Indexing government stock: A fund manager's view

Two major changes affecting local authorities in London are scheduled to be implemented in the next couple of years, namely the poll tax and the abolition of the Inner London Education authority. Some inner London authorities will be worse off as a result.     

Delegation and dynamic incentives

Using an agency model, we show how delegation, by generating additional private information, improves dynamic incentives under limited commitment. It circumvents ratchet effects and facilitates the revelation of persistent private information through two effects: a play‐hardball effect, which mitigates an efficient agent's ratchet incentive, and a carrot effect which reduces an inefficient agent's take‐the‐money‐and‐run incentive. Although delegation entails a loss of control, it is optimal when uncertainty about operational efficiency is large. Moreover, delegation is more effective with production complementarity. We also consider different modes of commitment to yield insights into optimal organizational boundaries.     

Literature section

Abstract

The goal of professional accounting education is to produce competent professional accountants capable of making positive contributions over their lifetimes to the profession and society in which they work. International Education Standards (IESs) establish global benchmarks for pre-qualification education and continuing professional development for professional accountants.     

The value of information and optimal organization

The article addresses the issue of optimal organization of production. I compare three organizational forms: centralization (one agent produces different inputs), decentralization (each of two agents produces a different input and contracts directly with the principal), and delegation (two agents produce different inputs, the principal contracts with one of them only). The optimal organizational form depends on the degree of complementarity/substitutability between the inputs in the final use. The degree of complementarity/substitutability also determines whether delegation is payoff equivalent to the two‐agent mechanism from the point of view of the principal. In the context of delegation, I consider which of the two agents should serve as the primary contractor. I also address the issue of collusion between the agents in a decentralized organization and characterize the conditions under which a stake of collusion exists.     

EVALUATING LOCAL MANAGEMENT OF SCHOOLS: METHODOLOGY AND PRACTICE

Under the Education Reform Act 1988, Local Education Authorities are required to delegate financial management to schools and are expected to evaluate their schemes. This paper reviews the continuing debate between positivist and naturalist evaluation methodologies. A taxonomy of evaluation methodologies is proposed and two LEAs' evaluations of school financial delegation schemes which predated the 1988 Act are assessed. These evaluations were weak in relation to both the positivist and naturalist techniques employed. The use of positivist and naturalist approaches in formative and summative evaluations of the 'merit' and 'worth' of LMS schemes is discussed.     

Designing domestic institutions for international monetary policy cooperation: A Utopia?

In a wide variety of international macroeconomic models monetary policy cooperation is optimal, non-cooperative policies are inefficient, but optimal policies can be attained non-cooperatively by optimal design of domestic institutions/contracts. We show that given endogenous institutional design, inefficiencies of non-cooperation cannot and will not be eliminated. We model the delegation stage explicitly and show that subgame perfect, credible contracts (chosen by governments based on individual rationality) are non-zero, but are different from optimal contracts and hence lead to inefficient equilibria. Optimal contracts require cooperation at the delegation stage, which is inconsistent with the advocated non-cooperative nature of the solution. A general solution method for credible contracts and an example from international monetary policy cooperation are considered. Our results feature delegation as an equilibrium phenomenon, explain inefficiencies of existing delegation schemes and hint to a potentially stronger role for supranational authorities in international policy coordination.     

Griffiths on community care

The Government's concern with community care found expression in the commissioning of Sir Roy Griffiths to prepare a report The result was a report which recommends more responsibility for local authorities than the Government has recently proposed in other fields. Some commentators question whether authorities will have the will or ability to deliver.     

Psychometric methods in accounting education: a review,some comments and implications for accounting education researchers

Psychometric instruments are widely used in accounting education research (Herring et al., Issues in Accounting Education, 4(1), 48–57, 1989; Benke and Street, Accounting Education: an international journal, 1(1), 33–45, 1992). Problems with the reliability of scores produced by such instruments have led to difficulties in interpreting the results of applied research (Schriesheim et al., Journal of Management, 19, 385–417, 1993). This paper has three aims. The first is to present a rationale for including information about the measurement properties of research instruments used in published accounting education research. Information regarding the reliability and validity of item scores is useful to readers, journal editors and reviewers - especially when the research topic addresses changes in educational policy and processes. Second, problems encountered with questionnairebased research are presented and current practice in accounting education is reviewed. Third, construct validation is discussed in respect of measurement validity and factor analytic methods. The paper concludes with suggestions for improving contemporary practice in accounting education research.     

The Goal Project: A Group Assignment to Encourage Creative Thinking,Leadership Abilities and Communication Skills

Abstract

The classroom assignment described in this paper, The Goal Project, gives students an opportunity to develop four of the skills and abilities required to be a successful accountant. In 1990, the Accounting Education Change Commission issued Position Statement Number One, Objectives of Education for Accountants. Appendix B of that statement contains eight categories of knowledge, skills, personal capacities and attitudes that are needed by accounting graduates. The Institute of Management Accountants has outlined the work of a management accountant to include working in small business teams and participating in strategic decision making. The project described in this paper replicates the work an accountant would perform when working in problem-solving teams. Data was collected and results are included from a questionnaire completed by 166 students who participated in The Goal Project. The results of perceived improvement in creative problem solving, leadership skills, and oral and written communication skills are presented.     

Justifying departmental expenditure programmes

In spite of the marketing ‘hype’ which surrounded the birth of its Enterprise Initiative, some genuine and worthwhile developments seemed to be taking root in the Department of Trade &; Industry. Time will tell whether the cultural and policy changes will outlive Lord Toung.     

