Can cost increases increase competition? Asymmetric information and equilibrium prices

We present an analysis of competition under asymmetric information where prices react asymmetrically to changes in firms' marginal costs. When one firm has private information about some customers, an increase in an uninformed firm's marginal cost leads to a price increase, as usual. However, an increase in the informed firm's marginal cost causes the equilibrium price to fall by improving the distribution of customers served by the uninformed firm. The model applies to settings where information asymmetries are important determinants of competition, such as credit, insurance, labor markets, or for the sale of goods where repeat business is important.     

The interaction among disclosures,competition, and an internal control problem

This paper studies the effect of an internal control problem on a firm's disclosure policy where firms compete in non-cooperative investment game, with each firm deciding to invest in its current technology or to invest in a non-proprietary innovation. By adopting the innovation, a firm earns higher revenues at the expense of its non-adopting rival. Each principal decides on a disclosure policy for its firm that entails releasing an agent's internal cost report of the firm's current technology to the rival firm. The agent has private information about the current technology's cost and an incentive to overstate the cost. An effect of disclosures is to increase coordination between the firms, which, without a control problem, increases firm profits. However, under the same conditions that disclosures were beneficial without the control problem, disclosures may be harmful to the principal with the control problem because increased coordination between the firms allows the agent to earn higher rents. Competition substitutes for commitment to an investment policy that limits the agent's rents and this disciplining role of competition is diminished with disclosures.     

Investing in a relationship

A principal can make an investment anticipating a repeated relationship with an agent, but the agent may appropriate the returns through ex post bargaining. I study how this holdup problem and efficiency depend on the contracting environment. When investment returns are observable, informal contracts ex post can be more efficient than formal contracts, as they induce higher investment ex ante: the principal invests not only to generate direct returns, but also to improve relational incentives. Unobservability of returns increases the principal's ability to appropriate the returns but reduces her ability to improve incentives. The optimal information structure depends on bargaining power.     

Optimal state‐contingent regulation under limited liability

We consider an optimal regulation model in which the regulated firm's production cost is subject to random, publicly observable shocks. The distribution of these shocks is correlated with the firm's cost type, which is private information. The regulator designs an incentive‐compatible regulatory scheme, which adjusts itself automatically ex post given the realization of the cost shock. We derive the optimal scheme, assuming that there is an upper bound on the financial losses that the firm can sustain in any given state. We first consider a two‐type, two‐state case, and then extend the results to the case of a continuum of firm types and an arbitrary finite number of states. We show that the first‐best allocation can be implemented if the state of nature conveys enough information about the firm's type and/or the maximal loss that the firm can sustain is sufficiently large. Otherwise, the solution is characterized by classical second‐best features.     

CEO Risk‐Taking Incentives and the Cost of Equity Capital

In this paper, we show that the sensitivities of an executive's wealth to changes in stock prices (deltas) decrease the implied cost of equity capital while the sensitivities of an executive's wealth to changes in stock volatility (vegas) increase the implied cost of equity capital. Our findings demonstrate that shareholders understand the risks of firms’ future projects as embedded in executive compensation and price these risks into the cost of equity capital accordingly. The findings have strong implications for optimal executive compensation contract design, project evaluation and cost of capital estimation.     

Overcompensation as a Partial Solution to Commitment and Renegotiation Problems: The Case of Ex Post Moral Hazard

In a Costly State Verification world, an agent who has private information regarding the state of the world must report what state occurred to a principal, who can verify the state at a cost. An agent then has what is called ex post moral hazard: he has an incentive to misreport the true state to extract rents from the principal. Assuming the principal cannot commit to an auditing strategy, the optimal contract is such that: (1) the agent's expected marginal utility when there is an accident (high‐ and low‐loss states) is equal to his marginal utility when there is no accident; (2) the lower loss is undercompensated, while the higher loss is overcompensated; and (3) the welfare of the agent is greater under commitment than under no‐commitment. Result 2 is contrary to the results obtained if the principal can commit to an auditing strategy (higher losses underpaid and lower losses overpaid). The reason is that by increasing the difference between the high and the low indemnity payments, the probability of fraud is reduced.     

