Tracing the causes of the banking crisis

We add the Bernanke–Gertler–Gilchrist model to a modified version of the Smets–Wouters model of the U.S. in order to explore the causes of the banking crisis. The innovation of this article is estimating the model using unfiltered data allowing for non-stationary shocks in order to replicate how the model predicts the crisis. We find that ‘traditional shocks’ account for most of the fluctuations in macroeconomic variables; the non-stationarity of the productivity shock plays a key role. Crises occur when there is a ‘run’ of bad shocks; based on this sample they occur on average once every 64 years and when they occur around 10% are accompanied by financial crisis. Financial shocks on their own, even when extreme, do not cause crises – provided the government acts swiftly to counteract such a shock as happened in this sample.     

The effect of financial liberalization on banking sector stability

Several studies indicate that financial liberalization increases likelihood of a financial crisis without distinguishing between a normal period, unstable period preceding the onset of banking panics and crisis/post period. We explain in this paper the relationship between financial liberalization and banking sector vulnerability. Then, we argue that banking sector turmoil is most likely to occur after an intermediate degree of liberalization. Using a recently updated dataset for financial reforms, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between liberalization and the likelihood of banking crisis for a sample of 49 countries between 1980 and 2010. We used a multinomial logit model in order to take into account what is called the ‘post crisis bias’. We ask whether the relationship remains when institutional characteristics of countries and dynamic effects of liberalization are considered. The empirical results indicate that the relationship between liberalization and banking sector stability depends strongly on the strength of capital regulation and supervision. With very weak regulation and supervision, the probability of banking crises is increasing with liberalization but this relationship is reversed as regulation and supervision become significant. The most important type of liberalization in relation to banking crises seems to be operational. A policy implication is that positive growth effects of liberalization can be achieved without increasing the risk of a banking fragility if appropriate institutions are developed.     

Formal Rules versus Informal Relationships: Prudential Banking Supervision at the FSA Before the Crash

Prior to the 2007–9 banking crisis, the UK Financial Services Authority presented itself as a ‘proportionate’ and ‘risk-based’ regulator, preferring firms to adhere to the spirit of high-level principles rather than the letter of detailed rules. Simultaneously, it developed a supervisory regime that was unprecedentedly complex, producing a ‘Handbook’ of intricate secondary legislation that ran to some 8000 pages. Explaining these contradictory aspects of the pre-crisis regime demands a reappraisal of the dominant explanations of the supervisory failures that contributed to the banking crisis. In contrast to accounts that focus on officials' uncritical adherence to efficient market thinking (regulatory groupthink) or the political clout of the financial industry (regulatory capture), this article suggests that supervisory officials' actions can be understood only by reference to their institutional and structural contexts. Amid heightened public sensitivity to risk, officials developed an elaborate and transparent supervisory framework as a defence against potential political censure. At the same time, collegial firm–supervisor relationships were preserved as state-of-the-art risk-management ideas were recombined and repackaged in line with the institutional legacies of earlier ‘club-like’ modes of supervision. Together, these divergent tendencies contributed to overconfidence in the use of predictive risk assessment and neglect of banks' fundamental business risks.     

Bank loan versus financial lease: how do traditional and innovative approaches within the banking sector influence economic growth? A comparative analysis between the US and China

ABSTRACT

The argument over the effects of financial structures on economic growth remains unsettled. This study, therefore, compares the dynamic correlation and lead–lag relationship between the different financial approaches within the banking sector (that is, traditional bank loans versus innovative financial leasing) and economic growth. We employ a continuous wavelet analysis using time-series data from 1982–2017 from the US (the world’s largest developed country) and China (the world’s largest developing country). The empirical results show that (1) episodes of significant correlation usually emerge during periods of reform, crisis or policy implementation; and (2) in China, traditional banking promotes economic growth in the long term, while the real economy only imputes the evolution of banks during critical economic reforms in the short term. Meanwhile, financial leasing could only promote the development of the real economy under suitable regulation; and (3) in the US, before the crises, the irrational growth of the real economy could increase bank assets, while during the crises, the traditional banking approach harms economic growth, and after the crises, financial leases play an important role in recovery. Therefore, we suggest that policymakers should establish adequate policies and regulations to solve the situation.     

Withstanding financial crises: would trade partners help or hurt?

