Capital control reconsidered: financialisation and economic policy

We consider capital controls and their impact on selected countries, providing a critique of IMF policy. We show how the warning signs of the 1970s were ignored and the consequences became apparent during the ensuing period of neoliberal hegemony. We contend that promoting increased capital mobility is counterproductive as it reduces macroeconomic ‘policy space’. We introduce a development of the international policy ‘trilemma’ in the form of a variant of the idea of the ‘quadrilemma’. We suggest that, in most cases, the key policy driving economic growth is fiscal policy but it may be that its unconstrained use (and that of monetary policy) is not possible either under fixed exchange rates or when free capital mobility exists; a nation may face a ‘demi-quadrilemma’. We contend that, in practice, a country can only adopt ‘two from four’; if it chooses to retain free use of monetary and fiscal policy, it must sacrifice both fixed exchange rates and capital mobility. We advocate the rejection of fixed exchange rates and free capital mobility allowing the retention of requisite monetary and fiscal policy space, and that a multinational approach to the capital control policy would effectively contribute to a growth and development strategy.     

How the ECB and the US Fed set interest rates

Monetary policies of the European Central Bank (ECB) and US Fed can be characterized by ‘Taylor rules’, that is both central banks seem to be setting rates by taking into account the ‘output gap’ and inflation. We also set up and tested Taylor rules which incorporate money growth and the euro–dollar exchange rate, thereby improving the ‘fit’ between actual and Taylor rule based rates. In general, Taylor rules appear to be a much better way of describing Fed policy than ECB policy. Simulations suggest that the ECB's short-term interest rates have been at a much lower level in the last 2 years compared with what a Taylor rule would suggest.     

A Case for Managed Exchange Rates*

The incorporation of adaptive expectations by Dornbusch in a Mundell-Fleming model modifies significantly the traditional results of policy effectiveness in a small, open economy. While monetary policy is still able to influence aggregate demand when flexible exchange rates prevail, the effects of this policy on other important variables in the economy during the adjustment process to a new equilibrium may be considered sufficiently ‘disruptive’ so that the authorities will be hesitant to use their only fully-effective policy instrument for income-stabilization purposes. However, by adding a target level for the exchange rate to their list of goal variables and by using an appropriate mix of monetary and fiscal policies, it appears to be possible for the government to avoid these disruptive side effects.     

Economic Growth,Terms of Trade and Welfare in an Open Monetary Economy*

The authors investigate the impact of growth on terms of trade, absolute prices and welfare using a two-country, monetary model. Under flexible exchange rates export-biased growth would lead to a decline in the terms of trade if the two countries are ‘similar’. Under fixed exchange rates a weaker condition than the barter condition of export-biased growth is sufficient, namely, for the import commodity the demand creating effect of growth dominates the supply effect while for the exported commodity the opposite holds. Secondly, substitutability between money and commodities indicates that no necessary relation holds between the terms of trade and the trade balance. Thirdly, the introduction of money creates a real balance effect so that decline in terms of trade is no longer a necessary (or sufficient) condition for immiserization. Finally, the paper concludes by questioning two policy conclusions drawn in earlier models: one, that the declining terms of trade of less developed countries was due to a bias in the growth strategy and, two, that monetary models of trade support the ‘monetarist’ proposition that growth and a deteriorating trade balance can only co-exist if the domestic monetary policy is nonneutral.     

The Bernanke and Blinder Model in an Open Economy: The Italian Case

Abstract. This paper analyzes the functioning of monetary policy transmission mechanisms in Italy from 1984 to 1998, highlighting the role performed by the credit system. We extend the Bernanke and Blinder model (1988) to the case of an open economy under a quasi‐fixed exchange rate regime, deriving analytically the conditions for the functioning of the three monetary policy channels generally identified in the literature (‘money’, ‘exchange rate’ and ‘credit’). These conditions explain the partial effectiveness of monetary policy in achieving price and income targets, while maintaining external equilibrium. By means of a structural VECM analysis, we evaluate the effectiveness of the transmission of monetary policy through the three channels.     

