The Endless Day: The Political Economy of Women and Work

Few critics will question that the high tide of the influence of American institutional economics was reached during the New Deal. John R. Commons, Thorstein Veblen and their disciples reached the apex of their impact on public policy as sources of doctrine, policy-making and advising. Commons remains an influential figure in the history of institutional economics and progressive social thought. And he resides in the American tradition of empirical collectivism as articulated by Currin V. Shields in 1952. The tradition as understood by Commons finds the ultimate locus of power in democratic majorities, not in hegemonic classes or corporate networks, and it is only by its refinement and replenishment that it can meet the demands thrust upon it. His mature theoretical work, published between 1924 and 1950, is the main source of his empirical collectivism as shown through textual exegesis and biographical extrapolation.     

The New Comparative Political Economy

With the collapse of communism in the late 1980s the field of comparative political economy has undergone major revision. Socialism is no longer considered the viable alternative to capitalism it once was. We now recognize that the choice is between alternative institutional arrangements of capitalism. Progress in the field of comparative political economy is achieved by examining how different legal, political and social institutions shape economic behavior and impact economic performance. In this paper we survey the new learning in comparative political economy and suggest how this learning should redirect our attention in economic development.JEL classification: B53, O10, O20, P0     

The Political Economy of Argentina's Debacle

In this paper I argue that political economy considerations and, in particular, the identity of the reformers, are central to understanding the Argentine crisis that culminated in sovereign default in January 2002. During the 1990s, the main political parties remained attached to populism, and no strong party emerged at the center of the political spectrum. This had two effects in the reform process. First, it severely deteriorated it (efficiency, corruption), reducing the support of the population. Second, when a series of shocks hit the economy the anti‐reform camp tried to undo most reforms, and thus convey a message to the population about the “right” model of the world.     

The Political Economy of Clientelism*

In this paper, we argue that the political‐commitment problem provides an explanation for why much income redistribution takes an inefficient form, particularly employment in the public sector. A job is a credible way of redistributing when it provides rents (such as in situations with moral hazard), and employment is optimal ex post. Moreover, a job is selective and reversible, and thus ties the continuation utility of a voter to the political success of a particular politician. We show that the need to make offers of employment incentive‐compatible leads to inefficiencies in the supply of public goods. We also show that such inefficient redistribution becomes relatively attractive in situations with high inequality and low productivity. Inefficiency is increased when the stakes from politics are high, when inequality is high, and when money matters less than ideology in politics.     

The Political Economy of Fiscal Consolidations

In the context of recent research in political economy, this paper addresses the policy problem of fiscal consolidation in terms of three types of issues: i) the macroeconomic effects of alternative strategies to consolidate; ii) the institutional setups conducive to a consolidation; and iii) the best strategy for implementing a consolidation in order to maximize its political feasibility. One methodological feature of this survey is an emphasis on policy feasibility. One methodological feature of this survey is an emphasis on policy issues in order to bridge the gap between the level of abstraction of politico-economic models of fiscal policy and the issues faced by a policymaker when attempting a fiscal consolidation.     

The Political Economy of Social Security

We consider a two-period overlapping generations model in which individual voters differ by age and by productivity. In such a setting, a redistributive pay-as-you-go system is politically sustainable, even when the interest rate is higher than the rate of population growth. The workers with medium wages (not those with the lowest wages) and the retirees form a majority which votes for a positive level of social security. This level depends on the difference between the rates of population growth and interest as well as on the redistributiveness of the benefit rule.     

The Political Economy of Bulimia Nervosa

Bulimia Nervosa constitutes a major social problem. There have, however, been few, if any, attempts to understand the distinctive features of this disorder from within the social sciences. Rather, the increasing prevalence of all forms of eating disorders are understood as a product of how the concepts of ‘femininity’ and the ‘controlled body’ are constructed within contemporary society. Bulimia and anorexia are ultimately seen to have their roots in the same social phenomena. While recognising the insights that the existing literature offers, we argue that in order to fully understand the rise of bulimia we must focus on the food system. More precisely, we must examine how the commercialisation of food preparation has led to a partial breakdown in meal structures and the rise of ‘everyday’ bingeing. The rise of extreme forms of disordered consumption associated with bulimia can be related to broader changes in the eating regime.     

The Political Economy of the IRS

This paper tests a multiple principal–agent model of the Internal Revenue Service. Using data for 33 IRS districts over six tax years, 1992–1997, we report evidence that the fraction of individual income tax returns audited is significantly lower in districts that are important to the president electorally and that have representation on key congressional committees. These findings suggest that the IRS is not a rogue government agency, but rather is an effective bureaucratic agent of its political sponsors. "Reforming" the IRS by subjecting it to an independent oversight board appointed by the president would therefore seem to be redundant.     

The Political Economy of Trade Preferences

This articles tests the implications the Grossman and Helpman "protection for sale" model. The goal is to address some of the problems associated with previous empirical studies. These problems are addressed using a data set derived from decisions reached by the president in cases involving product or beneficiary eligibility under the Generalized System of Preferences. The results provide some support for the Grossman and Helpman model, but they also indicate that factors not accounted for in this model play an important role in GSP eligibility decisions. (JEL F13 , F14 )     

论政治经济学、西方经济学的位置和功能

准确定位政治经济学、西方经济学的位置和功能,需要把握好以下问题:要正确看待西方经济学,分清西方经济学和当年马克思批判的资产阶级庸俗经济学的关系,鼓励对西方经济学进行创新性研究,有分析地加以利用;正确看待马克思主义在教学和研究中的指导作用,理解好马克思主义的基本内涵,采取与时俱进的态度来创新和发展政治经济学的资本主义部分,针对社会主义国家建设过程中出现的社会各阶层之间利益关系的矛盾,来创建社会主义政治经济学;深刻认识政治经济学和西方经济学的互补性。     

The Political Economy of the Global Environment

Issues of the ‘global commons’ have secured a prominent place in environmental discourse. The temperature-regulating functions of the global atmosphere and radiation control functions of stratospheric ozone offer clear examples of true public goods. Other environmental assets, such as biodiversity and forests, are treated as if they are public goods, but in reality are complex mixtures of private goods, local public goods and global public goods. The approach to the provision and protection of these goods has tended to focus on the development of international agreements, such as those at the Rio de Janeiro ‘Earth Summit’ in 1992. But do these agreements contain the relevant incentives to conserve the global commons? Much depends on one's view of human nature. The Scottish economic tradition suggests that unless incentives focus on ‘self love’, as postulated by Hume and Smith, improvements will, at best, be marginal. A richer array of policy measures is obtained by analysing the potential for ‘global bargains’, trades that improve the environment whilst making each party better off. The souls of Hume and Smith surely approve recent developments in practical global bargains.