Monetary policy, macroeconomic adjustment and currency speculation under floating exchange rates: the case of Bulgaria

This paper deals with the Bulgarian experience with exchange rate policy and the related macroeconomic adjustment in the transition period. It is argued that in the context of the Bulgarian macroeconomic environment, the exchange rate regime and the exchange rate policy (or the lack of such) did play a crucial role in determining the patterns of macroeconomic adjustment in this period. A simple general equilibrium model is suggested that provides some insights into the stylized performance of an economy under certain assumptions, similar to those characterizing the transitional state of the Bulgarian economy. Finally, some aspects of Bulgarian macroeconomic performance in recent years are analysed on the basis of the available empirical information and using the framework of the theoretical model. The paper concludes with the policy lessons of this experience.     

Structural breaks, cointegration, and speed of adjustment Evidence from 12 LDCs money demand

This article estimates a theoretically coherent and empirically robust money demand function for 12 developing countries. The modeling procedure not only tests for a regime shift in the cointegrating equation, but also in the error correction model. Five specific hypotheses are examined. The article demonstrates that a long-run equilibrium relationship exists between real M1 or M2 balances, real income, inflation, exchange rate, foreign exchange risk, and foreign interest rates in the countries studied. The study provides information on the speed of adjustment to equilibrium and the median and mean time lags for adjustment of real money balances to changes in each determinant. Although our results provide more evidence against M1 than M2, this study clearly establishes that both M1 and M2 must be considered as viable policy tools for less developed countries.     

What to stabilize in the open economy*

We consider the question how “best” to maintain price‐level stability in an open economy, and evaluate three possible policy choices: (a) a constant money growth rate rule; (b) a fixed exchange rate; and (c) a policy of explicit commitment to a price‐level target. In each case we assume that policy is conducted by injecting reserves into or withdrawing reserves from the “banking system.” In evaluating the three regimes, we adopt the criterion that the “best” policy should leave the least scope for indeterminacy and “excessive” economic volatility. In a steady‐state equilibrium, the choice of regime is largely irrelevant; any steady‐state equilibrium under one regime can be duplicated by an appropriate choice of the “control” variable under any other regime. However, we show that the sets of equilibria under the three regimes are dramatically different. When all countries follow the policy of fixing a constant rate of money growth, there are no equilibria displaying endogenously arising volatility and there is no indeterminacy of equilibrium. Under a regime of fixed exchange rates, indeterminacies and endogenously arising fluctuations are impossible if and only if the country with the low “reserve‐to‐deposit” ratio is charged with maintaining the fixed rate. Finally, when one country targets the time path of its price level, under very weak conditions, there will be indeterminacy of equilibrium and endogenously arising volatility driven by expectations.     

THE POLITICAL CHOICE OF THE EXCHANGE RATE REGIME*

The purpose of this paper is to present a model in which the choice of the optimal exchange rate regime is envisaged in a political setting. We consider a country whose voting population comprises three types of agents, importers, exporters and speculators, who select their position on exchange rate policy according to welfare maximization. As a result, well-defined interest groups are shown to emerge. Each coalition makes contributions to one of two political candidates running for political office in support for their optimal policy intervention. When policy pronouncements by the two candidates are made in terms of exchange rate volatility, the equilibrium consists of two extremes: a fixed versus flexible exchange regime, the latter with bounded volatility [JEL D72, F31].     

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a post Keynesian open-economy model

Using a post Keynesian model, this study aims to analyze the stabilizing role of fiscal and monetary policies in an open economy with a managed exchange rate regime. The real exchange rate is modeled as an endogenous variable and inflation explained using the conflicting claims approach. The dynamic properties of macroeconomic equilibrium are evaluated in different regimes of fiscal and monetary policies. The main result of this study suggests that the preferred policy regime is the one in which economic authorities are complementary and fiscal policy plays an explicitly active role. In this regime, the fiscal policy must commit to the target for the rate of capacity utilization and the monetary authority must commit to the inflation target.     

Exchange Rate Policy and Sovereign Spreads in Emerging Market Economies

This paper empirically analyzes the relationship between exchange rate policy and sovereign risk premia in emerging market economies, considering both officially declared regimes and actual exchange rate behavior. The results show that countries that announce a fixed exchange rate regime face lower spreads than countries that announce a floating regime or intermediate flexibility. When the actual exchange rate behavior is considered, this relationship persists between intermediate flexibility and pegs but countries that allow their exchange rates to freely float do not face higher spreads. The difference between the results is due to the fact that many countries deviate from their declared exchange rate policy. The countries that announce a floating regime do not face higher spreads than pegs when they actually allow a high degree of flexibility as they announced. However, intermediate flexibility leads to higher spreads independently of whether this is the announced policy or the actual behavior.     

