CHANGES IN MARKET PERCEPTION OF RISKINESS: THE CASE OF TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL

In 1984, the Comptroller of the Currency stated that the eleven largest banking firms were “too big to fail,” implying they would receive de facto 100 percent deposit insurance. The question is whether this announcement altered the market's perception of the riskiness of all banking organizations, not just those included in the Comptroller's statement. We address this question with two tests. First, through the examination of changes in institutional equity ownership from 1980 through 1988, we find that the announcement is associated with increases in institutional ownership at a time when a comparable set of nonfinancial firms saw reductions in institutional holdings. Second, through the examination of stock returns behavior of bank holding companies around announcements of dividend cuts and omissions from 1974 through 1991, we find that the Comptroller's 1984 announcement altered the market's reaction to dividend cuts and omissions by bank holding companies not specifically included in the Comptroller's statement.     

Commentary: Has Australia (or Any Other Jurisdiction) ‘Adopted’ IFRS?1

This paper replies to a statement made in this journal that ‘Australia definitely adopts IFRSs’. We analyse and compare the several methods that jurisdictions can use to implement International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). These include adopting the International Accounting Standards Board's (IASB) process of setting standards, as well as various forms of standard‐by‐standard implementation. We conclude that the Australian method of implementation is different in major ways from those used in such countries as Israel and South Africa, which involve adopting the IASB's process. By contrast, Australia follows a multi‐step process of enrolling each new standard into a category still entitled ‘Australian Accounting Standards’. To refer to the Australian method as ‘adoption’ of IFRS might therefore mislead, even though Australian companies eventually comply with IFRS.     

Is silence killing your company?

Many times, often with the best of intentions, people at work decide it's more productive to remain silent about their differences than to air them. There's no time, they think, or no point in going against what the boss says. But as new research by the authors shows, silencing doesn't smooth things over or make people more productive. It merely pushes differences beneath the surface and can set in motion powerfully destructive forces. When people stay silent about important disagreements, they can begin to fill with anxiety, anger, and resentment. As long as the conflict is unresolved, their repressed feelings remain potent, making them increasingly distrustful, self-protective, and all the more fearful that if they speak up they will be embarrassed or rejected. Their sense of insecurity grows, leading to further acts of silence, more defensiveness, and more distrust, thereby setting into motion a destructive "spiral of silence." Sooner or later, they mentally opt out--sometimes merely doing what they're told but contributing nothing of their own, sometimes spreading discontent and frustration throughout the workplace that can lead them, and others, to leave without thinking it through. These vicious spirals of silence can be replaced with virtuous spirals of communication, but that requires individuals to find the courage to act differently and executives to create the conditions in which people will value the expression of differences. All too often, behind failed products, broken processes, and mistaken career decisions are people who chose to hold their tongues. Breaking the silence can bring an outpouring of fresh ideas from all levels of an organization--ideas that might just raise the organization's performance to a whole new level.     

Assessing Conformity with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles Using Expert Accounting Witness Evidence and the Conceptual Framework

To enhance understanding of the status of the Financial Accounting Standards Board's Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting, we analyse important rules of evidence in United States (US) courts regarding the presentation of expert accounting witness testimony. We draw on this analysis to recommend the relocation of the Conceptual Framework in the US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) hierarchy. For empirical support, we explore how rules of evidence in the criminal trial in 2006 of Enron's two most senior executives affected assessment of whether Enron's financial reports conformed with the FASB's GAAP. We recommend that the FASB's Conceptual Framework should be included in authoritative literature as the uppermost authority, and that it be grounded closely in user needs and the ethical principles associated with meeting those needs. Further, we recommend that accounting expert witnesses adopt an overriding concern for objectivity and impartiality in assisting courts to understand complex accounting matters within the Conceptual Framework.     

