Some History of the Debate on Educational Policy of Accountants in Australia

The Australian professional accounting bodies developed their present educational policies during the period prior to 1964 when two major reports were issued. This paper traces the development of those educational policies, but particularly the crystallization of the philosophy underlying the decision of the Australian Society of Accountants to adopt degree level entry in 1965. The Institute of Chartered Accountants followed suit some years later. This signalled the end of the traditional system of part-time technical training associated with work experience, and established full degree-level education as a pre-requisite for professional accountants.     

Bank privatization and productivity: Evidence for Brazil

Over the last decade, the Brazilian banking industry has undergone major and deep transformations with several privatizations of state-owned banks, mergers and acquisitions, closing down of troubled banks, entry by foreign banks, etc. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the impacts of these changes in banking total factor productivity. We first obtain measures of bank-level productivity by employing the techniques due to Levinsohn and Petrin [Levinsohn, J., Petrin, A., 2003. Estimating production functions using inputs to control for unobservables. Review of Economic Studies 70, 317–342]. We then relate such measures to a set of bank characteristics. Our main results indicate that state-owned banks are less productive than their private peers, and that privatization has increased productivity.     

Political connections and privatization: Evidence from China

We examine how the political connections of acquirers influence the process and outcomes of privatization in China. We find that politically connected acquirers receive preferential treatment and acquire higher quality firms during full privatization, and document evidence of post-privatization tunneling from target firms to acquirers. We show that the excessive tunneling by politically connected acquirers is associated with lower performance after privatization. Overall, our results suggest that individuals are likely to abuse their political connections to exploit the opportunities arising from privatization. We recommend that policymakers constrain the influence of political connections in the privatization process.     

Transforming frameworks of accountability: The case of water privatization

The U.K. Government's belief in the innate inefficiency of traditional public sector provision of goods and services has inspired a number of initiatives which have resulted in management of public sector enterprises being confronted by an increasingly commercial environment, tighter financial controls, increased competition, and in some cases transfer to the private sector through privatization. This paper is concerned with investigating the ways in which accounting and accounting information has contributed to and shaped processes of organizational change in one area of the public sector, the ten Regional Water Authorities of England and Wales. In the early 1980s, the Water Authorities were subject to pressures from new Government financial controls and performance aims to become more efficient. These pressures intensified when the Government announced its intention to privatize them in 1986, and continued up to 1989 when privatization took effect. Since privatization the Water Authorities have been subject to “yardstick” competition under a new regulatory framework, and comparative judgements by the financial markets. In considering these changes, the paper examines the constitutive role of accounting in articulating changing organizational priorities, and in promoting first a vocabulary of costs and subsequently a vocabulary of profits as languages of organizational motive.     

The economics of bank privatization

This paper surveys the empirical literature examining bank privatization. We begin by documenting the extent of, theoretical rationale for, and measured performance of state-owned banks around the world, and then assess why many governments have chosen to privatize their often very large state-owned banking sectors. The empirical evidence clearly shows that state-owned banks are less efficient than privately owned banks, and that state domination of banking imposes increasingly severe penalties on those countries with the largest state banking sectors. On the other hand, there is little in the empirical record to suggest that privatization alone transforms the efficiency of divested banks, especially when these are only partially privatized. Privatization generally improves performance, but by far less than is typically observed in studies of non-financial industries. An increasingly common outcome of large-scale bank privatization programs is foreign ownership of many nations’ banking sector, which evidence suggests is usually positive in an economic sense, but problematic politically.     

Bank privatization and performance: Empirical evidence from Nigeria

We assess the effect of privatization on performance in a panel of Nigerian banks for the period 1990–2001. We find evidence of performance improvement in nine banks that were privatized, which is remarkable given the inhospitable environment for true financial intermediation. Our results also suggest negative effects of the continuing minority government ownership on the performance of many Nigerian banks. Finally, our results complement aggregate indications of decreasing financial intermediation over the 1990s; banks that focused on investment in government bonds and non-lending activities enjoyed a relatively better performance.     

State ownership and stock liquidity: Evidence from privatization

We provide unique firm-level evidence of the relation between state ownership and stock liquidity. Using a broad sample of newly privatized firms (NPFs) from 53 countries over the period 1994–2014, our study identifies a non-monotonic association between state ownership and stock liquidity. The inverse U-shaped relation is consistent with trade-offs between costs and benefits of state ownership and suggests an optimal level of government shareholdings that maximizes stock liquidity of NPFs. We further identify that the inflection point from the cost/benefit trade-off is contingent upon characteristics of the nation's institutional environment.     

The productivity effects of privatization: The case of Polish cooperatives

This paper evaluates the productivity effects associated with privatization of producer cooperatives. The results, based on a sample of 2164 Polish cooperatives, indicate that privatized cooperatives have: (1) 1% lower total factor productivity (TFP) the year prior to privatization and 3-20% higher TFP in the year of privatization and three years post-privatization, (2) 9-36% higher labor productivity, (3) capital productivity effects of − 16-6%. The evidence is consistent with governance and incentive mechanisms of cooperatives being more effective outside of state interference, and with competition and hard budget constraints leading to pressure to restructure and adopt practices that improve productivity.