Colluding through suppliers

This article investigates downstream firms’ ability to collude in a repeated game of competition between supply chains. We show that downstream firms with buyer power can collude more easily in the output market if they also collude on their input supply contracts. More specifically, an implicit agreement on input supply contracts with above‐cost wholesale prices and negative fixed fees (that is, slotting fees) facilitates collusion on downstream prices. Banning information exchange about wholesale prices decreases the scope for collusion. Moreover, high downstream prices are more difficult to sustain if upstream rather than downstream firms make contract offers.     

A New Method for Estimating the Effects of Fuel Taxes: An Application to Thailand

This article proposes a new methodology for estimating the impactof fuel price and tax changes on the general price level andthe distribution of income and applies a model to Thailand usingdata for 1975–76 and 1981–82. Because the modelallows for pricing under international competition where taxincreases must be partially absorbed in reduced factor incomerather than always being passed on in higher consumer prices,the results are significantly different from those generatedby the more conventional cost-plus pricing rule. The inflationaryimpact of fuel tax changes is slight because of both the opennessof the economy and the low energy intensity of manufacturingand other production in Thailand. In contrast, taxes on importsengender price increases not only for imports but also for goodswhich substitute for imports. The model also indicates thatthe net effects of taxes on petroleum products (other than kerosene)are progressive in their distributional impact, relative toa tax on imports or consumption. A main policy conclusion ofthe study is that fuel taxes could be used to increase bothequity and allocative efficiency without inducing significantinflationary responses. It follows that in the current circumstancesof falling world oil prices, developing countries could generaterevenues needed for structural adjustment by increasing fueltaxes to maintain domestic petroleum price levels.     

Consumer‐surplus‐enhancing collusion and trade

That collusion among sellers hurts buyers is a central tenet in economics. We provide an oligopoly model in which collusion can raise consumer surplus. A differentiated‐product duopoly operates in two geographically separated markets. Each market is home to a single firm, but can import, at a cost, from the foreign firm. Under some circumstances, a perfect cartel, relative to duopolistic competition, raises the price of the imported good and lowers the price of the home good. This raises welfare for most consumers and increases aggregate consumer surplus. A similar possibility result applies to autarky. Our analysis applies beyond the spatial setting.     

Competition and Collusion in Dealer Markets

This article develops a game-theoretic model to analyze market makers' intertemporal pricing strategies. We show that dealers who adopt noncooperative pricing strategies may set bid-ask spreads above competitive levels. This form of “implicit collusion” differs from explicit collusion, where dealers cooperate to fix prices. Price discreteness or asymmetric information are not required for collusion to occur. Rather, institutional arrangements that restrict access to the order flow are important determinants of the ability to collude because they reduce dealers' incentives to compete on price. Public policy efforts to increase interdealer competition should focus on such restrictions.     

人民币汇率传递机制研究与启示

汇率传递是指汇率波动通过直接或间接的渠道影响国内价格，影响汇率传递的因素主要包括外贸依存度、市场竞争和市场创新等方面。我国汇率传递效应受市场不完全竞争的影响，其汇率传递效应亦不完全。可以通过企业加速产品结构调整和技术创新，适应汇率弹性增强的需要；加快产业升级与结构调整；并继续实行富有弹性的汇率制度。     

A Model of International Asset Pricing with a Constraint on the Foreign Equity Ownership

This paper derives a closed-form valuation model in a two-country world in which the domestic investors are constrained to own at most a fraction, δ, of the number of shares outstanding of the foreign firms. When the “δ constraint” is binding, two different prices rule in the foreign securities market, reflecting the premium offered by the domestic investors over the price under no constraints and the discount demanded by the foreign investors. The premium is shown to be a multiple of the discount, the multiple being the ratio of the aggregate risk aversion of the domestic and foreign investors. Given the aggregate risk-aversion parameters, the equilibrium premium and discount are determined by the severity of the δ constraint and the “pure” foreign market risk.     

Exchange Rate Pass‐Through,Domestic Competition,and Inflation: Evidence from the 2005–08 Revaluation of the Renminbi

Import competition from China is pervasive in the sense that for many good categories, the competitive environment that U.S. firms face in these markets is strongly driven by the prices of Chinese imports, and so is their pricing decision. This paper quantifies the effect of the government‐controlled appreciation of the Chinese renminbi vis‐à‐vis the USD from 2005 to 2008 on the prices charged by U.S. domestic producers. In a panel spanning the period from 1994 to 2010 and including up to 519 manufacturing sectors, import price changes of Chinese goods pass into U.S. producer prices at an average rate of 0.7, while import price changes that can be traced back to exchange rate movements of other trade partners only have mild effects on U.S. prices. Further analysis points to the importance of trade integration, variable markups, and demand complementarities on the one side, and to the importance of imported intermediate goods on the other side as drivers of these patterns. Simulations incorporating these microeconomic findings reveal that a substantial revaluation of the renminbi would result in a pronounced increase in aggregate U.S. producer price inflation.     

