New development: Going off the rails? Rail franchising after the cancellation of the West Coast franchise competition

In August 2012, the UK's Department for Transport (DfT) announced the award of the new West Coast rail franchise to FirstGroup. The incumbent operator, Virgin Rail Group, then launched legal proceedings to challenge the decision. The DfT initially defended the award, but cancelled the franchise competition in October 2012 because it discovered serious errors in the procurement process. This article examines the key issues highlighted by this cancellation, and discusses their implications for the future of rail franchising.     

Ownership Structure as a Determinant of Firm Value: Evidence from Newly Privatized Czech Firms

Using a sample of 988 newly privatized Czech firms, with part of the ownership structure exogenously determined prior to voucher privatization, we find that share values are positively related with the ownership stakes of foreigners, insiders, and restituents. While the findings for foreigners and insiders can be attributed to their superior ability to identify more profitable firms, we interpret the findings on restituents as evidence of the beneficial effect of blockholdings. On the other hand, we find that the ownership of the fund with the largest stake is not significantly related with share value, suggesting that the value of external blocks depends on the identity of the owner. However, when the fund is also the largest blockholder in the firm, it has an adverse effect on share value. The negative effect of the dominant block owned by a fund is mitigated when a bank sponsors the fund. Although funds are legally separated from their sponsoring institutions, bank‐sponsored funds may nevertheless have inherited a better access to the innards of these firms, and may be in a better position to monitor them.     

The business risk audit: Origins, obstacles and opportunities

Is the business risk audit a better way to assess risks leading to focused audit testing, or is it simply a tool for generating opportunities to sell nonaudit services? Many feel strongly that the latter is more representative of the manner in which business risk audits were implemented. In this paper, I argue that the development of the business risk audit methodology in the 1990s was a complex process that arose naturally from the need to compensate for the commoditization of audits that occurred in the 1980s. The contemporaneous growth of risk management theories and processes provided a powerful perspective on which to base the re-engineering of the audit. However, the process of developing and implementing business risk audits was extremely difficult and may have run up against a number of unforeseen and unmanaged obstacles, particularly in regards to the existing rituals of the traditional audit. Given that the sales culture of consulting was taking hold among auditors at about the same time, it is possible that the well-intentioned efforts to revitalize the audit process were derailed by these difficulties and then diverted to support revenue growth via nonaudit services. When Enron and ensuing scandals occurred, questions arose as to whether the business risk audit was effective, or even appropriate. Regulatory initiatives that followed from the aftermath of Enron, such as an increased focus on management incentives for fraudulent reporting and greater in-depth analysis of internal controls, may provide a viable foundation for reconsidering business risk methods and melding the best of traditional substantive audits with the best of business risk auditing.     

Government Stakes as an Insurance Policy: Evidence from Seasoned Equity Offerings of Chinese Firms

While privatization has attracted much more attention in the literature, one type of reverse privatization, a privately-controlled firm inviting government ownership as its minority shareholders, is neglected in the literature. Using large-scale census firm data from China, we investigate the determinants of this kind of reverse privatization and its impact on firm performance. We find that (1) the decision of reverse privatization by Chinese private firms is affected by local political risk, firm-level financial characteristics, and industry-level characteristics, (2) the reverse privatization significantly affects the firm’s performance, which is measured in different proxies but the effects are not consistent, and (3) moreover, we find that the benefit of reverse privatization decreases as government ownership increases. Our results suggest that the prevalence of reverse privatization in China is a political outcome, which is affected by the trade-off of political risk and political privilege. Our work suggests that political risk and political considerations are the main driving factors of privatization, or its opposite, reverse privatization. Reverse privatization, to some extent, is a rational choice in some transition economies. Our findings offer clear policy implications to the nationalization phenomenon taking place around the world recently.     

Improving corporate governance where the State is the controlling block holder: evidence from China

This paper examines changes in values and returns for Chinese firms around announcements of block-share transfers among government agencies, State-owned enterprises and private investors. We find that transfers to all three types of investors result in positive abnormal returns around transfer announcements, even when the transfers do not create a new controlling block holder and when transfers are between State entities. We also find that transfers from State entities to private entities result in larger increases in value and returns than transfers between State-controlled entities – consistent with the superior incentives and expertise of private investors. We conclude that corporate governance can be improved at State-controlled firms by improving incentives and expertise of controlling block holders.     

Institutional ownership and credit spreads: An information asymmetry perspective

Recent literature has documented a link between institutional equity ownership (IO) and cost of debt capital, and interpreted it as a corporate governance effect. However, institutional equity investors may also affect cost of debt through their influence on information asymmetry condition of firms. To distinguish between the two effects, we break down institutional investors into different groups: transient institutional investors (TRA who are sensitive to information asymmetry but unlikely to participate in corporate governance, and the dedicated ones (DED) who act oppositely. Based on a most up-to-date and comprehensive bond data spanning the past 20 years, we find that credit spreads narrow (widen) with an increase in equity ownership by TRA (DED). The effects are most prominent among short-term bonds, bonds with lower ratings, higher leverage and higher volatilities. The results persist after controlling for potential endogeneity and other information asymmetry measures, and are unlikely due to an asset substitution effect. Overall, our findings provide strong support for the effect of information asymmetry on credit spread, and highlight the importance of distinguishing various types of institutional investors.     

