also shown that different fiscal policies, including labor income tax, capital income tax and government expenditure, play a distinct role in terms of remedying market distortions. Specifically, optimal income taxes decrease with the degree of market imperfections in order to remove the monopoly inefficiency, while they increase with the degree of congestion in order to remedy the adverse externality caused by congestion distortion. Since a higher degree of increasing returns to an expansion in the variety of intermediate goods is found to intensify the congestion effect of government infrastructure expenditure, the optimal rule of government expenditure proposed by Barro (1990) should be modified.  相似文献   

13.
This paper uses a fire protection measure based on a community's fire insurance rating to estimate the strength of congestion effects for fire protection services. The empirical results show that the congestion properties of fire protection are much like those of a pure public good. In addition, the paper introduces a new notion of returns to scale for public goods and estimates the relevant parameters for the fire protection case.  相似文献   

14.
本文从地方公共品的性质和供给特点出发 ,分析了地方公共品有效供给的帕累托条件。在此基础上指出 ,西部开发中地方公共品有效供给不足主要表现为地方公共品供给总量不足、供给结构不合理及中央政府和地方政府对地方公共品的供求管理错位 ,主要的改进措施是扩大西部地方公共品投资力度、优化供给结构 ,并建立规范的中央财政转移支付制度、健全西部地方公共品管理体制。  相似文献   

15.
In this paper we present a simple game form implementing Lindahl allocations as Nash equilibrium outcomes, which has nice stability properties. we show that if the preferences of eaach consumer are representable by a utility function of the form a(y)xi+bi(y), where xi(y), where xi is the amount of private good and y, the amount of public good, then the Nash equilibrium of our geme is locally stable under the gradient adjustment process. This restriction on the preferences has been known in hte literature as the necessary and sufficient condition for the Pareto optimal amount of pukic goods to be independent of the private goods distribution. This type of preference includes quasi-linear preferences as a special case. but unlike quasi-linearity, this allows a non zero income effect of demand for public goods as well as private goods, which is often supported by empirical evidence. Our result shows how an equilbirium can be achieved over time by a decentralized strategy adjustement process for a fairly general class of environments, even in the absence of a dominant-strategy equilibrium.  相似文献   

16.
An equivalence relationship between cores and Pareto optimal allocations of a public goods economy where the public goods are to be provided through a proportional income tax is presented. For this purpose, the definition of the core is modified by allowing coalitions to tax their complements at any given rate. Also, a certain rule which specifies the rate is introduced.  相似文献   

17.
One consequence of decentralized responsibility to set tax policy and environmental standards is that local governments might try to attract industry and jobs by underproviding local public goods with lower taxes or lax environmental standards or both. But if local authorities exploit fixed property site (i.e., land) taxation to fund local public goods, affect firm migration, and internalize potential local emission rents, herein we find decentralized efficiency is supported. This result reflects a dual form of the classic Henry George theorem previously overlooked.  相似文献   

18.
在市场经济条件下 ,地方政府的主要职责是分级提供各种地方性公共品 ,满足居民生活和企业生产的共同需要。但是 ,政府提供并不等于政府生产 ,更不等于政府垄断生产。中国现行地方性公共品供给制度的主要缺陷是地方政府以及公共部门的过度垄断。按公共品生产与提供、直接生产与间接生产分开等原则 ,打破垄断 ,有序地向国内外开放公共品生产市场 ,大力推进公共品生产的市场化 ,形成“公”与“私”以及各自内部的竞争 ,将有助于提高地方性公共品供给效率 ,增进公共福利 ,并有助于推进中国的市场化进程。  相似文献   

19.
A general equilibrium model of an economy with cities, farms and free migration of population is constructed. The cities produce internationally traded goods via production functions subject to economies of scale. They also produce housing and a local public good. Two areas are defined to be disjoint if households performing an economic activity in one area are not operating in the other. An area is exclusive if it is disjoint to its complement. The economic surplus of an area is then defined to be the value of the area's net export of goods and resources. Local efficiency of an area is defined to be a state in which its economic surplus attains its maximum value. This state is proved to be a necessary condition for Pareto optimality of the economy. It is then proved that beside Piguvian corrective taxes the only taxes necessary and sufficient to finance local government activities efficiently, are taxes on land rents. Furthermore, if jurisdiction of a local government is over an exclusive area no intervention of central government is necessary, and local authorities can be fully autonomous. If the economy can be divided into pairwise disjointed exclusive areas, those areas are optimal jurisdictions in the sense that efficiency in the economy can be achieved with local authorities only.  相似文献   

20.
In the presence of local public goods differences in tastes are an important determinant of the way in which partnerships are formed. Heterogeneity in tastes for private vs. public goods produces a tendency to positive assortment and partnerships of couples with similar tastes; heterogeneity in tastes for different public goods brings about partnerships of couples with similar tastes only if there is a significant overlap in the distribution of tastes of the two groups to be matched. We show that with two public goods we may get negative assortment, pure positive assortment being only one of many possibilities.  相似文献   

设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号