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1.
Our paper examines whether holding multiple outside board seats compromises a director’s ability to effectively perform monitoring duties. Analyzing over 1400 firms, we report that individuals who hold more outside directorships serve on fewer board committees. The relation, however, appears non-linear, U-shaped, and in support for both the busyness and the reputation hypotheses. In addition, we find that holding more outside board seats decreases the likelihood of membership on compensation and audit committees. The findings substantiate evidence [Akhigbe, A., Martin, A.D., 2006. Valuation impact of Sarbanes–Oxley: Evidence from disclosure and governance within the financial services industry. Journal of Banking and Finance 30 (3), 989–1006] of value relevance of board committee structures. Additional analysis of committee memberships suggests that women and ethnic minorities are placed on more board committees. Also, directors on smaller and independent boards serve on more committees. Finally, it appears that the Sarbanes–Oxley act had a material impact on the association between the number of multiple board seats and committee memberships. 相似文献
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《公共资金与管理》2013,33(5):275-281
As a recent Home Office White Paper ‘Building Communities, Beating Crime’ demonstrates, radical change now confronts the police service. Policing responsibilities and police budgets are being devolved to Basic Command Units and there will be radical internal changes in the make up and role of police and civilian staff in the service. The modernization process now contemplated by the Government can be expected to encompass both a number of issues identified within the 1993 Sheehy Report (particularly in relation to local pay bargaining) and further efficiency reforms that will impact significantly on the role and status of the police and the structure of police forces throughout England and Wales. 相似文献
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Barry Loveday 《公共资金与管理》2005,25(5):275-281
As a recent Home Office White Paper 'Building Communities, Beating Crime' demonstrates, radical change now confronts the police service. Policing responsibilities and police budgets are being devolved to Basic Command Units and there will be radical internal changes in the make up and role of police and civilian staff in the service. The modernization process now contemplated by the Government can be expected to encompass both a number of issues identified within the 1993 Sheehy Report (particularly in relation to local pay bargaining) and further efficiency reforms that will impact significantly on the role and status of the police and the structure of police forces throughout England and Wales. 相似文献
4.
Since 1995, police forces in England and Wales have been able to raise revenues locally to supplement grants from central government. We analyse the variation across police force areas in locally raised police revenues over the 2000s, and we find that three‐quarters of the temporal and spatial variation in local revenues per head can be explained by differences in incomes, prices and local preferences. A particularly robust parameter is the effective local community tax price associated with raising revenue. We discuss the police funding model in the wider context of fiscal federalism, and we point to alternative funding structures that could be adopted. 相似文献
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This study examines whether financial constraints and board governance play substitution roles in lowering agency concerns in corporate cash holdings. Using four firm-specific characteristics of financial constraints and 28 forward-looking board governance standards, we find that board governance mitigates agency concerns in cash holdings more significantly for financially less-constrained firms. Consistently, financially less-constrained firms increase the level of board governance and adopt more board governance standards. A natural experiment with the 2007 financial crisis provides robustness to our findings. Our evidence suggests that financial constraints interrelate with the effectiveness of board governance on corporate cash holdings. 相似文献
6.
Ji Jiao Talavera Oleksandr Yin Shuxing 《Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting》2020,54(1):69-110
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - This paper examines the relationship between number of topic-specific board meetings and quality of corporate governance. The quality of corporate... 相似文献
7.
《Journal of Corporate Finance》2003,9(3):295-316
We examine the role of the board of directors, the audit committee, and the executive committee in preventing earnings management. Supporting an SEC Panel Report's conclusion that audit committee members need financial sophistication, we show that the composition of a board in general and of an audit committee more specifically, is related to the likelihood that a firm will engage in earnings management. Board and audit committee members with corporate or financial backgrounds are associated with firms that have smaller discretionary current accruals. Board and audit committee meeting frequency is also associated with reduced levels of discretionary current accruals. We conclude that board and audit committee activity and their members' financial sophistication may be important factors in constraining the propensity of managers to engage in earnings management. 相似文献
8.
In this study we analyze the effect of latent managerial characteristics on corporate governance. We find that CEO and board chair fixed effects explain a significant portion of the variation in board size, board independence, and CEO-chair duality even after controlling for several firm characteristics and firm fixed effects. The effect of CEOs on corporate governance practices is attributable mainly to executives who simultaneously hold the position of CEO and board chair in the same firm. Our results do not show a decline in CEO discretionary influence on corporate governance after the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act and stock exchange governance regulations. 相似文献
9.
Audra L. Boone Laura Casares Field Jonathan M. Karpoff Charu G. Raheja 《Journal of Financial Economics》2007
Using a unique panel dataset that tracks corporate board development from a firm's IPO through 10 years later, we find that: (i) board size and independence increase as firms grow and diversify over time; (ii) board size—but not board independence—reflects a tradeoff between the firm-specific benefits and costs of monitoring; and (iii) board independence is negatively related to the manager's influence and positively related to constraints on that influence. These results indicate that economic considerations—in particular, the specific nature of the firm's competitive environment and managerial team—help explain cross-sectional variation in corporate board size and composition. Nonetheless, much of the variation in board structures remains unexplained, suggesting that idiosyncratic factors affect many individual boards’ characteristics. 相似文献
10.