Does Silence Speak? An Empirical Analysis of Disclosure Choices During Conference Calls

In this paper, we exploit the open nature of conference calls to explore whether managers withhold information from the investing public. Our evidence suggests that managers regularly leave participants on the conference call in the dark by not answering their questions. We find that the best predictors of such an event are firm size, a CEO's stock price–based incentives, company age, firm performance, litigation risk, and whether analysts are actively involved during the call's Q&A section. Finally, we document strong support for the assumption maintained in the literature that investors interpret silence negatively. That is, investors seem to interpret no news as bad news.     

Masculinity,Testosterone, and Financial Misreporting

We examine the relation between a measure of male CEOs’ facial masculinity and financial misreporting. Facial masculinity is associated with a complex of masculine behaviors (including aggression, egocentrism, riskseeking, and maintenance of social status) in males. One possible mechanism for this relation is that the hormone testosterone influences both behavior and the development of the face shape. We document a positive association between CEO facial masculinity and various misreporting proxies in a broad sample of S&P1500 firms during 1996–2010. We complement this evidence by documenting that a CEO's facial masculinity predicts his firm's likelihood of being subject to an SEC enforcement action. We also show that an executive's facial masculinity is associated with the likelihood of the SEC naming him as a perpetrator. We find that facial masculinity is not a measure of overconfidence. Finally, we demonstrate that facial masculinity also predicts the incidence of insider trading and option backdating.     

Performance Reporting – The IASB's Proposed Formats of Financial Statements in the Exposure Draft of IAS 1

This paper is a response to the exposure draft of proposed amendments to IAS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements published by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) in March 2006. The objective is to bring to the standard setter's attention research that is relevant to the issues raised in the exposure draft. We review analytic, empirical and experimental research that addresses the presentation of income and the format of the income statement. Overall, there is some support for a single statement of (total) recognised income and expense. However, net income is on average more relevant than comprehensive income, which may favour a two-statement approach. While this result is in line with the IASB's option of the two formats, it does not support the IASB's preference for a single statement.     

How Do Investors Interpret Announcements of Earnings Delays?

Unlike in the case of delays of 10‐K or 10‐Q filings, the SEC does not require managers to disclose delays of earnings announcements to the public. Thus, for companies that are unable to report earnings by their expected date, managers face a decision: remain silent or announce the delay. Prior research has investigated all earnings delays, whether or not they are accompanied by announcements of the delay announcement, and found that the market reaction is slightly negative, on average, for companies that allow their expected earnings dates to pass without disclosing results. It's not clear, however, whether this negative reaction was due to the absence of news or to the information contained in the announcements of the earnings delays. The authors' recent study documents that earnings delay announcements are associated with an average one‐day abnormal stock return of a negative 6%. This statistically as well as economically significant reduction in value is consistent with anecdotal evidence in the popular business press as well as predictions of disclosure theories, in particular the explanation that concerns about legal liability and managerial reputation motivate managers to disclose bad news. The study also shows that almost all managers who announce earnings delays attempt to influence the market reaction by disclosing the underlying cause. Finally, the study shows that the market reaction to earnings delay announcements is positively related to future earnings changes, consistent with the role of these disclosures in providing a signal of deteriorating financial performance.     

American Enterprise Institute Roundtable: Was Milton Friedman Right about Shareholder Capitalism?*

In this look back at Milton Friedman's famous essay in The New York Times 50 years ago organized by the American Enterprise Institute, three well‐known panelists discussed whether executives should continue to be guided by Friedman's oft‐cited statement that the “social responsibility of business is to increase its own profits.” One pretext or prompt for this discussion is the Business Roundtable's recent rethinking of the corporate mission, with its emphasis on all corporate stakeholders, employees and local communities as well as shareholders. Among the panelists, Marty Lipton takes the most enthusiastic view of this alternative to shareholder primacy. Now often identified as “stakeholder capitalism,” this alternative is embraced by Lipton as part of a “New Paradigm” in which large, universal owners act more or less in concert to pressure private companies to play a greater role in protecting the environment and lifting people out of poverty. By contrast, fund manager Cliff Asness and former Bush advisor and Columbia Business School dean Glenn Hubbard find considerable relevance and resilience in the old shareholder paradigm. Hubbard, for example, emphasizes the impossibility of maximizing long‐run value in highly competitive product and labor markets without taking care of all important stakeholders. And while sympathetic to the intent of the Business Roundtable—and the value of ensuring enough investment in corporate stakeholders—both Hubbard and Asness are troubled by the prospect of a corporate governance system trying to hold corporate managers accountable in a stakeholder‐centric world.     

