KEYNES ON WAGE FLEXIBILITY AND THE AUSTRALIAN WAGES SYSTEM*

Keynes' General Theory briefly discusses the Australian wages system, as an example of a system in which an attempt was made to fix real wages by law. Keynes argues that such a system, strictly enforced, generates an unstable unemployment equilibrium or highly volatile money wages and prices. This paper clarifies Keynes' views on the Australian system, with a view to their wider relevance for the significance of real and money wage flexibility and inflexibility in Keynes' economics. The most striking finding is that money wage stickiness is a conclusion, not an assumption, of Keynes' theory of employment.     

Sraffa,Keynes and 'The Years of High Theory'

This paper argues that Shackle's interpretation of 'the years of high theory' is flawed. Shackle (1967) sees Sraffa's critique of the Marshallian theory of value only as a step in the development of the theory of imperfect competition. In the same vein, Shackle reduces the message of Keynes's General Theory to the claim that unemployment results from the existence of uncertainty and irrational expectations. Thus, Shackle leaves open the possibility that both Sraffa's critique of Marshall and Keynes's theory of effective demand do not question the internal coherence of neoclassical theory, but instead merely assert that market imperfections render it irrelevant for the analysis of the real world. This paper argues, in contrast, that the theories of Sraffa and Keynes should be interpreted as radical departures from marginalism, and represent a return to the surplus approach of classical political economy.     

The Fault Line between Keynes and the Cambridge Keynesians: A Review Essay

This essay reviews Michael Ambrosi's important but neglected book on the formative period of Keynesian economics. The book traces the evolution of a Cambridge macroeconomic tradition running from Marshall and Pigou to Keynes, and interprets The General Theory as a response to Pigou's analysis of unemployment. Ambrosi also argues that Keynes's disciples, Richard Kahn, Nicholas Kaldor and Joan Robinson, were, in the 1930s, wedded to a Pigovian methodology and did not immediately recognise that Keynes had redefined the meaning of equilibrium in The General Theory. Keynes's attempt to redefine the analytical basis of neoclassical economics was thwarted, not merely by the neoclassical synthesis, but by those who claimed to be the inheritors and guardians of his vision.     

Keynes,Ricardo and the classical theory of interest

Keynes made harsh and repeated attacks on the work of Ricardo, blaming him particulary for what Keynes called the ‘classical theory’ of interest. Garegnani and others argue that Keynes' criticisms of the classical theory of interest apply to later neoclassical writers, but not to Ricardo. This paper re-examines Keynes' criticisms. It argues that Keynes attacked Ricardoapos;s theory of interest despite his awareness that Ricardo did not hold the ‘classical theory’. Moreover, Keynes not only expressed sympathy for Ricardo's understanding of interest, but his criticisms which do apply to Ricardo do not address Ricardo's theory of interest.     

Effective Demand: Securing the Foundations

Abstract

This paper is one of three contributions to a symposium commenting on papers previously published by the other authors. Allain (Allain, O. (2009) Effective demand and short-term adjustments in the General Theory, Review of Political Economy, 21, pp. 1–22) argues that Keynes elides a distinction between aggregate demand and global expenditure that is necessary to explain the formation of price expectations by individual entrepreneurs. Allain's conclusions depend upon redefinitions of aggregate and effective demand and the consumption function. Hartwig (Hartwig, J. (2007) Keynes vs. the Post Keynesians on the principle of effective demand, European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 14, pp. 725–739) argues that entrepreneurs must take into account the state of the economy as a whole, in order to form price expectations independently and not as a market equilibrium determined by aggregate supply and demand. This leaves demand price expectations to be determined outside the principle of effective demand. Neither author does full justice to Keynes's own treatment. We still need to agree by what mechanism individual entrepreneurs form a collective and mutually consistent state of expectation in The General Theory.     

Whither Keynesian probability? Impolite techniques for decision-making

The critical literature on Keynes has provided extensive analysis of why individual agents may find convenient to adopt a “conventional judgement”, and what he meant by “polite techniques” used to save their faces as “rational, economic men.” This paper concentrates instead on impolite techniques of thought suited to deal with Keynesian uncertainty. The paper suggests that the thread going from Keynes's Treatise on Probability to the General Theory and its defence provides a positive analysis of decision-making under uncertainty, and that placing emphasis on this positive analysis simply means adhering to Keynes's long-standing commitment to a (surely peculiar) probabilistic set-up.     

Was Keynes a Realist?

Lawson (1989a) has interpreted Keynes as a philosophical realist, adhering to the view that the economy has a constant inner structure. Against this it is claimed below that, although Keynes speaks about realism, it is not in this sense, but in the common sense way of referring to actually observable entities of an economic model. In addition, it can be shown that Keynes's views can be interpreted as instrumentalist—he emphasises characteristics such as usefulness and convenience, besides and instead of truth. Thus, truth and truthlike concepts do not, in Keynes's thinking, have the paramount position that they have in realist philosophy.     

