Upfront payments and exclusion in downstream markets

Although upfront payments are often observed in contracts between manufacturers and retailers, little is known about their competitive effects or the role retailers play in securing them. In this article, we consider a model in which two competing retailers make take‐it‐or‐leave‐it offers to a common manufacturer. We find that upfront payments are a feature of equilibrium contracts, and in all equilibria, only one retailer buys from the manufacturer. These findings support the claims of small manufacturers who argue that they are often unable to obtain widespread distribution for their products because of upfront payments.     

Does retailer power lead to exclusion?

This article examines whether retailer bargaining power and upfront slotting allowances prevent small manufacturers (who have no bargaining power) from obtaining adequate distribution. In contrast to the findings of Marx and Shaffer (2007) , who show that all equilibria involve limited distribution (i.e., exclusion of a retailer), we show that there is always an equilibrium in which full distribution is obtained, provided that full distribution is the industry profit‐maximizing outcome. The key feature leading to this differing result is that we do not restrict each retailer to offering the manufacturer a single tariff.     

基于销售成本差异的制造商策略选择研究

本文以企业核心竞争能力理论和库存理论为基础,研究了由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的二级供应链中制造商的前向一体化策略与供应链策略的选择问题。假设需求不确定和供应链存在销售成本,当制造商和零售商向市场出售产品都发生销售成本且销售成本存在差异时,通过对制造商的利润比较分析发现,销售成本的差异决定了制造商供应链合作策略与前向一体化策略的选择。     

价值链分析中作业成本法的应用--一个案例的启示

公司间的关系给管理会计带来了新的课题,如何提供信息以达到协调和优化供应链上的企业之间的活动就成为其中一个挑战.价值链分析就是解决这个问题的一种方法.但是,在实际运用中利用价值链分析来解决这个问题还鲜有报道.本文拟以介绍英国零售企业森伯利公司及其36家供应商为例,以作业成本法来支持价值链管理的运用,以期对我国进一步研究价值链会计有所启示.     

内部资本市场超额价值创造研究——基于资源基础理论的思考

本文基于资源基础理论视角研究了内部资本市场超额价值创造问题,界定了内部资本市场资源的内涵,将内部资本市场资源具体分为人力资本资源、财务资源、信息资源和关系资源,指出内部资本市场资源在企业集团环境中具有网络性和路径依赖的独特属性;探讨了内部资本市场各项资源在内部资本市场创造超额价值的方式,认为各项资源在超额价值创造过程中相互作用的主线是,人力资本资源运用关系资源和信息资源提高财务资源的价值存量和配置效率,创造内部资本市场超额价值。     

Retailers' choice of product variety and exclusive dealing under asymmetric information

This article considers vertical relations between an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer that can independently obtain a low‐quality, discount substitute. The analysis reveals that under full information, the retailer offers both varieties if and only if it is optimal to do so under vertical integration. However, when the retailer is privately informed about demand, it offers both varieties even if under vertical integration it is profitable to offer only the manufacturer's product. If the manufacturer can impose exclusive dealing, then under asymmetric information it will do so and foreclose the low‐quality substitute even if under vertical integration it is profitable to offer both varieties.     

Economic and political aspects of negotiated rents in the Swedish housing market

The aim of this paper is to describe the rent control system in Sweden, evaluate the effects on consumption and production in the housing market, and provide a public choice explanation of the present rent control system.The first section of this paper contains introductory remarks and an overview of the rental market in Sweden. The Swedish rent control system and its prerequisites are described in section 2. Attention is given to two important prerequisites: the existence of a large municipal housing sector and a strong tenants' movement. As a result, a rent system has been developed with all rents set by negotiations. The rent structure is determined by a fairness principle, which has some resemblance to market adapted rents. The rent level will be determined by a non-profit condition in municipal housing companies.In section 3 the effects of the existing rent control system are discussed with the municipality of Stockholm as a test case. Effects on rent level and rent structure are evaluated, and the relation between rent policy in municipal housing companies and resulting rents in private housing is analyzed. Gains and losses to tenants and landlords are evaluated as well as effects on construction and maintenance.In section 4 a political perspective is discussed. The aim is to explain why the system is not implemented in the market adapted way it was intended. Finally, the future of the rent system is discussed.     

