A decision theoretic formulation of insurance risk theory

Abstract

In a number of papers Borch has shown how certain insurance problems can be formulated using the concept of utility. (See Borch [3], [4], [5], [6], [7] and [8].) Borch's work is used as a building block in Part I of this report, which presents a Bayesian decision theoretic formulation of some of the main aspects of insurance risk theory. Part I makes use of the concepts of utility and subjective probability. It is admitted that these concepts are more commonly associated with individuals rather than groups of individuals such as insurance companies. However, in this report, we will refer to an insurance company as an individual (albeit a neuter one) and assume that it can quantify its preferences for consequences and its opinions about the occurrence of events. Further, we assume that a company “behaves” according to certain rules of consistent behavior which imply that when presented with several risky courses of action, the company will take the action which has the greatest expected utility. Formal treatments of assumptions that lead to this mode of behavior can be found in Savage [17] and Pratt, Raiffa, and Schlaifer [15].     

A theory of the corporate decision to resist FASB standards: An organization theory perspective

This paper develops a theoretical framework that specifies the conditions under which corporations are likely to resist financial reporting standards proposed by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). Determinants of corporate resistance to FASB standards are identified at three levels of analysis: the standard, the corporation, and the corporation’s industry. Propositions are formulated summarizing the effects of the determinants at these three levels, and guidelines are suggested for testing the propositions. Implications for the theory and the practice of accounting regulation are also discussed. The overall goal of the paper is to enhance our understanding of the drivers of corporate resistance to FASB standards, so that accounting regulators can manage the implementation of accounting standards more effectively.     

A leader's framework for decision making. A leader's framework for decision making

Many executives are surprised when previously successful leadership approaches fail in new situations, but different contexts call for different kinds of responses. Before addressing a situation, leaders need to recognize which context governs it -and tailor their actions accordingly. Snowden and Boone have formed a new perspective on leadership and decision making that's based on complexity science. The result is the Cynefin framework, which helps executives sort issues into five contexts: Simple contexts are characterized by stability and cause-and-effect relationships that are clear to everyone. Often, the right answer is self-evident. In this realm of "known knowns," leaders must first assess the facts of a situation -that is, "sense" it -then categorize and respond to it. Complicated contexts may contain multiple right answers, and though there is a clear relationship between cause and effect, not everyone can see it. This is the realm of "known unknowns." Here, leaders must sense, analyze, and respond. In a complex context, right answers can't be ferreted out at all; rather, instructive patterns emerge if the leader conducts experiments that can safely fail. This is the realm of "unknown unknowns," where much of contemporary business operates. Leaders in this context need to probe first, then sense, and then respond. In a chaotic context, searching for right answers is pointless. The relationships between cause and effect are impossible to determine because they shift constantly and no manageable patterns exist. This is the realm of unknowables (the events of September 11, 2001, fall into this category). In this domain, a leader must first act to establish order, sense where stability is present, and then work to transform the situation from chaos to complexity. The fifth context, disorder, applies when it is unclear which of the other four contexts is predominant. The way out is to break the situation into its constituent parts and assign each to one of the other four realms. Leaders can then make decisions and intervene in contextually appropriate ways.     

Supporting ALARP decision making by cost benefit analysis and multiattribute utility theory

Current guidance in the UK and elsewhere indicate upper and target risk limits for the operation of nuclear plant in terms of individual risk per annum. ‘As low as reasonably practicable’ (ALARP) arguments are used to justify the acceptance or rejection of policies that lead to risk changes between these limits. The suitability of cost‐benefit analysis (CBA) and multiattribute utility theory (MAUT) are assessed for performing ALARP (‘as low as reasonably possible’) assessments, in particular within the nuclear industry. Four problems stand out in current CBA applications to ALARP, concerning the determination of prices of safety gains or detriments, the valuation of group and individual risk, calculations using ‘disproportionality’, and the use of discounting to trade‐off risks through time. This last point has received less attention in the past but is important because of the growing interest in risk‐informed regulation in which policies extend over several timeframes and distribute the risk unevenly over these, or in policies that lead to a nonuniform risk within a single timeframe (such as maintenance policies). The problems associated with giving quantitative support to such decisions are discussed. It is argued that multiattribute utility methods (MAUT) provide an alternative methodology to CBA which enable the four problems described above to be addressed in a more satisfactory way. Through sensitivity analysis MAUT can address the perceptions of all stakeholder groups, facilitating constructive discussion and elucidating the key points of disagreement. It is also argued that by being explicitly subjective it provides an open, auditable and clear analysis in contrast to the illusory objectivity of CBA. CBA seeks to justify a decision by using a common basis for weights (prices), while MAUT recognizes that different parties may want to give different valuations. It then allows the analyst to explore the ways in which different parties might (or might not) come to the same conclusion even when weighting items differently.     

