The political economy of seigniorage

While most economists agree that seigniorage is one way governments finance deficits, there is less agreement about the political, institutional and economic reasons for relying on it. This paper investigates the main political and institutional determinants of seigniorage using panel data on about 100 countries, for the period 1960–1999. Estimates show that greater political instability leads to higher seigniorage, especially in developing, less democratic and socially-polarized countries, with high inflation, low access to domestic and external debt financing and with higher turnover of central bank presidents. One important policy implication of this study is the need to develop institutions conducive to greater political stability as a means to reduce the reliance on seigniorage financing of public deficits.     

Privatizations around the world: economic or political determinants?

The article examines economic, political, and institutional determinants of privatization using a panel of 50 countries over the period of 1988–2006. Our sample includes developed, developing, and transition economies. Privatization activity is measured by the number of privatization deals as well as the revenue raised and analyzed using the negative binomial regression and Tobit regression respectively. Although more privatization activity is usually taking place in countries displaying satisfactory economic performance in some respect, the role of economic factors turns out to be limited. The results identify a number of political and institutional determinants but some effects are specific to a particular type of economy. For example, in developing countries, right‐wing governments are associated with privatizations while new, not necessarily right‐wing governments, are behind privatization in Eastern Europe. The role of financial development is also varied, with sound financial institutions related to successful privatization in developed and developing countries but not in transition economies.     

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS,GOVERNANCE, AND CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A PANEL DATA ANALYSIS

This article aims at identifying the determinants of government expenditures of developing countries by placing emphasis on the political institutions and governance variables, which have not been addressed so much in the previous literature. Using a panel data analysis for 97 developing countries from the period 1984 to 2004, this study finds evidence that controlling for economic, social, and demographical factors, political institutional and governance variables significantly influence the consumption expenditure in developing countries. Political institutional variables such as the type of political ruling and political power in the parliament positively influence consumption expenditure; on the contrary, governance variables such as corruption influence negatively. Furthermore, we find that autocratic governments with military ruling are not particularly accommodative toward consumption expenditures as the public spending significantly shrinks under military dictatorship compared with other forms of governance. In order to check consistency of our findings, we ran alternative specifications as well as conducted extreme bound tests. Our results largely survived these tests showing robustness of our findings. (JEL E01, E02, E61, E62, H2, H4, H5, H6, O11, O5)     

The political economy of exchange rate regimes in developed and developing countries

This paper examines the influence of government ideology, political institutions and globalization on the choice of exchange rate regime via panel multinomial logit approach using annual data over the period of 1974-2004 in a panel of 180 countries: 26 developed and 154 developing.We provide evidence that government ideology, political institutions and globalization are important determinants of the choice of exchange rate regime. In particular, we find that left-wing governments, democratic institutions, central bank independence and financial development increase the likelihood of choosing a flexible regime, whereas more globalized countries have a higher probability of implementing a fixed regime. More importantly, we find that political economy factors have different effects on the choice of exchange rate regime in developed and developing countries. All our results are robust to panel ordered probit model.     

Nonlinearities and heterogeneity in environmental quality: An empirical analysis of deforestation

We use a panel data set of 59 developing countries over the 1972–1994 period to study the deforestation process. Relying on both parametric and semiparametric models, we examine nonlinearities and heterogeneity in the deforestation process. We first study the existence of an Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) and then analyze determinants of deforestation. Our data sample provides no evidence of an EKC. We also find that political institution failures may worsen the deforestation process in developing countries.     

The Lost Decades: Developing Countries' Stagnation in Spite of Policy Reform 1980–1998

I document in this paper a puzzle thathas not received previous attention in the literature. In 1980–98,median per capita income growth in developing countries was 0.0percent, as compared to 2.5 percent in 1960–79. Yet I documentin this paper that variables that are standard in growth regressions—policieslike financial depth and real overvaluation, and initial conditionslike health, education, fertility, and infrastructure generallyimproved from 1960–79 to 1980–98. Developing countrygrowth should have increased instead of decreased according tothe standard growth regression determinants of growth. The stagnationseems to represent a disappointing outcome to the movement towardsthe ``Washington Consensus' by developing countries. I speculatethat worldwide factors like the increase in world interest rates,the increased debt burden of developing countries, the growthslowdown in the industrial world, and skill-biased technicalchange may have contributed to the developing countries' stagnation,although I am not able to establish decisive evidence for thesehypotheses. I also document that many growth regressions aremis-specified in a way similar to the Jones (1995) critique thata stationary variable (growth) is being regressed on non-stationaryvariables like policies and initial conditions. It may be thatthe 1960–1979 period was the unusual period for LDC growth,and the 1980–98 stagnation of poor countries representsa return to the historical pattern of divergence between richand poor countries.     

