The Impact of Climate Change on the Balanced Growth Equivalent: An Application of <Emphasis Type="Italic">FUND</Emphasis>

The Stern Review added balanced growth equivalents (BGE) to the economic climate change research agenda. We first propose rigorous definitions of the BGE for multiple regions and under uncertainty. We show that the change in the BGE is independent of the assumed scenario of per capita income. For comparable welfare economic assumptions as the Stern Review, we calculate lower changes in BGE between a business as usual scenario and one without climate impacts with the model FUND than the Stern Review found with the model PAGE. We find that mitigation policies give even lower changes in BGE and argue that those policy choices should be the focus of the research effort rather than total damage estimates. According to our results, the current carbon tax should be below $55/tC. Sensitivity analyses show that the Stern Review chose parameters that imply high impact estimates. However, for regionally disaggregated welfare functions, we find changes in BGE that are significantly higher than the results from the Stern Review both for total damage as for policy analysis. With regional disaggregation and high risk aversion, we observe fat tails and with that very high welfare losses.      

MAKING CARBON TAXATION A GENERATIONAL WIN WIN

Carbon taxation is mostly studied in social planner or infinitely lived‐agent models, which obscure carbon taxation's potential to produce a generational win win. This article's large‐scale, dynamic 55‐period, overlapping generations model calculates the carbon tax policy delivering the highest uniform welfare gain to all current and future generations. Our model features coal, oil, and gas, increasing extraction costs, clean energy, technical and demographic change, and Nordhaus' carbon/temperature/damage functions. Assuming high‐end carbon damages, the optimal carbon tax is $70, rising annually at 1.5%. This policy raises all generations' welfare by almost 5%. However, doing so requires major intergenerational redistribution.     

SOCIAL NORMS,LOCAL INTERACTION,AND NEIGHBORHOOD PLANNING*

This article examines optimal social linkage when each individual's repeated interaction with each of his neighbors creates spillovers. Each individual's discount factor is randomly determined. A planner chooses a local interaction network or neighborhood design before the discount factors are realized. Each individual then plays a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game with his neighbors. A local trigger strategy equilibrium (LTSE) describes an equilibrium in which each individual conditions his cooperation on the cooperation of at least one “acceptable” group of neighbors. Our main results demonstrate a basic trade‐off in the design problem between suboptimal punishment and social conflict. Potentially suboptimal punishment arises in designs with local interactions since in this case monitoring is imperfect. Owing to the heterogeneity of discount factors, however, greater social conflict may arise in more connected networks. When individuals' discount factors are known to the planner, the optimal design exhibits a cooperative “core” and an uncooperative “fringe.”“Uncooperative” (impatient) types are connected to cooperative ones who tolerate their free riding so that social conflict is kept to a minimum. By contrast, when the planner knows only the ex ante distribution over individual discount factors, then in some cases the optimal design partitions individuals into maximally connected cliques (e.g., cul‐de‐sacs), whereas in other cases incomplete graphs with small overlap (e.g., grids) are possible.     

Sraffa,Keynes and 'The Years of High Theory'

This paper argues that Shackle's interpretation of 'the years of high theory' is flawed. Shackle (1967) sees Sraffa's critique of the Marshallian theory of value only as a step in the development of the theory of imperfect competition. In the same vein, Shackle reduces the message of Keynes's General Theory to the claim that unemployment results from the existence of uncertainty and irrational expectations. Thus, Shackle leaves open the possibility that both Sraffa's critique of Marshall and Keynes's theory of effective demand do not question the internal coherence of neoclassical theory, but instead merely assert that market imperfections render it irrelevant for the analysis of the real world. This paper argues, in contrast, that the theories of Sraffa and Keynes should be interpreted as radical departures from marginalism, and represent a return to the surplus approach of classical political economy.     

