WHICH CAPITALISM? LESSONS FORM THE EAST ASIAN CRISIS

As a result of the Asian crisis, relationship-based economic systems are now under attack for corruption and inefficiency. Yet, until recently, they were held up as an alternative (and in some respects superior) form of capitalism to the arm's-length, market-based, Anglo-Saxon systems of the U.S. and the U.K. What went wrong? This paper suggests that relationship-based systems work well when contracts are poorly enforced and capital is scarce. Power relationships substitute for contracts, and can achieve better outcomes than a primitive contractual system. But a relationship-based system suppresses the price system and the signals it provides. As a result, relationship-based systems are likely to misallocate capital when presented with large external capital inflows. Since the external capital comes from arm's length investors who typically have few contractual rights or little power in a relationship system, and since these investors are aware of the potential for misallocation, they rationally choose to maintain control over borrowers by keeping their claims short term. Thus, the contact between the two systems creates a fragile hybrid that, while mutually beneficial to relationship borrowers and arm's length investors in normal times, is excessively prone to shocks. Where do we go from here? The authors suggest that while there may be some short-term benefits for emerging economies from reverting to the pure relationship-based system, in the long run such economies will be held back unless they develop the greater disclosure, contract enforcement, and competition of the arm's-length system. The current Asian crisis may be the most opportune moment for these economies to effect the transition between systems.     

Factors influencing Japanese auto suppliers’ predictions about the future of new technologies – An exploratory study of electric vehicles

This article investigates the effects of different characteristics of supplier–customer relationships in the Japanese automotive industry, and how these influence predictions about future technologies of a disruptive nature, such as Electric Vehicles (EVs). We conducted a survey of a broad set of suppliers in the Japanese automotive industry and another survey of suppliers registered with Toyota's two supplier associations. The data were used to analyse the influence of particular relationships and practices on information gathering about new technologies, preparations for R&D and production of new components, and predictions about new technologies. The study shows that suppliers’ R&D intensity and the usage degree of the drawing-supplied parts system lead to predictions favouring the uptake of new technologies. Moreover, communication between automakers and suppliers and arm's-length relationships simultaneously lead to favourable views on the future of new technologies, especially with regard to EVs. Moreover, we find that Japanese-style cooperative relationships, arm's-length relationships, communication between automakers and suppliers, and communication among suppliers all lead to less favourable views on new technology uptake (in this case, EVs). We discuss the implications of these findings for research and practice, specifically for EVs.     

Management Buyouts of Divisions and Shareholder Wealth

This paper examines the wealth effects to parent company shareholders around the announcement of divisional management buyouts. Despite the relative absence of “arm's-length” bargaining between buyer and seller, there is no evidence that divisional management buyouts result in reductions in parent company share prices. Instead, small but statistically significant wealth gains are found during the two-day period surrounding the buyout announcement. This evidence suggests that divisional buyouts reallocate ownership of corporate assets to higher valued uses and that parent company stockholders share in the expected benefits of this change in ownership structure.     

Private placements and managerial entrenchment

We re-examine old evidence and provide new evidence on private placements of large-percentage blocks of stock. Our goal is to judge whether the prevailing hypotheses of monitoring and certification explain most private placements. Examining new evidence on events following the private placements and using a much larger sample than previous studies, our findings suggests that private placements are often made to passive investors, thereby helping management solidify their control of the firm. Although monitoring and certification may motivate some private placements, the evidence with respect to placement discounts, stock-price reactions, the post-placement activities of the purchasers, and a comparison with arm's-length trades of large blocks of stock favors managerial entrenchment as the explanation for many private placements.     

Transfer Pricing Practices and Regulatory Actions in the U.S. and U.K.: A Cross-Country Comparison and Analysis

With the continued globalization of world markets, transfer pricing has become one of the dominant sources of controversy in international taxation. Cross-country differences in transfer pricing practices and regulations present challenges to taxing authorities and multinational enterprises (MEs). In the last two decades, tax authorities in the United States (U.S.) and other countries have brought major court cases against MEs accused of underpayment of taxes through transfer pricing practices. This paper discusses transfer pricing practices, regulatory agencies, penalties related to violations, and proper documentation required in the U.S. and one of its major trading partners, the United Kingdom (U.K.). The paper also examines the acceptable valuation methods allowed as a surrogate for arm's-length transactions as established by the country's regulatory agency. Finally, the paper discusses the similarities and differences between the major court cases related to transfer pricing in the two countries.     