供应链成本控制:价值引擎与方法集成

本文以伙伴关系与信息共享为基础,分析了供应链成本控制中关系性租金和跨组织学习两种价值引擎。从时间序列、空间范围、流程深化三个角度,论证了全生命周期成本控制、跨组织成本控制、协同价值链分析三个供应链成本控制概念对各种成本控制方法的拓展与集成。在当前条件下,以伙伴关系为基础,加强成员间的信息共享与跨组织学习,开展供应链集成成本控制,有利于提升供应链竞争力。     

The Value of the Rent Control Option

In this paper, we combine direct arbitrage arguments and an option-pricing approach to develop a method of pricing the option for rent control. For a lump-sum payment of key money, a tenant acquires the right to rent a real estate unit for an exogenously determined controlled rent, as opposed to paying the free-market rent. The tenant may continue exercising this right as long as he or she lives. Alternatively, the tenant may sell the right to occupy the controlled rent unit and receive a fraction of the key money paid by the subsequent tenant. We value the equilibrium key money, in a representative agents partial equilibrium, while endogenously determining the expected tenure duration in a controlled rent unit. We propose a procedure for valuing rent control options different from the representative agents. Our analysis shows that under real-world levels of conditional life expectancy, the level of the fraction of the key money retained by a departing tenant has an insignificant effect on the expected tenure duration in a controlled rent unit and on the level of key money.     

Auctions versus negotiations: the effects of inefficient renegotiation

For the procurement of complex goods, the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation. If the buyer can specify the main characteristics of possible design improvements in a complete contingent contract, scoring auctions implement the efficient allocation. If this is not feasible, the buyer must choose between a price‐only auction (discouraging early information exchange) and bilateral negotiations with a preselected seller (reducing competition). Bilateral negotiations are superior if potential design improvements are important, if renegotiation is very costly, and if the buyer's bargaining position is strong. Moreover, negotiations provide stronger incentives for sellers to investigate design improvements.     

Information and bargaining in the hold‐up problem

This article incorporates an information structure with partial information into the canonical hold‐up problem. The optimal information structure balances the tradeoff between ex ante efficiency (the “information rent” effect) and ex post efficiency (the “bargaining disagreement” effect). With one‐shot bargaining, it occurs at an intermediate level of information asymmetry; when there is repeated bargaining, it is attained with perfect asymmetry. Asymmetric information, the parameter that is frequently ignored in the literature, turns out to be an important welfare instrument for the hold‐up problem. Our results therefore provide a basis for institutional design regarding the optimal control of information flow.     

两阶段闭环供应链制造商直销渠道入侵策略研究

运用博弈方法构建由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的两阶段供应链模型,研究有无再制造情形下制造商直销渠道的入侵策略和入侵时机问题。结果表明：无再制造情形下,在渠道竞争较弱且入侵将平分市场时,制造商不会开通直销渠道,否则会选择在第一阶段开通直销渠道;再制造情形下,在渠道竞争较弱且入侵将平分市场时制造商同样不会开通直销渠道,但竞争较弱且零售渠道占比较大时会选择在第二阶段开通直销渠道,否则其会在第一阶段开通直销渠道;无论是否进行再制造,制造商的渠道入侵都可能会损害零售商的利润,但是在竞争较强且零售渠道占比较大时渠道入侵却能使制造商和零售商均获益,且再制造情形下实现共赢的可能性更大。     

突发事件风险下考虑企业社会责任的闭环供应链决策

基于突发事件风险概率小、后果大的特点,考虑企业社会责任的闭环供应链应对突发事件风险中再制造成本扰动风险的优化决策。结果表明：当再制造成本扰动较小时,不需要调整闭环供应链的生产计划,反之则需要调整生产计划;若再制造成本扰动值增大,则需提高最优零售价并减少最优产量;若再制造成本扰动量绝对值增大,则需降低最优零售价格并增加最优产量。关注CSR的水平越高,最优的批发价格和最优的零售价反而会降低。最优的回收利用率、最优的产量及整个链条的总利润与CSR水平呈正相关。若再制造成本扰动值较小,零售商回收模式更加合适,而若扰动值超过一定值则应该选择制造商回收模式。     

风险喜好型零售商主导的双渠道定价策略研究(英文)

针对由一个风险喜好的零售商和一个风险规避的供应商组成的两层双渠道供应链,本文研究了当零售商在供应链中占主导地位情况下,双渠道中参与者的风险偏好程度和需求方差变化对其定价决策的影响。研究表明,随着零售商风险喜好程度的增加,零售渠道最优定价会减小;当零售商风险喜好达到一定程度时,随着需求方差的增长零售渠道最优定价才会提高。最后用一个算例验证了结论。     