This article provides new empirical evidence on the losses of real activity caused by various financial shocks. Spillover effects due to foreign trade linkages deserve special attention. To this end, we estimate a modify auto-regressive process and a Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations estimator is used to account for the dependency of one’s country growth on its trade-weighted partners growth. We run estimations on a set of currency collapses, banking crises and sovereign defaults in 49 advanced and developing countries from 1978 to 2011. The trade-weighted foreign demand effect mitigated the economic downturn following a banking or a sovereign debt crisis in all countries, while only the advanced ones benefited from it after a currency collapse. Trade-based spillover effects make banking crises more costly in the developing countries, in those that liberalize their financial account. It contrasts with what is observed during currency or sovereign debt crises.     

银行危机与货币危机共生性关系的实证研究

1 997— 1 998年的亚洲金融风暴中 ,银行危机与货币危机的同时爆发 ,即共生性危机的发生引发国际社会与学术界对这种现象的重新思考 :这种共生性现象是否确实具有普遍性 ?从理论的角度来看 ,银行危机与货币危机之间的确存在着一定的联系 ,但到目前为止 ,很少有研究从实证的角度来证明这种联系的确存在。正是基于此 ,本文从实证的角度出发 ,旨在揭示出银行危机与货币危机之间的确存在着相互影响 ,换言之 ,共生性危机的发生是具有显著性的。具体来说 ,本文以 1 975— 2 0 0 0年期间 53个国家危机的发生情况为研究对象 ,分别运用频率分布、信号法 ,以及概率回归模型来分析两种危机的共生性 ,并得到非常一致的结论 :在新兴市场国家中 ,银行危机与货币危机之间的确存在着明显的相互关系 ,同时银行危机更趋向于作为货币危机即将发生的同步或预警指标 ,而反之则不然。     

Projecting from a Fiction: The Case of Denmark and the Financial Crisis

Institutional and ideational crises are characterised by fundamental uncertainty about the world, and at the same time require swift action on part of decision makers. How do political actors overcome uncertainty to enable collective action? The paper argues that actors use the ideas of the pre-crisis regime and through processes of bricolage seek to fit them to radically different circumstances. This enables action, but it also privileges the actors that benefited from these ideas before the crisis. This helps explain why so relatively few changes to financial regulation are appearing from the recent crisis. The argument is illustrated through the case of financial crisis in Denmark, demonstrating that the Danish authorities used ideas developed since the banking crisis of the 1980s concurring on the discourse that the best solution to the crisis would be a further ‘consolidation' of the sector, that is, fewer small banks and stronger large banks. This shows both the strength and weakness of using old ideas for radically new problems: it enables actors to act in concert, but changes are incremental and the weaknesses of the previous regime may thus live on in the new regime.     

The future of financial markets: financial crisis avoidance

This article considers the lessons from the global financial crisis for redesigning the financial system and its regulation to make the chance of future such crises lower. It focuses on three areas: improvements to the regulation of individual financial firms; macroprudential analysis and improving the structure of crisis resolution and management. It argues that if the authorities implement a credible crisis management regime where no firm is too big to be resolved, a smarter and more incentive based approach to the regulation of individual financial firms and extensive macroprudential analysis that both makes the structure of financial markets less risky and identifies risks, the risk of future crises will be reduced. But no framework can eliminate the risk altogether.     

Liquidity and Twin Crises

This paper proposes a simple analytical framework for understanding 'twin crises'– i.e. crises where a currency crisis and banking crisis occur simultaneously and reinforce each other. The distinguishing feature of such crises is the spill‐over effects across financial institutions through collateral constraints, declines in market values of assets, currency mismatches on the balance sheet and the endogenous amplification of financial distress through asset sales. We explore the role of liquidity and the role of monetary policy in such crises. In particular, a central question is whether raising interest rates in the face of a twin crisis is the appropriate policy response. Raising interest rates has two countervailing effects. Holding the domestic currency becomes more attractive (other things being equal), but the value of the domestic banking system falls due to the fall in asset prices. When assets are marked to market, there is a potential for endogenously generated financial distress that leads to a collapse of asset prices, as well as the exchange rate. It is thus possible that raising interest rates can have the perverse effect of exacerbating both the currency crisis and the banking crisis.     