Estimating Impact of Formula Apportionment on Allocation of Worldwide Income and the Potential for Double Taxation

The issue of international transfer pricing and the allocation of worldwide income has become increasingly important as the number of multinational corporations (MNCs) has increased. An arm's-length transaction method of transfer pricing is currently the method required to assign worldwide income; however, evidence suggests that MNCs use the transfer-price mechanism to shift income between tax jurisdictions. As a result, a formulary apportionment method, similar to that used by the states, has been suggested as a preferred alternative. This paper develops a simulation model to investigate the impact on U.S. taxable income of MNCs if a formula apportionment model were adopted. Alternative simulation models explore the magnitude of potential for double taxation when two taxing jurisdictions use different formulary models. The results indicate that, in the aggregate, a decrease in U.S. taxable income could be expected. A relatively modest amount of formulary income is likely to be subject to double taxation when foreign jurisdictions weight the sales factor more heavily and income escapes taxation when the U.S. weights the sales factor more heavily. However, the impact for any single MNC could be significant.     

Quango reform: the next steps?

The coalition government elected in 2010 in the UK pursued a programme of quango reform focused on reducing the number and expenditure of arm’s-length bodies, increasing transparency, improving accountability and maximizing efficiency and effectiveness. This paper revisits Flinders and Skelcher’s 2012 Flinders, M. and Skelcher, C. (2012), Shrinking the quango state: five challenges in reforming quangos. Public Money &; Management, 32, 5, pp. 327–334.[Taylor &; Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] PMM paper ‘Shrinking the quango state: five challenges in reforming quangos’ to assess progress to date and consider future challenges. Drawing insights from the UK programme of quango reform, as well as similar developments in Ireland, the authors identify five new challenges for governments: regulating, managing, reconciling, co-ordinating and reflecting.     

Regulation Inside Government: Where New Public Management Meets the Audit Explosion

This article explores the scale and growth of regulation inside UK government, defined as standard-setting and monitoring by bodies constituted at arm’s-length from those they oversee. It argues regulation inside government is comparable in scale to regulation of business and has grown sharply over two decades, while public organizations in general have substantially downsized. Regulation inside government is highly diverse and there is a marked disjunction between the control regimes applied by regulators of government to those they regulate and the way the regulators are themselves assessed and controlled.     

Fair Value: Your Value or Mine? An Observation on the Ambiguity of the Fair Value Notion Illustrated by the Credit Crunch

Current International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) define fair value as a transaction price. In imperfect markets, buyer's and seller's marginal prices, at which they are rationally willing to transact, differ. The transaction price can be any amount within the range between those prices. However, scenarios are conceivable in which no such range exists because the seller's marginal price exceeds the buyer's. In this scenario, no arm's length transactions between knowledgeable, willing parties are possible. Such a scenario can be likely characterised by low liquidity and/or high information asymmetry and seems to be broadly consistent with what is recently referred to as the ‘credit crunch’. Under this scenario, the IFRS definition of fair value is not readily applicable. Two views are possible: under view 1, fair value refers to the potential buyer's marginal price. Although fair value does always exist conceptually, it negates the notion of two rationally acting parties. View 2 acknowledges that no arm's length transaction is possible, resulting in the fair value notion not being applicable. If these two views are applied to the IFRS definition of an active market, view 1 results in markets that are always active. Only view 2 allows distinguishing between active and inactive markets.     

Talent management in government in times of economic instability: selected cases from the BRICS countries

This paper explores the policies that three BRICS countries used to tackle the growing problem of attracting and retaining talent in public sector institutions. The authors trace the changes in these countries’ strategies and approaches resulting from growing budgetary constraints; labour market shifts; new demographic trends; increasing demands for higher performance by public servants; and complex challenges faced by governments worldwide. Although talent management in public sector institutions was a government priority for the three countries—Brazil, China, and Russia—the results achieved have been modest. The authors draw lessons for other governments from their analysis.     

The costs and benefits of increased accounting regulation: a case study of Lloyd's of London

While a valuable literature exists on theoretical considerations in cost-benefit analysis (cba) of accounting regulation, and although the regulators themselves acknowledge the need for cost-benefit appraisal of their work, empirical analysis of the costs and benefits of changes in accounting regulation is almost non-existent. This paper attempts such an analysis for a step change in accounting and audit regulation—at Lloyd's between 1982 and 1985. It aims both to advance the cba methodology, and to inform debate about the evolution of the Lloyd's market. While the estimates do not show whether the changes produced an optimal level or form of Lloyd's regulation, they do suggest that, comparing changes, the extra benefits exceeded the extra costs—whether the chosen accounting unit is a private one—Lloyd's Names—or a social one.     

