Causal Laws,Functional Relations and Tendencies

This paper draws upon critical realism to argue that the widespread use of functional relations and laws in economics is misconceived. This misconception stems from the inappropriate use of a deductivist mode of theorising; an empirical realist ontology; and a notion of causality as mere regularity or constant conjunction, all of which are associated with functional relations and laws. Not only does critical realism identify the cause of the misconception, it sustains an alternative causal/explanatory mode of theorising; a stratified ontology; a notion of causality as powers; and an alternative notion of law as tendency. Marx's ideas on the tendencies to employment and unemployment are used as an example of economic theory consistent with these alternatives.     

On Stephen Parsons' Philosophical Critique of Transcendental Realism

This paper replies to Stephen Parsons' critique of Tony Lawson's Economics and Reality recently published in this journal. The topics addressed include Lawson's critique of empirical realism; Lawson's definition of 'structures'; theories of truth; the relationship between mainstream economics and empirical realism; and the possibility of naturalism .     

Critical Realism as a Basis for Economic Methodology: A critique

This paper considers the claim that critical realism provides a convincing critique of mainstream economics and offers a sound methodological basis for an alternative approach. It argues that critical realism presents a tendentious definition of positivism and a characterisation of mainstream economics that is misleading, and that it misrepresents the nature and purpose of the work of Hume and modern Humean philosophers. It also argues that critical realism's bold ontological claims lack epistemological support. The paper concludes that critical realism does not provide a compelling basis for economic methodology.     

Eriksson on critical realism: a comment

Abstract

This note offers a critique of Ralf Eriksson's treatment of Critical Realism. Eriksson, in the context of an analysis of Keynes, makes several mistaken claims about Critical Realism. Specifically, contrary to Eriksson, Critical Realism does not claim that the world is independent of consciousness, that isolation and closure are equivalent, that abstraction and closure are equivalent, that Lawson employs double standards in the possibility of closed systems, or that realist theories must be simple. Eriksson attacks a vulgar form of realism, but not Critical Realism as it currently stands. We also argue that Eriksson's misinterpretations may be partially due to some ambiguous statements in the Critical Realist literature.     

Rhetoric vs realism in economic methodology: a critical assessment of recent contributions

This paper reviews the relatively new debate on rhetoric andrealism in economic methodology, concentrating on its main exponents:Deirdre McCloskey on the side of rhetoric, Tony Lawson as theadvocate of critical realism, and Uskali Mäki, arguingfor a combination of rhetoric and realism. The review highlightsa blind spot in the debate, namely the opportunity to rethinkcritically the project of epistemology.     

Realism,Regularities, and Prediction

Problems are identified with the transcendental argument that Lawson uses to make a case for realism in economics: this argument relies heavily upon an unproblematized conception of Free Will. Lawson's substantive conclusions are not vitiated, but the argument presented here suggests that he underestimates the role of regularities and prediction in economics.     

A critical realist interpretation of evolutionary growth theorising

The paper discusses a critical realist interpretation of evolutionarygrowth theorising by focusing on some of its basic characteristics.The evolutionary ontology is complex, differentiated, structured,systemic, open, ever-changing and radically uncertain. Its methodologytends to be increasingly based on ‘appreciative’theorising, retroductive explanations and interdisciplinaryanalysis. After discussing these features, the paper suggeststhat critical realism may indeed constitute an important philosophicaland methodological foundation for the future development ofevolutionary theories of economic growth.     

Post-truth: an alumni economist’s perspective

ABSTRACT

Drawing upon 50 years as an academic economist, this lecture to alumni of SOAS’s Department of Economics reflects upon the continual ‘post-truth’ aspects of mainstream economics, ranging over its substantive, if shifting, content, and its treatment of methodology and interdisciplinarity. It draws upon a wide range of theory, empirical analysis, policy and anecdote to highlight both the need for alternatives and the continuing, even increased, failure of the mainstream to engage with criticism and alternatives.     

Keynes's realisms

Abstract

Some authors pointed to a realist orientation in Keynes's thought. However, since ‘realism’ is a wide and sometimes equivocal term, one may ask what kind of realism Keynes's realism is. This paper argues that Keynes held to an ontological, logical–semantic and epistemic realism. Whereas ontological realism has metaphysical connections, logical–semantic realism involves a notion of truth, and epistemological realism presupposes a theory of knowledge. The character of the subject matter circumscribes the scope of this last kind of realism. Epistemological realism is related to the role of intuition and convention in Keynes's thought, the meaning and evolution of which is explained.     

Between mathematical formalism,normative choice rules,and the behavioural sciences: The emergence of rational choice theories in the late 1940s and early 1950s

Abstract

This paper discusses why mathematical economists of the early Cold War period favored formal-axiomatic over behavioral choice theories. One reason was that formal-axiomatic theories allowed mathematical economists to improve the conceptual and theoretical foundations of economics and thereby to increase its scientific status. Furthermore, the separation between mathematical economics and other behavioral sciences was not as clear-cut as often argued. While economists did not modify their behavioral assumptions, some acknowledged the empirical shortcomings of their models. The paper reveals the multifaceted nature of rational choice theories reflected in the changing interpretations and roles of the theories in those early years.     

