Children’s Snacks,their Ads and Consumer Sovereignty

Abstract

The concept of sovereign consumer preferences is challenged from three sides: child consumers, unhealthy food and advertising. The two theoretical concepts of merit goods and libertarian paternalism are implemented in order to classify situations in which full consumer sovereignty does not apply. An empirical analysis of ads for children’s snacks reveals the libertarian paternalist perspective as helpful for understanding the demand for and justification of ‘soft’ governmental intervention in the case of the advertised snacks, whilst the ads for these snacks may well be demerit goods. The banning or heavy taxation of these ads is therefore advocated.     

The Normative Problem of Merit Goods in Perspective

Abstract

In his Theory of Public Finance (1959), Musgrave invented the concept of merit wants to describe public wants that are satisfied by goods provided by the government in violation of the principle of consumer sovereignty. Starting from Musgrave’s mature discussion (1987), I construct two categories to classify the explanations of merit goods. The first strand of thought attempts to justify merit goods within the New welfare economics, by modifying its assumptions to accommodate irrationality, uncertainty, lack of information, and psychic externalities. The second category encompasses more radical departures from consumer sovereignty, drawn from philosophical critiques of economics. In the third part of the paper, I argue that the two strands might be represented by a non-individualistic social welfare function. I also show how this solution echoes Musgrave’s early views on public expenditures before he coined the concept of merit wants. From an historical perspective, the survival of the concept highlights the persistence of a social point of view in welfare economics.     

Retailing public goods: The economics of corporate social responsibility

This paper explores the feasibility and desirability of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). We identify CSR with creation of public goods or curtailment of public bads. Using a model with profit-maximizing firms, the paper shows that there is a direct parallel between CSR and traditional models of private provision of public goods. Indeed, firms that use CSR will produce public goods at exactly the same level as predicted by the standard voluntary contribution equilibrium for public goods. We compare CSR with government provision and charitable provision, discussing when CSR by private for-profit firms could have a comparative advantage in dealing with public goods provision.     

Homo Oeconomicus Returns: Neoliberalism,Socio-Political Uncertainty and Economic Policy

The aim of this paper is to discuss how neoliberal policy is changing the way people conceive of the economy and of society. After a brief outline of the main features of neoliberal policies, it argues that neoliberalism does not consist in a mere set of wrong economic theories or in the plain reflection of vested interests. It is a full-fledged view of how society should be organized. The paper then argues that these policies and the ideology that backs them up determine major institutional changes which affect economic, social and polity-related variables but also the general understanding that peo-ple have of the economy and of society. More specifically, it enhances uncertainty about one’s future and favors a non-solidaristic view of social relations. These changes tend to prejudge the effectiveness of employment policies and to reinforce the neolib-eral consensus. The conclusion is that it is not possible to conceive of an appropriate macroeconomic policy unless institutional changes are taken into account that trans-cend macroeconomics as such and re-establish the social underpinnings for that policy. These include changes in how the economy is coordinated but also changes in the bar-gaining power of workers and citizens relative to business.     

House money effects in public good experiments: Comment

We reconsider evidence from experiments that claim to show that using “house money” in standard public goods experiments has no effect on behavior. We show that it does have an effect when one examines the data using appropriate statistical methods that consider individual-level responses and account for the error structure of the panel data. JEL Classification D7 · C92 I am grateful for comments from two referees and an editor. All data and statistical code are available for public access at the ExLab Digital Library located at http://exlab.bus.ucf.edu.     

Fund-raising success and a solicitor's beauty capital: Do blondes raise more funds?

This study uses a door-to-door fund-raising field experiment to explore the returns to physical appearance on fund-raising success. Interestingly, blonde females earn more on average than brunette counterparts. However, the returns to physical appearance depend critically on the race of a potential donor.     