A brief history of decision making

Sometime around the middle of the past century, telephone executive Chester Barnard imported the term decision making from public administration into the business world. There it began to replace narrower terms, like "resource allocation" and "policy making," shifting the way managers thought about their role from continuous, Hamlet-like deliberation toward a crisp series of conclusions reached and actions taken. Yet, decision making is, of course, a broad and ancient human pursuit, flowing back to a time when people sought guidance from the stars. From those earliest days, we have strived to invent better tools for the purpose, from the Hindu-Arabic systems for numbering and algebra, to Aristotle's systematic empiricism, to friar Occam's advances in logic, to Francis Bacon's inductive reasoning, to Descartes's application of the scientific method. A growing sophistication with managing risk, along with a nuanced understanding of human behavior and advances in technology that support and mimic cognitive processes, has improved decision making in many situations. Even so, the history of decision-making strategies--captured in this time line and examined in the four accompanying essays on risk, group dynamics, technology, and instinct--has not marched steadily toward perfect rationalism. Twentieth-century theorists showed that the costs of acquiring information lead executives to make do with only good-enough decisions. Worse, people decide against their own economic interests even when they know better. And in the absence of emotion, it's impossible to make any decisions at all. Erroneous framing, bounded awareness, excessive optimism: The debunking of Descartes's rational man threatens to swamp our confidence in our choices. Is it really surprising, then, that even as technology dramatically increases our access to information, Malcolm Gladwell extols the virtues of gut decisions made, literally, in the blink of an eye?     

A test of the widespread-point-shaving theory

We test whether corruption is widespread in NCAA basketball by examining scoring patterns in games involving suspected point shavers. If conspiracy occurs frequently, then we should find that strong favorites score fewer points and/or allow more points than expected. However, findings reveal that strong favorites, previously believed to be the most likely candidates to engage in point shaving, may instead be the least likely. We propose that a shift in coaching strategy late in blowout games explains the anomalous bet outcome distribution patterns previously identified in the NCAA basketball betting market.     

Prospect theory and a manager's decision to trade a blind principal bid basket

We analyze asset managers' decisions to execute substantial baskets of stocks. Such transactions can be executed in two ways. The first method is through blind auctions with unique features known as blind principal bids (BPBs). The manager learns the trading cost once the auction process determines the commission. The second method is to use an agency trade. In this case, the asset manager faces an actual trading cost that is unknown before execution due to market impact uncertainty. Using proprietary data, we investigate the manager's choice between BPBs and agency trade in a natural experiment with large monetary stakes. The volume traded in each sample basket is significant, which can amount to over 0.5% of the NYSE daily share volume. Our findings show that managers' behavior is more consistent with prospect theory than the expected utility framework. When asset managers trade BPB baskets, they are reluctant to realize the potential higher cost of agency trade and opt for the fixed cost of BPBs instead. Thus, our results complement the literature on the disposition effect by demonstrating that managers' trading cost decisions exhibit “play it safe” behavior.     

A short remark on the theory of random sampling and the theory of variance

Abstract

In developing the theory of random sampling, no pressupposition is usually made as to the underlying limited population. This tends to render the theoretical work considerably more difficult; but then, in order to utilize the developed properties in tests, it is necessary to make certain limiting references to the theorem of limiting value, etc. It is, therefore, tempting to make requirements of distribution properties of the original population to avoid theoretical difficulties, and later try to expand the results obtained. The obvious course, then, is to seek the distribution of the estimate resulting from the random sample, on condition that the original limited population itself belongs to a distribution as the result of some process or other.     

A bilingual group decision support system

Bilingual meetings have always been relatively inefficient due to the necessity for human translators to interpret comments as they are made. Even meetings in which participants know some of the other language’s vocabulary are burdened by the necessity to translate. Until now, bilingual meetings have been conducted verbally with human translation. Here, we describe a computer-based system which allows participants to communicate simultaneously and anonymously while the system provides translations automatically. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A review of the collective theory of risk

Abstract

1. Ackermann, W. G. 1939. Eine Erweiterung des Poissonschen Grenzwertsatzes und ihre Anwendung auf Risikoprobleme der Sachversicherung. Berlin.     

A contribution to the theory of statistical estimation

1. The Estimation Problem.

In problems of statistical estimation, we are concerned with certain variables assumed to be random variables having more or less unknown probability distributions. A number of observed values of these variables are given, and it is required to use these values to learn something about the unknown distributions.     