COSTS AND BENEFITS OF EXCHANGE RATE STABILITY: CANADA'S INTERWAR EXPERIENCE

In January 1929, the Canadian government suspended gold exports and implemented a floating exchange rate regime that endured until the onset of World War II. In sharp contrast to the experience of other countries that left the gold standard, Canada's deflation and declining economic activity continued until 1933. This paper examines why the Canadian government chose to follow a restrictive monetary policy and how that policy affected the Canadian exchange rate. We show that the chosen policy was rational—given the government's assumptions and objectives—and that it was consistent with fiscal policy. In so doing, we argue that the government's commitment to monetary stability was credible. We show that one can explain the Canadian exchange rate's behavior by a simple expectations-based model of exchange rate determination, given external events and the government's monetary policy.     

Random perturbations of deterministic equilibria

This paper examines whether a small random deviation from a non-random policy process will destabilize the equilibrium exchange rate. The results focus on exchange rate dynamics when the government maintains a target zone or makes unanticipated deviations from a policy rule. With rational expectations small random shocks do not create large deviations from the policy rule exchange rate. If agents are approximately rational large deviations between exchange rates are possible.     

Interest Rate Volatility Prior to Monetary Union under Alternative Pre-Switch Regimes

Abstract. The volatility of interest rates is relevant for many financial applications. Under realistic assumptions the term structure of interest rate differentials provides an important predictor of the term structure of interest rates. This paper derives the term structure of differentials in a situation in which two open economies plan to enter a monetary union in the future. Two systems of floating exchange rates prior to the union are considered, namely a free-float and a managed-float regime. The volatility processes of arbitrary-term differentials under the respective pre-switch arrangements are compared. The paper elaborates the singularity of extremely short-term (i.e. instantaneous) interest rates under extensive leaning-against-the-wind interventions and discusses policy issues.     

On the relevance of exchange rate regimes for stabilization policy

This paper assesses the relevance of the exchange rate regime for stabilization policy. Using both fiscal and monetary policy, we conclude that the exchange rate regime is irrelevant. This is the case independently of the severity of price rigidities, independently of asymmetries across countries in shocks and transmission mechanisms. The only relevant conditions are on the mobility of labor and financial assets. The results can be summarized with the claim that every currency area is an optimal currency area. However, with labor mobility or tradable state-contingent assets, additional policy instruments would be required to establish the irrelevance result.     

Exchange Rate Flexibility and the Effect of Remittances on Economic Growth

This paper studies the question of whether exchange rate policy affects the impact of remittances on economic growth in recipient countries. The findings indicate that more flexible exchange rate regimes are associated with a greater increase in economic growth following an increase in remittances, but also that the impact of remittances on growth is positive under a fixed regime. The results further show that the effect of remittances under a fixed exchange rate regime is positive in less financially developed countries as well, but do not provide conclusive evidence that this effect varies inversely with exchange rate flexibility in such economies as theorized; the results being sensitive to the choice of financial development indicator.     

The Bernanke and Blinder Model in an Open Economy: The Italian Case

Abstract. This paper analyzes the functioning of monetary policy transmission mechanisms in Italy from 1984 to 1998, highlighting the role performed by the credit system. We extend the Bernanke and Blinder model (1988) to the case of an open economy under a quasi‐fixed exchange rate regime, deriving analytically the conditions for the functioning of the three monetary policy channels generally identified in the literature (‘money’, ‘exchange rate’ and ‘credit’). These conditions explain the partial effectiveness of monetary policy in achieving price and income targets, while maintaining external equilibrium. By means of a structural VECM analysis, we evaluate the effectiveness of the transmission of monetary policy through the three channels.     

Public Sector Rationing and Private Sector Selection

We study the interaction between nonprice public rationing and prices in the private market. Under a limited budget, the public supplier uses a rationing policy. A private firm may supply the good to those consumers who are rationed by the public system. Consumers have different amounts of wealth, and costs of providing the good to them vary. We consider two regimes. First, the public supplier observes consumers’ wealth information; second, the public supplier observes both wealth and cost information. The public supplier chooses a rationing policy, and, simultaneously, the private firm, observing only cost but not wealth information, chooses a pricing policy. In the first regime, there is a continuum of equilibria. The Pareto dominant equilibrium is a means‐test equilibrium: poor consumers are supplied while rich consumers are rationed. Prices in the private market increase with the budget. In the second regime, there is a unique equilibrium. This exhibits a cost‐effectiveness rationing rule; consumers are supplied if and only if their cost–benefit ratios are low. Prices in the private market do not change with the budget. Equilibrium consumer utility is higher in the cost‐effectiveness equilibrium than the means‐test equilibrium.     

