Revealed preferences and aspirations in warm glow theory

In warm glow models, an agent may prefer one alternative but aspire to choose another. The agent chooses her aspiration if she gets a sufficiently large warm glow payoff for acting as she aspires. This basic framework is widely used in models of turnout in elections and contributions to public goods, but is often criticized for being ad hoc. In this paper, we provide choice-theoretic foundations for warm glow theory. We characterize the empirical content of warm glow theory, show how to infer the core elements of the model from data and show that it is possible to predict behavior even when preferences and aspirations are not revealed. Our results provide support for assumptions often made in the literature and suggest new applications for warm glow models.     

Joan Robinson and Maurice Dobb on Marx

This paper examines the formation of Joan Robinson's early viewson Marx through a dialogue with Maurice Dobb and then the receptionof these views at the time by Kalecki, Keynes and some prominentreviewers. It considers how her views were formed and developedin this dialogue and assesses how her position differed fromthose of others interested in Marx and working in Cambridgeat the time, including Piero Sraffa. It concludes that, despitecertain misreadings and limitations, Robinson's reading of Marxwas not of inconsequence and that she was not unaware of thedifferent approach she took to Marx.     

Margaret G. Reid: Life and achievements

Feminist critics of mainstream economics, and of the neoclassical paradigm in particular, have focused primarily on exposing and questioning the gender biases and androcentric claims to neutrality, objectivity and rationality of the most male-dominated discipline among the social sciences. The scientific method and mathematical sophistry so cherished in the discipline have also come under severe attack from several quarters. However, despite the intellectual ferment and some practical gains for women that these criticisms have engendered, even today the substantial contributions several women scholars have made to the field of economics are not well known or fully acknowledged. This paper traces and highlights Margaret Reid's contributions to the development of some core theories in economics. While several of her male colleagues whose work she had inspired or contributed to have been awarded the Nobel Prize, the discipline of economics still owes a huge debt to Reid and to several other women economists.     

母以子贵:性别偏好与妇女的家庭地位-来自中国营养健康调查的证据

基于中国普遍存在的对男孩的性别偏好,本文采用所生育小孩的性别作为妇女家庭地位和议价能力的度量指标,研究该指标对家庭内部资源分配及后果的影响。中国健康营养调查数据中有关家庭耐用品消费决策的信息表明,第一胎性别对妇女在家庭中的地位有重要作用。本文发现,当妇女的家庭地位随着生育男孩而提高后,家庭中食物支出份额会增加,该妇女营养摄入增加,而她的身体健康状况会变好。     

《林中之死》的原型解读（英文）

舍伍德·安德森的名篇《林中之死》讲述了一个并不可怕但又无法避免的死亡的故事,展现了女主人公悲怆的一生和故事讲述者对她的死亡的反应。认为原型批评能更好地阐释格兰姆斯夫人从天真纯洁的女孩到最后被所有人遗弃的老女人形象。在她的一生中,不幸和悲剧总是陪伴左右,因此,认为格兰姆斯夫人的形象体现了替罪羊原型——她不过是那个冷酷无情的的父权社会中众多无辜女性牺牲品中的一个,她存在的唯一价值就是被男人利用,成为父权社会的替罪羊。     

One-sided patience with one-sided communication does not justify stackelberg equilibrium

The theory of games (with complete information) in which a single patient longrun player faces a succession of short-run opponents cannot plausibly be used to justify the Stackelberg solution concept, because if that player can select which subgame-perfect equilibrium is to be played then she can presumably also change her selection. Consequently, while she can choose among one-shot Nash outcomes, she cannot achieve the Stackelberg outcome.     

Team production,endogenous learning about abilities and career concerns

This paper studies career concerns in teams where the support a worker receives depends on fellow team members׳ efforts and abilities. In this setting, by exerting effort and providing support, a worker can influence her own and her teammates׳ project outputs in order to bias the learning process in her favor. To manipulate the market׳s assessment, we argue that in equilibrium, a worker has incentives to help or even sabotage her colleagues in order to signal that she is of higher ability. In a multiperiod stationary framework, we show that the stationary level of work effort is above and help effort is below their efficient levels.     

