SME performance in transition economies: The financial regulation and firm-level corruption nexus

Using a general equilibrium endogenous growth model we explain underperformance in the small and medium enterprise sector as an effect of corruption and non-competitive banking. Limited competition in the banking sector causes a high loan-deposit spread, worsens the initial effect of corruption, and depresses growth. Fostering bank competition, for instance, by allowing foreign bank entry, would be a simple solution to this problem, but frequently, authorities choose to hamper bank competition. Therefore, we explain the persistence of non-competitive banking as a result of governments’ regulatory choice. If the government has a stake in the banking sector there exists a trade-off between current benefits from bank profits and future growth. Firm-level corruption affects intertemporal optimization and distorts the government’s choice towards more restrictive regulation, i.e., less bank competition, even if the deciding institution itself is not corrupt. These results show that the two prominent problems for small and medium enterprises, corruption and finance, are mutually reinforcing.     

On the distribution of education and democracy

This paper empirically analyzes the influence of education on democracy by controlling for unobservable heterogeneity and by taking into account the persistency of some of the variables. The most novel finding is that an increase in the education attained by the majority of the population is what matters for the implementation and sustainability of democracy, rather than the average years of schooling. We show this result is robust to issues pertaining omitted variables, outliers, sample selection, or a narrow definition of the variables used to measure democracy.     

Does democracy affect taxation and government spending? Evidence from developing countries

Focusing on developing countries in three geographical areas (South-East Asia, Latin America and European Union), we explore the relation between political variables and tax revenue, public spending and their structure. We build a new dataset for the 1990–2005 period with fiscal, political and socio-economic variables. Since democracy is a complex and multidimensional concept, we measure it using two variables, the political strength of democratic institutions, and the protection of civil liberties. We perform three sets of estimates: (i) cross-country pooled OLS regressions with region fixed effects, (ii) country fixed effects regressions and (iii) region specific regressions with country fixed effects. While the first model delivers some significant correlations between political variables and tax items, when controlling for country fixed effects we find that tax revenue and tax composition are in general not significantly correlated with the strength of democratic institutions and the protection of civil liberties. The only exceptions are indirect, trade and property taxes. A similar result applies to public spending, with the exception of defense expenditure. Overall, our findings cast some doubt on the exact public policy channels through which political institutions affect economic development.     

Child labor and agricultural shocks

This paper examines the relationship between household income shocks and child labor. In particular, we investigate the extent to which transitory income shocks lead to increases in child labor and whether household asset holdings mitigate the effects of these shocks. Using data from a household panel survey in Tanzania, we find that both relationships are significant. We investigate mechanisms that could account for these results, including buffer stocks and borrowing.     

Asymmetric effects of financial development on South-South and South-North trade: Panel data evidence from emerging markets

Using bilateral trade data in total and technology-and-skill-intensive manufactured goods for 28 developing countries that account for 82% of all developing country manufactures exports between 1978 and 2005, this paper explores the effects of financial development on the pattern of specialization in South-South and South-North trade. The empirical results using dynamic panel regressions and comprehensive sensitivity tests suggest that financial development in the South has an economically and statistically significant positive effect on the share of total and technology-and-skill-intensive manufactures exports in GDP, and total exports in South-South trade. In contrast, no such significant or robust effect of financial development is found in South-North trade. Overall, the positive effect of financial development is found to be asymmetric favoring South-South significantly more than South-North trade. In addition, financial development is found to be increasing technology-and-skill-intensive manufactured goods exports significantly more than total manufactured or merchandise goods exports.     

Political instability: Effects on financial development, roots in the severity of economic inequality