The Relationship between Bankruptcy Model Predictions and Stock Market Perceptions of Bankruptcy

This study uses a cumulative sum technique to determine the point at which the stock market first perceives that a firm may file for bankruptcy. The study then attempts to identify information, whether from financial statements or from other sources, that may have influenced the market in its reassessment of the firm's prospects. The results indicate that the switching point of the mean and variance of stock returns appears to be related both to financial statement information (as measured by changes in bankruptcy model probability assessments) and the release of unfavorable news in the Wall Street Journal.     

An Analysis of Concepts and Evidence on the Question of Whether IFRS Should be Conservative

Do international accounting standards require conservative accounting? The IASB's conceptual framework suggests that they should not, while the research literature is largely silent on the matter, typically presuming conservatism to be an outcome of private contracting rather than standardized, public, general purpose financial reporting. In this paper, we analyze the actual requirements of IFRS. We find multiple examples of recognition requirements that lead to unconditional conservatism, measurement requirements that lead to conditional conservatism, and also presentation/disclosure requirements that further support a conservative reporting environment. These findings complement, support and deepen existing evidence in the empirical literature that accounting is in practice conservative. We show, however, that the requirements for conservatism in IFRS conflict with, first, the IASB's stated position in its conceptual framework that accounting should not be conservative and, second, the private contracting explanation for conservatism that is generally accepted in the literature. What is missing, and lies behind both conflicts, is an acknowledgement and understanding of the role of an agency/contracting perspective in enhancing the decision‐usefulness of general purpose accounting standards, given the information/incentive asymmetry and uncertainty that characterizes the real‐world context in which those standards operate. From a policy perspective, such an understanding would reconcile the IASB's conceptual framework with the actual requirements of IFRS. From a research literature perspective, such an understanding would re‐position accounting standards as central to the practice of accounting conservatism, which would in turn require revision to the generally accepted theory of a private contracting explanation for the empirical evidence of conservative accounting practice.     

Financial statement comparability and accounting fraud

We examine the association between financial statement comparability and the likelihood of accounting fraud. Prior research documents a negative association between the quality of a firm's reporting environment and accounting fraud. We build on this literature and show that poor financial statement comparability is associated with a greater likelihood of accounting fraud. We also find that accounting comparability declines over time as the year of fraud detection approaches and that the association between comparability and fraud becomes more negative over this time. In addition, we find that financial statement comparability improves after fraud detection, consistent with the notion that managers improve their financial reporting quality after fraud.     

Workforce diversity and financial statement readability

The Securities and Exchange Commission has associated readability with a range of linguistic features largely determined by the language style of the information producers, including sentence length and the use of personal pronouns, familiar words, surplus words and active voice. We examine the impact of a firm's workforce ethnic diversity on its financial statement readability. Based on linguistic literature, we argue that a more diverse workforce increases the linguistic heterogeneity of the inputs into financial statements, hindering financial statement readability. We show that financial statement readability decreases with the ethnic diversity of the workforce, and that this effect is more pronounced for firms located in a community with a high crime rate or low social capital. We also find that the market reacts less to the earnings surprises of firms with less readable financial statements. We further find that the impact of white-collar employee diversity on readability is greater than that of blue-collar employee diversity. The results of robustness tests suggest that workplace diversity does not reduce firms' overall information production quality, which rules out the alternative explanation that employee diversity hinders financial statement readability through increasing employee conflict and communication errors. Overall, our study suggests that workforce diversity is an important determinant of financial statement readability.     