所有制形式与社会化大生产

公有制和私有制都在尽可能的条件下，寻求与社会化大生产相统一、相协调的机会和可能，最大限度地促进生产力的发展。资本主义社会生产力发展的基本矛盾是生产资料私有制与社会化大生产的矛盾。而社会主义初级阶段社会生产力发展的基本矛盾可以说是单一的生产资料公有制与社会化大生产的矛盾。只有解决了这个矛盾，才能切实解放生产力，从而发展生产力。     

国有产权、会计稳健性与权益资本成本——来自中国证券市场的证据

以2007～2008年上市公司为样本,实证检验了会计稳健性和权益资本成本的关系,以及国有所有权对二者关系的影响。结果表明:会计稳健性与权益资本成本负相关,而国有所有权则削弱了会计稳健性在降低权益资本成本方面的作用。     

When does a public–private partnership (PPP) lead to inefficient cost management? Evidence from South Korea’s urban rail system

This paper investigates the impact of a public–private partnership (PPP) on the operational cost-efficiency of South Korea’s urban rail system. Seoul’s line 9, which is operated by a PPP, was compared with Seoul Metropolitan Rapid Transit (SMRT) which is entirely run by the public sector. Overall, no evidence was found that private operation led to clear and significant declines in costs to the public. Private shareholders, on the other hand, experienced a surprisingly high rate of return. The author explains why two characteristics defining a typical PPP—activity bundling and public–private risk-sharing—were behind this unintended outcome and makes suggestions to prevent other governments experiencing similar problems.     

Openness, profit opportunities and foreign banking

Using new data from the World Bank and OCC surveys, we show correlations across a wide range of countries between foreign banking and domestic economic, financial and bank regulatory conditions. Foreign banking tended to be more prevalent in countries that were more open to foreign ownership of their banks, more open to banks’ engaging in a wider range of financial activities and more open to international trade. Restrictions on foreign ownership of domestic banks that were in place in the late 1970s reduced the current extent of foreign banking. Foreign banking was negatively correlated with current restrictions on banks’ securities, insurance and real estate activities. Countries that had more international trade tended to have more foreign banking. Foreign banking was more pervasive in countries where banking was more profitable and where the domestically-owned banking sector was smaller relative to GDP.     

"所有制偏好论":国企改革深化的理论障碍

我国国有企业改革难以深化并取得实质性突破与进展,最深层次的原因不在技术与操作方面,而在于理论层面。"公有制偏好论"是我国国有企业改革深化最大的根本性障碍,而"私有制偏好论"又是国有企业改革深化的误区。夺取我国国有企业改革的胜利,必须从理论上实现从"所有制偏好论"到"所有制平等论"的根本转变。     

The politics of utility reform: a case study of the Ugandan water sector

The global pursuit of neoliberalist reforms has been a markedly political process resulting in a variety of outcomes. Using the case of the Ugandan water sector, the authors demonstrate that this political process is most pronounced when reforms lead to organizational changes and is less evident when private institutions are introduced.     

Employee stock ownership and the cost of capital

This paper investigates the relationship between employee stock ownership and the cost of capital, the main determinant of shareholder value creation computed through economic value added (EVA). By reducing agency conflicts within the firm, we hypothesize that employee share ownership reduces the firm’s cost of capital by affecting its two components, i.e. the cost of equity and the cost of debt. We test this hypothesis in France, a leading country in terms of employee ownership, based on a panel of the 120 largest listed companies for the 2000–2011 period. We find: (i) no significant relationship between employee stock ownership and the cost of equity; (ii) a negative curvilinear relationship between employee stock ownership and the cost of debt; (ii) a negative curvilinear relationship between employee stock ownership and the weighted average cost of capital. These results suggest debtholders regard ESO as positive as long it is moderate because it shifts risk from them to employees and that this effect is still perceptible in the weighted average cost of capital.     

Share‐pledging and the cost of debt

We examine how corporate insiders pledging their equity stakes to collateralise personal loans influences firm cost of debt. Pledging enables managers to diversify personal holdings, potentially increasing risk‐taking incentives. However, exposure to contingent risks creates potentially stronger risk‐reducing incentives. Using hand‐collected data with OLS, difference‐in‐differences, and instrumental variables models, we find significant decreases in yield spreads associated with executive share‐pledging. Reductions in spreads surrounding share‐pledge disclosures suggest investors update their risk assessment to reflect pledging managers’ risk‐taking incentives. Consistent with risk‐reducing incentives, firms with share‐pledging executives subsequently reduce leverage.     

