Optimal taxation,the compensation principle and the measurement of changes in economic welfare

This paper explores the implications of optimal taxation for the measurement of changes in economic welfare. It shows that the measure implied by the compensation principle — the sum of the relevant compensating variations — is only accurate in the presence of optimal lump-sum taxation: an unsurprising conclusion, but a gloomy one given that such taxation is generally infeasible. However, all is not lost. The paper uses the linear income tax case to show that it is possible to derive weights that can be attached to the relevant compensating variations to provide accurate measures of changes in welfare in the presence of second-best taxation: weights that can be calculated from observable data.     

集团控制与国有企业治理

本文研究集团控制对国有企业可能产生的正面影响机制——减轻管理层代理问题和可能产生的负面影响机制——加重股东间代理问题,全面评估国有企业集团控制作为国企治理模式改革的有效性。以2004年至2008年中国国有上市公司为样本的统计结果显示:(1)集团控制会有效减轻国有企业的管理层代理问题;(2)当外部监管程度高时,集团控制不会加剧国有企业的股东间代理问题;而当外部监管程度低时,集团控制会加剧国有企业的股东间代理问题。因此,集团控制是一种有效改善国有企业管理层代理问题的治理模式,而由此加剧的股东间代理问题应通过强化外部监管加以解决。     

The Social Ontology of Fear and Neoliberalism

Fear is a primal instinct; it is a survival mechanism the evolution of which allowed the early humans, indeed all species to adapt, evolve, and survive. When humans moved into settled communities with more advanced means of production, the nature of fear—much like the nature of social relationships—changed. Once the means of social reproduction were secured, fear became less necessary as a survival instinct and more useful as a heuristic device. Fear evolved. Fear cannot be characterized solely as a socially constructed phenomenon, nor as the instinctual response to personally felt traumas. The growth and nature of fear must be studied as a process that develops under its own inertia, feeding off its antecedent past, and as a phenomenon that is shaped by and in turn shapes its institutional setting. Fear should be understood as both structurally determined and socially transformative. This research seeks to examine the ontology of fear, specifically as it relates to neoliberalism.     

Efficient local taxation and local public goods

This paper considers local public goods which crowd both with respect to the number of people served and the amount of property served. It is shown that it may be possible to have efficient decentralized provision of such goods using marginal cost taxes; however, the pricing system in this case is likely to require very large numbers of competing communities. Thus, it appears to be preferable to have separate jurisdictions provide goods which crowd with respect to people — such as education. The implications for stratification are also considered.     

Endogenous trade policy in general equilibrium: An interaction of redistribution rule,trade openness,and labor market condition

Using a general equilibrium framework, the paper derives trade policy endogenously for a small country. It shows that, contrary to the existing literature, a lobbying industry is not guaranteed trade protection; it may even face trade taxes. Besides lobbying, trade policy depends on other factors such as the trade revenue distribution rule, income distribution across groups, trade openness, factor substitutability in production, industry employment size, and labor market flexibility. The paper also shows that the observed phenomenon of government preference for import tariffs over export subsidies—a long overdue puzzle—is an inherent outcome of lobbying equilibrium. It also shows that trade policies such as import tariffs and export taxes that have the same impact on economic market—Lerner symmetry (1936)—are driven by the same forces in the political market.     

The network structure of the United States input-output table

Economists triangulate input-output tables in order to find a predominant direction in the interindustrial movement of goods and services. Typically, industries, such as Mining, which are far removed from Final Demand, are situated at one end of the input-output table after rearrangement. At the other end are industries that produce for Final Demand, such as Food and Automobiles. Triangulation yields a linear ordering of industries. Much greater detail than this on the complex directionalities of interindustrial flows is presented here. The maximum flow minimum cut algorithm of network flow theory is employed to identify production and consumption complexes. These are relatively self-contained blocks of industries. In each block, there is one industry — the node of the complex — whose total production (consumption) is greater than the amount produced (consumed) by all members of the collection for (from) non-members. Many production complexes have as their nodes primary industries — ones that would be situated near one end of the table after triangulation — and as their other members Final Demand-oriented industries — ones that would be located near the other end. If there arem industries in an input-output table, ann-member production complex is composed of one nodal industry with total output,P, and (n?1) other industries, which together as then-member complex sell less thanP to the (m?n) other industries. 200 production and 42 consumption complexes of the most highly detailed version of the 1967 U.S. input-output table available are presented.     

