INFLATION,OUTPUT, AND WELFARE*

We study the effects of anticipated inflation on aggregate output and welfare within a search‐theoretic framework. We consider two pricing mechanisms: ex post bargaining and a notion of competitive pricing. Under bargaining, the equilibrium is generically inefficient and an increase in inflation reduces buyers' search intensities, output, and welfare. If prices are posted and buyers can direct their search, search intensities are increasing with inflation for low inflation rates and decreasing for high inflation rates. The Friedman rule achieves the efficient allocation, and inflation always reduces welfare, although it can have a positive effect on output for low inflation rates.     

Does wage-inflation targeting complement foreign exchange intervention? An evaluation of a multi-target,two-instrument monetary policy framework

We assess the inclusion of wage inflation as an intermediate target of an emerging central bank using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with sticky wages and prices calibrated for the South Korean economy. The model includes wage inflation as an additional target jointly with domestic price inflation and the output gap in a Taylor- type interest rate rule operating with a sterilized foreign exchange (FX) intervention rule. Our results show a complementary relationship between wage inflation targeting and price inflation targeting. That is, by supplementing price inflation targeting with wage inflation targeting, welfare improves for cases with and without sterilized FX intervention. When intervention is in place, wage inflation targeting has the added advantage of reducing the volatilities of nominal exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves thereby promoting a more sustainable conduct of FX intervention.     

Long run determinants and short run dynamics of inflation in Tunisia

The essential idea of this study is to analyse the origins of inflation at short and long runs in Tunisia relying on annual data during the period 1962 to 2003. We also suggest a model that has a structure determined by monetary and structural factors, and estimated by Johansen's cointegration technique. The empirical results show that inflation is explained by mixed factors: monetary ones such as money supply, the interest rate and the real effective exchange rate; and structural ones like the nominal average annual wage rate, the import prices and the real output. The analysis aims at pointing out the long run determinants of inflation and studying its short run dynamics.     

Robust central banking under wage bargaining: Is monetary policy transparency beneficial?

We study the role of transparency in an environment of robust monetary policy under wage bargaining. The standard view from the game-theoretical literature is that, with unionised labour markets, monetary policy transparency is unambiguously “bad” (it induces increases in wage and price inflation, unemployment and may lead to higher inflation uncertainty). The empirical literature is instead ambiguous about the macroeconomic effects of transparency. By recasting the earlier theory into a robust monetary policy environment, and focusing transparency on the uncertainty about the preference for price stability, we show that the macroeconomic effects of transparency are more favourable than normally found. The impact on nominal wages, inflation and real variables (real wages and unemployment) is not parameter-free but depends on the public's informedness about this coefficient. The impact on real variables is found to disappear in case unions do not internalise the effect of wage decisions on the economy (i.e. in the case of atomistic unions). Finally, we find that the effect of transparency on inflation uncertainty is more complex than in the standard approach. We show that transparency may have the beneficial effect of reducing inflation variability not only when monetary uncertainty is low (as previously reported), but also when monetary uncertainty exceeds an upper threshold.     

Multiple Wage Bargaining Systems in the Single European Currency Area

Little attention in the EMU literature has been paid to the interaction between centralbank monetary rules and systems of collective wage bargaining. Analytically andempirically, coordinated wage bargaining systems respond with real wage restraintto non-accommodating monetary policy. Since wage determination is dominated bycollective bargaining in all the EMU member states and wage coordination within themember states has grown since 1980, this is a topic of potential importance. In particular, the replacement of the Bundesbank, directly targeting German inflation, by an ECB targeting European inflation has removed a major institutional support of wage restraint in Germany. The consequences of this for EMU are worked out under two scenarios, that inflation expectations will be generated by ECB monetary policy and that they will reflect German inflation outcomes. Possible institutional developments are discussed including government-union bargains. The Bundesbank has also played a major role in maintaining fiscal rectitude by targeting excess fiscal deficits in Germany: again its replacement by the ECB – targeting (if at all) European rather than German fiscal policy – loosens fiscal constraints. For underlying structural reasons therefore, it is possible that Germany and other EMU countries will move to a period of fiscal activism with wage restraint and low inflation purchased through social contract negotiations.     

How flexible are real wages in EU countries? A panel investigation

We estimate the degree of real wage flexibility in 19 EU countries in a wage Phillips curve panel framework. We find evidence for a reaction of wage growth to unemployment and productivity growth. The degree of real wage flexibility tends to be larger in the central and eastern European (CEE) countries than in the euro area; weaker in downturns than during upswings. There exists an inflation threshold, below which real wage flexibility is low. We also find that a part of the heterogeneity in real wage flexibility and unemployment may be related to differences in the wage bargaining institutions.     