Race,Gender, and Familial Status: Discrimination in One US Mortgage Lending Market

This paper, using data from the 1992 Boston Federal Reserve study of mortgage lending, reports preliminary evidence of patterns of gender and familial status discrimination that differ markedly by race in the US. White couples with children experienced familial status discrimination if the female partner was in the labor market, but not if she was at home raising her children. However, African-American or Hispanic couples with children suffered familial status discrimination if she stayed home to raise her children, but much less so, if at all, if she was in the labor market. This pattern of racial differentiation may reflect social norms dating back to slavery that have favored labor force participation for African-American and Hispanic mothers but not white mothers. On the other hand, it was true across racial groups that single women, more than single men, were disadvantaged in the mortgage market by children.     

Concentric circles of limits to the rate of accumulation: an interpretation of Joan Robinson's theory of economic dynamics

In addition to her well-known contributions to the theory of capital, Joan Robinson provided, in her Accumulation of Capital and Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth, a theory about the determinants of the rate of growth. The growth rate was limited by entrepreneurs' animal spirits. Within that constraint, growth might be further limited by the inflation barrier, which could occur either because of a floor to real wages or because of full employment. This paper provides a series of simple dynamic models that illustrate these situations, drawing attention to this neglected aspect of her work and making it easier to compare her work with the monetary growth models produced by her neoclassical contemporaries.     

On the Contributions of Barbara Bergmann to Economics

Abstract

This paper examines the major economic contributions of Barbara R. Bergmann. After presenting her personal background information, it gives an overview of her theoretical framework. This is followed by her critique of economic methodology and an examination of her major contributions in micro-simulation, feminist analysis of labor markets and the family, and policy-oriented work focused on improving the lives of women and children. The essay concludes with a brief discussion of Bergmann's unique qualities as an activist economist in the pursuit of social change.     

日本国债保有结构的变化及国债市场新动向

日本的国债依存度连年上升，财政负担严重，到了非改革不可的地步。回顾国债市场历史发展，可从政策金融和商业金融两个方面观察出90年代以来国债保有结构出现的变化，预测出日本国债市场发展的新动向。     

LEARNING, EXTERNALITIES, AND THE SALE OF INVENTIONS TO FIRMS WITH CORRELATED VALUATIONS

I examine how an inventor's ability to learn affects the bargaining outcome when she attempts to sell a discovery to one of two oligopolistically competitive firms with correlated and private valuations. It is shown that learning gives the inventor an incentive to lower her proposed price to the first firm approached since being rejected would cause her to be pessimistic when dealing with the second firm. At the same time, however, the inventor would like to raise her proposed price since this pessimism is weaker if she is rejected upon making a high proposal. Another incentive to raise the proposal comes from the fact that learning increases the first firm's willingness to pay for the invention. Computational results suggest that the first effect dominates and thus the inventor lowers her proposal in the first round. When dealing with the second firm, it is shown that learning results in a lower equilibrium proposal and contracting with more types. Moreover, it is shown that the cost of lowering the proposed price outweighs the benefit of contracting with more types so that learning in general reduces the continuation value associated with contracting in the second round.     

Informed principal with correlation

In this paper we analyze an adverse selection model with one principal and one agent, who are both risk neutral and have private information. We assume that the private information of the principal is correlated with that of the agent. The main result of the paper is that the principal can extract a larger share of the surplus from the agent than in the case where her information is public. The principal can design such a contract because she exploits the fact that her type is an informative signal on the agent's one. We fully characterize the equilibrium of the game in which different types of principal offer the same menu of contracts that leaves the agent uninformed about the principal's type. This gives more freedom to the principal when setting the transfers because the agent's constraints need to hold only at an interim stage.     

Who you are or whom you know? Consumption interdependences in social networks

This paper presents an analysis of whether a consumer's decision to switch from one mobile phone provider to another is driven by individual consumer characteristics or by actions of other consumers in her social network. Such consumption interdependences are estimated using a unique dataset, which contains transaction data based on anonymized call records from a large European mobile phone carrier to approximate a consumer's social network. Results show that network effects have an important impact on consumers’ switching decisions: switching decisions are interdependent between consumers who interact with each other and this interdependence increases in the closeness between two consumers as measured by the calling data. In other words, if a subscriber switches carriers, she is also affecting the switching probabilities of other individuals in her social circle. The paper argues that such an approach is of high relevance to both switching of providers and to the adoption of new products.     

Do Sell-Side Stock Analysts Exhibit Escalation of Commitment?