The 2014–15 Financial Crisis in Russia and the Foundations of Weak Monetary Power Autonomy in the International Political Economy

ABSTRACT

This article contributes to international political economy debates about the monetary power autonomy (MPA) of emerging market and developing countries (EMDs). The 2014–15 Russian financial crisis is used as a case study to explore why an accumulation of large international reserves does not provide protection against currency crises and macroeconomic adjustments in EMDs. The analysis centres on the interplay between two dimensions of MPA: the Power to Delay and the Power to Deflect adjustment costs. Two structural factors condition Russia’s low MPA. First, the country’s subordinated integration in global financial markets increases its financial vulnerability. The composition of external assets and liabilities, combined with cross-border capital flows, restrict the use of international reserves to delay currency crises. Second, the choice of a particular macroeconomic policy regime embraced the financialisation of the – mainly state-owned – Russian banking sector, thus making it difficult to transform liquidity inflows into credits for enterprises. Russia’s main comparative advantage, hydrocarbon export revenues, is not exploited. The type of economy created due to the post-Communist transition means that provided ‘excessive’ liquidity remains in the financial system and is channelled into currency arbitrage. This factor increases exchange rate vulnerability and undermines Russia’s MPA.     

Anatomy of a financial crisis

This paper provides an asymmetric information framework for understanding the nature of financial crises. It provides the following precise definition of a financial crisis: A financial crisis is a disruption to financial markets in which adverse selection and moral hazard problems become much worse, so that financial markets are unable to efficiently channel funds to those who have the most productive investment opportunities. As a result, a financial crisis can drive the economy away from an equilibrium with high output in which financial markets perform well to one in which output declines sharply. The asymmetric information framework explains the patterns in the data and many features of these crises which are otherwise hard to explain. It indicates that financial crises have effects over and above those resulting from bank panics and therefore provides a rationale for an expanded lender-of-last-resort role for the central bank in which the central bank uses the discount window to provide liquidity to sectors outside of the banking system.     

The symbolic politics of delegation: macroprudential policy and independent regulatory authorities

This paper investigates the motivations that led policy-makers to delegate macroprudential authorities to newly created independent systemic regulatory authorities (SRAs). Three case studies are examined: the US Financial Stability Oversight Council, the European Systemic Risk Board and the UK’s Financial Policy Committee. Policy-makers’ motivations are captured by examining the specific institutional features of the newly created SRAs and by tracing the legislative debates that surrounded their creation. The findings of this empirical analysis call into question several of the conventional claims that are used to justify delegation to technocratic agencies from the functionalist and ideational scholarship. Given the limitations of the explanations based on efficiency considerations and socialisation of welfare losses, this paper suggests that the delegation of powers to SRAs was ultimately motivated by what is referred to as the ‘logic of symbolic politics.’ It is argued that the main motivation that emerges from the legislative debates for delegating this important task is that the SRAs provided a quick institutional ‘fix’ to signal to the public that in the wake of the international crisis of 2007–2009, policy-makers were redressing regulatory mistakes made prior to and during the crisis that had caused a severe deterioration of public’s wealth.     

Liberalization,Regulatory Delays and Vulnerability to Systemic Banking Crisis

This work aims at contributing to the improvement of the early warning systems of banking crises using a new approach accounting for model uncertainty. We show that a multinomial logit model based on Bayesian model averaging (BMA) is a good strategy to predict banking crisis. To do this, we argue that differences in vulnerability to banking crisis can be largely explained by an asymmetry between financial market evolution and regulation update on a sample of 49 developed and developing countries between 1980 and 2010. When markets are liberalized, competition pushes bankers to take more risks and take advantage of regulatory delays thus increasing crises probabilities. Our empirical evidence supports that crisis probability is higher in country liberalizing their banking system when regulation is not updated. We developed an early warning system for systemic banking crises based on the multinomial logit model. Its main difference to existing prediction models and its contribution to the literature is that it is intended to identify and resolve what is called by Bussiere and Fratzscher [(2006). Towards a new early warning system of financial crises. Journal of International Money and Finance, 25(6), 953–973] as post-crisis bias in binomial models and to develop a new methodology of leading indicators selection based on BMA. Overall, our model predicts all banking crises during our sample period.     

Impact of FDI in the Fiscal Adjustment Process

Economic history, particularly the history of the Eurozone, is full of cases of countries experiencing severe economic crises. These crises may have different causes and effects and may be transmitted differently among the affected countries. However, the type of crisis that has the most widely spread political, economic, and social impact is the recession crisis. As a rule of thumb, a recession crisis is the result of a separate crisis, such as a country’s debt crisis (e.g. Greece, Portugal and Spain), a financial and banking crisis, or a crisis due to various bubbles (e.g. the real estate crisis in the United States). The main purpose of this paper is to study the course of a series of countries, which were or currently are in a crisis and a supervised adjustment program, in terms of managing the exit from the crisis, the implementation of macroeconomic and reform policies, the policy applied for attracting foreign direct investments, and the impact of such policy on the countries that were affected by the crisis.     

