Let first-level supervisors do their job

Performing well as a first-level supervisor is like walking the circus high wire. In both positions, the ability to maintain one's balance when shifting forces pull in opposite directions is a measure of one's success. First-level supervisors must be able to harmonize the demands of management, the demands of the collective work force (often represented by unions), and the demands of workers with the requirements for doing the tasks at hand. These needs are more often than not conflicting and even at times mutually exclusive. First-level supervisors usually have mixed emotions about their situation and often lose their sense of identity as they try to perform this precarious balancing act. Today these supervisors are part of management, but chances are they were once among the employees they are now trying to supervise. Although first-level supervisors have the responsibility for implementing the goals of upper management, their organizational authority to carry out the necessary actions is frequently unclear and often insufficient. By allowing these lowest-level managers to use the levers of influence inherent in their position, higher-level managers will be improving the performance of the whole organization.     

The navigation of an iceberg: The optimal use of hidden orders

Market participants with large orders to execute are often reluctant to expose these to an open order book in their entirety in order to avoid a potential adverse market impact. Therefore, investors often split large orders into smaller tranches. Iceberg orders facilitate these trading practices by executing such business automatically in the order book. This article analyzes the rationale for the use of iceberg orders by assessing the costs and benefits of this trading instrument.     

Reading history: comment on Chenoweth and Feitelson

While Chenoweth and Feitelson have done a service to the futures community by comparing the Global 2000 Report with The Resourceful Earth-two important books of the late 1970s/early 1980s—their comparison is flawed in three dimensions: (1) they treat the books as though they were intended to be accurate predictions of the future. Their intention, instead, was to influence public policy in certain, often contrasting, directions; (2) by using in 2000 the same data sources the two books used in the 1970s (rather than better data sources available now, but not then), the authors' comparative conclusions are often flawed; and (3) in spite of this, their own conclusions often do not seem to follow from the comparative data they present: using only the data the two authors present, The Resourceful Earth does not appear to have been more ‘accurate’ in ‘predicting’ the year 2000 than was the Global 2000 report.     

Myopic loss aversion and stock investments: An empirical study of private investors

Myopic loss aversion was suggested by Benartzi and Thaler (1995) as an explanation for the equity premium puzzle. Its main prediction is that loss averse investors, who evaluate their investment performance too frequently and therefore often observe small losses on their stock portfolios, would invest too little in equity. We investigate the link between myopic loss aversion and actual investment decisions of individual investors, using survey data. Our results are consistent with the predictions of Benartzi and Thaler. Higher myopic loss aversion is associated with lower stock investment as a share of total assets. Investors tend to evaluate their stock portfolio performance too often, which contributes to the prevalence of myopic loss aversion. The effect of myopia is most apparent when investors both evaluate their portfolios frequently and trade stocks regularly.     

Competent jerks, lovable fools, and the formation of social networks

When looking for help with a task at work, people turn to those best able to do the job. Right? Wrong. New research shows that work partners tend to be chosen not for ability but for likability. Drawing from their study encompassing 10,000 work relationships in five organizations, the authors have classified work partners into four archetypes: the competent jerk, who knows a lot but is unpleasant; the lovable fool, who doesn't know much but is a delight; the lovable star, who's both smart and likable; and the incompetent jerk, who.. .well, that's self-explanatory. Of course, everybody wants to work with the lovable star, and nobody wants to work with the incompetent jerk. More interesting is that people prefer the lovable fool over the competent jerk. That has big implications for every organization, as both of these types often represent missed opportunities. Because they are liked by a disproportionate number of people, lovable fools can bridge gaps between diverse groups that might not otherwise interact. But their networking skills are often developed at the expense of job performance, which can make these employees underappreciated and vulnerable to downsizing. To get the most out of them, managers need to protect them and put them in positions that don't waste their bridge-building talents. As for the competent jerks, too often their expertise goes untapped by people who just can't put up with them. But many can be socialized through coaching or by being made accountable for bad behavior. Others may need to display their competence in more isolated settings. Intriguingly, managers aren't limited to leveraging people that others like and changing those that others loathe. They also can create situations in which people are more apt to like one another, whatever their individual qualities.     