Was Keynes a Realist?

Lawson (1989a) has interpreted Keynes as a philosophical realist, adhering to the view that the economy has a constant inner structure. Against this it is claimed below that, although Keynes speaks about realism, it is not in this sense, but in the common sense way of referring to actually observable entities of an economic model. In addition, it can be shown that Keynes's views can be interpreted as instrumentalist—he emphasises characteristics such as usefulness and convenience, besides and instead of truth. Thus, truth and truthlike concepts do not, in Keynes's thinking, have the paramount position that they have in realist philosophy.     

Foundational explorations for a normative theory of political economy

I set out an individualistic and pragmatic choice framework for a normative theory of political economy, and argue that, given pluralism with respect to individual ends, a consensus on any political or economic institution presupposes that it is perceived to serve as a public means to private ends. Concerning the crucial question of the distribution of the benefits that political and economic cooperation can make possible, I argue that the various models typically employed—those pertaining to competitive market interaction, decision making under uncertainty, bargaining theory, and social choice theory—fail to provide for a stable consensus, i.e., one that is resistant to non-compliance and renegotiation. Since, however, such instabilities are mutually disadvantageous, these approaches fail to establish how rational individuals can capture all the gains that cooperation makes possible. Appealing to a modified version of the social-psychological construction that Rawls introduces in chapter 8 ofA Theory of Justice I argue that stability is a function of a perceived sense of mutual concern. I conclude by arguing that Rawls own egalitarian/efficiency principle gives natural expression to such a concern, and thus can serve as the object of a stable consensus.     

Learning under supervision: an experimental study

In many market environments, for example in investment banking, salesforce management and others, workers and supervisors work closely as a team. Workers are paid a fixed salary and supervisors determine any raises, which are typically dependent on how well the organization does. In such scenarios, a supervisor who constantly offers suggestions can create a problem—typically a worker cannot ignore his supervisor’s advice, yet if such advice is wrong and is followed, it will only decrease firm profits. We conduct a laboratory experiment to address a question critical for such settings—does the relationship between advisor and worker interfere with the learning abilities of the worker? The answer is a resounding no. In fact, subjects who have a supervisor advising them and whose advice is costly to ignore actually learn better than those with an advisor whose advice can be ignored. An even more striking result is that advisees as well as advisors in both these conditions learn better than subjects with no advisors. Our result can be attributed to the presence of advice and has direct relevance to learning in many environments.     

A note on the difference between human and non-human productive factors: Comments on ‘Love, war, and culture: An institutional approach to human evolution’

In this article, Professor Pagano views human relations as generally ‘(…) influenced by the prevailing features of the goods (private, public and positional) that have characterized production in different stages of the history.’ In my comment, I focus on the distinction between human and non-human productive factors. Because of their obvious relationship, some of the considerations that follow from such a distinction are already—explicitly or otherwise—in the target article’s argument; those that are not, especially with regard to the cultural determinant of value, could be easily integrated into it.     

A note on the marginal benefits and efficiency of goods provided by local government

This paper focuses on the specification error found in many of the empirical studies dealing with the economic efficiency of local government in providing goods such as education. The paper argues that the compensated demand function—rather than the ordinary demand function—should be used in order to derive the marginal benefits of a given good. The ordinary demand functions used in previous studies would lead to inflated estimates of the marginal benefits and, therefore, to inaccurate empirical results. The paper presents a compensated demand function derived from a linear expenditure demand system. Using public education as an example, it demonstrates how such a statistically unobservable compensated demand function can be used to produce correct measurements of marginal benefits of a public service provided by local government. The results of the investigation into the efficiency aspects of public education will also be discussed.     

Leniency policies and illegal transactions

We study the consequences of leniency—reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers—on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions, such as corruption, manager–auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is known that leniency helps deterring illegal relationships sustained by repeated interaction. Here we find that—when not properly designed—leniency may simultaneously provide an effective governance mechanism for occasional sequential illegal transactions that would not be feasible in its absence.     