Optimal Currency Areas Scottish Economic Society/Royal Bank of Scotland Annual Lecture, 1999

Microeconomic efficiency and market transparency argue in favour of UK membership in EMU and for Scotland’s membership in the UK monetary union and also in EMU. UK seigniorage (government revenues from money issuance) would be boosted by EMU membership. Lender of last resort arrangements would not be substantially affected by UK membership in EMU. The UK is too small and too open to be an optimal currency area. The same point applies even more emphatically to Scotland. The ‘one‐size‐fits‐all’, ‘asymmetric shocks’ and ‘cyclical divergence’ objections to UK membership are based on the misapprehension that independent national monetary policy, and the associated nominal exchange rate flexibility, can be used effectively to offset or even neutralise asymmetric shocks. This ‘fine tuning delusion’ is compounded by a failure to understand that, under a high degree of international financial integration, market‐determined exchange rates are primarily a source of shocks and instability. Instead, opponents of UK membership in EMU view exchange rate flexibility as an effective buffer for adjusting to asymmetric shocks originating elsewhere. I know of no evidence that supports such an optimistic reading of what exchange rate flexibility can deliver under conditions of very high international financial capital mobility. The economic arguments for immediate UK membership in EMU, at an appropriate entry rate, are overwhelming. Monetary union raises important constitutional and political issues. It involves a further surrender of national sovereignty to a supranational institution, the ECB/ESCB. It is essential that this transfer of national sovereignty be perceived as legitimate by those affected by it. In addition, the citizens of the UK have become accustomed to a high standard of openness and accountability of their central bank since it gained operational independence in 1997. The ECB/ESCB must be held to the same high standard, and, while there are grounds for optimism, there still is some way to go there.     

The Influence of Household Financial Debt on Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy: France and Britain compared

The structure of household financial debt may have a major effect on the ability of governments to use monetary policy as a means of influencing exchange rate values. This is illustrated by a discussion of the comparative situation of France and Britain during the 1992–93 ‘crisis’ in the European exchange rate mechanism. The large volume of floating rate household debt in the UK placed a significant limitation on the ability of the UK authorities to use monetary policy. By contrast, the lower volume of mainly fixed rate household debt in France enabled the French authorities to make full use of monetary policy as desired in the pursuit of exchange rate targets. As modern financial markets are highly volatile, governments should take policy measures to create more stable structures of household debt.     

Over- and Underbidding in Central Bank Open Market Operations Conducted as Fixed Rate Tender

Abstract. Open market operations play a key role in allocating central bank funds to the banking system and thereby in steering short‐term interest rates in line with the stance of monetary policy. Many central banks apply so‐called ‘fixed rate tender’ auctions in their open market operations. This paper presents, on the basis of a survey of central bank experience, a model of bidding in such tenders. In their conduct of fixed rate tenders, many central banks faced specifically an ‘under‐’ and an ‘overbidding’ problem. These phenomena are revisited in the light of the proposed model, and the more general question of the optimal tender procedure and allotment policy of central banks is addressed.     

MONETARY CREDIBILITY VS. VOTER APPROVAL: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND EXCHANGE‐RATE STABILIZATION DURING CRISES

This paper analyzes how political institutions affect the execution of exchange‐rate policy. By focusing on policy‐makers' responses to the emergence of speculative pressure on their currencies, we argue that the effect of democratic institutions on exchange‐rate stability is likely to be conditioned by the officially announced exchange‐rate regime. Officially fixed exchange rates are the main instrument of autocrats to signal commitment to long‐term stability. Autocratic governments with strictly fixed exchange rates are thus more likely to defend their exchange rates than autocrats with an intermediate regime because the latter implicitly signal that they care less about monetary stability. In contrast, democrats defend more often in intermediately than in fully fixed official regimes by using a combination of external and internal adjustments, which reduce the negative effects of a devaluation on voters. Our analysis of 189 currency crises between 1975 and 1999 supports this conditional effect.     