交通基础设施的公共产品属性探析

交通基础设施是为满足全社会经济生活中人与物的位移需求而生产出的产品,该产品具有显著的公共需求性与公益性。以公共产品理论为基础,从非排他性和非竞争性的角度可以判定交通基础设施具有公共产品属性,通过分析交通基础设施的消费机理深入探讨交通基础设施使用过程中产生拥挤现象的原因,可以否定交通基础设施为拥挤性公共产品的观点。此外,投资主体的变化不会变更交通基础设施的公共产品性质。     

我国公共产品基础理论研究进展与评述

公共产品作为公共经济学的核心概念,引入到我国学术界的时间不长,其基础理论发展经历了一个多元化的演化过程,其间伴随着多种思想、学科的交叉与针锋。探究其思想渊源与理论演变历程,将有助于对中国特色的公共产品理论框架的构建。本文试图在公共产品思想溯源的基础上,梳理与述评我国公共产品基础理论的发展与演变,力求搭建一个系统的我国关于公共产品基础理论研究的框架,并在此基础上把握我国目前研究的最近进展,从而促成一个独立的中国特色的公共产品基础理论研究框架的构建。     

Depreciation and intergenerational altruism in the private provision of public goods

The static model of the private provision of public goods is refuted by empirical and experimental evidence which shows that contributions are above the levels predicted by the theory. The model is reconsidered here in an intertemporal framework that allows the formation of a stock of public good over time and admits intergenerational altruism into preferences. Both of these factors affect the level of private provision. An intertemporal version of the Samuelson rule is derived and it is shown that, for some parameter values, the provision level determined by this is matched by private provision. For other parameter values, it is shown how a system of taxation can achieve the optimum.     

Testing static game theory with dynamic experiments: A case study of public goods

Game theory provides predictions of behavior in many one-shot games. On the other hand, most experimenters usually play repeated games with subjects, to provide experience. To avoid subjects rationally employing strategies that are appropriate for the repeated game, experimenters typically employ a “random strangers” design in which subjects are randomly paired with others in the session. There is some chance that subjects will meet in multiple rounds, but it is claimed that this chance is so small that subjects will behave as if they are in a one-shot environment. We present evidence from public goods experiments that this claim is not always true.     

Targeting public goods to the poor in a segregated economy: An empirical analysis of central mandates in rural India

While local governments are increasingly being vested with control over funds for public goods, concern over the capture of decentralized funds by local elites has led decentralization to be combined with central mandates which require a certain proportion of funds to directly benefit the poor. If local capture is pervasive, however, central mandates may not be effective. Despite the popularity of this combination of decentralization and centralized control, there is little empirical evidence which separately identifies their effect on investment in public goods, and hence assesses the effectiveness of central mandates. This paper provides such evidence, using data collected by the authors for the North Indian state of Punjab, an economy where economic conditions facilitate such an analysis. We find that central mandates are effective, enhancing intra-village equality in expenditure on public goods. This finding informs the debate on the equity effects of centralized versus decentralized programs.     

Existence,uniqueness and some comparative statics for ratio and Lindahl equilibria

We present a rigorous, yet elementary, demonstration of the existence of a unique Lindahl equilibrium under the assumptions that characterize the standard n-player public good model. Indeed, our approach, which exploits the aggregative structure of the public good model, lends itself to a transparent geometric representation. Moreover, it can handle the more general concept of the cost share or ratio equilibrium. Finally, we indicate how it may be exploited to facilitate comparative static analysis of Lindahl and cost share equilibria.      

Benefit Incidence of Public Recreation Areas—Have the Winners Taken Almost All?

This study presents a framework for investigating the benefit incidence of provision of public recreation opportunities. The proportion of individuals who use outdoor recreation services increases with income, and frequency of use differs by the users’ gender and life situation (e.g., depending on whether they are students or older citizens). The decomposition of distributive incidence shows that a bias in favor of high-income groups may be accentuated when the perceived value of these services is taken into account in monetary terms. We compare alternative strategies in terms of equity for improving recreation opportunities, e.g., reduced distance to or increased acreage of recreation sites. Our results indicate that although these strategies improve the welfare distribution among the income groups, a considerable proportion of benefits nevertheless accrue to high-income groups.