THE LIQUIDITY ROUTE TO A LOWER COST OF CAPITAL

The managements of many public companies do not pay much attention to the liquidity of their securities. Many if not most CEOs and CFOs feel powerless to affect what goes on in financial markets, and a common attitude among top executives is that maintaining liquidity is the concern of the securities exchanges and the Securities and Exchange Commission. This approach may work for those companies whose stocks are already highly liquid—a group made up mainly of large‐cap companies, as well as a number of smaller high‐flying, high‐tech firms. But, for the vast majority of public companies—especially smaller and mid‐sized firms—this is likely to be the wrong policy. As the authors of this article demonstrated in their pioneering study (published in the Journal of Financial Economics in 1986), liquidity appears to be a major determinant of a company's cost of capital. As their theory suggests and their empirical tests confirmed, the more liquid a company's securities, the lower its cost of capital and the higher its stock price. And, as discussed in this article, academic research since then has produced a large and impressive body of evidence linking greater liquidity to higher stock prices. Although recent technological innovations such as Internet‐based trading have increased liquidity generally, not all companies appear to have benefited equally. The authors offer a number of suggestions for companies intent on increasing the liquidity of their stock. Specifically, they propose that managers do the following: (1) consider measures, such as stock splits, designed to increase their investor base by attracting small investors; (2) seek trading venues for their securities that promise to increase liquidity; and (3) take advantage of the new Internet technology to provide more and better information to investors. Moreover, for smaller companies with little or no analyst coverage, the authors offer the radical suggestion that such companies actually pay analysts to cover their stock, much as companies pay Moody's or Standard & Poors to rate their bonds. This, in the authors' view, would be a more efficient alternative to the current practice of using stock splits to encourage intermediaries to make markets in the firm's shares.     

A note on the interaction effects of non-financial measures of performance

Using principal-agent analyses, the effect of the interactions between two non-financial measures of performance in an agent’s incentive compensation scheme is studied. The agent can allocate effort between “meeting output targets” and “getting output that needs no rework.” The principal trades off (1) a penalty for not meeting output targets, and (2) cost of reworking output that is defective when initially produced. In a compensation mechanism that includes incentives based on measures of output that needs no rework, as well as total output, it is shown that the agent may respond to an increased weight on output that needs no rework by reducing effort allocated towards it. This occurs when the increased weight on the output that needs no rework is accompanied by a sufficiently steep decrease in the weight on total output in the compensation mechanism, leading to a reduction of all effort, and all output. Numerical analyses and implications for the use of multiple measures of performance-based incentives are provided.     

Accounting information,disclosure, and expected utility: Do investors really abhor uncertainty?

Investors are said to “abhor uncertainty,” but if there were no uncertainty they could earn only the risk‐free rate. A fundamental result in the analytical accounting literature shows that investors buying into a CARA‐normal CAPM market pay lower asset prices, gain higher ex‐ante expected returns, and obtain higher expected utility, when the market payoff has higher variance. New investors obtain similar “welfare” gains from risk under a log/power utility CAPM. These results do not imply that investors “abhor information.” To realize investors' ex‐ante expectations, the subjective probability distributions representing market expectations must be accurate. Greater payoff risk can add to investors' expected utility, but higher ex‐post(realized) utility comes from better information and more accurate ex‐ante expectations. An important implication for accounting is that greater disclosure can have the simultaneous effects of (i) exposing more fully or perceptibly firms' payoff uncertainty, thereby increasing new investors' expected utility, and (ii) improving market estimates of firms' payoff parameters (means, variances, covariances), thereby giving investors a better chance of realizing their expectations. Paradoxically, better information can be valuable to new investors by exposing more fully and more accurately the risk in firms' business operations and results–new investors maximizing expected utility want both more risk and better information.     