TESTING THE BAUMOL–NORDHAUS MODEL WITH EU KLEMS DATA

Baumol's (1967 ) seminal model of structural change predicts that large service industries financed mainly through taxes and social contributions—like health care and education, for instance—will acquire ever‐larger shares of total expenditures and that, concomitantly, overall productivity growth will decline. Applying a new testing strategy for Baumol's model, Nordhaus (2008 ) finds strong evidence in favor of the “cost and growth diseases” in U.S. GDP‐by‐industry data (published by the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Economic Analysis). The aim of the present paper is twofold. The first is to check whether Nordhaus's results can be reproduced using U.S. industry data from the EU KLEMS database. Second, Nordhaus's testing methodology is applied to European Union data from the same database. The results suggest that—although there are differences vis‐à‐vis the U.S.—the EU also shows symptoms of “Baumol's diseases.”     

The Wicksell-Tobin investment model

We formalize in this paper Wicksell's investment decision model and compare it with Tobin's q-theory. Wicksell's firms either compare the natural rate of interest with the prevailing market interest rate or the capital values with the replacement costs of investment projects. This exposition of Wicksell's approach reveals some striking similarities with Tobin's supply-price-of-capital model, which relates the marginal efficiency of capital to the rate of return required by portfolio investors in the well-known q-ratio. The ratio market value to replacement cost of capital should, therefore, more appropriately be termed the Wicksell-Tobin q. Our formalization of Wicksell's investment theory appears to open up a promising new avenue for further research in cases where banks provide the source of funds.     

Spillovers,subsidies, and second‐best socially optimal R&D

This paper provides a thorough second‐best welfare analysis of the standard two‐stage model of R&D/product market competition with R&D spillovers. The planner's solution is compared to the standard non‐cooperative scenario, the R&D cartel, and the cartelized research joint venture (or joint lab). We introduce the notion of a social joint lab, as a way for the planner to avoid wasteful R&D duplication. With no spillovers, the non‐cooperative scenario, the joint lab, and the second‐best planner's solutions coincide. However, with spillovers, all three scenarios yield R&D investments that fall short of the socially optimal level. To shed light on the role of the spillover level on these comparisons, we observe that the gaps between the market outcomes and the planners solutions widen as the spillover parameter increases. Finally, we establish that a social planner and a social joint lab solutions may be achieved starting from any of the three scenarios by offering firms respective suitably weighted quadratic R&D subsidization schedules.     

Value and Exploitation: A counterfactual approach

A deconstruction of the Marxian theories of value and exploitation is attempted by arguing, first, that the labour theory of value is logically and methodologically inconsistent as a basis for a theory of capitalist exploitation and, second, that it is founded on an ontology of the social being which is not plausibly justified. A counterfactual model economy is then built, called Utopia, in which the workers receive the whole net output while commodities exchange at labour values. This model is used as a benchmark to evaluate a capitalist economy where commodities exchange at production prices and workers are exploited. It is shown that the factor of exploitation can be expressed as a ratio between the labour commanded by, and the labour contained in, the net output, or between the value added produced in a capitalist economy and that produced in Utopia. The resulting theory of exploitation entails a weak ontology of the social being, expressing a worker's point of view.     

CREDIBILITY AND RENEGOTIATION OF OUTCOME FUNCTIONS IN IMPLEMENTATION*

Recent research has been motivated by the fact that the outcome function in implementation may not be “credible”. On the one hand, the players may try to renegotiate the final outcome, if there is another outcome which they prefer. On the other hand, the “social planner” may have an incentive not to implement the finaloutcome, if there is another outcome which he prefers. I show that in the exchange economy, the first problem is not serious. a planner with unlimited commitment power can design a “collusion-proof” mechanism, which is stable against all sorts of group devciation, including the ex post trade of goods among the agents. I will, However, argue tha hte second problem (the planner's commitment problem) can be very serious.     