Simple tests of target zones: the Irish case

In a small open economy with fixed exchange rates, tandard theory suggests that domestic inflation and interest rates should equal those abroad. In a credible target zone, the same theories suggest that inflation and interest rates should be ‘close’. Here, we seek to make precise this idea of limits on inflation and interest rate differentials consistent with limits on exchange rate movements. We then examine the case of Ireland, which joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979 attracted by the prospects of lower, German influenced, inflation and interest rates. We find in the early years of the ERM, both Irish inflation and interest rastes were inconsistent with credibility of the exchange rate regime; in he latter years, from 1987 on, rates were in the derived range around German rates.     

Managed Exchange Rates*

Managed exchange rates have become a tool of macroeconomic stabilization policy. Much of the previous emphasis on parametrically chosen exchange rate regimes has missed the advantages of a strategy of a variable target exchange rate when the central bank tries to maintain equilibrium output in the face of various shocks to the economy. Based on a standard IS-LM-AS macromodel, optimal combinations of exchange rate and money supply changes are found that insulate the economy against all stipulated shocks. However, these combinations vary from one shock to another; therefore recognition signals are necessary. Continuous information on some variables allows the central bank to identify shocks if they can be guaranteed to occur individually, but not otherwise. As a second-best strategy, ‘defensively managed exchange rates’ appear suitable. The paper also discusses some side effects and other practical difficulties of a managed exchange rate as an automatic stabilizer.     

UNEMPLOYMENT PERSISTENCE AND THE SUSTAINABILITY OF EXCHANGE RATE PEGS

It is commonly thought that an open economy can accommodate output shocks through either exchange rate or real sector adjustments. We formalize this notion by incorporating unemployment persistence into a two‐sided escape clause model of currency crises. We show that unemployment persistence makes a currency peg more fragile and undermines the credibility of the monetary authority in a dynamic setting. The fragility is captured by a devaluation premium in expectations that increases the average inflation rate when the currency peg is more vulnerable to ‘busts’ than ‘booms’. This interaction between macroeconomic and microeconomic rigidities suggests that a policy reform can only be consistent if it renders either exchange rates or the economy more flexible.     

A geometric approach to disequilibrium exchange rate fluctuations: The case of Switzerland

This article deals with the effects of exchange rate fluctuations in non-Walrasian macromodels. A demand driven model (‘Keynesian Unemployment’) and a supply driven model (‘Classical Unemployment’), both estimated on Swiss data, are alternatively considered. In each case an exchange rate modification and possible accompanying policy measures are considered. The feasible consequences on employment and the balance of trade are investigated by means of a geometric comparative static technique. For each type of fix-price equilibrium, the favourable conditions for a devaluation and a revaluation are thus emphasised.     

A cautionary note in using patterns of shocks to determine optimal exchange rate policy. An exploration of Nepalese and Indian exchange rate relations: 1964–1994

Nepal and India are developing countries in Asia whose (hard) peg has existed for almost forty years as well as no restriction on capital mobility between both countries. However, empirical results suggest that Nepal and India do not face symmetric patterns of shocks and are thus not suitable for a fixed exchange rate under this criteria. One possible explanation may be that the monetary authority plays some role in the short run to reduce the cost of the exchange rate regime. This suggests that some caution should be used in basing optimal exchange rate policy on this single criteria.     

Capital inflows, fiscal discretion, and exchange rate policy

Many writers have argued for the benefits of a credible fixed exchange rate (a hard peg) as a commitment device in an open economy. But historically, fixed exchange rates have often been associated with large current account deficits and episodes of ‘over-borrowing’. This paper develops a model of capital inflows that are linked to the exchange rate regime because of endogenous fiscal policy. The key message of the paper is that a hard peg is undesirable in the absence of commitment in fiscal policy. In face of a credible fixed exchange rate, the fiscal authority subsidizes capital inflows. The economy will engage in inefficiently high international borrowing, and in welfare terms may end up worse off than under capital market autarky. To eliminate the incentive to subsidize borrowing, the monetary authority must follow a flexible exchange rate rule in which capital inflows lead to exchange rate appreciation. If fiscal policy must be financed by money creation rather than direct taxation, then a fixed exchange rate rule may cause both over-borrowing and a subsequent exchange rate crisis.     