Strategy and the new economics of information

We are in the midst of a fundamental shift in the economics of information--a shift that will precipitate changes in the structure of entire industries and in the ways companies compete. This shift is made possible by the widespread adoption of Internet technologies, but it is less about technology than about the fact that a new behavior is reaching critical mass. Millions of people are communicating at home and at work in an explosion of connectivity that threatens to undermine the established value chains for businesses in many sectors of the economy. What will happen, for instance, to dominant retailers such as Toys "R" Us and Home Depot when a search through the Internet gives consumers more choice than any store? What will be the point of cultivating a long-standing supplier relationship with General Electric when it posts its purchasing requirements on an Internet bulletin board and entertains bids from anybody inclined to respond? The authors present a conceptual framework for approaching such questions--for understanding the relationship of information to the physical components of the value chain and how the Internet's ability to separate the two will lead to the reconfiguration of the value proposition in many industries. In any business where the physical value chain has been compromised for the sake of delivering information, there will be an opportunity to create a separate information business and a need to streamline the physical one. Executives must mentally deconstruct their businesses to see the real value of what they have. If they don't, the authors warn, someone else will.     

Can Space Syntax Help Us in Understanding the Intraurban Office Rent Pattern? Accessibility and Rents in Downtown Stockholm

The effect of accessibility upon rent is investigated for office properties located in Downtown Stockholm. Starting from the firm’s cost minimization problem, a translog hedonic model is derived. The results suggest the model has good predictive power in explaining the variation in the log of the rent. A negative rent gradient is obtained with a base approximately 90 m from the postulated focal point. It appears as if Space Syntax adds important information to the understanding of the intraurban office rent pattern.

Cost Management in Sri Lanka: A Case Study on Volume,Activity and Time as Cost Drivers

Despite its theoretical superiority, the activity-based costing (ABC) model has had only moderate success in replacing the traditional volume-based absorption costing models in complex organizations worldwide. Even in organizations that have launched ABC projects, the implementations often do not sustain. In response to this general lack of enthusiasm worldwide for ABC, accountants developed the time-driven activity-based costing (TDABC) model as an alternative cost allocation model. This paper presents a comparison of the TDABC model with ABC, and considers if this alternative cost allocation model (1) is easier to implement from an international perspective and (2) provides comparable cost information for decision making. We use a case study in a country outside the model's country of origin to understand the similarities and differences in absorption costing systems that use ‘volume,’ ‘activities,’ and ‘time’ as the drivers of indirect cost allocations. We also use the case study to ascertain if any country‐specific factors impede ABC implementation. We conclude the following: the TDABC model has similar implementation complexities to ABC if modelling conditions are strictly adhered to; these complexities are independent of country‐specific factors; and in its simplest form, the model generates the same decision information errors of traditional costing.     

Trade credit and supplier competition

This paper examines how competition among suppliers affects their willingness to provide trade credit financing. Trade credit extended by a supplier to a cash constrained retailer allows the latter to increase cash purchases from its other suppliers, leading to a free rider problem. A supplier that represents a smaller share of the retailer’s purchases internalizes a smaller part of the benefit from increased spending by the retailer and, as a result, extends less trade credit relative to its sales. In consequence, retailers with dispersed suppliers obtain less trade credit than those whose suppliers are more concentrated. The free rider problem is especially detrimental to a trade creditor when the free-riding suppliers are its product market competitors, leading to a negative relation between product substitutability among suppliers to a given retailer and trade credit that the former provide to the latter. We test the model using both simulated and real data. The estimated relations are consistent with the model’s predictions and are statistically and economically significant.     

The effect of cost information on buyer–supplier negotiations in different power settings

We investigate the influence of total cost of ownership (TCO) information on buyer–supplier negotiations in different power settings. Based on social exchange theory and recent literature on information processing, we expect that buyers with detailed TCO information and less power than their negotiation partners may try to (re)gain control over their own outcomes by sharing information. The results of our experiment indicate that the performance disadvantage of less powerful buyers is less pronounced when the buyer has detailed TCO information, whereas more powerful buyers do not seem to be able to profit from TCO information. These somewhat counterintuitive findings are explained through detailed analysis of the buyer’s negotiation behavior, which shows that less powerful buyers who have access to TCO data use problem solving techniques more frequently than powerful buyers, who tend to rely on distributive bargaining techniques instead. We conclude that power can motivate a failure to share TCO information, resulting in less effective interfirm negotiation outcomes.     

Interactive control in target cost management

This paper discusses target cost management (TCM) from the viewpoint of simultaneous engineering. Firstly, it shows empirically how simultaneous engineering is implemented in Japanese companies. Secondly, it formulates and then tests hypotheses on the influential power of managers involved in the process of target costing. Thirdly, it describes processes of interactive control directed at information and value sharing among managers that help explain why simultaneous engineering is working effectively in Japanese companies. It also formulates and tests hypotheses on information and value sharing among managers. Fourthly, it concludes that interactive control in TCM helps generate unique ideas for product development and cost reduction, and that Target Cost Management is a key subsystem of strategic cost management.