Disclosure standards for vertical contracts

In this article, we investigate the welfare consequences of disclosure of vertical contracts. When much of retail competition is among products provided by a dominant supplier, disclosure provides a means through which the supplier can use its prices to coordinate the retail behavior of its wholesale customers. From the retail consumers' perspective, such coordination is unwanted, leading them to favor opacity of contracts. When retail competition is across brands made by different suppliers, disclosure becomes a conduit through which suppliers compete indirectly via their retail surrogates. Consumers welcome the increased competition accompanying such disclosures. In short, the efficacy of disclosure standards depends critically on the suppliers’ market reach and the relative intensity of intrabrand versus interbrand retail competition.     

How Does Cross‐Border Activity Affect EU Banking Markets?

Cross‐border activity in the EU is widely viewed as a necessary condition for the implementation of a single banking market and therefore as a positive factor for the enhancement of competition and cost performance in the region. In this paper, we analyse the relevance of this view by investigating whether cross‐border activity really promotes competition and cost efficiency in EU banking markets. We also consider the potential role of a bank's mode of entry by comparing existing domestic banks that foreign banks take over (mergers and acquisitions) with new branches created by foreign banks, often through subsidiaries (greenfield operations). We consider the impact of cross‐border banks on cost efficiency (measured by the stochastic frontier approach), profitability (assessed through return on assets) and competition (measured by the Lerner index). We find that greenfield banks enhance cost efficiency and competition, while mergers and acquisitions hamper competition and cost efficiency. Therefore, our results suggest that EU authorities should promote only greenfield banks rather than all cross‐border entries.     

Accounting information,disclosure, and expected utility: Do investors really abhor uncertainty?

Investors are said to “abhor uncertainty,” but if there were no uncertainty they could earn only the risk‐free rate. A fundamental result in the analytical accounting literature shows that investors buying into a CARA‐normal CAPM market pay lower asset prices, gain higher ex‐ante expected returns, and obtain higher expected utility, when the market payoff has higher variance. New investors obtain similar “welfare” gains from risk under a log/power utility CAPM. These results do not imply that investors “abhor information.” To realize investors' ex‐ante expectations, the subjective probability distributions representing market expectations must be accurate. Greater payoff risk can add to investors' expected utility, but higher ex‐post(realized) utility comes from better information and more accurate ex‐ante expectations. An important implication for accounting is that greater disclosure can have the simultaneous effects of (i) exposing more fully or perceptibly firms' payoff uncertainty, thereby increasing new investors' expected utility, and (ii) improving market estimates of firms' payoff parameters (means, variances, covariances), thereby giving investors a better chance of realizing their expectations. Paradoxically, better information can be valuable to new investors by exposing more fully and more accurately the risk in firms' business operations and results–new investors maximizing expected utility want both more risk and better information.     

Product Market Competition, Insider Trading, and Stock Market Efficiency

How does competition in firms' product markets influence their behavior in equity markets? Do product market imperfections spread to equity markets? We examine these questions in a noisy rational expectations model in which firms operate under monopolistic competition while their shares trade in perfectly competitive markets. Firms use their monopoly power to pass on shocks to customers, thereby insulating their profits. This encourages stock trading, expedites the capitalization of private information into stock prices and improves the allocation of capital. Several implications are derived and tested.     

A Breakdown of the Valuation Effects of International Cross‐listing*

It is well known that cross‐listing domestic stocks in foreign exchanges has significant valuation effects on the listed company's shares. Using a sample of firms with dual shares, we explore the differential effects of cross‐listing on prices and we are able to separate the different sources of the benefits of cross‐listing. These sources include market segmentation, liquidity, and the bonding of controlling shareholders to lower expropriation of firm resources. Our results show that even though the market segmentation and bonding effects are both statistically significant, the economic significance of segmentation is more than double that of bonding. Furthermore, we document an economically and statistically significant increase in the liquidity of both share classes after the listing. Overall, our results explain why less and less firms are willing to list in the USA: Sarbanes Oxley has increased the cost of adopting better governance while its benefits are not substantial; and market segmentation has decreased significantly in the last years.     

Information transmission and causality in the Italian Treasury bond market

We examine causality and efficiency in the Italian T-bond market, where cash trades take place on the domestic Mercato Telematico dei Titoli di Stato, while futures trading is based on the London International Financial Futures Exchange. We find evidence that causality in prices runs in both directions, and that the cash lead is almost comparable in size and extension to the futures lead. We then try to assess whether the cash market is weak-form efficient with respect to LIFFE prices. Using a simple trading rule with a variety of time and price filters, we conclude that the observed lead cannot be exploited to make a profit after transaction costs.     