Determinants of entrepreneurship using fuzzy set methods: Europe vs. non-Europe

This article uses fuzzy set qualitative methods, with Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2014 data, to show differences in the entrepreneurial determinants between European developed countries and non-European developing countries. We first estimate baseline regression models and then develop fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis to study the necessary and sufficient conditions of entrepreneurial activity. Results indicate that, while in Europe, the key determinants are education and technological equity; individuals in developing and nondeveloped countries tend to be, or become, entrepreneurs independently of the macroeconomic background.     

Globalization and growth in the low income African countries with the extreme bounds analysis

The relationship between globalization and economic growth, especially in the poorer developing countries, is controversial. Previous studies have used single globalization indicators such as the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP. This paper uses a comprehensive measure of a globalization of Dreher (2006), which is based on measures of globalization of the economic, social and political sectors. Panel data estimates with data of 21 low income African countries show a small but significant positive permanent growth effects. The sensitivity of this growth effect is examined with the extreme bounds analysis (EBA). Contrary to the findings by Levine and Renelt (1992) that cross-country growth relationships are fragile, the effects of globalization and some other determinants of the long run growth rate are found to be robust by EBA.     

The Determinants of Governance: A Cross-Country Analysis

Drawing on insights from economic, political, and cultural theories of governance, this article investigates the determinants of governance for a large sample of countries, both developed and developing. The results indicate that countries with a history of Western European influence and with British common law origins have better governance. In addition to these exogenous and historically predetermined variables, economic factors such as openness to trade, resource-intensity in exports, and levels of economic development have a significant impact on governance. (JEL D73 , H11 , K42 )     

Why are Latin America's savings rates so low? An international comparative analysis

This paper presents a theoretical and empirical assessment of the determinants of savings rates, with special emphasis on Latin American savings rates. The study is based on international comparisons, using data from 36 countries for 1970–1992. A distinction is made between private and public savings. The later are endogenously determined by economic and political variables. Per capita income growth is the most important determinant of private and public savings; public savings are lower in countries with higher political instability; public savings crowd out private savings, but less than proportionately. Low Latin American savings are due to the magnitudes of their determinants, rather than structural differences.     

Is Foreign Direct Investment “Gender Blind”? Women's Rights as a Determinant of US FDI

The impact of women's rights on a country's competitiveness in the global economy is a source of contention. While educational opportunities for women, as well as political empowerment, are linked to a variety of positive outcomes, the impact of economic rights is mixed. Toward better understanding these issues, we focus on the role of women's rights in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). Though foreign capital plays a key role in the development strategies of many countries, and many of the growth areas in FDI rely heavily on women's labor, extant literature on the determinants of FDI largely ignores gender. To gain insight into these issues, we examine the impact of women's political, economic, and educational rights across four different types of US FDI into the developing world. We find a mixed relationship between women's rights and FDI that varies across industrial sectors.     

Political stability and growth: An application of dynamic GMM and quantile regression

This paper studies the effect of political stability on economic growth by taking 120 developing countries over the period of 1996–2014. We apply relatively advanced dynamic two step system-GMM and quantile regression. Political stability is found to be a key determinant of economic growth. More importantly, political instability (or risk) is found to be higher in the OIC countries and is a deterrent to economic growth. Also, for the lower and middle income OIC countries, political instability appears to affect economic growth more severely perhaps due to the absence of strong economic and political institutions. Moreover, political instability is also found to be significantly higher in the oil-dependent OIC countries. Notably, political instability is likely to affect growth through the channels of investment and human capital accumulation in the developing countries. Finally, the impact of political stability and political instability on growth is found to be equally distributed across the OIC countries with higher or lower growth level. Therefore, the development of political and economic institutions along with human capital development is recommended for all the developing countries in general and the OIC countries in particular.     