The Case For Strategic Realism: A Response To Lawson

Tony Lawson makes a compelling case that it is only naive realism that feminist social scientists and philosophers need to avoid, not any and all realist arguments. However, he leaves mysterious, on the one hand, why so many feminists have preferred epistemological to ontological arguments and, on the other hand, why naive realism, which is indeed problematic, can appear to be a good scientific/epistemic strategy. The essay below tries to demystify these phenomena, notes a possible misleading aspect of his use of the term "epistemological relativism", and argues for a somewhat more limited value of the ontological argument he proposes for standpoint epistemologies.     

Economics, realism and reality: a comparison of Maki and Lawson

There is presently considerable debate about the applicationand interpretation of realism in economics. Interest in thisarea of the philosophy and methodology of economics has intensifiedover the last twenty years, especially owing to the substantialcontributions by Uskali Mäki and Tony Lawson, respectively.Although their work falls under the same banner of realism ineconomics, their projects differ significantly in many importantrespects. This review tries to clarify the contrasting approachesof each author and explains the main reasons for the differencesbetween them. The emphasis is on clarification of their respectivepositions rather than a comprehensive critical evaluation assuch.     

Transforming economics into what? Heterodox economics and critical realism

The volume under review consists of comments on critical realismby heterodox economists. This paper addresses a number of themesfrom the book, e.g., history and reflexivity, sometimes expandingon the authors' comments on critical realism, other times respondingto them on behalf of critical realists. It considers the goalsof critical realism and ask to what extent the book furthersthem. It concludes that the high level of abstraction at whichcritical realism operates encourages those commenting on itto do so at a similarly high level of abstraction. As it stands,critical realism and the contributions to the book are too divorcedfrom the concerns of concrete economic theorising to be of greatuse to practising heterodox economists.     

Validation of modeled pharmacoeconomic claims in formulary submissions

Abstract

Modeled or simulated claims for costs and outcomes are a key element in formulary submissions and comparative assessments of drug products and devices; however, all too often these claims are presented in a form that is either unverifiable or potentially verifiable but in a time frame that is of no practical use to formulary committees and others who may be committed to ongoing disease-area and therapeutic-class reviews. On the assumption that formulary committees are interested in testable predictions for product performance in target populations and ongoing disease area and therapeutic reviews, the methodological standards that should be applied are those that are accepted in the natural sciences. Claims should be presented in a form that is amenable to falsification. If not, they have no scientific standing. Certainly one can follow ISPOR-SMDM standards for validating the assumptions underpinning a model or simulation. There is clearly an important role for simulations as an input to policy initiatives and developing claims for healthcare interventions and testable hypotheses; however, one would not evaluate such claims on the realism or otherwise of the model. The only standard is one of the model’s ability to predict outcomes successfully in a time frame that is practical and useful. No other standard is acceptable. This sets the stage for an active research agenda.     

Critical Realism,Feminist Epistemology,and the Emancipatory Potential of Science: A Comment on Lawson and Harding

In a recent contribution to this Journal , Tony Lawson (1999) claims that the methodological framework of critical realism fits the "explanatory and emancipatory projects" of feminist economics. This essay challenges his claim on the basis that a "naive" notion of science underlies critical realism. It argues that for feminist economists, a rethinking of traditional notions of scientific inquiry is just as important as the rethinking of methodology, and that one cannot be done without the other.     

Richard H. Thaler: A Nobel Prize for Behavioural Economics

ABSTRACT

This paper provides an overview of Richard Thaler’s career and the contributions to behavioural economics that earned him the 2017 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. It focuses on his role in exposing and making sense of empirical anomalies in orthodox economics, his analysis of mental accounting, and his work with Cass Sunstein on the notion of libertarian paternalism and the ‘nudge’-based behavioural approach to economic policy. It then considers his contributions critically and explores how, unlike previous behavioural economics, Thaler succeeded in getting his new approach to behavioural economics accepted by mainstream economists.     

Was Keynes a Realist?

Lawson (1989a) has interpreted Keynes as a philosophical realist, adhering to the view that the economy has a constant inner structure. Against this it is claimed below that, although Keynes speaks about realism, it is not in this sense, but in the common sense way of referring to actually observable entities of an economic model. In addition, it can be shown that Keynes's views can be interpreted as instrumentalist—he emphasises characteristics such as usefulness and convenience, besides and instead of truth. Thus, truth and truthlike concepts do not, in Keynes's thinking, have the paramount position that they have in realist philosophy.     

Deregulation and Women's Employment: The Diverse Experiences of Women in Britain

Tony Lawson (1999) argues that critical realism will facilitate revelatory and emancipatory projects in feminist economics. The strength of Lawson's argument lies in its rejection of social atomism and methodological individualism. Societies are best understood as structurally connected systems rather than as atomistic aggregates. Its weakness lies in its reliance on a humanist conception of human agency, a conception that is increasingly questioned by some feminists.