Anticipating Nelson and Winter: Jack Downie's theory of evolutionary economic change

An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change , by Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter continues to have great influence on evolutionary economic thought. While their modeling techniques and the breadth of their vision for evolutionary theorising must be seen as seminal and effective innovation in economic theory, they were not the first inventors of such a theory. Close examination reveals that much of the economic theory was anticipated by Jack Downie whose book, The Competitive Process, was published in 1958. The extent of anticipation is remarkable, with not merely the two elements of population ecology, selection and mutation, but the way in which they are theorised to work being replicated by Nelson and Winter.     

Coevolution of economic behaviour and institutions: towards a theory of institutional change

Traditionally, economics has regarded institutions, notably norms and regulations, as fixed or exogenous. Surprisingly few insights on institutional evolution from natural and social sciences have made their way into economics. This article gives an overview of evolutionary theories of institutions in biology, sociology, anthropology and economics. These theories are subsequently compared with non-evolutionary theories of institutions. Next, the insights and approaches are integrated into a framework for analysis of institutions based on the notion of coevolution.JEL Classification: B52, D10, D70, D64, Z13J.C.J.M. van den Bergh     

Endogenous economic growth with disembodied knowledge

Mainstream endogenous growth models assume that new knowledge is embodied into either new intermediate or final goods, monopolistically supplied by the patent holder. Recent technological progress, however, often gives rise to pure intellectual contents, such as software codes or business models, directly usable in the production of final goods. Once a content of this type has been produced, it is in fixed supply, that is, the inventor can only rent it out (or sell it) or not; hence, the quantity restriction typical of monopoly cannot arise, while competition is viable. We show that, however, as long as the inventor owning a patent can control through license activation devices the access to the intellectual content of the workers using her invention in the final goods production, monopolistic exploitation becomes viable and will occur. It turns out that in this framework, the income share of labor is smaller than in the Lab‐Equipment economy, which represents the setting closest to our model. Moreover, with elastic labor supply labor employment is also negatively impacted. This implies that some standard public policies devised for correcting inefficiencies in development may perform poorly in this framework.     

Endogenous institutional change after independence

Independence from colonial rule was a key event for both political and economic reasons. We argue that newly independent countries often inherited sub-optimal institutional arrangements, which the new regimes reacted to in very different ways. We present a model of endogenous changes in property rights institutions where an autocratic post-colonial elite faces a basic trade-off between stronger property rights, which increases the dividends from the modern sector, and weaker property rights that increases the elite's ability to appropriate resource rents. The model predicts that revenue-maximizing regimes in control of an abundance of resource rents and with insignificant interests in the modern sector will rationally install weak institutions of private property, a prediction which we argue is well in line with the experience of several developing countries.     

Endogenous mortality, human capital and economic growth

We consider growth and welfare effects of lifetime-uncertainty in an economy with human capital-led endogenous growth. We argue that lifetime uncertainty reduces private incentives to invest in both physical and human capital. Using an overlapping generations framework with finite-lived households we analyze the relevance of government expenditure on health and education to counter such growth-reducing forces. We focus on three different models that differ with respect to the mode of financing of education: (i) both private and public spending, (ii) only public spending, and (iii) only private spending. Results show that models (i) and (iii) outperform model (ii) with respect to long-term growth rates of per capita income, welfare levels and other important macroeconomic indicators. Theoretical predictions of model rankings for these macroeconomic indicators are also supported by observed stylized facts.     

Schumpeter and the theory of capitalist economic development

This paper gives a centenary appreciation of the contributions to economic thought of Joseph A. Schumpeter, with special focus on his work, The Theory of Economic Development (TED) it proceeds, first, by providing (in section 1) an overview of Schumpeter's life and works; second, by giving an interpretative exposition of the main themes of TED (in section 2) and Schumpeter's broader ‘economic sociology’ (in section 3) in terms of the place of these ideas in the history of economic thought; third, by examining the reception to TED and the impact of it and Schumpeter's dynamic methodology on the discipline (in section 4).     

Endogenous growth through investment-specific technological change

This paper examines a model in which growth takes place through investment-specific technological change, which in turn is determined endogenously through research spending. In particular, the role of the degree of substitutability between research spending and new capital construction is explored. It is shown that the effect of a change in the capital tax rate on the growth rate can depend on the degree of substitutability between research spending and new capital construction. Research subsidies tend to have a larger impact on the growth rate than would an investment tax credit of the same magnitude. Increases in the capital tax rate can increase the growth rate of the economy, even in the absence of externalities. In contrast to the existing literature, the welfare cost of capital taxation in this model can be negligible. There may be multiple tax rates on capital that achieve the same growth rate. It is demonstrated that in the presence of certain types of positive externalities, the optimal growth rate can be attained through the use of capital taxes—rather than subsidies.     

Endogenous technological change with leisure-dependent utility

Summary. This paper investigates the effect of introducing leisure-dependent utility into two models of endogenous technological change. Due to the flexibility in the labour supply the dynamics of the models change significantly. It is shown that if agents attach enough value to leisure in comparison to consumption two balanced growth paths may exist. This implies that economies with the same preferences and the same technology may experience different long-run growth rates. Received: October 17, 1997; revised version: January 6, 1999     

Infrastructural change and secular economic development

Long-term economic development is determined by changes to the infrastructure, especially material and non-material infrastructural networks that link agents in different locations. The infrastructure consists of the slowly changing, collective arena that supports production, exchange, and consumption, such as the built environment, transport networks, and institutions. In the short run the infrastructure can be regarded as fixed. Changes to the infrastructure are under normal conditions small enough to be disregarded by producers and consumers. With the creation of a critical link of a network, there will however be a revolutionary restructuring of the arena. Critical links are here defined as additions to infrastructural networks that create opportunities for new information and transport flows between previously unconnected regions. Such a revolutionary restructuring of infrastructural networks has been called a logistical revolution. Certain institutional pre-conditions are necessary for a logistical revolution, while the creation of a critical link is both a necessary and a sufficient condition. This paper discusses the three logistical revolutions that occurred in the 13th century, around 1600, and in the 19th century, which each had crucial similarities with the current “information revolution.”     

Federal regulation and aggregate economic growth

We introduce a new time series measure of the extent of federal regulation in the U.S. and use it to investigate the relationship between federal regulation and macroeconomic performance. We find that regulation has statistically and economically significant effects on aggregate output and the factors that produce it—total factor productivity (TFP), physical capital, and labor. Regulation has caused substantial reductions in the growth rates of both output and TFP and has had effects on the trends in capital and labor that vary over time in both sign and magnitude. Regulation also affects deviations about the trends in output and its factors of production, and the effects differ across dependent variables. Regulation changes the way output is produced by changing the mix of inputs. Changes in regulation offer a straightforward explanation for the productivity slowdown of the 1970s. Qualitatively and quantitatively, our results agree with those obtained from cross-section and panel measures of regulation using cross-country data.     

Issues in controllability and the theory of economic policy

The paper demonstrates that the concepts of dynamic controllability are useful for the theory of economic policy by establishing four propositions. First, dynamic controllability is a central concept in stabilization policy. Second, the ability to achieve a target state, even if it cannot be maintained, may be of economic interest. Third, dynamic controllability is of special interest for ‘historical’ models. Fourth, the conditions for any notion of dynamic controllability are distinct from and weaker than those for Tinbergen static controllability.