“A deficient performance”: The regulation of the train operating companies in Britain's privatised railway system

This paper focuses on the performance and regulation of the train operating companies in Britain's privatised railway system. It places regulation in context by examining rail privatisation, with particular scrutiny given to the theory and practice of the franchising process which established these companies. The record of the regulatory authority is assessed up to the announcement in 2004 of its planned abolition. This assessment employs critical financial analysis, and draws on non-financial performance indicators, in order to examine the extent to which it achieved its five main objectives: increasing the number of rail passengers; managing franchises in the interests of passengers; encouraging efficiency and economy in the provision of passenger rail services; encouraging investment in rail services; and securing a progressive improvement in the quality of rail services. The paper concludes that the regulatory authority's performance was “deficient” as it only achieved the first of these objectives. It places this failure in context by highlighting the fundamental problem—the flawed concept of fragmenting and privatising a loss-making rail industry in the interests of British capitalism. The “stronger” regulation envisaged by the Blair Government is revealed as a smoke screen behind which there is a continuing transfer of wealth from taxpayers to the owners and providers of capital.     

Agency Problems and the Performance of Venture-backed IPOs in Germany: Exit Strategies,Lock-up Periods,and Bank Ownership

Abstract

The agency problems for initial public offerings are well documented in the literature. The objective of this research is to investigate the potential conflicts of interest for the ‘Neuer Markt’ in Germany. Of special interest are venture-backed IPOs and those in which banks acted as venture capitalist, underwriter, and provided analyst recommendations. High initial returns and outperformance are observed over the first 6 months of trading, which decreases significantly over the subsequent 18 months. The individual performance depends on the VC's underwriter and bank affiliation, exit behaviour, and lock-up commitment. Venture capitalists, and especially banks, timed their exit well. This indicates some serious agency problems in the German IPO market.     

State privatization and the unrelenting expansion of neoliberalism: The case of the Greek financial crisis

The existing literature has identified two waves of reforms within the neoliberal agenda of state privatization, deregulation and new public management. This study examines what we call the third wave of neoliberal reforms of governmentality, in which members of central governments and public servants increasingly come to think and behave like business entrepreneurs. We address the matter through the lens of crises theoretically capable of undermining neoliberalism's legitimacy. Specifically, we aim to better understand the manufacturing of consent to the neoliberal agenda of state privatization. We study the falsification of Greek public accounts as revealed in 2010, relying on empirical material, such as journalistic statements and reports from international institutions. Our analysis indicates that, although the Greek crisis provided an opportunity to question key aspects of contemporary state management, including the practice by governments of creative finance, the main problematizing trajectories articulated in both the media and political arenas did not destabilize but consolidated neoliberalism. In particular, we illustrate how discursive activity favors the emergence of a collective interpretation of crises that perpetuates the hold of neoliberalism over the social and political realms. In the discussion, we reflect on the consequences that this has for democratic processes.     

The Level and Stability of Institutional Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from Taiwan

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of shareholding stability of institutional investors on firm performance. We analyze 647 sample companies listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2009 using the coefficient of variance of institutional holding proportion as the measure for ownership stability. The empirical results show that increasing stability of institutional holdings is related to better firm performance. The low-risk and younger firms with higher CEO incentive compensation, larger insider holdings, and higher growth usually have better performance. Furthermore, when the long-term institutional shareholdings, particularly of foreign institutions, are higher, the firm performance is better.     

Institutional Ownership Type and Earnings Quality: Evidence from Iran

Institutional ownership is an important factor in corporate governance. Institutional investors play important roles in firms because of their substantial shareholdings and their capability to monitor managers. However, the question is whether they are capable of monitoring the managers. The literature has provided different evidence for the monitoring role of institutional investors. This study attempts to provide insights into the monitoring roles of institutional investors by examining the relationship between institutional ownership and earnings quality on the Tehran Stock Exchange. Institutional investors are classified into two groups, namely active institutional investors and passive institutional investors, based on their monitoring power in Iran. A multidimensional method is used to measure the various aspects of earnings quality, such as earnings response coefficient, predictive value of earnings, discretionary accruals, conservatism, and real earnings management. The results show that institutional ownership has a positive effect on earnings quality. Similar to total institutional ownership, active institutional ownership has positive effects on proxies of earnings quality. Nonetheless, passive institutional ownership does not have any power to affect earnings quality. Moreover, lead-lag tests of the direction of causality suggest that institutional ownership leads to more earnings quality and not the reverse.     

Majority and Minority Ownership of Publicly-Traded Firms: A Test of the Value of Control Using Market Multiples

Publicly-traded companies that are controlled by other publicly-traded companies provide a unique setting in which to test whether the market values of majority and minority ownership interests are proportionate to their ownership percentages. Test results indicate that the value of subsidiary net assets and net income are greater to majority shareholders than to minority shareholders. However, comparison of asset and income valuation with a sample of diffusely-held firms indicates that this valuation asymmetry is not due to a wealth transfer from the minority to the majority owners but to a discounting of the portion of the subsidiary owned by the minority shareholders.