Political Connections and the Cost of Bank Loans

This paper analyzes whether the political connections of listed firms in the United States affect the cost and terms of loan contracts. Using a hand‐collected data set of the political connections of S&P 500 companies over the 2003–2008 time period, we find that the cost of bank loans is significantly lower for companies that have board members with political ties. We consider two possible explanations for these findings: a Borrower Channel in which lenders charge lower rates because they recognize that connections enhance the borrower's credit worthiness and a Bank Channel in which banks assign greater value to connected loans to enhance their own relationships with key politicians. After employing a series of tests to distinguish between these two channels, we find strong support for the Borrower Channel but no direct evidence supporting the Bank Channel. Finally, we demonstrate that political connections reduce the likelihood of a capital expenditure restriction or liquidity requirement commanded by banks at the origination of the loan. Taken together, our results suggest that political connections increase the value of U.S. companies and reduce monitoring costs and credit risk faced by banks, which, in turn, reduces the borrower's cost of debt.     

Procurement when price and quality matter

A buyer seeks to procure a good characterized by its price and its quality from suppliers who have private information about their cost structure (fixed cost and marginal cost of providing quality). We characterize the buyer's optimal buying mechanism. We then use the optimal mechanism as a theoretical and numerical benchmark to study simpler buying procedures such as scoring auctions and bargaining. Scoring auctions can extract a significant proportion of the buyer's strategic surplus (the difference between the expected utility from the optimal mechanism and the efficient auction). Bargaining does less well and often does worse than the efficient auction.     

Analysts’ sale and distribution of non fundamental information

We examine an analyst’s sale and distribution of information related to short-term price movements but unrelated to underlying firm value. By selling non fundamental information, the analyst increases competition on the signal, but prices become more sensitive to net order flow, creating an offsetting increase in the non fundamental signal’s value. More precise non fundamental information is more widely distributed. In the limit, a perfect non fundamental signal will be publicly disclosed for an arbitrarily small fee, and the analyst earns profits as if he possessed fundamental information. Consistent with empirical findings, analysts’ recommendations can be profitable, even when widely distributed or seemingly inconsistent with detailed forecasts. Analysis based on non fundamental information does not contribute to greater price efficiency but reduces liquidity costs. In a multi-period setting, traders with non fundamental information do not front-run, preferring to transact only in the period in which uninformed demand is executed.     

Does it pay to be socially connected with wall street brokerages? Evidence from cost of equity

We show that social connections between a firm's executives and directors and brokerages that follow the firm decrease the firm's cost of equity. We use quasi-natural experiments to address endogeneity concerns and find that the uncovered effect of firm-brokerage social connections on cost of equity is likely causal. The effect is found to be more pronounced for firms with more soft information, opaque information environments, tight financial constraints, weak corporate monitoring, or high executive equity ownership. Further, consistent with the evidence on cost of equity, we find that firm-brokerage social connections reduce SEO underpricing, decrease information asymmetry in stock markets, and improve the firm's equity valuation.     

The Influence of Foreclosure Delays on Borrowers' Default Behavior

This paper conducts loan‐level analysis to investigate the influence of expected foreclosure delay on a borrower's default propensity. We include the actual foreclosure times in the analysis to capture the dynamic nature of foreclosure duration. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find a statistically and economically significant impact of foreclosure delay on borrower default behavior. In the current market condition where many borrowers have negative equity, the increase in delay may make default an optimal choice for more borrowers. The negative effect of increased foreclosure delay may need to be considered when devising policies to aid troubled borrowers.     

Pairing provision price and default remedy: optimal two‐stage procurement with private R&D efficiency

This article studies cost‐minimizing two‐stage procurement with Research and Development (R&D). The principal wishes to procure a product from an agent. At the first stage, the agent can conduct R&D to discover a more cost‐efficient production technology. First‐stage R&D efficiency and effort and the realized second‐stage production cost are the agent's private information. The optimal two‐stage mechanism is implemented by a menu of single‐stage contracts, each specifying a fixed provision price and remedy paid by a defaulting agent. A higher delivery price is paired with a higher default remedy, and a more efficient type opts for a higher price and higher remedy.     