A firm-level chronicle of financial crises in the Southern Cone

This paper chronicles the recent emergence of financial crises in the ‘Southern Cone’ countries of South America. Relying on firm-level panel data, major changes in the macro and regulatory environments are linked to changes in firms' earnings streams and financial structures. For each country, a ‘boom’ phase, a ‘squeeze’ phase, and a ‘bust’ phase are identified. It is argued that the proximate cause of this pattern was wild fluctuation in the expected real return on financial assets. Though no formal model is developed, it is suggested that these swings were due to the system of incentives created by rapid banking sector deregulation cum exchange-rate-based stabilization policies.     

Banking,currency, stock market and debt crises in Spain, 1850–1995

What type of crisis is generated when debt increases? We extend the literature by framework by introducing currency and stock market crises in the analysis. We apply our proposal to the case of Spain, since this is a country that has experienced a very important amount of financial crises from the nineteenth century onwards. We find the same results as the previous literature for the determinants of banking and debt crises but substituting external and public debt with perpetual debt and where perpetual debt has a less important role than crises in the private sector. Moreover, we find evidence in favour of the hypothesis that currency crises depend strongly and positively on financial centre crises and negatively and mildly on perpetual debt. We justify the negative relalionship due to an inflation tax. We also find evidence in favour of the hypothesis that stock market crises depend only positively and strongly on financial centre crises.     

Real effects of banking crises: Imports of capital goods by developing countries

We examine the hypothesis that banking crises have real effects on developing economies by reducing imports of capital goods. We test this hypothesis by estimating a model for the determinants of imports of capital goods by a panel of developing economies during 1961 to 2010. Our results suggest that not only do banking crises have statistically significant and economically important effects on imports of capital goods, but these effects increase the longer a banking crisis lasts. Imports of capital goods are a critical component of the capital stock and the production process in developing economies and, thus, our results highlight one important channel through which banking crises may hamper the growth prospects of these economies.     

What can Islamic financing tell us about macro-prudential policies?

Macro-prudential policies are theoretically effective at mitigating a debt deflation crisis by forcing individuals to internalize their impact on aggregate prices reducing systemic risk caused by pecuniary externalities. To better understand the potential effectiveness of a macro-prudential time varying tax/subsidy on debt/dividends, we empirically estimate the impact of an Islamic financing presence on financial crises. Adherence to Islamic financing principles for a nontrivial portion of a country’s population has similar impacts to a macro-prudential policy in that these limited asset holders are likely to hold less debt or use debt-like instruments rather than conventional debt, driving down their marginal rate of substitution and the price of equity in equilibrium. To empirically estimate the effects of this policy, we interact an Islamic financing variable with debt in an otherwise standard model of financial crises. The results show that this macro-prudential-like policy decreases the likelihood of a banking crisis by 50%. The contribution of the article is twofold. First, we show that an Islamic finance presence encourages precautionary savings like a macro-prudential policy. Second, using an Islamic finance presence to capture macro-prudential potential effects, we find empirically that the likelihood of banking crises are cut roughly by half when such policies are in effect.     

How does equity capital cost affect bank performance during a financial crisis?

This article theoretically examines how equity capital cost affects return performance and safety of a bank and how this effect varies across a financial crisis comparing to a normal time when the bank manager’s performance reveals the like of higher equity return and the dislike of higher equity risk. We derive two main results. First, an increase in the bank’s equity capital cost from an increase of the interest rate of the Federal funds results in a reduced loan risk-taking at an increased optimal bank interest margin, implying better bank performance. Second, by ignoring the dislike, we find that the better performance is reinforced during a financial crisis but is reduced during a normal time. Financial crises and the dislike preference as such contribute a relatively low return and the stability of banking activities.     

Credit information sharing and banking crises: An empirical investigation

We study the effect of credit information sharing on the likelihood of banking crises using a comprehensive cross-country dataset for the period from 1975 to 2006. The empirical analysis shows that credit information sharing reduces the likelihood of banking crises and it does more so in low income countries. The effect is statistically and economically significant, and applies to both public registries and private bureaus. Furthermore, we show that credit information sharing reduces the impact of rapid credit growth on banking crises. Specifically, rapid credit growth is less likely to lead to a banking crisis in countries with credit information sharing.