A retail benchmarking approach to efficient two‐way access pricing: no termination‐based price discrimination†

We study access pricing rules that determine the access prices between two networks as a linear function of marginal costs and (average) retail prices set by both networks. When firms compete in linear prices, there is a unique linear rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium, independently of underlying demand conditions. When firms compete in two‐part tariffs, there exists a class of rules under which firms choose the variable price equal to the marginal cost. Therefore, the regulator can choose among these rules to pursue additional objectives such as increasing consumer surplus or promoting socially optimal investment.     

Timing of Sale,Pricing, and Cost Information: Evidence from the Airline Industry*

This study examines the association between when an airline sells its passenger seats and the pricing method (marginal cost or full cost) it employs. Prior literature suggests that when firms are able to change prices during the selling period, the optimality of full cost pricing or marginal cost pricing depends on when demand information is revealed during the period between capacity commitment decisions and time of sale. Full cost‐based pricing is appropriate in determining capacity commitment and prices simultaneously, while marginal cost provides more relevant information for pricing when capacity has been committed. Using the price and cost data from a sample of four U.S. domestic airlines, we find that full cost explains price variations of first‐day sales robustly. The adjusted R² of the marginal cost pricing model is larger in the sample of sales two days prior to departure than in the sample of first‐day sales. In the analysis of the sample of sales two days prior to departure, we find that, based on the adjusted R² of the full cost pricing and marginal cost pricing models, the explanatory power of marginal cost pricing is relatively weaker than full cost pricing. Our results document the use of different cost information along the dynamic change of price and provide implications in understanding the role of cost information in setting prices.     

Loss persistence and returns in the UK

In this study, we examine whether estimated loss reversal probabilities are fully reflected in UK stock market prices. Overall, we provide evidence of varying degrees and types of loss firm mispricing with respect to estimated loss reversal probabilities. In particular, a significant and positive relationship between loss reversal probability and annual returns is found only for firms with higher trading costs. When looking at monthly returns, however, especially for the financial statement release month subsequent to the loss year, a significant and positive relationship is found for all firms. Thus, the evidence is consistent with UK market participants not fully incorporating relevant information into the pricing of loss firms and, as a consequence, being surprised by the content of the earnings for many or all UK loss firms.     

Colluding through suppliers

This article investigates downstream firms’ ability to collude in a repeated game of competition between supply chains. We show that downstream firms with buyer power can collude more easily in the output market if they also collude on their input supply contracts. More specifically, an implicit agreement on input supply contracts with above‐cost wholesale prices and negative fixed fees (that is, slotting fees) facilitates collusion on downstream prices. Banning information exchange about wholesale prices decreases the scope for collusion. Moreover, high downstream prices are more difficult to sustain if upstream rather than downstream firms make contract offers.     

Strategic transfer pricing,absorption costing,and observability

This paper analyses the use of transfer pricing as a strategic device in divisionalized firms facing duopolistic price competition. When transfer prices are observable, both firms’ headquarters will charge a transfer price above the marginal cost of the intermediate product to induce their marketing managers to behave as softer competitors in the final product market. When transfer prices are not observable, strategic transfer pricing is not an equilibrium and the optimal transfer price equals the marginal cost of the intermediate product. As a strategic alternative, however, the firms can signal the use of transfer prices above marginal cost to their competitors by a publicly observable commitment to an absorption costing system. The paper identifies conditions under which the choice of absorption costing is a dominant strategy equilibrium.     

Market forces meet behavioral biases: cost misallocation and irrational pricing

Psychological and experimental evidence, as well as a wealth of anecdotal examples, suggests that firms may confound fixed, sunk, and variable costs, leading to distorted pricing decisions. This article investigates the extent to which market forces and learning eventually eliminate these distortions. We envision firms that experiment with cost methodologies that are consistent with real‐world accounting practices, including ones that confuse the relevance of variable, fixed, and sunk costs to pricing decisions. Firms follow “naive” adaptive learning to adjust prices and reinforcement learning to modify their costing methodologies. Costing and pricing practices that increase profits are reinforced. In some market structures, but not in others, this process of reinforcement causes pricing practices of all firms to systematically depart from standard equilibrium predictions.     