The logic of Keynes' criticism of the Classical model

The Classics' remedy for unemployment was to lower money wages. Keynes opposes this remedy. Therefore, in The General Theory, he aims at building a model in which a fall in money wages may not cause an increase in employment. Most of the interpretations of Keynes identified this aim, but did not attach enough importance to it. Reading The General Theory in the light of this aim, we discover what Keynes' logic of elaboration is, then what Keynes' ideas about voluntary or involuntary unemployment are.     

Keynes's realisms

Abstract

Some authors pointed to a realist orientation in Keynes's thought. However, since ‘realism’ is a wide and sometimes equivocal term, one may ask what kind of realism Keynes's realism is. This paper argues that Keynes held to an ontological, logical–semantic and epistemic realism. Whereas ontological realism has metaphysical connections, logical–semantic realism involves a notion of truth, and epistemological realism presupposes a theory of knowledge. The character of the subject matter circumscribes the scope of this last kind of realism. Epistemological realism is related to the role of intuition and convention in Keynes's thought, the meaning and evolution of which is explained.     

Keynes and probability: An assessment

Abstract

Most interpreters agree that Keynes had a wide-ranging, complex, ‘vision of the world’, which underlies his theoretical contributions. Whenever this is forgotten, as happens in the so-called neoclassical synthesis, not only the original Keynesian spirit goes lost but also, and especially, we lose substantive bricks for our theoretical constructions. The paper considers an important instance of this general rule; namely Keynes's views on the logic of probability, meant as the field concerning human behaviour in an uncertain world (hence connected to, but distinct from, the pure theory of probability, meant as a field of mathematics). The paper begins by recalling the main aspects of the classical and frequentist approaches to probability and the main criticisms they received, pertaining among other things to the limits of their applicability. We then consider Keynes's own views, stressing three aspects: the definition of probability as pertaining to the field of logic, the notion of uncertainty and of the ‘weight of the argument’, the ‘theory of groups’. We then discuss the subjective approach of de Finetti, Ramsey and Savage, and contrast it with Keynes's own views. Finally, we consider the implications of our analysis for the interpretation of Keynes's General Theory, and of his attitude towards econometrics.     

Is ex‐ante ex‐post analysis irrelevant to Keynes's theory of employment?

Ex‐ante ex‐post analysis has become a standard tool in macroeconomics. Yet Keynes dismissed it. We argue that Keynes's dismissal of ex‐ante ex‐post analysis is not an oddity but an indication of the originality of his theory of employment compared to standard macroeconomics. First, the principle of effective demand does not amount to a process that determines employment and income at the point of intersection of the traditionally defined ex ante supply and demand functions. Second, the finance motive allowed Keynes to confirm the identity of aggregate supply and demand already asserted in The General Theory. This latter conclusion is puzzling, however, since the principle of effective demand presupposes the possibility of a discrepancy between supply and demand. We suggest that Keynes's theory of employment is linked to a theory of income distribution whereby profits are a redistributed share of factor income which is transferred to firms when prices exceed factor costs. The identity and the equilibrium condition then relate to separate measurements of income and output, factor cost and prices.     

Joan Robinson's disillusion with economics

In her last public comments on the state of economics, Joan Robinson made some extraordinary remarks that conveyed profound pessimism and theoretical nihilism. To account for the bleakness of Robinson's later views on economics and economic policy this article examines her last decade. These years were marked by an array of reverses to the causes she espoused. While ill health and a propensity to be provocative coloured her disposition, her comment about economic theory disintegrating in her hands was not made casually; it was, rather, an acknowledgement that her project to integrate Keynes with the classical surplus theory had failed. This acknowledgement crystallised into her rejection of the long-period equilibrium interpretation of Keynes's theory of unemployment. At the end of her life Robinson was willing only to embrace the more traditional short-period Keynesian model grounded in uncertainty and expectations.     

The Role of credit in a Keynesian monetary economy

Abstract

This paper describes the features of a monetary economy on the basis of Keynes's distinction between a real exchange economy and a monetary economy. In The General Theory, Keynes identifies the reasons for the non-neutrality of money by highlighting the store of wealth function of money; this approach has been adopted by most Keynesian economists. The aim of this paper is to show that such an approach only partially explains the reasons for money non-neutrality and that important elements which demonstrate the relevance of monetary variables emerge when the means of payment function of money is considered. Investigating the role of this function requires that we deal explicitly with how spending decisions are financed. The paper argues that the market for credit must be considered separately from the market for money, and that a viable credit theory can be built from Keynes's post-General Theory writings.     

