Knowledge Questions: Hayek,Keynes and Beyond

This paper discusses the knowledge problem in terms of both the use and generation of knowledge. This is analyzed in the context of Hayek's failure to respond to the Keynes Challenge—the claim that markets fail to produce relevant knowledge—by suggesting that in the aftermath of The General Theory he was not well-positioned to address that problem. Ironically, his post-World War II work in cognitive psychology, The Sensory Order, offers a theory of the generation of knowledge which can provide a useful analogy for understanding the generation of market-level knowledge.     

From Keynes to Hayek: The marvel of thriving macroeconomies

Inherent ignorance of and uncertainties about the future may translate into doubts about the overall viability of market mechanisms. However, these doubts are quelled by a broad empirical observation: market economies thrive. Hayek sometimes abstracted from such ignorance and uncertainties in order to identify the market mechanisms that are essential to thriving economies. His often-overlooked “interest-rate brake,” for instance, keeps the rate of implementation of new technologies in line with peoples willingness to save. A careful reading of macroeconomic history suggests that artificial booms often ride piggyback on genuine booms. During a period of technological breakthroughs, the central bank's adherence to the Real Bills Doctrine overrides the interest-rate brake and engenders an unsustainable boom. JEL Code B22, E30, E50     

Hayek, Keynes, and modern macroeconomics

The Great Recession seems to be creating a change in the trend of macroeconomic thinking. Prior to the financial crisis of 2008, dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models dominated the macroeconomics literature without any apparent challengers on the horizon. Since then, however, we have seen an increasing interest in macroeconomic models that address the state of confidence (??animal spirits??), complexity, cognition, and radical uncertainty. Most of the renewed interest in animal spirits, complexity, cognition, and radical uncertainty has come from a more or less ??Keynesian?? perspective. We discuss the potential to emphasize these elements from a more ??Hayekian?? perspective and argue that Austrian approaches to macroeconomics along these lines are more likely to resonate with mainstream economists than in years past.     

Hayek and Keynes: From a common critique of economic method to different theories of expectations

The methodological positions of Hayek and Keynes contain striking similarities. Both authors opposed empiricist approaches to economics that assign priority to mere observation as the source of knowledge. Both emphasised intentionality, motivation and human agency. Notwithstanding this common ground, they had different conceptions of how beliefs are formed and had different explanations of thought and action in economics. Hayek grounded his explanation on an evolutionary theory of the mind, i.e. on psychological premises, whereas Keynes based his view of belief formation on probable reasoning, where probability is a logical concept. Starting from psychological premises Hayek maintained that individuals act rationally only by following rules. As a consequence, he considered conventional expectations to be the primary guide for agents in economic life. Keynes agreed that conventional expectations actually guide economic behaviour, but he maintained that they are justified only in situations of total ignorance. In conditions of limited knowledge, agents can base their action on reasonable expectations, independently of conventions. Moreover, agents?particularly those institutions responsible for economic policy?ought to shun conventional behaviour in order to counteract its negative social consequences. We argue that Keynes's theory of expectations is well grounded upon his theory of logical probability. Hence his advocacy of discretionary policy is rationally justified.     

F. A. Hayek vs. J. M. Keynes in Shackle's marginal gloss*

The intellectual rivalry of F. A. Hayek and J. M. Keynes has recently caught the attention of historians of economic thought, journalists and the broad public. However, how was it viewed at the time? This article uses archival material in the form of marginal annotations made by G. L. S. Shackle to determine contemporary reading responses to the theoretical developments of the 1930s. Shackle's unique reading style that includes legible, dated, annotations and the fact that a substantial part of his academic library survives gives us a unique vantage point from which to explore anew this period of intellectual history.     

Post-Hayekian socialism a la Burczak: Observations

Burczak (Socialism after Hayek, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006) presents a proposed form of stakeholder socialism to overcome the critique by Hayek of Marxist socialist systems. This involves financing the beginning of worker-owned and managed cooperatives through a wealth tax, with a generous social safety net, within a market economy in a democratic political system with civil liberties. While such a system may overcome worker alienation, avoid many of the informational and incentive-based inefficiencies identified by Hayek, and have some special efficiencies of its own, it will likely suffer from the financing problems most cooperatives face within predominantly market capitalist economies as they try to grow larger. The most likely location for an effort at such a system might be in a smaller country that has had some experience with workers’ management, such as the former Yugoslav republic of Slovenia.      

Keynes and probability: An assessment

Abstract

Most interpreters agree that Keynes had a wide-ranging, complex, ‘vision of the world’, which underlies his theoretical contributions. Whenever this is forgotten, as happens in the so-called neoclassical synthesis, not only the original Keynesian spirit goes lost but also, and especially, we lose substantive bricks for our theoretical constructions. The paper considers an important instance of this general rule; namely Keynes's views on the logic of probability, meant as the field concerning human behaviour in an uncertain world (hence connected to, but distinct from, the pure theory of probability, meant as a field of mathematics). The paper begins by recalling the main aspects of the classical and frequentist approaches to probability and the main criticisms they received, pertaining among other things to the limits of their applicability. We then consider Keynes's own views, stressing three aspects: the definition of probability as pertaining to the field of logic, the notion of uncertainty and of the ‘weight of the argument’, the ‘theory of groups’. We then discuss the subjective approach of de Finetti, Ramsey and Savage, and contrast it with Keynes's own views. Finally, we consider the implications of our analysis for the interpretation of Keynes's General Theory, and of his attitude towards econometrics.     

Hans Singer's debts to Schumpeter and Keynes

This essay discusses Hans Singer's intellectual formation andthe influences on his early writings and on his post-1947 developmenteconomics. It asks what impact the unusual experience of studyingwith both Schumpeter and Keynes had upon his subsequent economicthinking and practice. It argues that the influence of boththese mentors was surprisingly small, compared with that ofSpiethoff and Clark. Singer repaid his debts to Schumpeter andKeynes, but by working in the new currency of development economics,some of which was his own coinage. His motivation for this vasteffort was derived from the social egalitarianism of figuressuch as William Beveridge, Archbishop Temple and R. H. Tawney,rather than the liberalism of Schumpeter and Keynes.