INDUSTRY EFFECTS OF ANALYST STOCK REVISIONS

We examine the industry valuation effects of analyst stock revisions and identify the variables that influence these effects. Our results show that industry rivals experience significant abnormal returns in response to revision announcements. Although the mean stock price response suggests contagion effects, there is also evidence of significant competitive effects. The valuation effects are influenced by the magnitude of the rated firm's announcement return, along with analyst‐specific and industry‐specific characteristics. However, the sensitivity of the valuation effects to these characteristics is conditioned on whether the industry effects are contagious or competitive.     

ANALYST BEHAVIOR SURROUNDING TENDER OFFER ANNOUNCEMENTS

We examine the usefulness and credibility of analyst recommendations by focusing on their behavior surrounding tender offer announcements. For our 1998–2001 sample, we find analysts did not identify takeover targets through their recommendations nor did they distinguish between wealth‐increasing and wealth‐decreasing tender offers. We find some evidence of conflicts of interest in analyst recommendations, but it is confined to the 1999–2000 dot‐com period. However, the long‐run performance following recommendations suggests that these conflicts have little ultimate cost to investors.     

ANALYST REPUTATION,DEALER AFFILIATION,AND MARKET MAKING

We investigate the effects of analysts' affiliation and reputation on dealers' market making activities. We find that for a given stock, dealers who have affiliated analysts covering the stock quote and trade more aggressively than those who do not have any affiliated analysts. More important, the reputation of affiliated analysts plays an additional role in the affiliated dealer's quote and trade behavior. Dealers with affiliated star analysts post more aggressive quotes and have larger market shares than dealers with affiliated nonstar analysts. Although dealers who post more aggressive quotes also induce affiliated star analysts to cover the stocks, the positive effect of analyst reputation on the affiliated dealers' quote aggressiveness remains significant and robust after controlling for potential endogenous and simultaneous problems.     

Information content of IPO grading

In the year 2007, Indian capital market regulator-SEBI, introduced a unique certification mechanism for IPOs whereby all IPOs have to undergo mandatory quality grading by independent rating agencies. In this paper we argue that such objective, independent and exogenous certifying mechanism provides a better opportunity to test the well established certification hypothesis, especially in the context of emerging markets with institutional voids. Using a sample of 163 Indian IPOs we test the efficacy of IPO grading mechanism. We find, grading decreases IPO underpricing and positively influences demand of retail investors. Grading reduces secondary market risk and improves liquidity. However, grading does not affect long run performance of the IPOs. IPO grading successfully capture firm size, business group affiliation and firm’s quality of corporate governance. Our findings imply that, in emerging markets, regulator’s role to signal the quality of an IPO contributes towards the market welfare.     

GLAMOUR VERSUS VALUE: TRADING BEHAVIOR OF INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS

We design a new metric to measure the net buying and selling by institutions and individual investors and find that from 1980 to 2004 institutional investors were net buyers of growth stocks and net sellers of value stocks, implying that individual investors were net buyers of value stocks and net sellers of glamour stocks. The institutional preference for glamour and value stocks seems to be related to sell‐side analysts' recommendations and recent favorable stock price performances, especially during the post‐1994 period. Finally, the institutional buying of growth stocks and sale of value stocks was not based on superior information.     

Overreaction in the thrift IPO aftermarket

We study the initial returns and long-run performance of a unique sample of thrifts that have recently converted from mutual to stock form. In addition to a full claim on all IPO proceeds, new investors in a converted thrift also receive a claim on all pre-conversion market value at no cost. Thus, the average firm in our sample has a degree of underpricing automatically built into its offer price. We find that after removing the large initial returns, cumulative excess returns for the firms in our sample are positive for 12 months after the IPO. Beginning in the second year after the IPO, the average firm in our sample undergoes a significant price correction that lasts approximately 18 months and which produces negative cumulative abnormal returns for up to 5 years post-issue. Differences in risk-adjusted returns also indicate negative long-run returns, with poor performance concentrated in the second and third years following the IPO. The return differences are most pronounced among the small thrifts in our sample, and are broadly consistent with investor overreaction at the time of the IPO that continues for 6–12 months before prices begin reverting back to fundamental value.     