Information Aggregation Bias and Samuelson's Dictum

Under the assumption of incomplete information, idiosyncratic shocks may not dissipate in the aggregate. An econometrician who incorrectly imposes complete information and applies the law of large numbers may be susceptible to information aggregation bias. Tests of aggregate economic theory will be misspecified even though tests of the same theory at the microlevel deliver the correct inference. A testable implication of information aggregation bias is “Samuelson's Dictum” or the idea that stock prices can simultaneously display “microefficiency” and “macroinefficiency;” an idea accredited to Paul Samuelson. Using firm-level data from the Center for Research in Security Prices, we present empirical evidence consistent with Samuelson's dictum. Specifically, we conduct two standard tests of the linear present value model of stock prices: a regression of future dividend changes on the dividend-price ratio and a test for excess volatility. We show that the dividend price ratio forecasts the future growth in dividends much more accurately at the firm level as predicted by the present value model, and that excess volatility can be rejected for most firms. When the same firms are aggregated into equal-weighted or cap-weighted portfolios, the estimated coefficients typically deviate from the present value model and “excess” volatility is observed; this is especially true for aggregates (e.g., S&P 500) that are used in most asset pricing studies. To investigate the source of our empirical findings, we propose a theory of aggregation bias based on incomplete information and segmented markets. Traders specializing in individual stocks conflate idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks to dividends. To an econometrician using aggregate data, these assumptions generate a rejection of the present value model even though individual traders are efficiently using their available information.     

A Comparison of Option Prices Under Different Pricing Measures in a Stochastic Volatility Model with Correlation

This paper investigates option prices in an incomplete stochastic volatility model with correlation. In a general setting, we prove an ordering result which says that prices for European options with convex payoffs are decreasing in the market price of volatility risk.As an example, and as our main motivation, we investigate option pricing under the class of q-optimal pricing measures. The q-optimal pricing measure is related to the marginal utility indifference price of an agent with constant relative risk aversion. Using the ordering result, we prove comparison theorems between option prices under the minimal martingale, minimal entropy and variance-optimal pricing measures. If the Sharpe ratio is deterministic, the comparison collapses to the well known result that option prices computed under these three pricing measures are the same.As a concrete example, we specialize to a variant of the Hull-White or Heston model for which the Sharpe ratio is increasing in volatility. For this example we are able to deduce option prices are decreasing in the parameter q. Numerical solution of the pricing pde corroborates the theory and shows the magnitude of the differences in option price due to varying q.JEL Classification: D52, G13     

Does Greater Firm‐Specific Return Variation Mean More or Less Informed Stock Pricing?

Roll [1988] observes low R² statistics for common asset pricing models due to vigorous firm‐specific return variation not associated with public information. He concludes that this implies “either private information or else occasional frenzy unrelated to concrete information”[p. 56]. We show that firms and industries with lower market model R² statistics exhibit higher association between current returns and future earnings, indicating more information about future earnings in current stock returns. This supports Roll's first interpretation: higher firm‐specific return variation as a fraction of total variation signals more information‐laden stock prices and, therefore, more efficient stock markets.     

Stock and Bond Liquidity and its Effect on Prices and Financial Policies

An asset is liquid if it can be traded at the prevailing market price quickly and at low cost. We show that in addition to risk, liquidity affects asset prices and returns. Theories of asset pricing suggest that the expected return of an asset is increasing in its risk, because risk-averse investors require compensation for bearing more risk. Because investors are also averse to the costs of illiquidity and want to be compensated for bearing them, asset returns are increasing in illiquidity. Thus, asset prices should depend on two asset characteristics: risk and liquidity. This paper surveys research on the effects of liquidity on asset prices and returns, showing that liquidity is an important factor in capital asset pricing.     

Inflation and output dynamics with state-dependent pricing decisions

This paper studies a state-dependent pricing model in which firms face a fixed cost of changing their pricing plans. A pricing plan specifies an entire sequence of time-varying future prices. Allowing firms to choose a pricing plan rather than a single price generates inflation inertia in the response of the economy to small changes in the growth rate of money. Allowing firms to choose when to change their pricing plan generates a non-linear response of inflation and output to small and large changes in the money growth rate. The non-linear solution method also reveals that the model generates an asymmetric response of output and inflation to monetary expansions and contractions.     

Competitive cross‐subsidization

Cross‐subsidization arises naturally when firms with different comparative advantages compete for consumers with heterogeneous shopping patterns. Firms then face a form of co‐opetition, as they offer substitutes for one‐stop shoppers and complements for multi‐stop shoppers. When intense competition for one‐stop shoppers drives total prices down to cost, firms subsidize weak products with the profits made on strong products. Moreover, firms have incentives to seek comparative advantages on different products. Finally, banning below‐cost pricing increases firms' profits at the expense of one‐stop shoppers, which calls for a cautious use of below‐cost pricing regulations in competitive markets.     