This paper presents evidence that when an analyst makes an out-of-consensus forecast of a company's quarterly earnings that turns out to be incorrect, she escalates her commitment to maintaining an out-of-consensus view on the company. Relative to an analyst who was close to the consensus, the out-of-consensus analyst adjusts her forecasts for the current fiscal year's earnings less in the direction of the quarterly earnings surprise. On average, this type of updating behavior reduces forecasting accuracy, so it does not seem to reflect superior private information. Further empirical results suggest that analysts do not have financial incentives to stand by extreme stock calls in the face of contradictory evidence. Managerial and financial market implications are discussed.     

Messy conversations and the willingness to be disturbed

We all long for a sense of community in our professional lives where we can bring our spirit, passion, and whole selves to work. When we work in environments of tribal warfare and clans carrying out subversive activities, we will choose to leave our souls at home to protect them from the toxicity of the work environment. For anyone who has been cared for by nurses who have left their soul at home, you have experienced the outcome of negative environments that cannot have effective conversations. Recently a nurse told about her experience of realizing one day that she had the right to be happy at work so that she could more effectively take care of her 5-year-old daughter when she returned home. When she saw this as a right, she made a decision to leave her organization and look for a place that valued conversations and harmony rather than aggression and lack of trust. The only way to improve the world is through relationships, and conversations are the prelude to creating that change. Having the courage to reach out and start the dialogue knowing full well that it might be very messy is the only way to end the fragmentation and loss of community we experience in our organizations. Wheatley (2002) describes the experience of "...sacred as a feeling that I belong here" (p. 133). In the process of conversations, we can explore and appreciate our differences but also feel more connected and one with each other as a result of having the courage to converse. When we see each other as equals, we also free ourselves to open up to new learning and relationships which can lead to excellence in clinical outcomes. It's all about the courage of conversations.$     

Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation

Game theoretic models of learning which are based on the strategic form of the game cannot explain learning in games with large extensive form. We study learning in such games by using valuation of moves. A valuation for a player is a numeric assessment of her moves that purports to reflect their desirability. We consider a myopic player, who chooses moves with the highest valuation. Each time the game is played, the player revises her valuation by assigning the payoff obtained in the play to each of the moves she has made. We show for a repeated win-lose game that if the player has a winning strategy in the stage game, there is almost surely a time after which she always wins. When a player has more than two payoffs, a more elaborate learning procedure is required. We consider one that associates with each move the average payoff in the rounds in which this move was made. When all players adopt this learning procedure, with some perturbations, then, with probability 1 there is a time after which strategies that are close to subgame perfect equilibrium are played. A single player who adopts this procedure can guarantee only her individually rational payoff.     

Demonstrating group selection: A comment on Janet Landa’s ‘The bioeconomics of homogenous middleman groups as adaptive units’

Janet Landa provides an impressive historical tour of the development of her theory of homogeneous middlemen groups (HMGs), and how she arrived at the group selection approach. Despite her claim that the case studies she presents provide evidence for group selection in human societies, we argue that such a conclusion is premature. We suggest that an evolutionary explanation of HGMs will be strengthened by greater attention to the details of the selective process.     

Partially Revealing Campaign Promises

Candidates competing for political office give promises to voters. There are no legal restraints preventing incumbents from breaking their electoral promises. This paper models campaign promises as pure cheap talk and asks why is it influential. We propose that a candidate's campaign promises are a partially revealing signal of her policy preference type. The incumbent's policy choice is yet another signal of her type. Policy choice is a costly signal (unlike campaign promises). The incumbent keeps her electoral promises in order to preserve ambiguity about her type, which is necessary to assemble a winning majority for reelection. She keeps her promises regardless of information about the efficiency of different public policies which she receives upon taking office. Therefore, campaign promises generate inefficiencies in public policy.     

Joan Robinson's disillusion with economics

In her last public comments on the state of economics, Joan Robinson made some extraordinary remarks that conveyed profound pessimism and theoretical nihilism. To account for the bleakness of Robinson's later views on economics and economic policy this article examines her last decade. These years were marked by an array of reverses to the causes she espoused. While ill health and a propensity to be provocative coloured her disposition, her comment about economic theory disintegrating in her hands was not made casually; it was, rather, an acknowledgement that her project to integrate Keynes with the classical surplus theory had failed. This acknowledgement crystallised into her rejection of the long-period equilibrium interpretation of Keynes's theory of unemployment. At the end of her life Robinson was willing only to embrace the more traditional short-period Keynesian model grounded in uncertainty and expectations.