Data preprocessing and data parsimony in corporate failure forecast models: evidence from Australian materials industry

The present study, based on data for delisted and active corporations in the Australian materials industry, is an attempt to develop a systematic way of selecting corporate failure‐related features. We empirically tested the proposed procedure using three datasets. The first dataset contains 82 financial economic factors from the corporation's financial statement. The second dataset comprises 73 relevant financial ratios, which either directly or indirectly measure a corporation's propensity to fail, and are conciliated from the first dataset. The third dataset is a parsimonious dataset obtained from the application of combining a filter and a wrapper to preprocess the first dataset. The robustness of this preprocessed dataset is tested by comparing its performance with the first and second datasets in two statistical (logistic regression and naïve‐Bayes) and two machine learning (decision tree, neural network) classes of prediction models. Tests for prediction accuracies and reliabilities, using the computational (ROC curve, AUC) and the statistical (Cochran's Q statistic) criteria show that the third dataset outperforms the other two datasets in all four predicting models, achieving various accuracies ranges from 81 per cent to 84 per cent.     

Corporate Real Estate Sale and Leaseback Effect: Empirical Evidence from Europe

Corporate real estate disposals have increased in Europe during the past few years. In this research paper, we study market reactions of publicly traded European companies' real estate sale and leaseback announcements during 1998–2004. This study is one of the first ones to study the sale and leaseback impact on corporate value with a pan‐European data. We find that the sale and leaseback announcements have on average positive impact to firm's value which is in line with the previous studies. However, we also find that the positive effect is mainly caused by the deals with high transaction value to company market value ratio. Smaller transactions do not create on average any abnormal returns. Our results support the hypothesis that the positive sale and leaseback announcement effect is a consequence of revealed hidden value of the company's assets. Thus, sale and leaseback can also be seen as a mechanism for revealing the hidden value of company's assets to the market.     

Financial Markets and Economic Growth*

In this reprinting of the Nobel Prize‐winning financial economist's classic statement about the origins of financial crises, the Southeast Asian crisis of the late 1990s is attributed “not to too much reliance on financial markets, but to too little.” Like the U.S. economy a century ago, the emerging Asian economies did not then—and do not now—have well‐developed capital markets and remain heavily dependent on their banking systems to finance growth. But for all its benefits, banking is not only basically 19th‐century technology, but disaster‐prone technology. And in the summer of 1997, a banking‐driven disaster struck in East Asia, just as it had struck so many times before in U.S. history. During the 20th century, the author argues, the U.S. economy reduced its dependence on banks by developing “dispersed and decentralized” financial markets. In so doing, it increased the efficiency of the capital allocation process and reduced the economy's vulnerability to the credit crunches that have recurred throughout U.S. history. By contrast, Japan has not reduced its economy's dependence on banks, and its efforts to deal with its banking problems during the crisis of the late'90s served only to destabilize itself as well as its neighbors. Developing countries in Asia and elsewhere are urged not to follow the Japanese example, but to take measures aimed at developing financial markets and institutions that will either substitute for or, in some cases, complement bank products and services.     

Seven Fallacies Concerning Milton Friedman's “The Role of Monetary Policy”

This paper analyzes Milton Friedman's (1968a) article “The Role of Monetary Policy,” via a discussion of seven fallacies concerning the article. These fallacies are as follows: (i) “The Role of Monetary Policy” was Friedman's first public statement of the natural rate hypothesis. (ii) The Friedman–Phelps Phillips curve was already present in Samuelson and Solow's (1960) analysis. (iii) Friedman's specification of the Phillips curve was based on perfect competition and no nominal rigidities. (iv) Friedman's (1968a) account of monetary policy in the Great Depression contradicted the Monetary History’s version. (v) Friedman (1968a) stated that a monetary expansion will keep the unemployment rate and the real interest rate below their natural rates for two decades. (vi) The zero lower bound on nominal interest rates invalidates the natural rate hypothesis. (vii) Friedman's (1968a) treatment of an interest-rate peg was refuted by the rational expectations revolution. The discussion lays out the reasons why each of these seven items is a fallacy and infers key aspects of the framework underlying Friedman's (1968a) analysis.     