Becoming the boss

Even for the most gifted individuals, the process of becoming a leader is an arduous, albeit rewarding, journey of continuous learning and self-development. The initial test along the path is so fundamental that we often overlook it: becoming a boss for the first time. That's a shame, because the trials involved in this rite of passage have serious consequences for both the individual and the organization. For a decade and a half, the author has studied people-particularly star performers-making major career transitions to management. As firms have become leaner and more dynamic, new managers have described a transition that gets more difficult all the time. But the transition is often harder than it need be because of managers' misconceptions about their role. Those who can acknowledge their misconceptions have a far greater chance of success. For example, new managers typically assume that their position will give them the authority and freedom to do what they think is best. Instead, they find themselves enmeshed in a web of relationships with subordinates, bosses, peers, and others, all of whom make relentless and often conflicting demands. "You really are not in control of anything, says one new manager. Another misconception is that new managers are responsible only for making sure that their operations run smoothly. But new managers also need to realize they are responsible for recommending and initiating changes-some of them in areas outside their purview-that will enhance their groups' performance. Many new managers are reluctant to ask for help from their bosses. But when they do ask (often because of a looming crisis), they are relieved to find their superiors more tolerant of their questions and mistakes than they had expected.     

Motivating salespeople: what really works

No sales force consists entirely of stars; sales staffs are usually made up mainly of solid perfomers, with smaller groups of laggards and rainmakers. Though most compensation plans approach these three groups as if they were the same, research shows that each is motivated by something different. By accounting for those differences in their incentive programs, companies can coax better performance from all their salespeople. As the largest cadre, core performers typically represent the greatest opportunity, but they're often ignored by incentive plans. Contests with prizes that vary in nature and value (and don't all go to stars) will inspire them to ramp up their efforts, and tiered targets will guide them up the performance curve. Laggards need quarterly bonuses to stay on track; when they have only annual bonuses, their revenues will drop 10%, studies show. This group is also motivated by social pressure-especially from new talent on the sales bench. Stars tend to get the most attention in comp plans, but companies often go astray by capping their commissions to control costs. If firms instead remove commission ceilings and pay extra for overachievement, they'll see the sales needle really jump. The key is to treat sales compensation not as an expense to rein in but as a portfolio of investments to manage. Companies that do this will be rewarded with much higher returns.     

The hospital capital crisis: issues for trustees

The erosion of the capital position in the hospital industry--one of the most complex and overregulated industries in the United States--is a major challenge to trustees. Hospital trustees have often neglected to examine their hospitals' capital needs on more than a project-by-project basis. In dealing with their hospitals' capital needs, trustees, most of whom are successful business people, too often take off their "business" hats and put on their "social worker" hats. In doing so they not only neglect to subject their hospitals' capital and operating programs to searching cost-benefit review, but they also overlook much useful knowledge about how to use corporate organization to shelter new ventures and strengthen their hospitals' market position and solvency. In this article, the authors discuss how hospitals can adopt successful corporate restructurings and strategies to respond to the adverse financial developments they will have to face in the coming years.     

Why Do Managers Explain Their Earnings Forecasts?

Managers often explain their earnings forecasts by linking forecasted performance to their internal actions and the actions of parties external to the firm. These attributions potentially aid investors in the interpretation of management forecasts by confirming known relationships between attributions and profitability or by identifying additional causes that investors should consider when forecasting earnings. We investigate why managers choose to provide attributions with their forecasts and whether the attributions are related to security price reactions to management earnings forecasts. Using a sample of 951 management earnings forecasts issued from 1993 to 1996, we find that attributions are more likely for larger firms, less likely for firms in regulated industries, less likely for forecasts issued over longer horizons, more likely for bad news forecasts, and more likely for forecasts that are maximum type. Furthermore, attributions are associated with greater absolute price reactions to management forecasts, more negative price reactions to management forecasts (forecast news held constant), and a greater price reaction per dollar of unexpected earnings. Our findings hold after control for the aforementioned determinants of attributions and after control for other firm‐ and forecast‐specific variables that are often associated with security prices.     