The Economic Situation

Throughout the first nine months of 1976 the Australian economy has remained virtually stagnant, with output and employment increasing only marginally and unemployment rising also. With the government following a severely contractionary policy in an attempt to break inflation the economy seems poised for a further modest downturn in the next nine months so that a self-sustaining recovery from the current recession does not seem to be in prospect before the second half of 1977. On the basis of existing policies our forecasts indicate a rate of growth of real GDP of only about 1.0 per cent in 1976–77, implying a further significant rise in unemployment during the financial year. There have been some hopeful signs in recent months of a reduction in inflation — the consumer price index increases in the first three quarters of 1976 were modest and wage rate increases remain closely in line with the wage indexation guidelines — but three factors have emerged to cast doubt on whether this improving trend will continue. The first is the effect of the recent drought on prices of foodstuffs, particularly meat, and the second is the expected 1.5 to 2.0 per cent increase in the consumer price index as a result of the changes in the method of financing hospital and medical services. These two factors mean that the December quarter increase in the consumer price index may be more than 5 per cent, threatening a further stimulus to inflation in 1977. Thirdly, present government policies could easily lead to a breakdown of the wage indexation system and a return to some form of collective bargaining over wage rates. Assuming nevertheless, a de facto continuation of partial indexation in 1977, we expect increases in male award wages and male average earnings of about 13 per cent during 1977, these increases being similar to those during 1975 and 1976 but much below the increases of 36 per cent and 28 per cent respectively recorded during 1974. Our forecasts also indicate increases in the consumer price index of 14 per cent during 1976 and 11 per cent during 1977, following increases of 16.3 per cent and 14.0 per cent during 1974 and 1975 respectively. These forecasts indicate that the government's fiscal, monetary, exchange rate and wage policies are likely to come under heavy challenge early in 1977, and decisions taken at that time are likely to be major determinants of economic developments in Australia in the next few years. The Institute would again urge a shift to a co-operative package including full wage indexation, with cuts in indirect taxes and public sector charges to wind down inflation and expand the economy. On current indications, labour productivity will be no higher in 1976–77 than in 1973–74, because of the weakness of total output, so that the whole burden of wage increases in that three year period has fallen on unit costs of production. It is our belief that the twin problems of inflation and unemployment will only be defeated in Australia when both cuts in indirect or direct taxes and increases in productivity are applied to reducing inflation in the context of an orderly system of wage and price determination.     

Real wage rigidities and optimal monetary policy in a small open economy

The main objective of the study is to provide a theoretical analysis of optimal monetary policy in a small open economy where households set real wage in a staggered fashion. The introduction of real wage rigidities plays a important role to resolve main shortcomings of the standard new Keynesian small open economy model. The main findings regarding the issue of monetary policy design can be summarized as three fold. First, the optimal policy is to seek to minimize variance of domestic price inflation, real wage inflation, and the output gap if both domestic price and real wage are sticky. Second, controlling CPI inflation directly or indirectly induces relatively large volatility in output gap and other inflations. Therefore, both CPI inflation-based Taylor rule and nominal wage-inflation based Taylor rule are suboptimal. Last, a policy that responds to a real wage inflation is most desirable.     

Wage restraint and monetary union

Existing work on wage bargaining predicts more aggressive wage setting under monetary union. This is exemplified by Cukierman and Lippi (2001) who postulate that wages are set having area-wide prices in mind. The insight of aggressive wage behaviour has not been confirmed by the EMU experience, which has been characterised by wage moderation. The present paper investigates the possibility of wage restraint using a monetary union model which, realistically, assumes that trade unions set wages with national prices in mind. Drawing on plausible ranges for all parameter values (and macroeconomic shocks), our simulations show that a monetary union elicits real wages that are broadly comparable to those obtained under monetary autonomy. The confidence bounds around these results are rather wide, in particular including scenarios of wage restraint.     