White elephants

Underdevelopment is thought to be about lack of investment, and many political economy theories can account for this. Yet, there has been much investment in developing countries. The problem has been that investment growth has not led to output growth. We therefore need to explain not simply underinvestment, but also the missallocation of investment. The canonical example of this is the construction of white elephants—investment projects with negative social surplus. In this paper we propose a theory of white elephants. We argue that they are a particular type of inefficient redistribution, which are politically attractive when politicians find it difficult to make credible promises to supporters. We show that it is the very inefficiency of such projects that makes them politically appealing. This is so because it allows only some politicians to credibly promise to build them and thus enter into credible redistribution. The fact that not all politicians can credibly undertake such projects gives those who can a strategic advantage. Socially efficient projects do not have this feature since all politicians can commit to build them and they thus have a symmetric effect on political outcomes. We show that white elephants may be preferred to socially efficient projects if the political benefits are large compared to the surplus generated by efficient projects.     

Joint Production of Food and Wildlife: Uniform Measures or Nature Oases?

Intensive agriculture is often bad for wildlife. Does this imply that a goal to boost wildlife on agricultural land is best met through a general reduction in intensity? We argue that such an approach may not be optimal, since cost functions for provision of wildlife on agricultural land may be non-convex, due to fixed costs associated with such provision. This implies that, even when farms are identical, it may be preferable to split them into groups of high providers and low providers. We test our hypothesis in a study of the optimal management of mown grasslands in southern Sweden, where the two products are silage and successful reproduction of ground-nesting birds, and the variable controlled by the farmer is the date of the first mowing. We show that the optimal solution is likely to involve some farmers maintaining profit-maximizing practices while other—identical—farmers delay their first mowing significantly. The superiority of such split solutions may have major implications for agricultural policy.     

Inefficient Local Regulation of Local Externalities

The consequences of commitment failure have been missing from debates about the decentralized regulation of automobile emissions and other sources of local consumption externalities. Even when the direct external effects of such products are limited to a single jurisdiction, the presence of increasing returns‐to‐scale production causes one jurisdiction's choice of regulatory standard to affect the prices and availability of goods elsewhere. Decentralized regulatory equilibria may be inefficient as a result. Because of a commitment failure, production may be split between standards—and consumers denied the full range of products—when it is efficient to have standards that allow products to be consumed everywhere. Coordination failures may cause similar inefficiencies. The results question the usefulness of the principle of subsidiarity as commonly employed.     

Expected work experience and the gender wage gap: A new human capital measure

Work experience is a key variable in earnings function estimates and wage gap decompositions. Because data on actual work experience are rare, studies commonly use proxies, such as potential experience. But potential experience is identical for all individuals of the same age and level of education, so it ignores labor market intermittency because of childbirth and child rearing—a critical omission when analyzing gender differences in earnings. This paper constructs a better proxy: expected work experience, which is the sum of the annual probabilities that an individual worked in the past. This measure can be generated using commonly available data on labor force participation rates by age and gender to gauge the probability of past work. Applying the measure to labor force survey data from the Philippines shows that conventional proxies underestimate the contribution of gender differences in work experience in explaining the gender wage gap.     

A way to foster innovation: a venture capital district from Silicon Valley and route 128 to Waterloo Region

Although the US economy is traditionally cited as the model, there are other technology frontier examples, such as Canada, arising from strong linkages among firms, research communities, the financial community and government. This paper compares the most important American districts—Route 128 and Silicon Valley—with the Waterloo Region of Ontario. Second, it focuses on the linkage between venture capital and Canadian universities and shows some successful cases of knowledge and technology transfer at the University of Waterloo. Taken together, these sections provide a snapshot of the nature and status of technology transfer at Canadian universities and how it compares with that in the US.     

经纬度延伸:发展劳动价值论

依据卫兴华教授的《劳动价值论需要创新与发展》一文的结构框架,提出用“经纬度延伸”这一核心思路来解决劳动价值论的矛盾问题。本文认为,传统的关于“商品生产”的劳动价值论是狭隘的,应该经度由生产延伸到流通,纬度由商品延伸到服务,从而形成完整意义上的劳动价值论。在构建了新框架体系基础上,还探讨了其它相关问题,证明根据“经纬度延伸”这一思路能够对劳动价值论中现有的矛盾进行合理的解释。