The end of risk communication as we know it

According to the US National Research Council, risk communication ought to be viewed as a dialogue among people conducted to help facilitate a more accurate understanding of risks and, related, the decisions they may make to manage them. But, in spite of this widely accepted perspective on risk communication, there is often a disconnect between how it is defined and how it is practiced. Rather than focusing on a true dialogue aimed at improving risk assessments and risk management decisions, risk communication is often viewed as means of simply educating people about existing risk assessments so that, on their own, they might make (or contribute to) better risk management decisions. More worrisome, risk communication is still often seen as a means of ‘correcting’ misconceptions about, or perceptions of, risk; in other words, risk communication is used as a vehicle for attempting to align lay perceptions with their expertly assessed severity. In this paper, I argue that risk communication must become more decision-focused if it is to meet the objectives set forth – in 1989 – by the US National Research Council.     

Excel in the accounting curriculum: perceptions from accounting professors

Public accounting firms emphasize the importance of accounting graduates being proficient in Excel. Since many accounting graduates often aspire to work in public accounting, a question arises as to whether there should be an emphasis on Excel in accounting education. The purpose of this paper is to specifically look at this issue by examining accounting faculty's perceptions of Excel in public accounting and accounting education. We survey 245 faculty members at over 100 accounting programs. We find that a majority of faculty incorporate Excel in their accounting classes consistent with their perception of Excel importance. However, we find that students are not fully proficient in Excel based on faculty's perceptions. This study contributes to the accounting education literature by identifying possible disconnections between Excel skills faculty include in the accounting curriculum and specific Excel skills faculty believe new hires (i.e. recent accounting graduates) most often use in public accounting.     

PROFESSIONAL SOCIALISATION, COMMERCIAL PRESSURES AND JUNIOR STAFF'S TIME-PRESSURED IRREGULAR AUDITING—A CONTEXTUAL INTERPRETATION

Research suggests a correlation between commercial concerns, time pressures and junior staff's ‘irregular auditing’ that results in audit failures. This article examines junior staff's irregular auditing in the context of trainees' normal auditing responsibilities and the specific nature of time pressures at their firms. The discussion recognises that omnipresent commercial concerns often leads to adoption of new audit methods that may militate against time pressures. Empirical evidence from in-depth interviews is used to highlight that firms that use risk-based auditing expect their trainees to help realise commercial gains by focusing audit work on areas where material misstatements could occur. The evidence shows that trainees do concentrate work on areas where material misstatements could occur. Acts that reduce audit quality occur in other areas and may often be seen by senior staff who may sanction extra work, if necessary. The article uses these findings to infer that junior staff do not have low regard for audit protocol.     

Ad spending: maintaining market share

Accuracy in manufacturers' advertising budgeting is hampered by reliance on the case rate system, which ties budgets to sales. A better measure is a brand's market share compared with its share of voice (the brand's share of the total value of the main media exposure in that product category). New brands are often "investing" in the market: speaking in a louder voice than their market shares would justify. Popular brands are often "profit taking"--keeping their voices low but enjoying a disproportionately large market share. The interrelationship between market share and share of voice, with either "investing" or "profit taking" the desired result, is not usually considered when determining ad budgets. But as advertisers realize how market share can respond to advertising pressure through switches in the share of voice, this method of market testing should gain in importance.     

Don't They Care? Or,Are They Just Unaware? Risk Perception and the Demand for Long‐Term Care Insurance

The potential need for long‐term care (LTC) is one of the greatest financial risks faced not only by the elderly but also by their adult children, who often provide care or financial assistance. We investigate adult children's role in the demand for LTC insurance. Similar to flood insurance, we find that demand for LTC insurance is low due to low risk perception. The more aware adult children are of the risk, the more likely LTC insurance is to be purchased, either by the children themselves on behalf of their parents or by the parents under the influence of their children.     

Breaking the trade-off between efficiency and service

For manufacturers, customers are the open wallets at the end of the supply chain. But for most service businesses, they are key inputs to the production process. Customers introduce tremendous variability to that process, but they also complain about any lack of consistency and don't care about the company's profit agenda. Managing customer-introduced variability, the author argues, is a central challenge for service companies. The first step is to diagnose which type of variability is causing mischief: Customers may arrive at different times, request different kinds of service, possess different capabilities, make varying degrees of effort, and have different personal preferences. Should companies accommodate variability or reduce it? Accommodation often involves asking employees to compensate for the variations among customers--a potentially costly solution. Reduction often means offering a limited menu of options, which may drive customers away. Some companies have learned to deal with customer-introduced variability without damaging either their operating environments or customers' service experiences. Starbucks, for example, handles capability variability among its customers by teaching them the correct ordering protocol. Dell deals with arrival and request variability in its high-end server business by outsourcing customer service while staying in close touch with customers to discuss their needs and assess their experiences with third-party providers. The effective management of variability often requires a company to influence customers' behavior. Managers attempting that kind of intervention can follow a three-step process: diagnosing the behavioral problem, designing an operating role for customers that creates new value for both parties, and testing and refining approaches for influencing behavior.     