A DISEQUILIBRIUM MODEL UNDER BILATERAL MONOPOLY*

The paper points out a crucial difference between the conventional disequilibrium macro model and partial equilibrium models of wage bargaining, In the former the real wage is constrained to be less than or equal to the marginal product, whereas in the latter the real wage is frequently constrained to be greater than or equal to the marginal product. The paper builds a disequilibrium model under bilateral monopoly, paying explicit attention to the labour market. The well-known union model of McDonald and Solow forms the basis of the labour market analysis. Just as the three regions of Keynesian Unemployment, Classical Unemployment and Repressed Inflation are configured in the conventional case, an equivalent exercise is undertaken but with the addition of a collectively negotiated wage. The particular wage agreement used is the Nash bargain. The framework is then used to account for the unusual events that occurred in the UK labour market 1979–81, particularly the unprecedented rise in unemployment with no diminution of the inflation rate. It suggests that there was a shift in bargaining advantage in favour of employers, which resulted in an increased share of profits in national income. This regime change exacerbated the unfavourable circumstances for labour, which existed at that time.     

On the optimality of a minimum wage: New insights from optimal tax theory

We build a theoretical model to study whether a minimum wage can be welfare-improving if it is implemented in conjunction with an optimized nonlinear income tax. We consider this issue in a framework where search frictions on the labor market generate unemployment. Workers differ in productivity. The government does not observe workers' productivity but only their wages. Hence, the redistributive policy solves an adverse selection problem. We show that a minimum wage is optimal if the bargaining power of the workers is relatively low. However, if the government controls the bargaining power, then it is preferable to set a sufficiently high bargaining power.     

LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND MACROECONOMIC VOLATILITY IN A PANEL OF OECD COUNTRIES

In this paper we analyze empirically how labor market institutions influence business cycle volatility in a sample of 20 OECD countries. Our results suggest that countries characterized by high union density tend to experience more volatile movements in output, whereas the degree of coordination of the wage bargaining system and the strictness of employment protection legislation appear to be only of limited importance. We also find some evidence suggesting that highly coordinated wage bargaining systems have a dampening impact on inflation volatility.     

Countercyclical or procyclical real wages? A disaggregate explanation of aggregate asymmetry

The time-series analysis of disaggregated data for a sample of 28 private industries verifies the prevalence and sources of asymmetry in aggregate data. The evidence indicates that asymmetry in the cyclical behavior of the real wage is widespread across the U.S. economy. The reduction in the real wage during recessions appears pronouncedly larger compared to the increase in the real wage during expansions in many industries. Across industries, price inflation increases faster compared to nominal wage inflation in the face of higher demand variability. Price flexibility moderates the increase in the real wage and output growth during expansions. In contrast, prices appear more downwardly rigid compared to the nominal wage in the face of demand variability. Price rigidity exacerbates the reduction in the real wage and output contraction during recessions. The combined evidence supports the implications of the sticky-price explanation of business cycles.First version received: June 2003/Final version received: June 2004The author thanks an anonymous referee for helpful comments on an earlier draft of the paper. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and should not be interpreted as those of the International Monetary Fund.     

THE REDISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF THE INFLATIONARY PROCESS IN JAPAN, 1955–75*

It is often discussed that inflation introduces a substantial, arbitrary and regressive redistribution of income and wealth under even mild inflation. But after a quarter century of experience with inflation in postwar Japan, very little is known about these costs of inflation on an empirical basis. Due to the complexity of the evaluation of the redistributional impact on Japan, the present paper analyzes the effects of inflation on individuals or groups as wage earners, debtors and creditors, taxpayers, and holders of real estate. The main results of the present investigation suggest that the Japanese inflation for 1955–75 did not seem to introduce much inequality in the income (flow) account in the economy, but that the inequality between households has appeared more in the wealth (stock) account, especially between the house-owner groups and non-house-owner groups. These observations are mainly derived from the following investigations; (i) the wage lag hypothesis about inflation, even if not wrong, does not seem acceptable when applied to the entire period (1955–75) as well as to each of the five sub-periods; (ii) there has been a substantial transfer of real purchasing power from households to non-financial corporations, and, to a lesser extent, to government entities in the debtor-creditor redistribution; (iii) among households, the most substantial redistribution takes place from the non-houseowners to houseowners with land, because of the huge amount of capital gains from the rapid increase in the price of real estate relative to the prices of other assets or the consumer price index, except for the last three years of rampaging inflation.     

Pattern Bargaining and Wage Leadership in a Small Open Economy*

Pattern bargaining with the tradables (manufacturing) sector as the wage leader is common in Europe. We question the conventional wisdom that such bargaining produces wage restraint. In our model, all forms of pattern bargaining give the same outcomes as uncoordinated bargaining under inflation targeting. Under a monetary union, wage leadership for the non‐tradables sector is conducive to wage restraint, whereas wage leadership for the tradables sector is not. Comparison thinking might lead the follower to set the same wage as the leader. Such equilibria can arise when the leader sector is the smaller sector, and these can promote high employment.     