We here bring forward strong evidence that political instability impedes financial development, with its variation a primary determinant of differences in financial development around the world. As such, it needs to be added to the short list of major determinants of financial development. First, structural conditions first postulated by Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) as generating long-term inequality are shown here to have strong empirical support as exogenous determinants of political instability. Second, that exogenously-determined political instability in turn holds back financial development, even when we control for factors prominent in the last decade’s cross-country studies of financial development. The findings indicate that inequality-perpetuating conditions that result in political instability and weak democracy are fundamental roadblocks for international organizations like the World Bank that seek to promote financial development. The evidence here includes country fixed effect regressions and an instrumental model inspired by Engerman and Sokoloff’s (2002) work, which to our knowledge has not yet been used in finance and which is consistent with current tests as valid instruments. Four conventional measures of national political instability – Alesina and Perotti’s (1996) well-known index of instability, a subsequent index derived from Banks’ (2005) work, and two indices of managerial perceptions of nation-by-nation political instability – persistently predict a wide range of national financial development outcomes. Political instability’s significance is time consistent in cross-sectional regressions back to the 1960s, the period when the key data becomes available, robust in both country fixed effects and instrumental variable regressions, and consistent across multiple measures of instability and of financial development. Overall, the results indicate the existence of an important channel running from structural inequality to political instability, principally in nondemocratic settings, and then to financial backwardness. The robust significance of that channel extends existing work demonstrating the importance of political economy explanations for financial development and financial backwardness. It should help to better understand which policies will work for financial development, because political instability has causes, cures, and effects quite distinct from those of many of the key institutions most studied in the past decade as explaining financial backwardness.     

Measuring the return on household enterprise: What matters most for whom?

Return on assets (ROA) from household enterprise is crucial for understanding the well-being and productivity of households in developing economies. Yet the definition and measurement of household enterprise ROA remain inconsistent or unclear. We illustrate potential measurement problems with examples from various actual surveys. We then take advantage of a detailed integrated household survey to perform a robustness analysis, acting as if we had gathered less data than was actually the case, to see what matters and for whom. The three issues that matter most for accurate measurement of household enterprise ROA are the choice of accrual versus cash basis of income, the treatment of household's own labor in enterprise income, and the treatment of non-factor income. Also, this sensitivity matters most for a relatively poor region dominated by crop cultivation relative to a richer region with non-farm enterprises. Though the choice between accrued income and cash income matters less when the frequency of the data declines, there remains high sensitivity in longer-term and annualized data. We conclude the paper by providing recommendations on how to improve the survey questionnaires for more accurate measurement in field research.     

Does financial development reduce corruption?

We estimate the impact of bank credit to the private sector on corruption, using indicators of a country’s legal origin as instrumental variables to assess causality. We find that bank credit to the private sector reduces corruption, with the result robust to instrumenting for bank credit and for many different controls.     

Borrower runs

Microfinance institutions and other lenders in developing countries rely on the promise of future loans to induce repayment. However, if borrowers expect that others will default, and so loans will no longer be available in the future, then they will default as well. We refer to such contagion as a borrower run. The optimal lending contract must provide additional repayment incentives to counter this tendency to default.     

Financial constraints and investment: assessing the impact of a World Bank credit program on small and medium enterprises in Sri Lanka

Abstract.  This paper examines the investment behaviour of a sample of small, credit-constrained firms in Sri Lanka. Using a unique panel data set, we analyze and compare the activities of two groups of small firms distinguished by their differential access to financing; one group consists of firms with subsidized loans from the World Bank, while the other group consists of firms without such subsidies. The paper shows that the program led to higher levels of investment for financially constrained firms. However, the evidence is inconclusive on whether the program improved economic efficiency.     

Credit constraints,inequality and the growth gains from trade

This paper tests the hypothesis that, in the presence of credit constraints, higher wealth inequality affects negatively the growth gains from trade liberalisation. Variations in the growth rate of value added–decomposed in the growth rate of the number of establishments and the growth rate in average size–of manufacturing industries in 34 developing countries before and after trade liberalisation are used to study the effects of inequality on the difference in growth under liberalised and nonliberalised regimes. The results show that the number of firms in industries with high dependence on external finance in countries with higher inequality grow significantly slower, in both statistical and economic terms, than in industries with low dependence on external finance in countries with lower inequality following a trade liberalisation relative to the closed-economy period.     

Have the returns to education really increased in Vietnam? Wage versus employment effect

Many studies have analyzed changes in the returns to education in globalizing economies using the Mincerian framework. These studies have typically estimated the returns to education in terms of changes in wages rather than employment, effectively ignoring the fact that during globalization not only wages but also employment patterns are affected. In this paper we use four large-scale representative household surveys from the transition economy Vietnam for the period 1998–2006 to estimate the returns to education taking into account both changes in wages and employment. The results show that the estimated increases in returns to education are lower once changes in employment patterns are taken into account.