The ASB's Exposure Draft Statement of Principles: A Comment

This paper is based on a shorter comment sent to the Accounting Standards Board in response to the request for comments on the exposure draft, Statement of Principles for Financial Reporting. It is intended to be a comprehensive dissent from that ED, and also to suggest an alternative course of action for the ASB. In the first place, the ASB's position, according to which the provision of more fair value accounting (FVA)-based information is a central plank among its principles, is contested on the grounds of both (a) market incompleteness (entailing limited availability of reliable FVA-based information) and (b) lack of evidence of demand on the part of financial statement users for FVA-based information. In the second place, the ASB's approach to issues of recognition is subjected to critical analysis and found to be inadequate. Finally, the ASB's decision that the essential function of its Statement of Principles should be to advocate a set of recognition rules and measurement bases (including some that are controversial) is contested. Instead, it is proposed that the Statement of Principles should incorporate a larger framework, including a set of procedural principles, according to which the Board would reach conclusions on the various issues with which it has to deal, so that its conclusions would be seen to be authoritative because they had been reached by a process of rigorous enquiry in accordance with appropriate procedures. These principles would incorporate Rawls' (1971) notions of reflective equilibrium and procedural justice.     

HOW TO FIX ACCOUNTING—MEASURE AND REPORT ECONOMIC PROFIT

Bending accounting rules has become so ingrained in our corporate culture that even ethical business leaders succumb to the temptation to “manage” their earnings in order to meet analysts' demands for smoothly rising results. The author of this article argues that such behavior reflects not a general decline in ethical standards so much as executives' growing sense that accounting itself has become “unhinged from value.” For example, clearly valuable expenditures on R&D, customer acquisition, and employee training are generally expensed immediately against earnings. And reported corporate income is often further reduced by provisions for losses that most companies never expect to incur, by “book” taxes they never expect to pay, and by depreciation charges on assets that are actually increasing in value. At the same time, the opportunity costs associated with employee stock options and the corporate use of equity capital are not reflected in the accountant's measure of profit. To improve the quality of corporate governance and revitalize the public's faith in reported earnings, the author proposes a complete overhaul of GAAP accounting to measure and report economic profit, or EVA. Stated in brief, the author's concept of economic profit begins with an older, but now seldom used, definition of accounting income known as “residual income,” and then proposes a series of additional adjustments to GAAP accounting that are designed to produce a reliable measure of a company's annual, sustainable cash‐generating capacity. Besides expensing the cost of equity capital as well as stock options, the author recommends bringing off‐balance‐sheet items such as pension assets and liabilities back onto the balance sheet, eliminating reserve accounting, capitalizing R&D and other expenditures on intangible assets, and recording economic rather than accounting depreciation. Such changes, by replacing the accountants' current flawed definition of earnings with a comprehensive new statement of value added, could restore investor confidence in financial statements. Even more important, managers would be less likely to pursue their now common practice of boosting earnings by making value‐reducing operating and investment decisions and more likely to use financial reporting not to mislead the market but as an opportunity to communicate relevant, forward‐looking information.     

Discount Rates in Disarray: Evidence on Flawed Goodwill Impairment Testing

Discount rate selection represents a centrally material factor impacting valuation models. Given the strong reliance on discounted cash flow modelling as a basis for determining an asset's recoverable amount, the judgement exercised by reporting entities regarding rate selection is of paramount importance in influencing the outcomes of the impairment testing process conducted under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The discretion surrounding rate selection could be used opportunistically to avoid or manage the timing of impairment losses to the detriment of transparency, comparability and decision usefulness. This study provides evidence consistent with the opportunism on the part of financial statement preparers, by demonstrating the existence of variances between independently generated risk‐adjusted discount rates and those disclosed as having been used by a sample of large listed Australian companies.