The Concept of Trust and the Political Economy of John Maynard Keynes,Illustrated Using Central Bank Forward Guidance and the Democratic Dilemma in Europe

Trust is an issue to which Keynesians and post-Keynesians have paid relatively little attention. However, properly understood it is an aspect of almost all activity, including key elements of socio-economic reality. Without trust, market exchange is at the very least problematic, if not impossible. Moreover, trust is intrinsic to a variety of issues with which Keynes, and subsequent Keynesianism have been concerned. In this paper we provide a general social theory conceptualisation of trust and then set out some of the areas where this concept resonates with the work of Keynes in terms of the role of conventions. Conventions quintessentially involve trust and that trust can be unstable, can be withdrawn and can require rebuilding. We illustrate this with reference to central bank policy and the Bank of England's introduction of Forward Guidance. Exploring the problem of trust in the context of banking also highlights a challenge for the continued relevance of Keynes' work. We now live in a neoliberal world and this provides a quite different context for state intervention than was previously the case. Keynes' work is now an argument for the alternative, and as such it requires more than a technical economic argument, it must also address the problem of trust in state policy-makers. We briefly illustrate the challenge this poses with reference to Europe.     

Keynes and a post-Keynesian controversy over the effect of debt on income expansion

The paper considers arguments of Robertson (1938) and Asimakopulos (1983) that the Keynesian multiplier expansion of output may be constrained by debt implicitly incurred in the financing of autonomous investment necessary to start the multiplier process. The task of this essay is to show that within the ‘short-period’ and static analytical framework of Keynes, this line of reasoning regarding the adverse effects of debt on multiplier-induced expansions of output is unwarranted. Nevertheless it is concluded that if the Keynesian framework is abandoned in favour of a dynamic framework in the manner of a steady trend rate of growth - a choice dependent on how one conceives of the economy, as inherently static or dynamic - then such arguments have troubling implications. In particular, the dependence of Keynes's approach on credit and hence debt forges links between ‘short-periods' whose distinctness from one another is crucial to Keynes's result.     

A tale of two traditions: Pierre Force's Self-interest before Adam Smith

Abstract

The paper compares different strands of New Keynesian Economics with regard to Keynes' original work. Two issues are analysed in detail. First, the explanations provided by Keynes and New Keynesians of nominal and real wage behaviour. Second, the different theories concerning the ability of flexible nominal wages in assuring full employment. It is argued that, although involuntary unemployment is a central problem both in Keynes' and New Keynesians' views, referring to the role of nominal and real wages in explaining unemployment, New Keynesians theories present important features that differ, sometimes substantially, from the concepts developed by Keynes in his General Theory.     

Money as an Institution of Capitalism: Some Notes on a Monetary Theory of Uncertainty

Dillard notes that to consider money as an institution of capitalism means to emphasize that money is an essential element in explaining fluctuations in income and employment. He states that Keynes's liquidity preference theory offers a sound explanation of money as an institution of capitalism. Keynes's explanation is based on a necessary condition, independent of money: the presence of uncertainty. The objective of the paper is to elaborate a different explanation of the role of money, based on Keynes's 1933 and 1937–39 works, according to which the presence of money constitutes the necessary condition to justify the importance of uncertainty.     

Beauty contested: how much of Keynes' remains in behavioural economics' beauty contests?

Abstract

In one of the most famous passages of the economic literature, John Maynard Keynes likens the stock market to a beauty contest (BC), in which the winners are those who anticipate the average opinion. In behavioural economics there have recently been attempts at investigating the BC experimentally. We argue that there exist important differences between Keynes' and behavioural economics' BCs. We identify several types of BCs and propose a taxonomy. We also suggest that, in spite of these differences, Keynes' theory of decision under uncertainty is central to understanding the actual behaviour observed in experimental BCs.     

The Point of Effective Demand

Abstract

Keynes's principle of effective demand conceives competitive equilibrium in terms of the choices of entrepreneurs, investors and consumers, rather than of the optimal allocation of factors of production. In The General Theory, effective demand is distinguished from aggregate demand and from income, expected or realised, and there is no suggestion that equilibrium means the convergence of expectations. Reconsideration of Keynes's use of time and equilibrium periods leads to the conclusion that he treats employment as in continuous equilibrium, at the point of effective demand, determined by the state of expectation, the correctness of which is strictly irrelevant. The nature of the equilibrium represented by the point of effective demand is here described, not in terms of the multiplier, but in terms of the continuous equilibrium of supply and demand in short-term forward markets. This reading is faithful to Keynes's conception of aggregate demand as dependent upon the expectations of entrepreneurs, and it resolves the meaning of his ‘long-period employment.’ Formal appendices identify the differences between Keynes and Walras and the nature of the multiplier. The paper concludes that the Keynesian cross and ‘Swedish’ analysis should be abandoned, and the Walrasian conception recognised as only the limiting case of general competitive equilibrium in a monetary economy.     

Confidence in Keynes and Hayek: Reply to Burczak

We agree with Burczak's identification of the crucial issues. We disagree with his interpretation of them. We expand our defense of the claim that Keynes was a rationalist. We introduce the "horizon principle" to critize Keynes' dichotomy between short-term and long-term expectations. We question the statistical simile guiding some Post Keynesian dsiscussions of uncertainty. We point to the role of evolution in shaping conventions that fit the economic environment in a world with novel events. We think the evidence favors our view over Burczak's. Finally, we put in a plea for framing the issues in a way that facilitates empirical testing.