Federalism, separatism and international trade

This paper explores whether countries that have a federal Constitution engage in more international trade. We identify two possible mechanisms through which political fragmentation of nation-states, namely federalism, might impact positively on trade globalization processes: domestic market fragmentation and the free trade strategy pursued by certain separatist regions in federal countries. We use a gravity equation running panel regressions to estimate the impact of federalism on trade. The Poisson estimator proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) is used to handle the null trade flows. We test our predictions on a large data set of 148 countries on the 1980–2002 period. After controlling for determinants of trade potentially correlated with federalism, a federalist system is found to increase international trade. We also find that separatism and linguistic fractionalization impact positively on trade openness.     

Geopolitics and international organizations: An empirical study on IMF facilities

There is growing awareness that the distribution of IMF facilities may not be influenced only by the economic needs of borrowers. This paper focuses on the fact that the IMF may favour geopolitically important countries in the distribution of IMF loans, differentiating between concessional and non-concessional facilities. To carry out the empirical analysis, we construct a new database that compiles a wide array of proxies for geopolitical importance for 107 IMF countries over 1990–2003, focusing on emerging and developing economies. We use a factor analysis to capture the common underlying characteristic of countries' geopolitical importance as well as a potential analysis since we also want to account for the geographical situation of the loan recipients. While controlling for economic and political determinants, our results show that geopolitical factors influence notably lending decisions when loans are non-concessional, whereas results are less robust and in opposite direction for concessional loans. This study provides empirical support to the view that geopolitical considerations are an important factor in shaping IMF lending decisions, potentially affecting the institution's effectiveness and credibility.     

Finance and inequality: Channels and evidence

We provide a framework to interpret the recent literature on financial development and inequality. In many developing countries, access to funding and financial services by firms and households is still very skewed. Recent evidence suggests that poor access does not only reflect economic constraints but also barriers erected by insiders. Inequality affects the distribution of political influence, so financial regulation often is easily captured by established interests in unequal countries. Captured reforms deepen rather than broaden access, as small elites obtain most of the benefits while risks are socialized. Financial liberalization motivated to increase access may in practice increase fragility and inequality, and lead to political backlash against reforms. Thus financial reforms may succeed only if matched by a buildup in oversight institutions. Journal of Comparative Economics 35 (4) (2007) 748–773.     

Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?

This paper studies the pattern of allocation of foreign aid from various donors to receiving countries. We find considerable evidence that the direction of foreign aid is dictated as much by political and strategic considerations, as by the economic needs and policy performance of the recipients. Colonial past and political alliances are major determinants of foreign aid. At the margin, however, countries that democratize receive more aid, ceteris paribus. While foreign aid flows respond to political variables, foreign direct investments are more sensitive to economic incentives, particularly good policies and protection of property rights in the receiving countries. We also uncover significant differences in the behavior of different donors.     

A rent-seeking perspective on privatization

This paper considers the recent wave of privatization activity as a consequence of rent-seeking among competing special-interest or pressure groups. The dynamic interaction of interest groups through a political system generates repetitive, irregular waves or cycles of rent-creation, rent-transfer and, ultimately, rent-dissipation as the essence of the political process that determines transitory political outcomes (legislation, administrative decisions, as judicial interpretations). This perspective is used as a framework for speculation about the general and county-specific determinants of the worldwide upswing in privatization activity and the differences in privitization experiences of countries such as Canada and the United Kingdom.     

Borders and Growth

This paper presents a framework to understand and measure the effects of political borders on economic growth and per capita income levels. In our model, political integration between two countries results in a positive country size effect and a negative effect through reduced openness vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Additional effects stem from possible changes in other growth determinants, besides country size and openness, when countries are merged. We estimate the growth effects that would have resulted from the hypothetical removal of national borders between pairs of adjacent countries under various scenarios. We identify country pairs where political integration would have been mutually beneficial. We find that full political integration would have slightly reduced an average country's growth rate, while most countries would benefit from a more limited form of merger, involving higher economic integration with their neighbors.     

CORRUPTION AND ELECTIONS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY FOR A CROSS-SECTION OF COUNTRIES

In this paper, we study whether voters are more likely to "vote out" a corrupt incumbent than to re-elect him. Specifically, we examine whether they retract their support from political candidates who they think are corrupt by looking at changes in an index of corruption perceptions between the current and the last elections. Our results suggest that corruption in public office is effectively punished by voters. Furthermore, our findings support the idea that both the political system and the democratic experience are important determinants of the voters' reaction and control of corruption; while voters in countries with parliamentary systems or with relatively low levels of democracy react negatively to an increase in corruption, no perceptible effect of this kind was found in countries with mature democracies, and the evidence is inconclusive in the case of countries with presidential systems.