《Global Finance Journal》2007,17(3):264-282
This study examines the effects of regulation and a contested market for corporate control on the internal mechanisms of corporate governance. The study focus is on two sectors, manufacturing and banking, due to their differences in the governance environment. In the United Kingdom for the sample period used in this study, manufacturing was characterized by a contested market for corporate control with little or no regulatory interference. In banking on the other hand, takeovers, hostile or otherwise, were absent and ownership changes and board appointments were supervised by the regulator—the Bank of England. The findings of the panel data estimates show that, unlike in the manufacturing sector, disciplinary top management turnover in banks was not related to share price performance. Outside directors were significantly less effective in disciplining top management in banks than in manufacturing firms. 相似文献
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We study the link between a firm's quality of governance and its alliance activity. We consider alliances as a commitment technology that helps a company’ Chief Executive Officer overcome agency problems that relate to the inability to ex ante motivate division managers. We show that well-governed firms are more likely to avail themselves of this technology to anticipate ex post commitment problems and resolve them. The role of governance is particularly important when the commitment problems are more acute, such as for significantly risky/long-horizon projects (“longshots”) or firms more prone to inefficient internal redistribution of resources (conglomerates), as well as in the absence of alternative disciplining devices (e.g., low product market competition). Governance also mitigates agency issues between alliance partners; dominant alliance partners agree to a more equal split of power with junior partners that are better governed. An “experiment” that induces cross-sectional variation in the cost of the alliance commitment technology provides evidence of a causal link between governance and alliances. 相似文献
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Accounting conservatism and corporate governance 总被引:7,自引:0,他引:7
Juan Manuel García Lara Beatriz García Osma Fernando Penalva 《Review of Accounting Studies》2009,14(1):161-201
We predict that firms with stronger corporate governance will exhibit a higher degree of accounting conservatism. Governance
level is assessed using a composite measure that incorporates several internal and external characteristics. Consistent with
our prediction, strong governance firms show significantly higher levels of conditional accounting conservatism. Our tests
take into account the endogenous nature of corporate governance, and the results are robust to the use of several measures
of conservatism (market-based and nonmarket-based). Our evidence is consistent with the direction of causality flowing from
governance to conservatism, and not vice versa, indicating that governance and conservatism are not substitutes. Finally,
we study the impact of earnings discretion on the sensitivity of earnings to bad news across governance structures. We find
that, on average, strong-governance firms appear to use discretionary accruals to inform investors about bad news in a timelier
manner.
相似文献
Fernando Penalva (Corresponding author)Email: |
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This paper suggests the topic of corporate agility as a fruitful area for corporate governance research. Corporate agility, which refers to a firms ability to adapt to changes in its environment, is likely to be a critical, yet understudied, determinant of firm performance and survival. This paper proposes an inverse relation between the centralization of decision-making in firms and agility. It also proposes that certain governance structures often viewed as increasing agency costs, such as insider-controlled boards and dual class stock, may actually increase agility and thereby improve firm performance and the chances of survival. The paper concludes with a discussion of specific ways in which agility might be incorporated into the corporate governance literature. 相似文献
17.
Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number two executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures of the presence and extent of mutual monitoring from the No. 2 executive are positively related to future firm value (Tobin’s Q); (2) the beneficial effect is more pronounced for firms with stronger incentives for the No. 2 to monitor and with higher information asymmetry between the boards and the CEOs; and (3) mutual monitoring is a substitute for other governance mechanisms. The results suggest that mutual monitoring provides important checks and balances on CEO power. 相似文献
18.
The main purpose of this paper is to examine underwriters’ response to issuers’ ineffective corporate governance. Given the
growing importance of corporate governance for the success of equity offerings, we examine this response using a sample of
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Previous studies suggest various rationales behind underwriter syndication, such as risk
sharing, market-making, information production, certification, and monitoring. We offer an information-asymmetry-reduction
hypothesis for the persistence of underwriter syndication. We argue that less effective corporate governance decreases information
credibility, which, in turn, increases information asymmetry, leading underwriters to increase syndicate size to mitigate
subsequent agency problems. Consistent with this prediction, we find that the size of the underwriter syndication is inversely
related to proxies that measure the effectiveness of corporate governance. Results remain robust even after controlling for
other confounding factors. 相似文献
19.
We examine the link between the monitoring capacity of the board and corporate performance of UK listed firms. We also investigate how firms use the flexibility offered by the voluntary governance regime to make governance choices. We find a strong positive association between the board governance index we construct and firm operating performance. Our results imply that adherence to the board‐related recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance Code strengthens the board's monitoring capacity, potentially helping mitigate agency problems, but that investors do not value it correspondingly. Moreover, in contrast to prior UK findings suggesting efficient adoption of Code recommendations, we find that firms at times use the Code flexibility opportunistically, aiming to decrease the monitoring capacity of the board, which is followed by subsequent underperformance. This finding questions the effectiveness of the voluntary approach to governance regulation followed in the UK and in many countries around the world. 相似文献
20.
This article has two related tasks. First, we review the articles published in this Special Issue on Corporate Control, Mergers, and Acquisitions. These articles provide new evidence on several aspects of corporate control and governance including the value and performance effects of various ownership groups, the impact of internal governance structures, the effects of regulatory changes on specific industries and evidence on bidding strategies in takeovers. This analysis leads us to our second task – to examine the evolution of corporate control research, broadly defined. Our analysis shows a movement in research from mergers and acquisitions to a broader analysis of corporate governance, especially internal governance features. We suggest that there is a trend toward an increase in the relative importance of internal governance compared to discipline from the market from corporate control. This trend reflects an important change over the past several decades in the means through which the market disciplines corporate behavior. 相似文献