The demand-boost theory of exclusive dealing

This article unifies various approaches to the analysis of exclusive dealing that so far have been regarded as distinct. The common element of these approaches is that firms depart from efficient pricing, raising marginal prices above marginal costs. We show that with distorted prices, exclusive dealing can be directly profitable and anticompetitive provided that the dominant firm enjoys a competitive advantage over rivals. The dominant firm gains directly, rather than in the future, or in adjacent markets, thanks to the boost in demand it enjoys when buyers sign exclusive contracts. We discuss the implication of the theory for antitrust policy.     

Security prices in a production economy with durable capital

Security prices and physical stocks of capital are determined jointly in a rational expectations economy as functions of a set of exogenous stochastic factors. Investors employ firm marginal productivity of capital to allocate savings across firms. Firm capital stocks adjust to exogenous shocks across many periods. Security price functions in period t are derived in the cases of constrained and unconstrained firm capital in t. The risk premia in security returns include two sets of terms. One set, corresponding to traditional asset pricing models, relates cash flows directly to the stochastic factors. The second set captures interfirm effects which arise because firm capital in each period t is durable.     

Does the classification of intangibles matter? An equivalence testing

Many studies confirm that intangibles have future economic benefits included in them. This study examined whether analysts consider intangibles to be similar in economic value, regardless of the accounting treatment assigned to them. It conducted four experiments by providing 26 analysts with future earnings potentials, and asking them to forecast stock prices for three companies over three firms’ continuous years. One firm had an internally produced brand, the second company had a bought brand, and the third firm had an internally produced brand and bought brands. These three firms were used in four forecasting environments designed for this study. Each forecasting environment constituted an experiment. Each forecasting environment differed, with capital market information specific to each firm. Provided with this information, the analysts forecast stock prices for the three firms in each of the four experiments. Comparing the forecast stock prices, the study found that the two brand classes had similar influence on analysts’ stock pricing forecasts, to infer them as equivalent in economic value, in each of the four forecasting environments.     

Endogenous cartel formation with heterogeneous firms

In the context of an infinitely repeated capacity‐constrained price game, we endogenize the composition of a cartel when firms are heterogeneous in their capacities. When firms are sufficiently patient, there exists a stable cartel involving the largest firms. A firm with sufficiently small capacity is not a member of any stable cartel. When a cartel is not all‐inclusive, colluding firms set a price that serves as an umbrella with non‐cartel members pricing below it and producing at capacity. Contrary to previous work, our results suggest that the most severe coordinated effects may come from mergers involving moderate‐sized firms, rather than the largest or smallest firms.     

The theory of limit pricing: Some applications to the banking industry

This paper employs a probabilistic theory of limit pricing to examine a number of issues of bank behavior relevant to limit pricing. First, the circumtances under which an entry threat produces a procompetitive impact on prices are analyzed. In contrast to the single-product firm, unambiguous predictions are found to result only in rather special situations. Next, the theory is used to examine the conditions under which it is optimal for a bank to ration credit as a result of an entry threat, suggesting limit pricing as an alternative explanation for this phenomenon. Finally, the theory is employed to contrast the implications of limit pricing from that of a related concept (probable future competition) as they apply to bank merger policy.     

Adjustment Process of the Price to Book Ratio for Regulated Utilities

This study tests whether shifts in the price to book ratio (PB) of electric utilities follow a partial adjustment rather than the pure adjustment process implied by the cost-plus pricing policy of regulation. The results for utilities are compared to benchmark results for manufacturing firms to highlight the similarity/dissimilarity in the time-series behavior of PB for regulated and non-regulated firms. It is shown that shifts in PB follow a partial adjustment process. The adjustment period is longer for utilities than for manufacturing firms and extends well beyond the average regulatory lag. Moreover, shifts in PB are associated with changes in future profits and investments.     

Towards an organizational theory of the transfer pricing process

Understanding the transfer pricing issue as it arises in large decentralized firms is important, because it represents a pervasive problem in the design of managerial accounting and control systems in complex organizations. This paper draws on the growing literature on the economics of internal organization to develop an understanding of the strategic, organizational and transactional conditions under which transfer pricing (and related control) issues arise, and the organizational processes used to implement intra-firm transfers of products and to determine transfer prices. The objective of the paper is to develop a theory of the transfer pricing process and to reduce hypotheses from the theory.