Tracking the international proceeds of corruption and the challenges of national boundaries and national agencies: the UK example

ABSTRACT

Corruption is a major inhibitor to economic growth, discouraging to domestic and foreign investment and destabilizing of governments. Unsurprisingly, international attention has intensified in recent years with global initiatives to counter corruption and address the proceeds of corruption. These have placed requirements upon national governments to increase transparency, reducing opportunities for use of the legitimate legal and financial infrastructure to disguise and move the proceeds of corruption. This paper reviews the boundaries at national and agency level that can create challenges for those agencies tasked with investigating and returning the proceeds of corruption to the countries from which they came. The paper considers the mechanisms that the agencies in a returning country—the UK—have at their disposal and whether national policy changes can affect their focus and operation. Specifically it reviews the role and future of the International Corruption Unit of the National Crime Agency.     

Transfer pricing in vertically integrated industries

Tax officials judge whether a multinational’s transfer price is consistent with the arm’s-length standard, the price at which two independent firms would carry out a similar transaction, by using data from comparable but independent transactions. In vertically integrated industries, the only source of comparable data may be from controlled (nonindependent) transactions. Conventional wisdom asserts that standard arm’s-length methods cannot perform well in such markets because the comparability rules encourage the integrated firms to collude tacitly on transfer prices in a way that amplifies tax-differential incentives. In this paper, we show that strategic linkages between vertically integrated firms operating in the same final good market moderate, and can possibly reverse, tax-differential incentives if the correct comparison method is used. The Cost-Plus method turns out to be the most effective in limiting the equilibrium amount of profit-shifting out of the high-tax country and it yields the highest tax revenues for the high-tax country. These benefits are shown to strengthen when the firms have private cost information.      

Quasi‐Nationalisation in the UK Banking Crisis: A Problematic Policy Option

The systemic banking crisis in 2008 led to the quasi‐nationalisation of two UK listed banks: The Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Banking Group (National Audit Office, 2010). Using property rights and agency theory as the theoretical frameworks, this paper analyses whether the quasi‐nationalisation of these banks has been successful. It is argued that as a rescue mechanism, quasi‐nationalisation was a positive development. However, questions arise over its effect as an instrument of banking reform. The State's arm's length approach to management represents a lost opportunity to change the culture of profitability over people that contributed to the banking crisis.     

Banking Competition and Capital Ratios

Empirical studies provide evidence that bank capital ratios exceed regulatory requirements. But why do banks maintain capital levels above regulatory requirements? We use data for more than 2,600 banks from 10 European countries to test recent theories suggesting that competition incentivises banks to maintain higher capital ratios. These theories also predict that banks that engage in arm's length lending have lower capital ratios, and that shareholder rights and deposit insurance characteristics affect capital ratios. Consistent with these theories, our evidence robustly indicates that competition increases capital holdings. Banks that lend at arm's length exhibit lower capital ratios, whereas banks in countries with strong shareholder rights operate with higher capital ratios. We also show some evidence that generous deposit protection schemes that exclude non‐deposit creditors are associated with higher capital ratios. Our results have important policy implications. First, while the traditional view suggests imposing restrictions on bank activities in order to restrain competition, our analysis indicates the opposite, even after adjusting the regressions for risk‐taking. Second, weak shareholder rights undermine market forces that would otherwise encourage banks to hold higher capital ratios.     

New development: Faith and foreign policy—a perspective from the Vatican

Religion matters in foreign policy as much as it does in domestic society and, to understand the world in which we live, we have to comprehend religion as a source of influence and motivation in people's lives. That is not always easy for foreign policy specialists and diplomats. Britain's relations with the Holy See go back to 1479 when England sent its first resident ambassador overseas. The Holy See is one of the world's most global bodies—touching directly 17.5% of the world's population through the Catholic Church. It is a unique hybrid of the global and the local, which helps to form global public opinion. Today, the UK's oldest embassy is working on a whole range of issues with the Holy See from tackling climate change, disarmament, international development, interfaith dialogue and preventing and ending conflict.     