Marx Inside the Circuit: Discipline device,wage bargaining and unemployment in a sequential monetary economy

The aim of this paper is to show that Marxian labour theory of value can be consistently interpreted in terms of the monetary circuit model, where firms need initial finance to start production and where the money supply is endogenous. In contrast to the recently revived Marxian monetary models, in particular the New Interpretation, it is argued here that although the money wage is bargained for on the labour market, the real wage is determined by firms' choices, since firms autonomously determine the structure of production and hence real consumption for the working class as a whole. This does not mean that firms are able to set the real wage without economic and social constraints. Starting from our circuitist reading of the labour theory of value and distribution, a model is developed in order to determine the level of employment and income distribution, on the assumptions that (i) the industrial reserve army affects wage bargaining and labour effort and that (ii) workers react to the failure of their expectations on the real wage by reducing their work intensity. In this context, it is shown that firms may increase their share of profits over time only be means of innovations.     

The role of labor markets for euro area monetary policy

In this paper, we explore the role of labor markets for monetary policy in the euro area in a New Keynesian model in which labor markets are characterized by search and matching frictions. We first investigate to which extent a more flexible labor market would alter the business cycle behavior and the transmission of monetary policy. We find that while a lower degree of wage rigidity makes monetary policy more effective, i.e. a monetary policy shock transmits faster onto inflation, the importance of other labor market rigidities for the transmission of shocks is rather limited. Second, having estimated the model by Bayesian techniques we analyze to which extent labor market shocks, such as disturbances in the vacancy posting process, shocks to the separation rate and variations in bargaining power are important determinants of business cycle fluctuations. Our results point primarily towards disturbances in the bargaining process as a significant contributor to inflation and output fluctuations. In sum, the paper supports current central bank practice which appears to put considerable effort into monitoring euro area wage dynamics and which appears to treat some of the other labor market information as less important for monetary policy.     

Inflation,minimum wage and other wages: an econometric study on French macroeconomic data

This study examines the set of interdependences between the formation of wages, prices and the minimum wage (SMIC) through a vectorial error correction model estimated on French quarterly macroeconomic data covering the 1970–1/1999-4 period. Two periods are distinguished: the period of inflation rise from 1970 to 1981, which coincides with an important squeeze of the wage range, measured by the ratio of the minimum wage to the hourly wage rate; the period of disinflation since 1981, that has been concomitant with a stability of wage inequalities. Disinflation has hardly benefited the evolution of the SMIC which has always profited by price rises, in real and relative terms, which have become less strong. This evolution does not benefit any more on wage rises, when the interdependences between variables are taken into account. The SMIC seems however to have gained in efficiency as an instrument on wage disparity reduction. It rises are finally more persistent in real terms and relatively to the other salaries and have always as little inflationary impact on wages as on prices.     

NOMINAL WAGE INDEXATION,QUASI‐EQUILIBRIA AND REAL WAGE DYNAMICS

In contrast to the traditional static approach to indexation, this paper analyses the dynamic consequences for real wages of the mechanism that links nominal wages to inflation. Revisiting a contribution by Dehez and Fitoussi on macroeconomic fluctuations , I analyse a monetary overlapping generations small open economy in which full indexation is interpreted as the occurrence of a dynamic ‘quasi‐equilibrium’. In the suggested framework, the nominal wage is linked to the inflation rate by a specific indexation formula whose shape relies on unions' bargaining positions. Assuming a constant peg for the real interest rate and the superneutrality of money, I show that the economy has a unique long‐run quasi‐equilibrium allocation whose stability depends only on the behaviour of the monetary authority. Moreover, I show how the operating of a ‘wage‐aspiration effect’ might lead to the persistence of involuntary unemployment.     

Inflation regimes and the stability of the pass-through of wages to consumer prices in Canada

This article has formally identified distinct historical inflation regimes in Canada since 1961 in order to facilitate an investigation of the impact of regime changes on the wage-price dynamics in the economy. Both in and out-of-sample evidence suggest that wage growth exerts an influence on inflation only during a high-inflation regime but inflation exerts a more systematic and quantitatively stronger influence on wage growth regardless of the prevailing inflation regime. Overall, the results do not support either the ‘cost-push’ view of inflation or the ‘new view’ that claims that increased globalization during the 1990s has reduced the feedback from wage growth to inflation by weakening the bargaining power of workers.