THE ECONOMIC GAINS OF TRADING STOCKS AROUND HOLIDAYS

I assess the economic gains of strategies that account for the effect of holiday calendar effects on the daily returns and volatility of the 30 stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average index. The dynamic strategies use forecasts from stochastic volatility models that distinguish between regular trading days and different types of holidays. More important, I assess the economic value of conditioning on holiday effects and find that a risk-averse investor will pay a high performance fee to switch from a dynamic portfolio strategy that does not account for the effect of holidays on daily conditional expected returns and volatility to a strategy that does. This result is robust to reasonable transaction costs.     

THE DYNAMICS OF BOND YIELD SPREADS AROUND RATING REVISION DATES

We examine the effect of rating revisions on sterling Eurobond yields using a panel model with conditional heteroskedasticity that controls for event‐induced changes in the variance of spreads. Positive rating revisions are fully anticipated by the time the upgrade occurs. Negative revisions are only partially anticipated, and spreads on downgraded bonds rise for some time after the downgrade has been announced. This asymmetry is not apparent in a conventional event study model. All ratings announcements are accompanied by a temporary fall in yield volatility. We attribute this to the resolution of uncertainty about the true rating of the bond.     

Why are IPO investors net buyers through lead underwriters?

In Nasdaq initial public offerings (IPOs) issued between 1997 and 2002, purchases of lead underwriter clients exceed sales by an amount equal to 8.79% of the total issue. We find that lead underwriter clients do not buy to build larger long-term positions, capitalize on superior execution quality, or because of clientele effects. However, characteristics of net buying that are at odds with these explanations and other behaviors (like institutional purchases of cold IPOs) are all consistent with lead underwriters engaging in quid pro quo arrangements with clients. Price contribution analysis shows that such client buying activity contributes significantly to first-day price increases.     

Acquisition valuations of withdrawn IPOs: When IPO plans turn into mergers

We examine the acquisition valuations of withdrawn-IPOs – private targets that are acquired after they file and then withdraw their IPOs – to examine how IPO registration and withdrawal affect valuations of withdrawn-IPOs in their subsequent mergers. We find that these “almost public” withdrawn-IPOs sell at a significant acquisition premium relative to comparable pure private targets that never file IPO registration and at acquisition valuations similar to comparable public targets. The premium persists only for withdrawn-IPOs that are acquired before their IPO withdrawals after other factors are controlled for. These findings confirm that there is a significantly positive (negative) valuation impact of IPO registration (IPO withdrawal) on withdrawn-IPOs’ subsequent acquisitions. The two effects offset each other for withdrawn-IPOs that are acquired after their IPO withdrawals.     

WHEN‐ISSUED SHARES,SMALL TRADES,AND THE VARIANCE OF RETURNS AROUND STOCK SPLITS

The increases in volatility after stock splits have long puzzled researchers. The usual suspects of discreteness and bid‐ask spread do not provide a complete explanation. We provide new clues to solve this mystery by examining the trading of when‐issued shares that are available before the split. When‐issued trading permits noise traders to compete with a more homogenous set of traders, decreasing the volatility of the stock before the split. Following the split, these noise traders reunite in one market and volatility increases. Thus, the higher volatility after the ex date of a stock split is a function of the introduction of when‐issued trading, the new lower price level after the split date, and the increased activity of small‐volume traders around a stock split.     

IPO first-day returns,offer price revisions,volatility, and form S-1 language

Form S-1 is the first SEC filing in the initial public offering (IPO) process. The tone of the S-1, in terms of its definitiveness in characterizing the firm’s business strategy and operations, should affect investors’ ability to value the IPO. We find that IPOs with high levels of uncertain text have higher first-day returns, absolute offer price revisions, and subsequent volatility. Our findings provide empirical evidence for the theoretical models of uncertainty, bookbuilding, and prospect theory.     