LINKAGES BETWEEN EXCHANGE RATE POLICY AND MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

Using a sample of 104 countries, we study macroeconomic performance from 1973 to 2007. We examine GDP growth, inflation rate, growth volatility and inflation volatility, and their response to a ‘words versus deeds’ measure of exchange‐rate policy, which is obtained by interacting a country's de jure and its de facto policy. For non‐industrialized countries, the highest growth rates and the lowest inflation volatility are associated with countries that pursue fear of floating policy, whereas countries that pursue a matched float policy (de jure and de facto floating) have the highest inflation rates but the lowest GDP volatility.     

Floating exchange rates versus a monetary union under rational beliefs: the role of endogenous uncertainty

Using the concept of ex-post optimality, we compare different exchange rate regimes, including floating exchange rates and fixed exchange rates with a Monetary Union in a two country OLG model with stochastic endowments. The emphasis of this comparison is on the welfare consequences of agents having incorrect beliefs. We do not assume that agents can hold any beliefs, but rather that their beliefs are rational that is consistent with the observed empirical behavior of the economy. We study a large set of possible policies, but two of them have our particular interest. The first policy implies devaluations in reaction to a negative shock, while the other implies a fixed exchange rate. These policies have very different consequences. The first will for generic beliefs not result in an ex-post optimal allocation. The other policy is on the other hand always feasible and results in an ex-post optimal allocation. When the two countries form a Monetary Union, the ex-post optimal allocation is also achieved. The meaning of “endogenous uncertainty” as an institutionally induced uncertainty is illustrated. Received: September 1, 2001; revised version: 24 June 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I would like to thank Horace W. Brock, Gianluca Cassese, Paula Orlando, Ho-Mou Wu as well as seminar participants at Copenhagen Business School, ESEM98, Keio University, Kyoto University, Osaka University, SITE (Stanford) and University of Copenhagen for many useful comments on the paper. I am also grateful to Mark J. Garmaise, Takako Fujiwara-Greve, and an anonymous referee for many helpful suggestions for improving the paper. Without the many discussions about Rational Beliefs and related issues I have had with Mordecai Kurz over the years, the research presented here would not have been possible. Financial support from The Carlsberg Foundation, Danish Social Research Council, University of Copenhagen and SITE is gratefully acknowledged.     

Asymmetric information and agenda control: The bases of monopoly power in public spending

A pervasive empirical finding, widely known as the ‘flypaper effect’, is that lump-sum intergovernmental grants generate considerably greater public spending by the recipient jurisdiction than would be predicted by equivalent shifts in personal income in that jurisdiction. Moreover, such observations are inconsistent with standard median voter models of the political process. We posit a model in which it is in the interest of suppliers of a collectively provided good not to generate full information to voters about outside aid. The empirical results are consistent with ‘flypaper’ and suggest that voters are very poorly informed about outside grants.     

A look at ‘overshooting’ in a two-tier float exchange rate system

This note examines the celebrated ‘overshooting’ hypothesis in the context of a two-tier float exchange rate regime. It is shown that monetary expansion leads to depreciation of both spot exchange rates and there is a presumption in favor of financial exchange rate ‘overshooting’.     

汇率-资本流动性的制度安排和财政-货币政策的有效性研究

笔者通过拓广的蒙代尔-弗莱明模型,并突破了传统的"三元冲突"汇率制度安排理论的研究路径,考虑引入资本流动性相对强度系数的概念,又在固定汇率制下引入"冲销"干预政策因素,提出了一个在固定和浮动汇率及不同资本流动性制度安排下财政-货币政策有效性指数曲线的新假说,对汇率-资本流动性制度安排对于宏观经济政策(财政-货币政策)综合有效性的影响问题做了一些较为深入的探讨.笔者认为,我国作为一个经济大国应尽可能地拥有宏观经济政策的自主权,考虑到我国当前金融市场体系尚不够完善,货币政策传导机制还存在严重障碍,所以在近期财政政策的权重应大于货币政策,从而在我国汇率制度改革过程中,为保留宏观经济政策的自主权,在加快放宽人民币汇率弹性的同时必须加强相应的资本管制.