Contingent Capital vs. Contingent Reverse Convertibles for Banks and Insurance Companies

During the credit and liquidity crisis in 2007 and 2008, banks found themselves largely unable to raise significant new equity quickly from parties other than sovereign wealth funds and governments. Some banks have thus recently begun to consider contingent capital as a means of pre‐arranging recapitalizations for future crises. Contingent capital is a type of put option that entitles a company to issue new securities on pre‐negotiated terms, often following the occurrence of one or more risk‐based triggering events. This article compares the economic merits of a new security—a “contingent reverse convertible” or CRC—against more traditional forms of contingent capital. In November 2009, Lloyds Banking Group plc issued “Enhanced Capital Notes”—subordinated debt that converts into common stock if Lloyds's core regulatory capital falls below 5% of its regulatory risk‐weigh ted assets. This CRC is not strictly speaking a form of contingent capital, but it does give banks the potential to recapitalize themselves quickly in the face of a crisis without having to turn to governments and taxpayers. One important limitation of CRCs is that because they do not generate new cash for a bank at the time of conversion, they are unlikely to stop a liquidity crisis once it has begun. More traditional contingent capital facilities, by contrast, do put cash in the hands of the issuer at the time the facility is drawn. But even for those inclined to use CRCs, it may be unrealistic to expect many other institutions to imitate the structure of the Lloyds offering. Persuading existing investors to take a more subordinated position in a bank's capital structure and write a put option to the bank on its own stock will be neither cheap nor easy. For this reason, the more traditional solutions used to date may have more success with banks, though arriving at a price that helps issuers and satisfies investors will be a challenge for those structures as well.     

Session V: Macro Perspectives: Bigger Problems than Corporate Governance

Columbia Business School's well‐known authority on value‐based investing begins by attributing today's economic problems to a “global economic dislocation,” one that is rooted in the ongoing—and in Greenwald's view, inevitable—decline of manufacturing and displacement by services. Like the other example of dislocation in modern times, the Great Depression of the 1930s, the 2008 global financial crisis and protracted recession— still very much with us—are viewed as originating in the sharp decline of a major “sector” of the global economy. In the Depression of the ‘30s it was agriculture; in the recent financial crisis it was manufacturing. In both cases, technological advances and economy‐wide productivity increases led to huge increases in stock and financial asset prices—but also to sharp drops in the prices of farm and manufactured goods, and massive overcapacity and ruinous competition in both sectors. According to the author, the working off of overcapacity in the agricultural sector was accomplished largely by the effect of World War II in moving huge numbers off the farm and into the mainly urban industrial sector at government expense. This labor force relocation, which occurred in all developed economies, was essential to a global economic transformation that for the next 50 years provided high productivity growth and greater equality of income and wealth. More recently, however, the global economy has been confronted with the challenge of accomplishing a transition from manufacturing to services that will feature lower productivity growth and more inequality. Foreseeing a long, difficult process, Greenwald's biggest concern is that government intervention will distract businesses from making this transition effectively—which means continuing to operate as efficiently as possible, downsizing when necessary—and so make the problems worse. And while business focuses on preserving its own efficiency and value, Greenwald urges governments to look for more cost‐effective ways—for example, expanded use in the U.S. of the Earned Income Tax Credit—to cushion workers from the consequences. Nobel laureate Edmund Phelps, while agreeing with much of Greenwald's analysis, has a different explanation of the U.S. productivity dilemma. Innovation is viewed as the primary driver of the prosperity of the advanced economies. Higher income and wealth matter less than job satisfaction, participation, and an array of non‐material “modern values” that have somehow been lost and that, for Phelps, are the key to restoring economic growth and “mass flourishing.”     

The Nature and Rationale of a Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting by Islamic Banks

Islamic banks have to abide by the revealed doctrines in Islam in conducting their business and financial transactions. They employ in-house religious advisers—often referred to as Shari'a Supervisory Board (SSB)—who issue a special report to inform users of financial statements whether or not the bank has adhered to the Islamic principles. Recently, a private standard-setting body—the Financial Accounting Organization for Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions (FAOIBFI)—has been set up to externally regulate the financial reporting by Islamic banks. The FAOIBFI has published two statements on the objectives and concepts of financial reporting to act as a framework in setting accounting standards for Islamic banks. This paper examines the FAOIBFI's approach for developing objectives and concepts of financial accounting and investigates its need for such a theoretical framework. It is argued that the FAOIBFI's objectives and concepts would not be useful in mandating accounting standards on issues that are affected by religious ruling. This does not necessarily mean that such a framework may not be useful in legitimating the FAOIBFI's role and in setting accounting standards for issues that are not governed by revealed moral doctrines although it will be subject to similar limitations to those found by other standard-setting bodies in utilising and applying their framework. However, it implies that the more the FAOIBFI sets accounting standards that incorporate religious ruling, the less it would tend to find its own objectives and concepts useful. The ambiguities that may arise from different interpretations of the religious rules will require resolutions primarily by reference to religious rather than accounting authority.