Relational delegation

We analyze a cheap talk game with partial commitment by the principal. We first treat the principal's commitment power as exogenous and then endogenize it in an infinitely repeated game. We characterize optimal decision making for any commitment power and show when it takes the form of threshold delegation—in which case the agent can make any decision below a threshold—and centralization—in which case the agent has no discretion. For small biases, threshold delegation is optimal for any smooth distribution. Outsourcing can only be optimal if the principal's commitment power is sufficiently small.     

Working for patients: Making the internal market effective

To be effective, the internal market for health care involves a recognition that there are different types of market, each with its own characteristics. Written contracts can only go so far. There is also a need to create administrative infrastructures which will ensure that the different markets function effectively.     

T. B. Sprague

1. Introduction.

The object of this work is to show that the effective rate of interest of loans practically can be calculated with so great an accuracy that all practical demands regarding accuracy are more than satisfied. As will be seen from section 5, the effective rate of interest can be very quickly calculated by use of inverse linear interpolation for ordinarily occurring cases with a result which in general is correct with 3, 4 or more figures all according to practical demands. These methods can generally be used for all types of loans.     

Model Uncertainty and Delegation: A Case for Friedman's k-Percent Money Growth Rule?

Model uncertainty affects the monetary policy delegation problem. If there is uncertainty with regards to the determination of the delegated objective variables, the central bank will want robustness against potential model misspecifications. We show that with plausible degree of model uncertainty, delegation of the Friedman rule of increasing the money stock by k percent to the central bank will outperform commitment to the social loss function (flexible inflation targeting). The reason is that the price paid for robustness under flexible inflation targeting outweighs the inefficiency of money growth targeting. Imperfect control of money growth does not change this conclusion.     

Accounting education literature review (1991–1997), part I: Curriculum and instructional approaches

This paper updates the work of Rebele, Stout, and Hassell (A review of empirical research in accounting education: 1985–1991. Journal of Accounting Education, I, 167–231, 1991) and Rebele and Tiller (Empirical research in accounting education: A review and evaluation. In A. C. Bishop, E. K. St. Pierre and R. L. Benke (Eds), Research in Accounting Education, 1–54. Harrisonburg, VA: Center for Research in Accounting Education, James Madison University, 1996) by reviewing a subset of the accounting education literature published during the period 1991–1997. Specifically, we review articles (both empirical and nonempirical) related to the accounting curriculum and instructional approaches in accounting that were published in the following journals: Journal of Accounting Education, Issues in Accounting Education, The Accounting Educators' Journal, and Accounting Education: A Journal of Theory, Practice and Research. A second paper, Part II, will review articles published in these same journals during the period 1991–1997 on the topics of assessment, use of technology, students, faculty concerns, cases, and instructional resources.     

Welfare effects of information and rationality in portfolio decisions under parameter uncertainty

We analyse and quantify, in a financial market with parameter uncertainty and for a Constant Relative Risk Aversion investor, the utility effects of two different boundedly rational (i.e. sub-optimal) investment strategies (namely, myopic and unconditional strategies) and compare them with each other and with the utility effect of full information. We show that effects are mainly caused by full information and predictability, being the effect of learning marginal. We also investigate the saver's decision regarding whether to manage her/his portfolio personally (DIY investor) or hire, against the payment of a management fee, a professional investor and find that delegation is mainly motivated by the belief that professional advisors are, depending on investment horizon and risk aversion, either better informed (‘insiders’) or more capable of gathering and processing information, rather than possessing the ability to learn from financial data. In particular, for very short investment horizons, delegation is primarily, if not exclusively, motivated by the beliefs that professional investors are better informed.     

Contracting out of a state pension scheme

Abstract

The title of this paper is not common in actuarial literature, but the subject is one which has become familiar to every Briton in the last two years and which is essentially actuarial. The phrase "contracting out" has become English shorthand for an arrangement by which a private pension scheme may decide that it will not join a State pension scheme, usually because it already provides equal or better benefits. If the private scheme "contracts out" it will be excused the payment of contributions and will, of course, forgo the benefits.     

An introduction into Lundberg's theory of risk

Abstract

In this number of the journal a paper of Dr. Filip Lundberg is published, in which he thoroughly deals with certain problems of the theory of risk. As all the former works of Dr. Lundberg about the theory of risk with only one exception (the paper “Über die Theorie der Rückversicherung” in the transactions of the Congress of Actuaries in Wien 1909) are published in the Swedish language and consequently inaccessible to the international insurance world, a simultaneous report of some of the fundamental ideas in this former production perhaps will offer some interest. Though the latest paper follows a special line, the starting points and the manner of consideration are unaltered, and hence an aquaintance with the simpler problems which here will be dealt with will be rather illustrative.     

Delegation and sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance within business groups: Evidence from China

In emerging markets, companies are often organized into corporate groups in which the controlling shareholders control the member firms through stock pyramids and cross-shareholdings. We examine how the incentive for these controlling shareholders to maximize the value of groups results in less delegation of decision rights to the CEO of the member firm and, in turn, how such delegation affects the rate of CEO turnover in response to the financial performance measures reported by member firms. Our results suggest that delegation, measured as the extent to which controlling owners control the board of directors, is negatively associated with the interdependence of member firms. We also find that delegation weakens the sensitivity of the CEO-turnover rate to financial performance measures. These findings extend the literature by providing evidence on how delegation and management-incentive arrangements are jointly determined at the firm level.     

The pathfinder process in Northern Ireland

Government has many customers — not just the individual citizen, but also corporate customers from the private sector. Getting close to those customers will require changes in the nature of public sector culture. Below are two examples — the first from Northern Ireland and the second from Whitehall — of government departments which have tried to change the way in which they do things.