Financial firm bankruptcy and systemic risk

Financial firm distress often leads to regulatory intervention, such as “too big to fail” (TBTF) policies. Two oft-cited channels to justify TBTF are domino effects (counterparty risk) and the effects of fire sales. We analyze the policy responses for avoiding systemic risk while considering the role of these two factors. Prior bankruptcies suggest that cascades caused by counterparty risk do not occur, as firms diversify their exposures. Instead, crises tend to be symptomatic of common factors in financial firms’ portfolios, which lead to widespread instances of declining asset values and which are often misinterpreted as resulting from fire sales.     

CEO Compensation in Financially Distressed Firms: An Empirical Analysis

This paper studies senior management compensation policy in 77 publicly traded firms that filed for bankruptcy or privately restructured their debt during 1981 to 1987. Almost one-third of all CEOs are replaced, and those who keep their jobs often experience large salary and bonus reductions. Newly appointed CEOs with ties to previous management are typically paid 35% less than the CEOs they replace. In contrast, outside replacement CEOs are typically paid 36% more than their predecessors, and are often compensated with stock options. On average, CEO wealth is significantly related to shareholder wealth after firms renegotiate their debt contracts. However, managers' compensation is sometimes explicitly tied to the value of creditors' claims.     

Auditor independence, self-interested behavior and ethics: some experimental evidence

Our paper presents the results obtained in a laboratory environment in which subjects revealed their beliefs about an uncertain state of the world and then participated in a simple task which required them to report on whether the report of a second party is consistent with the subjects’ beliefs. Because maintaining prior judgements (audit independence) which were in disagreement with the second party’s decision (a potential for a qualified audit opinion) were costly to the subject, a situation was created in which the subject might compromise her beliefs at a price. The results suggest that amoral, self-interested profit-maximizing behavior does not generally characterize the subjects in this experiment. Furthermore, subjects compromise their beliefs less often, i.e., breach independence, the higher their scores on a Defining Issues Test, but more often, the greater the cost of adhering to their beliefs.     

Upfront payments and exclusion in downstream markets

Although upfront payments are often observed in contracts between manufacturers and retailers, little is known about their competitive effects or the role retailers play in securing them. In this article, we consider a model in which two competing retailers make take‐it‐or‐leave‐it offers to a common manufacturer. We find that upfront payments are a feature of equilibrium contracts, and in all equilibria, only one retailer buys from the manufacturer. These findings support the claims of small manufacturers who argue that they are often unable to obtain widespread distribution for their products because of upfront payments.     

THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE CHOICE: NEW EVIDENCE FOR A DYNAMIC TRADEOFF MODEL

Most academic insights about corporate capital structure decisions come from models that focus on the trade-off between the tax benefits and financial distress costs of debt financing. But empirical tests of corporate capital structure indicate that actual debt ratios are considerably different from those predicted by the models, casting doubt on whether most companies have leverage targets at all. In particular, there is considerable evidence that corporate leverage ratios reflect in large part the tendency of profitable companies to use their excess cash flow to pay down debt, while unprofitable companies build up higher leverage ratios. Such behavior is consistent with a competing theory of capital structure known as the "pecking order" model, in which management's main objectives are to preserve financing flexibility and avoid issuing equity.
The results of the authors' recent study suggest that although past profits are an important predictor of observed debt ratios at any given time, companies nevertheless often make financing and stock repurchase decisions designed to offset the effects of past profitability and move their debt ratios toward their target capital structures. This evidence provides support for a compromise theory called the dynamic tradeoff model, which says that although companies often deviate from their leverage targets, over the longer run they take measures to close the gap between their actual and targeted leverage ratios.