人民币汇率制度渐进性转换路径的Logistic回归分析

目前浮动汇率制度转换的相关理论和实证分析相对匮乏.通过构建二元Logistic回归模型对样本国家的汇率制度转换进行实证研究,分析人民币汇率制度从固定盯住汇率制度退出的渐进性转换路径问题,可得出人民币汇率制度退出固定盯住汇率制度应先转向中间汇率制度的研究结论,从而为我国人民币汇率制度转换政策提供重要的理论和实证支持.     

On the relevance of floating exchange rate policies

I study the relevance of the composition of the public debt between domestic and foreign liabilities in a standard stochastic small open-economy framework. The government issues nominal bonds of several maturities with noncontingent face value at redemption. Intervening in the exchange market to implement an adequate state-contingent path for the nominal exchange rate is an effective way for the government to prevent the economy from reaching any competitive equilibrium it wishes to rule out. Most sterilized interventions are not neutral; however, few of them are. As a consequence, the composition in question is undetermined. Hence, a floating regime may decentralize every competitive outcome, even one induced by a pegging policy. Conversely, outcomes brought forth by a floating regime can also be induced by a policy that prescribes active government intervention in the foreign currency market. Moreover, an open-market operation can be replaced by an equivalent combination of an exchange intervention plus a restructuring of the domestic debt maturity. Introducing in the model strategic behavior by the government combined with asymmetric information or lack of commitment can remove that indeterminacy. Hence, these factors seem to be the major determinants of a possible relation between floating exchange rate policies and economic outcomes.     

Unveiling the objectives of central banks: Tales of four Latin American countries

We estimate the stabilization objectives of four Latin American countries that have implemented a flexible inflation targeting regime recently: Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru. In doing so, we develop a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model for these economies and estimate their structural parameters through Bayesian methods. To infer the stabilization objectives in each country, we assume that central banks set monetary policy optimally. Our main results highlight that the central banks in these four countries have a high preference for stabilizing inflation, but do not have the systematic objective of stabilizing the exchange rate. This result is robust to assuming either commitment or discretion in the optimal policy. Also, in contrast to the case of commitment, assuming discretion in the optimal monetary policy increases the preference for interest rate smoothing, making it comparable to a preference for inflation stabilization. Finally, except for the case of Peru, the monetary policy under discretion has a better empirical fit in these countries than the one under commitment.     

Do Fundamentals Explain the Behaviour of the Swedish Real Effective Exchange Rate?

This study examines the long‐run relationship between the real effective exchange rate and its fundamental determinants, and derives a real effective equilibrium exchange rate for the Swedish krona. Our results indicate that the krona was severely overvalued in late 1992, when the fixed exchange rate regime was abandoned. By the end of 2000 the krona was undervalued by approximately 5 percent, given the prevailing economic conditions. Arithmetic examples of suitable SEK/EUR conversion rates are calculated under various assumptions to provide a guideline if Sweden were to adopt the euro in the future.     

发展中国家汇率制度安排的名与实——对法定汇率制度与事实汇率制度之差异的经验分析

文章分析了发展中国家汇率制度安排名与实不符现象的分布与演变,并对其成因提出了一些假说。文章使用面板数据多元混合Logit模型的计量分析发现,较高的通货膨胀导致恐惧浮动现象,而较高外汇储备或严格的资本管制则导致恐惧固定现象,这在很大程度上支持了我们提出的关于发展中国家汇率制度安排名与实不符现象成因的假说。     

A cautionary note in using patterns of shocks to determine optimal exchange rate policy. An exploration of Nepalese and Indian exchange rate relations: 1964–1994

Nepal and India are developing countries in Asia whose (hard) peg has existed for almost forty years as well as no restriction on capital mobility between both countries. However, empirical results suggest that Nepal and India do not face symmetric patterns of shocks and are thus not suitable for a fixed exchange rate under this criteria. One possible explanation may be that the monetary authority plays some role in the short run to reduce the cost of the exchange rate regime. This suggests that some caution should be used in basing optimal exchange rate policy on this single criteria.     

The mystery of the Chinese exchange rate regime: basket or no basket?

Economists have taken for granted the claim made by the Chinese government that the policy shift introduced in July 2005 constituted a change in the exchange rate regime from a fixed peg to a basket peg. We demonstrate that neither the stylized facts nor the empirical evidence support the proposition of a basket peg and suggest several reasons as to why China has not adopted this regime. The results could prove useful for identifying the Chinese exchange rate regime in the aftermath of the perceived policy shift following the August 2015 devaluation.