How did it all begin? Adam Smith on the early and rude state of society and the age of hunters

Abstract

Scholars tend to examine Smith's historical approach as a whole from the perspective of the four stages theory. This leads to a neglect of Smith's ability to use history in different ways as his different purposes require. This article distinguishes Smith's recourse to primitive society with respect to his purposes in Wealth of Nations and in Lectures on Jurisprudence. In the former, Smith analyses the capitalist economy, thereby laying emphasis on capital and the division of labour in his account of wealth. In the latter, he explains the evolution of institutions in order to challenge contractarian accounts of government.     

Bounded rationality,expectations, and child labour

This paper develops a model with overlapping generations, where the household's optimal fertility, child labour, and education decisions depend on the parents’ expectations or beliefs about the return to education. It is shown that there exists a range of parental income where the fertility rate is high and children participate in the labour market and receive an incomplete education if a parent believes the return to education is low. The act of participating in the labour market reduces the child's ability to accumulate human capital; thus, the action of sending a child into the labour market is sufficient to ensure that the parents’ initially pessimistic expectations are fulfilled. It is then shown that a one‐time policy intervention, such as banning child labour and mandatory education, can be enough to move a country from the positive child labour equilibrium to an equilibrium with no child labour.     

Inequality: The original economic sin of capitalism? An Evaluation of Thomas Piketty's "Capital in the twenty-first century"

This is a review article of Thomas Piketty's book “Capital in the twenty-first century”. Piketty promotes the old theme that, under capitalism, the rich tend to become richer and the poor become poorer, at least in relative terms. We consider whether the data really shows that wealth and income are becoming more concentrated; the role of income transfers (Piketty's data is for pre-tax and pre-transfer income) and other influences on inequality such as real estate prices; the implications of social and economic mobility; the role of the state in fostering inequality; and the determination of socially acceptable inequality. We conclude that Piketty has not succeeded in showing that the inequality r > g (the rate of return is greater than the rate of growth) is the principal determinant of inequality. Piketty offers neither an accompanying theory of social justice nor a theoretical framework to support his case. In particular, lacking is a revealed appreciation of the effects of high marginal tax rates on growth and efficiency.     

Implementation with partial provability

We extend implementation theory by allowing the social choice function to depend on more than just the preferences of the agents and allowing agents to support their statements with hard evidence. We show that a simple condition on evidence is necessary for the implementation of a social choice function f when the preferences of the agents are state independent and sufficient for implementation for any preferences (including state dependent) with at least three agents if the social planner can perform small monetary transfers beyond those called for by f. If transfers can be large, f can be implemented in a game with perfect information when there are at least two players under a boundedness assumption. For both results, transfers only occur out of equilibrium. The use of evidence enables implementation which is robust in the sense that the planner needs little information about agents? preferences or beliefs and agents need little information about each others? preferences. Our results are robust to evidence forgery at any strictly positive cost.     

Krishna Bharadwaj's “Return to Classical Theory”: an attempt towards an archaeological reconstruction

Abstract

In the wake of Sraffa's ‘return to classical theory’, Krishna Bharadwaj undertook a critical reassessment of Marshall's claim to continuity with classical theory in general and Ricardo's ‘intensive margin’ in particular. Her analysis is based on an analytical separation between two distinct ways of economic reasoning: the ‘surplus based’ and the ‘demand and supply based’ theories. Calling it an ‘archaeological reconstruction’ of the history of economic theories, I will examine how such an interpretation of theoretical shifts clarifies both the presuppositions behind analysing at the ‘margin’, and hence its radical departure from the conceptual content of the classical theory.     

Shackle on Equilibrium: A Critique

This paper presents a critical evaluation of Shackle's views on economic method. Shackle's arguments against equilibrium analysis are shown to apply to orthodox theory, which has subjectivist foundations, but not to the objectivist classical approach associated with Sraffa. The long-period equilibrium method is indispensable to the analysis of how market societies function. Moreover, since the classical theory contains no trace of the factor substitution mechanisms that underpin neoclassical orthodoxy, its explanations of distribution, employment and outputs must take explicit account of institutions, power and ethical norms. Thus there is no conflict between social economics and the method of the classical economists and Sraffa. On the contrary, the classical approach provides a rigorous framework for the investigation of the very issues that are at the center of institutional and social economics.     