A behavioural theory of the fund management firm

The paper outlines a behavioural theory of the fund manager (FM) firm comprising investment decisions (at stock and portfolio levels) by teams and individuals, and of an organisation process and contextual resource factors affecting decisions. FM organisational processes interacted with resources to enhance investment team decision conditions, costs and processes. Enhanced conditions and reduced decision costs were expected to improve the chances of FM success via new information production and better-quality decisions. These dynamic elements to FM firms can be interpreted as tentative organisational means to deal with major problems of behaviour, uncertainty and information asymmetry at the heart of the valuation, investment and performance problems facing FMs. Field research was conducted in 15 FM firms during 2004–2011. A grounded theory approach was employed in processing the data. This led to improvements in empirical understanding of behaviour within FM firms and markets. The results were discussed relative to relevant literature and previous grounded theory. This created a new conceptual tool to investigate FM underperformance and variety in FM styles. The paper demonstrated an empirically rich model of hierarchy, information production, capital allocation and other resource usage in financial institutions and discussed how this created further opportunities for research.     

A theory of corporate spin-offs

We develop a new rationale for corporate spin-offs, and for the performance and value improvements following them, based on corporate control considerations. We consider a firm with multiple divisions, with incumbent management having different abilities for managing these divisions. If the incumbent loses control to a more able rival, it benefits all shareholders (including the incumbent) by increasing equity value, but involves the incumbent losing his private benefits of control. We show that a spin-off increases the incumbent's chance of losing control to such a rival. This, in turn, motivates the incumbent either to work harder at managing the firm (in order to avoid any loss of control), or to relinquish control of one of the firms resulting from the spin-off (either immediately following the spin-off, or subsequently in a control contest). We show that spin-offs will be associated with positive announcement effects and increases in long-term operating performance. Further, certain categories of spin-offs will exhibit long-term positive abnormal stock returns.     

A theory of loan syndication

We provide a new theory of loan syndication. Bank syndicates control sector risk by downsizing the industry when market demand fails to meet expectations.     

A theory of risk disclosure

In this paper, we consider the price effects of risk disclosure. We develop a model in which investors are uncertain about the variance of a firm’s cash flows and the firm releases an imperfect signal regarding this variance. In our model, uncertainty over the riskiness of a firm’s cash flows leads to a variance uncertainty premium in its price. We demonstrate that risk disclosure decreases the firm’s cost of capital by reducing this premium and that the market response to risk disclosure is small when the expected level of risk is high. Moreover, we find that firms acquire and disclose more risk information when their cash flow risk is greater than expected. Finally, we demonstrate that in a multi-asset setting, only risk disclosure concerning systematic risks will impact the cost of capital.     

A theory of banking structure

This paper proposes a theory to analyze the specialization of banking activities based upon the different functions that banks perform when rendering a variety of financial services. The functional difference in the services performed by banks is based upon two dimensions: the degree of information asymmetry involved in providing the service, and the degree of verifiability of the value of the service rendered. This has implications for the length of banking relationships and also determines whether banks develop the right degree of skill specialization and resource intensity for the existing task mix. Costly overspecialization occurs in certain deal type transactions and underspecialization occurs in relationship type transactions. The paper examines how bank-client relationships are structured and proposes an explanation for phenomena such as bank syndication. First-mover advantages and monopoly skills are also shown to be natural outcomes of the model. The analysis has implications for banking regulation, such as for the Glass–Steagall Act, in the sense that it analyzes the effects of this specialization, first enacted within the spirit of the Act.     

A lender-based theory of collateral

We consider an imperfectly competitive loan market in which a local relationship lender has an information advantage vis-à-vis distant transaction lenders. Competitive pressure from the transaction lenders prevents the local lender from extracting the full surplus from projects. As a result, the local lender inefficiently rejects marginally profitable projects. Collateral mitigates the inefficiency by increasing the local lender's payoff from precisely those marginally profitable projects that she inefficiently rejects. The model predicts that, controlling for observable borrower risk, collateralized loans are more likely to default ex post, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. The model also predicts that borrowers for whom local lenders have a relatively smaller information advantage face higher collateral requirements, and that technological innovations that narrow the information advantage of local lenders, such as small business credit scoring, lead to a greater use of collateral in lending relationships.     

A partial adjustment theory of the balance of payments

This paper develops a partial adjustment theory of the balance of payments by incorporating the inter-temporal optimizing behavior of the two agents of the society: the public and the central bank. The central bank is viewed as the government's regulator of domestic credit and its objectives are taken as distinct from and possibly at odds with the public's objectives due to imperfect competition in the political marketplace. The final equation derived here implies that the balance of payments reflects both the active behavior of the central bank concerning foreign reserves and the contribution of the public's flow demand for money.