Value of Latent Information: Alternative Event Study Methods

This paper presents an econometric model to value latent information underlying corporate events. This model computes the market's inference of the value of latent information from the probability of an event, conditional on firm-specific, preevent information. It provides a convenient framework for testing significance of preevent information variables, such as accounting attributes and lagged stock return. Simulations show that this model, when applied to both event and preevent period data, can decrease the incidence of bias in event studies. If restricted to only event period data, this model reduces to a truncated regression and does not perform as well as standard procedures.     

Innovation and Information Acquisition under Time Inconsistency and Uncertainty

When an agent invests in new industrial activities, he has a limited initial knowledge of his project's returns. Acquiring information allows him both to reduce the uncertainty on the dangerousness of this project and to limit potential damages that it might cause on people's health and on the environment. In this paper, we study whether there exist situations in which the agent does not acquire information. We find that an agent with time-consistent preferences, as well as an agent with hyperbolic ones, will acquire information unless its cost exceeds the direct benefit they could get with this information. Nevertheless, a hyperbolic agent may remain strategically ignorant and, when he does acquire information, he will acquire less information than a time-consistent type. Moreover, a hyperbolic-discounting type who behaves as a time-consistent agent in the future is more inclined to stay ignorant. We then emphasize that this strategic ignorance depends on the degree of precision of the information. Finally, we analyse the role that existing liability rules could play as an incentive to acquire information under uncertainty and with regard to the form of the agent's preferences.     

Managing The Volatility Of Gaap Earnings

Abstract

The adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 97 (SFAS 97) eliminated the “lock-in” concept introduced in SFAS 60. Since many of the actuarial assumptions used in the calculation of the deferred acquisition cost (DAC) asset are difficult to predict over an extended period of time, “dynamic unlocking” was a sensible solution. Although this “dynamic unlocking” keeps the assumptions in line with recent experience, it comes at a cost—increased volatility of GAAP earnings. Some of the causes of this volatility are warranted since it accentuates the effects on earnings due to certain changes in the underlying experience. Other causes of this volatility may be unwarranted because of a misapplication of the principles underlying SFAS 97 and SFAS 120 or the manner in which changes in experience were reflected. In addition, most analysts expect the amortization of deferred acquisition costs to increase when earnings are better than expected. Conversely, analysts expect the amortization of deferred acquisition costs to decrease when earnings are worse than expected. Often the amortization of deferred acquisition costs behaves in a manner contrary to their expectations. This article analyzes what causes this volatility, explains why the amortization can behave contrary to expectations, and suggests several techniques for minimizing these unwarranted results.     

Leverage-based index revisions: The case of Dow Jones Islamic Market World Index

US firms added to the Dow Jones Islamic Market World Index, a leverage-based index, witness permanent positive price and liquidity effects, whereas excluded firms sustain negative price and liquidity effects but no decrease in the investor awareness. Included/excluded firms experience a significant drop/no change in the cost of equity. Among the deleted firms, those with an increase in debt level bear a more severe decrease in liquidity and institutional ownership, and an increased cost of equity than those firms without an increase in debt use. Conveying private information on changes in a firm's corporate strategy and operating environment, revisions by a leverage-based index are different from those by size-based indexes.     

Information acquisition and voting with heterogeneous experts

A social planner selects heterogeneously biased experts to (either sequentially or simultaneously) acquire costly signals, and then agents vote between two alternatives. To maximize social welfare, the social planner adopts an alternating mechanism—choosing extremely biased experts whose preferences oppose the pivotal voter's current preference—in the optimal sequential mechanism, whereas she chooses mildly biased experts in the optimal simultaneous mechanism. Despite the flexibility of a sequential mechanism, the optimal simultaneous mechanism can achieve strictly higher social welfare when information cost is low. Supermajority rules can dominate simple majority rule in terms of both information acquisition and social welfare.