Cycles in the IPO market

We develop a model in which time-varying real investment opportunities lead to time-varying adverse selection in the market for IPOs. The model is consistent with several stylized facts known about the IPO market: economic expansions are associated with a dramatic increase in the number of firms going public, which is in turn positively correlated with underpricing. Adverse selection is procyclical in the sense that dispersion in unobservable quality across firms should be more pronounced during booms. Taking the premise that uncertainty is resolved (and thus private information revealed) over time, we test this hypothesis by looking at long-run abnormal returns and delisting rates. Consistent with the model, we find (a) greater cross-sectional return variance, and (b) higher incidence of delisting for hot-market IPOs.     

Do secondary shares in the IPO process have a negative effect on aftermarket performance?

We revisit and extend the topic of secondary share sales and revisions in IPOs. First we test to determine if secondary share sales constitute a negative signal that is captured in aftermarket performance. We find secondary share sales in general are not correlated with poorer initial or long-run performance, but selling by officers and directors is associated with poorer long-run returns. Second, we examine if secondary share revisions (1) reflect selling shareholders’ attempts to conceal private information or (2) are contingent upon whether a firm can reach its goal of raising sufficient capital. We find empirical support for a capital goal, but not for concealment.     

Asymmetric Information in the IPO Aftermarket

Using the adverse selection component of the spread as a measure of asymmetric information, we investigate how asymmetric information evolves after firms go public. We find that the level of asymmetric information is lower immediately after the initial public offering (IPO) compared with its level after a period of seasoning. In addition, we test the hypothesis that the greater the underpricing of an IPO, the more information is produced in its aftermarket, and the lower the aggregate level of asymmetric information. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis and are robust after controlling for other factors.     

Voluntary Disclosure with Informed Trading in the IPO Market

We examine voluntary disclosure and capital investment by an informed manager in an initial public offering (IPO) in the presence of informed and uninformed investors. We find that in equilibrium, disclosure is more forthcoming—and investment efficiency is lower—when a greater fraction of the investment community is already informed. Moreover, managers disclose more information when the likelihood of an information event is higher, more equity is issued, or the cost of information acquisition is lower. Investment efficiency and the expected level of underpricing are non‐monotonic in the likelihood that the manager is privately informed.     

MARKET TIMING IN REGRESSIONS AND REALITY

We compare price‐to‐earnings ratios and dividend yields, which are indirect measures of sentiment, with the bullish sentiment index, which is a direct measure. We find that the sentiment index does better as a market‐timing tool than do P/E ratios and dividend yields, but none is very reliable. We do not argue that market timing is impossible. Rather, we observe that stock prices reflect both sentiment and value, both of which are difficult to measure and neither of which is perfectly known in foresight. Successful market timing requires insights into future sentiment and value, insights beyond those that are reflected in widely available measures.     

THE BROKERAGE FIRM EFFECT IN HERDING: EVIDENCE FROM INDONESIA

We examine herding behavior of domestic and foreign investors in the Indonesian stock market. We document that both domestic and foreign investors from a particular brokerage firm tend to herd. The foreign investors exhibit a greater propensity to herd than domestic investors. However, when examining investor trading across brokerage firms, we find only weak evidence of herding by domestic investors and no herding by foreign investors. Our overall findings suggest a strong brokerage firm effect on herding but a weak marketwide effect. Moreover, we find evidence that the strong brokerage effect on herding is likely driven by acting on common information.     

THE IMPORTANCE OF LIQUIDITY AS A FACTOR IN ASSET PRICING

We employ the Fama‐French time‐series regression approach to examine liquidity as a risk factor affecting stock returns. Prior studies establish liquidity as an important consideration in investment decisions. Here, liquidity is found to be an important factor affecting portfolio returns, even after the effects of market, size, book‐to‐market equity, and momentum are considered. Nonzero intercepts remain, however, indicating continued missing risk factors.     

INVESTOR EXPECTATIONS OF VOLATILITY INCREASES AROUND LARGE STOCK SPLITS AS IMPLIED IN CALL OPTION PREMIA

Recent studies find abnormal common stock price behavior associated with ex-dates of stock splits. Volatility increases are substantia) and abrupt. This study extends previous analyses to the options market by examining investor perceptions of volatility increases through implied standard deviations of returns. Investors fail to anticipate volatility increases until the ex-date. Furthermore, abnormal option returns are present. The increased volatility and these results suggest option market inefficiency.