PRICING CURRENCY OPTIONS UNDER STOCHASTIC INTEREST RATES AND JUMP‐DIFFUSION PROCESSES

We investigate the effects of stochastic interest rates and jumps in the spot exchange rate on the pricing of currency futures, forwards, and futures options. The proposed model extends Bates's model by allowing both the domestic and foreign interest rates to move around randomly, in a generalized Vasicek term‐structure framework. Numerical examples show that the model prices of European currency futures options are similar to those given by Bates's and Black's models in the absence of jumps and when the volatilities of the domestic and foreign interest rates and futures price are negligible. Changes in these volatilities affect the futures options prices. Bates's and Black's models underprice the European currency futures options in both the presence and the absence of jumps. The mispricing increases with the volatilities of interest rates and futures prices. JEL classification: G13     

International dimensions of optimal monetary policy

This paper provides a baseline general equilibrium model of optimal monetary policy among interdependent economies with monopolistic firms and nominal rigidities. An inward-looking policy of domestic price stabilization is not optimal when firms’ markups are exposed to currency fluctuations. Such a policy raises exchange rate volatility, leading foreign exporters to charge higher prices vis-à-vis increased uncertainty in the export market. As higher import prices reduce the purchasing power of domestic consumers, optimal monetary rules trade off a larger domestic output gap against lower consumer prices. Optimal rules in a world Nash equilibrium lead to less exchange rate volatility relative to both inward-looking rules and discretionary policies, even when the latter do not suffer from any inflationary (or deflationary) bias. Gains from international monetary cooperation are related in a non-monotonic way to the degree of exchange rate pass-through.     

Do capital importing countries pay higher prices for their imports of goods?

We examine the effects that a country's net capital flows have on the (border) prices that a country pays for its imports of goods. Using data from 2000 to 2009 for 11 euro area countries we utilize a pricing-to-market specification to study exporters' pricing behavior to the rest of the countries in the sample, at the industry level, for 900 goods disseminated at the 4-digit Standard International Trade Classification level. This allows us to construct a panel dataset which contains observations across exporters, importers, industries and time. We find a strong positive influence of the importing country's net capital inflows on the border prices of its imports of goods. This result is robust across different specifications of the underlying model, as well to different sample dis-aggregations across types of capital flows, product categories, and exporters.     

The effects of information availability on the benefits accrued from enhancing audit-firm reputation

This paper reports on a laboratory experiment that examines the effect of market setting and reputation enhancement on audit prices, profits, and number of contracts. Klein and Leffler (1981) The role of market forces in assuring contractual performance. Journal of Political Economy, 89, 615–641 provide theory related to reputation effects based on the availability of perfect ex-post quality (of the audit) information. Such information is not routinely available within audit markets. Therefore, the assumption of the availability of perfect ex-post quality information was relaxed to reflect a more realistic market in which audit quality must be inferred from information related to audit failure. Findings are that restricting the information available in this manner significantly affected the market's response to the auditor's attempts to establish a reputation. While the markets for which perfect ex-post quality information was provided closely followed the model's expectations, the limited information markets did not—auditors who attempted to enhance their reputation were unable to charge significantly higher prices and correspondingly made significantly lower profits.     

The effect of low-wage import competition on U.S. inflationary pressure

The effect of import competition from low-wage countries on U.S. inflationary pressure is estimated using a new methodology that identifies the causal response of prices to comparative advantage-induced supply shocks in these nations. The results of a panel covering 325 manufacturing industries from 1997 to 2006 show that imports from nine low-wage countries are associated with strong downward pressure on prices. When these nations capture a 1% share of the U.S. sector, the sector's producer prices decrease by 2.35%. Because import competition also influences the skewness of the distribution of price changes, it is likely to have impacted U.S. equilibrium inflation.     

The Beta Dilemma in Emerging Markets

In principle, emerging markets analysts employ the same analytical framework when estimating the value of businesses as their counterparts in developed economies: they forecast future cash flows and discount those to the present with appropriate costs of capital that are estimated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) framework. But in practice, emerging market analysts have a more complicated job because the task of estimating costs of equity in emerging markets is more difficult. Whereas developed economies have an abundance of historical data on overall stock market movements, industry share price behavior, and many individual share price histories, emerging market economies often do not. There may be no comparable local firms that are publicly traded—or if there are, their CAPM betas may be unreliable. And if analysts instead use the beta of a U.S. competitor as a surrogate for the emerging market beta, they face the question of whether domestic betas are equivalent across borders. As a consequence, appraisers of emerging market companies confront a “beta dilemma.” Part of this is a data problem stemming from shorter share price histories in emerging markets and the absence of publicly traded companies in some industries. In such cases, analysts may be inclined to use industry betas calculated with U.S. share prices as a substitute. But this creates an equivalence problem—the possibility, as confirmed by the author's research, that domestic U.S. and emerging market betas are not statistically equivalent for most industries. The author proposes a solution to this problem that involves grouping emerging markets into a single, distinctive asset class that allows for reliable calculations of industry betas. He also suggests ways of testing emerging market industry betas to determine whether they are statistically comparable.     

Stock returns and product market competition: beyond industry concentration

The main purpose of this paper is to provide direct evidence that product market structure affects stock returns. This is not only through industry concentration, as found in Hou and Robinson (J Finance 61:1927–1956, 2006), but also based on firms’ product substitutability and industry market size. Furthermore, the predictive power of product substitutability and market size for stock returns is not subsumed by industry concentration. Our results highlight the multi-dimensional structure of product market competition and its impact on asset prices.