When Do Opening Stock Returns Tend to be Higher?

Abstract

In this study, I make an effort to formulate a trading rule that would make use of some systematic interday patterns in individual stocks’ opening returns. I analyze intraday price data on all the stocks that were S&P 500 Index constituents during the period from 1993 to 2012. I document that if the general market direction of the previous day's opening session is controlled for, then a stock's opening return tends to be higher if, on the previous trading day, its opening return was relatively high (either positive, or higher than the same day's opening market return) and its open-to-close return was relatively low (either non-positive, or lower than or equal to the same day's open-to-close market return). Finally, for the sampling period, I construct two different investment portfolios involving a long position in the stocks on the days when, according to the findings, their opening returns are expected to be high and a short position in the stocks on the days when, according to the findings, their opening returns are expected to be low. Both portfolios are found to yield significantly positive returns, providing evidence for the practical applicability of the documented patterns in opening stock prices.     

Comparative Capitalisms,Ideational Political Economy and French Post-Dirigiste Responses to the Global Financial Crisis

This article advances the case for the more systematic incorporation of ideational factors into comparative capitalisms analysis as a corrective to the rational choice proclivities of the Varieties of Capitalism approach. It demonstrates the pay-off of such an ideationally attuned approach through analysis of French capitalist restructuring over the last 25 years, placing it in comparative context. A modus operandi for such ideational explanation is elaborated through delineating different national conceptions of the market, and setting out their impacts on practices of market-making. The claim made in this article is that understanding the evolution of French capitalism requires recognition of the ongoing market-making role of the French State, in combination with the French conception of the market and its embedding within a social context characterised by the inter-penetration of public and private elitist networks of France's ‘financial network economy’ which remains substantially intact. The ideational dimension is crucial because French understandings of the market and competition, the ideational building blocks of market-making, inform French state interventions and leave footprints on French institutions and market structures, and the evolutionary trajectory of French capitalism. In charting this trajectory, this article deploys the concept of post-dirigisme. We map out the parameters and causes of the post-dirigiste condition in France through examination of French bond market development, privatisation, the shift from a government- to a market- dominated financial system, and French capitalism's internationalisation. It then uses post-dirigisme to explain French state responses to the financial crisis and the banking bailout, noting how state actors, in concert with the banking elites, actively facilitated dominant market positions of French international champions.     

The wages‐and‐profits fund: Classical remnants in Marshall's early theory of distribution

Abstract

This paper traces the development of Marshall's theory of wages from the late 1860s to the publication of the first edition of the Principles of Economics (1890). Section one attempts to unravel Marshall's recollections of early intellectual influences, many of which were often distorted or wrong. Specifically, J. S. Mill's, Fleeming Jenkin's and J. H. von Thünen's influence on Marshall's early theory of distribution is explored in this context. In section two, analyses of Marshall's theory of wages in Economics of Industry (1879) and in other published writings is presented. This section draws attention to the similarity between Marshall's treatment of wages and the classical wage fund doctrine. In the final section, we re‐examine Marshall's defence of his theory of value and distribution in the Economics of Industry in the face of criticism of it by American economists S. M. MacVane and J. L. Laughlin in the Quarterly Journal of Economics.     

‘Catholic in its faith,Catholic in its manner of conceiving science’: French Catholic political economy in the 1830s

Abstract

This paper addresses a group of Catholic political economists in France in the 1830s, which was described by the Dublin Review as ‘Catholic in its faith, and Catholic in its manner of conceiving science’. A first section clarifies how contemporaries perceived this group. This is followed by an analysis of Villeneuve-Bargemont's Economie politique Chrétienne in order to outline a standard Catholic approach to political economy. Finally, that standard is used to chart the work of other Catholic economists within that group and to contrast it with the approach followed by other contemporary social political economists.